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The Moral Self: a Review and Integration of the Literature The IRIOP Annual Review Issue Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/job.1919 The moral self: A review and integration of the literature PETER L. JENNINGS1*,†, MARIE S. MITCHELL2† AND SEAN T. HANNAH3 1Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California, U.S.A. 2Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, U.S.A. 3School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, U.S.A. Summary The role of the self in moral functioning has gained considerable theoretical and empirical attention over the last 25 years. A general consensus has emerged that the self plays a vital role in individuals’ moral agency. This surge of research produced a proliferation of constructs related to the moral self, each grounded in diverse theoretical perspectives. Although this work has advanced our understanding of moral thought and behavior, there has also been a lack of clarity as to the nature and functioning of the moral self. We review and synthesize empirical research related to the moral self and provide an integrative framework to increase conceptual coherence among the various relevant constructs. We then discuss emerging opportunities and future directions for research on the moral self as well as implications for behavioral ethics in organizational contexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Keywords: moral self; moral identity centrality; moral judgment disposition; self-conscious moral orientation; self-conscious moral emotions; moral strength; moral functioning The corruption and scandals that have plagued organizations in recent years have prompted significant interest in the study of ethical work behavior. Accounting for human moral functioning and behavior, however, has proven to be a complex and difficult problem. Initial research relied heavily on Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive moral development theory, which emphasizes the importance of moral reasoning to explain ethical behavior. Indeed, research has shown that cognitive moral development predicts moral behavior (see Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006 for a review) but that the strength of these effects varies considerably and is modest at best (Blasi, 1980). This weak and inconsistent relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior is known as the “judgment–action gap” (Walker, 2004, p. 1). This judgment–action gap motivated the search for more comprehensive theoretical frameworks in which moral psy- chologists (e.g., Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004) and, recently, organizational behavior ethics researchers (e.g., Treviño et al., 2006), have focused on the moral self as the key to explaining the complexity of human moral functioning. We propose that a deeper understanding of what constitutes the moral self, and its development is essential to advancing research on ethical behavior in morally complex and challenging organizational contexts. Scholarly interest in the moral self traces back to Aristotle who expounded a holistic concept of the moral self grounded in character and virtue (Solomon, 1992). Yet, it was only after Blasi (1983) introduced his “self model” of moral functioning that the topic gained momentum. Blasi sought to bridge the judgment–action gap by proposing that moral action results from the integration of morality into one’s sense of self (e.g., Erikson, 1964). A person has a moral self to the extent that moral notions (e.g., moral values, ideals, goals, and concerns) are central to self- understanding (Blasi, 1993), which motivates felt responsibility to behave consistent with those notions. Blasi’s model has proven to be foundational for moral self theory and launched the post-Kohlbergian era of scholarly work (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). A surge of research followed (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). However, this work is not integrated into a holistic framework, *Correspondence to: Peter L. Jennings, Leavy School of Business, Department of Management, Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA 95053, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected] †Note that these authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally. Received 02 May 2012 Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Revised 10 December 2013, Accepted 10 December 2013 P. L JENNINGS ET AL. which has created ambiguity about the nature of the moral self. Reviews (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008) and edited books (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009) have consolidated some aspects of this literature, but a review surveying empirical research and its significance to ethical behavior in organizations is lacking. Our review seeks to bring clarity to the state of knowledge about the moral self and provide directions for future research. We begin with an overview of the theory of the moral self and review empirical work that has explicitly examined the moral self as a focal construct. Our goals are to capture the main empirical findings associated with the moral self that are relevant to organizations and synthesize these findings into an integrative framework. We also discuss emerging opportunities and future research directions, with an emphasis on the implications for the nature of the moral self and its functioning in organizational contexts. Theory of the Moral Self Moral self research is based on the Aristotelian premise that morality is a characteristic of a person and not simply a result of abstract moral reasoning (Blasi, 1993; Solomon, 1992). Morality is understood to be at the heart of what it means to be a person (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). The moral self is concerned with the morality of selfhood (the qualities by virtue of which a person is oneself) that implicates both who a person is (a person’s sense of self and identity based on deeply felt concerns, commitments, and attachments) and how a person acts (a person’s character- istic ways of thinking, feeling, and regulating behavior; Baumeister, 1987; Solomon, 1992). These ideas follow an ontological tradition in moral philosophy and psychology, which posit that the self involves both a private dimen- sion rooted in the core of one’s being and a public dimension manifested in an orientation to be true to oneself in action (Erikson, 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; James, 1892/2001; Schlenker, 1980; Solomon, 1992). Thus, moral self research has focused on explaining (i) how morality is internalized into a person’s sense of self, which we refer to as the “having” side of the moral self, and (ii) how that internalized morality influences cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities that govern decisions and behavior, which we refer to as the “doing” side of the moral self. The “having” side of the moral self is cognitively and socially constructed (Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). Social construction occurs through roles, practices, and interpersonal interactions within the social-moral context in which a person is embedded, such as family, community, or organization (Harter, 1999; Hunter, 2000). Cognitive construc- tion occurs through individuals’ beliefs about their self (i.e., self-concepts and identities) on the basis of social interactions that bring meaning to their experiences (Harter, 1999). When these socially and cognitively constructed beliefs are based on morality, a person is understood as “having” a moral self. The “doing” side of the moral self emerges when these moral beliefs invoke self-relevant cognitions, evaluations, emotions, and regulatory processes that motivate moral action (Aquino & Freeman, 2009). The “doing” side under- scores the executive agency of the self to take responsibility, make decisions, initiate actions, and exert control over itself and the environment (Baumeister, 1998). Without this executive function, the moral self would be a “mere helpless spectator of events, of minimal use or importance” (Baumeister, 1998, p. 680). Cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities are essential to agency, governing nearly all the self’s activities, especially those concerning morality (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1996). As such, the “doing” side of the moral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998). In sum, this “having” and “doing” conceptualization of the moral self implies that the moral self is not a stand- alone construct or variable but is a complex amalgam of moral constructs and processes, wherein self-defining moral beliefs, orientations, and dispositions implicate cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities essential to moral action. This holistic understanding reflects an emerging trend in both moral psychology (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009) and self psychology more generally (Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Consistent with these ideas, Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job THE MORAL SELF we define the moral self as a complex system of self-defining moral attributes involving moral beliefs, orientations, dispositions, and cognitive and affective capacities that engage regulatory focus toward moral behavior. Review of Empirical Research on the Moral Self To be as comprehensive of the published empirical work as possible, we searched abstracts of published articles appearing in EBSCO and ABI Inform
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