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Edward Westermarck's Moral and Social Theory View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Helsingin yliopiston digitaalinen arkisto Morality Made Visible While highly respected among evolutionary scholars, the sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher Edward Westermarck is now largely forgotten in the social sciences. This book is the first full study of his moral and social theory, focusing on the key elements of his theory of moral emotions as presented in The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas and summarised in Ethical Relativity. Examining Westermarck’s evolutionary approach to the human mind, the author introduces important new themes to scholarship on Westermarck, including the pivotal role of emotions in human reciprocity, the evolutionary origins of human society, social solidarity, the emergence and maintenance of moral norms and moral responsibility. With attention to Westermarck’s debt to David Hume and Adam Smith, whose views on human nature, moral sentiments and sympathy Westermarck combined with Darwinian evolutionary thinking, Morality Made Visible highlights the importance of the theory of sympathy that lies at the heart of Westermarck’s work, which proves to be crucial to his understanding of morality and human social life. A rigorous examination of Westermarck’s moral and social theory in its intellectual context, this volume connects Westermarck’s work on morality to classical sociology, to the history of evolutionism in the social and behavioural sciences, and to the sociological study of morality and emotions, showing him to be the forerunner of modern evolutionary psychology and anthropology. In revealing the lasting value of his work in understanding and explaining a wide range of moral phenomena, it will appeal to scholars of sociology, anthropology and psychology with interests in social theory, morality and intellectual history. Otto Pipatti is a researcher in the Department of Social Research at the University of Helsinki, Finland. Classical and Contemporary Social Theory Series Editor Stjepan G. Mestrovic Texas A&M University, USA Classical and Contemporary Social Theory publishes rigorous scholarly work that re-discovers the relevance of social theory for contemporary times, demonstrat- ing the enduring importance of theory for modern social issues. The series cov- ers social theory in a broad sense, inviting contributions on both ‘classical’ and modern theory, thus encompassing sociology, without being confined to a single discipline. As such, work from across the social sciences is welcome, provided that volumes address the social context of particular issues, subjects, or figures and offer new understandings of social reality and the contribution of a theorist or school to our understanding of it. The series considers significant new appraisals of established thinkers or schools, comparative works or contributions that discuss a particular social issue or phenomenon in relation to the work of specific theorists or theoretical approaches. Contributions are welcome that assess broad strands of thought within certain schools or across the work of a number of thinkers, but always with an eye toward contributing to contemporary understandings of social issues and contexts. Titles in this series From the Peaceable to the Barbaric Thorstein Veblen and the Charro Cowboy Beatriz Aldana Marquez Morality Made Visible Edward Westermarck’s Moral and Social Theory Otto Pipatti Critical and Cultural Interactionism Insights from Sociology and Criminology Michael Hviid Jacobsen For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ sociology/series/ASHSER1383 Morality Made Visible Edward Westermarck’s Moral and Social Theory Otto Pipatti First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Otto Pipatti The right of Otto Pipatti to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis. com, has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-8153-4743-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-16916-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC Contents Acknowledgements vi List of abbreviations vii Introduction 1 1 Research programme on morality 8 2 The evolution of Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions 22 3 Westermarck’s mature account of morality 37 4 Sympathy in Westermarck’s sociology (I): evolutionary roots and expansion 62 5 Sympathy in Westermarck’s sociology (II): the genesis and maintenance of moral norms 72 6 The anatomy of moral responsibility 83 7 The origin and development of moral sentimentalism: Westermarck on Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume 99 8 The Smithian roots of Westermarck’s theory of morality 122 Concluding remarks 141 Bibliography 148 Index 167 Acknowledgements This book is the end result of research which began in the early days of my under- graduate studies. As this long toil is finally drawing to a close, I wish to express my gratitude to those involved. Heikki Sarmaja has been reading my writings for longest, and his comments have been extremely helpful for my work. Many years of ongoing conversations with Antti Lepistö have likewise been very valuable for my endeavours. I am very grateful to Petteri Pietikäinen and Niina Timosaari for their long-standing support. Erkki Kilpinen in his helpfulness, encouragement and unreserved attention has been of great support throughout my postgraduate career. Pekka Sulkunen’s understanding of Westermarck’s relevance to sociology contributed decisively to the realisation of the study. My partner Hilma Salonen’s assistance has been irreplaceable both in completing my doctoral thesis and creat- ing this book. Olli Lagerspetz, Camilla Kronqvist, Pertti Töttö and Juhani Ihanus have commented on my work in depth. Many thanks to Miialiila Virtanen, Jouni Ahmajärvi and Julia Dahlberg for much support along the way. An earlier ver- sion of Chapter 2 was published in Lagerspetz, O., Antfolk, J., Gustafsson, Y & Kronqvist, C. (Eds.) (2017). Evolution, Human Behaviour and Morality: The Leg- acy of Westermarck. London: Routledge. Abbreviations E Hume, D. (1978). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ER Westermarck, E. (1932). Ethical Relativity. London: Paul Kegan. HHM Westermarck, E. (1891). The History of Human Marriage. London: Macmillan. HHM I Westermarck, E. (1921). The History of Human Marriage vol. 1. London: Macmillan. HHM II Westermarck, E. (1921). The History of Human Marriage vol. 2. London: Macmillan. HHM III Westermarck, E. (1921). The History of Human Marriage vol. 3. London: Macmillan. MML Westermarck, E. (1929). Memories of My Life. New York: The Macaulay Company. ODMI I Westermarck, E. (1906). The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas vol. 1. London: Macmillan. ODMI II Westermarck, E. (1908). The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas vol. 2. London: Macmillan. T Hume, D. (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press. TMS Smith, A. (1982). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Lib- erty Fund. All references to archive materials, unless stated otherwise, are to Edward West- ermarck Collection at Åbo Akademi University Library, Manuscript and Picture Unit Collections. Introduction This book offers an overall interpretation of the Finnish sociologist, anthropolo- gist and philosopher Edward Westermarck’s (1862–1939) moral and social theory. The study has two main aims. First, it lays out the key features of Westermarck’s theory of how people make moral judgements, the nature of emotions in which these judgements are based, and the psychological and social elements influenc- ing them. At the same time, this study shows that Westermarck’s moral theory is an ambitious and wide-ranging analysis of the fundamentals of human social behaviour and social reality. By combining these moral-psychological and soci- ological aspects of Westermarck’s work, this book reconstructs his understand- ing of emotions, and the different forms of emotional contagion in particular, as the fundamental elements of human sociality. The second aim of this book is to explore Westermarck’s thought in the context of his main sources of inspiration, enabling a better understanding of his work. Westermarck’s theory of morality is based on a combination of eighteenth-century British moral philosophy, Darwin- ian evolutionism and the comparative method employed as a means of tracing resemblances and differences between different cultures and societies as well as human and animal behaviour. In this regard, this study highlights the importance of Darwinian evolutionary theory to the different aspects of Westermarck’s pro- ject. In addition, it demonstrates how Westermarck’s theory of moral emotions developed out of, and in response to, David Hume’s and Adam Smith’s
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