The Moral Self: a Review and Integration of the Literature

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h RO nulRve Issue Review Annual IRIOP The Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/job.1919 The moral self: A review and integration of the literature

PETER L. JENNINGS1*,†, MARIE S. MITCHELL2† AND SEAN T. HANNAH3 1Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California, U.S.A. 2Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, U.S.A. 3School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, U.S.A.

Summary The role of the self in moral functioning has gained considerable theoretical and empirical attention over the last 25 years. A general consensus has emerged that the self plays a vital role in individuals’ moral agency. This surge of research produced a proliferation of constructs related to the moral self, each grounded in diverse theoretical perspectives. Although this work has advanced our understanding of moral thought and behavior, there has also been a lack of clarity as to the nature and functioning of the moral self. We review and synthesize empirical research related to the moral self and provide an integrative framework to increase conceptual coherence among the various relevant constructs. We then discuss emerging opportunities and future directions for research on the moral self as well as implications for behavioral ethics in organizational contexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Keywords: moral self; moral identity centrality; moral judgment disposition; self-conscious moral orientation; self-conscious moral emotions; moral strength; moral functioning

The corruption and scandals that have plagued organizations in recent years have prompted signiﬁcant interest in the study of ethical work behavior. Accounting for human moral functioning and behavior, however, has proven to be a complex and difﬁcult problem. Initial research relied heavily on Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive moral development theory, which emphasizes the importance of moral reasoning to explain ethical behavior. Indeed, research has shown that cognitive moral development predicts moral behavior (see Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006 for a review) but that the strength of these effects varies considerably and is modest at best (Blasi, 1980). This weak and inconsistent relationship between moral judgment and moral behavior is known as the “judgment–action gap” (Walker, 2004, p. 1). This judgment–action gap motivated the search for more comprehensive theoretical frameworks in which moral psychologists (e.g., Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004) and, recently, organizational behavior ethics researchers (e.g., Treviño et al., 2006), have focused on the moral self as the key to explaining the complexity of human moral functioning. We propose that a deeper understanding of what constitutes the moral self, and its development is essential to advancing research on ethical behavior in morally complex and challenging organizational contexts. Scholarly interest in the moral self traces back to Aristotle who expounded a holistic concept of the moral self grounded in character and virtue (Solomon, 1992). Yet, it was only after Blasi (1983) introduced his “self model” of moral functioning that the topic gained momentum. Blasi sought to bridge the judgment–action gap by proposing that moral action results from the integration of morality into one’s sense of self (e.g., Erikson, 1964). A person has a moral self to the extent that moral notions (e.g., moral values, ideals, goals, and concerns) are central to self- understanding (Blasi, 1993), which motivates felt responsibility to behave consistent with those notions. Blasi’s model has proven to be foundational for moral self theory and launched the post-Kohlbergian era of scholarly work (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). A surge of research followed (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). However, this work is not integrated into a holistic framework,

*Correspondence to: Peter L. Jennings, Leavy School of Business, Department of Management, Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real, Santa Clara, CA 95053, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected] †Note that these authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally.

Received 02 May 2012 Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Revised 10 December 2013, Accepted 10 December 2013 P. L JENNINGS ET AL. which has created ambiguity about the nature of the moral self. Reviews (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008) and edited books (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009) have consolidated some aspects of this literature, but a review surveying empirical research and its significance to ethical behavior in organizations is lacking. Our review seeks to bring clarity to the state of knowledge about the moral self and provide directions for future research. We begin with an overview of the theory of the moral self and review empirical work that has explicitly examined the moral self as a focal construct. Our goals are to capture the main empirical findings associated with the moral self that are relevant to organizations and synthesize these findings into an integrative framework. We also discuss emerging opportunities and future research directions, with an emphasis on the implications for the nature of the moral self and its functioning in organizational contexts.

Theory of the Moral Self

Moral self research is based on the Aristotelian premise that morality is a characteristic of a person and not simply a result of abstract moral reasoning (Blasi, 1993; Solomon, 1992). Morality is understood to be at the heart of what it means to be a person (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). The moral self is concerned with the morality of selfhood (the qualities by virtue of which a person is oneself) that implicates both who a person is (a person’s sense of self and identity based on deeply felt concerns, commitments, and attachments) and how a person acts (a person’s characteristic ways of thinking, feeling, and regulating behavior; Baumeister, 1987; Solomon, 1992). These ideas follow an ontological tradition in moral philosophy and psychology, which posit that the self involves both a private dimension rooted in the core of one’s being and a public dimension manifested in an orientation to be true to oneself in action (Erikson, 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; James, 1892/2001; Schlenker, 1980; Solomon, 1992). Thus, moral self research has focused on explaining (i) how morality is internalized into a person’s sense of self, which we refer to as the “having” side of the moral self, and (ii) how that internalized morality influences cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities that govern decisions and behavior, which we refer to as the “doing” side of the moral self. The “having” side of the moral self is cognitively and socially constructed (Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). Social construction occurs through roles, practices, and interpersonal interactions within the social-moral context in which a person is embedded, such as family, community, or organization (Harter, 1999; Hunter, 2000). Cognitive construction occurs through individuals’ beliefs about their self (i.e., self-concepts and identities) on the basis of social interactions that bring meaning to their experiences (Harter, 1999). When these socially and cognitively constructed beliefs are based on morality, a person is understood as “having” a moral self. The “doing” side of the moral self emerges when these moral beliefs invoke self-relevant cognitions, evaluations, emotions, and regulatory processes that motivate moral action (Aquino & Freeman, 2009). The “doing” side under- scores the executive agency of the self to take responsibility, make decisions, initiate actions, and exert control over itself and the environment (Baumeister, 1998). Without this executive function, the moral self would be a “mere helpless spectator of events, of minimal use or importance” (Baumeister, 1998, p. 680). Cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities are essential to agency, governing nearly all the self’s activities, especially those concerning morality (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1996). As such, the “doing” side of the moral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998). In sum, this “having” and “doing” conceptualization of the moral self implies that the moral self is not a stand- alone construct or variable but is a complex amalgam of moral constructs and processes, wherein self-defining moral beliefs, orientations, and dispositions implicate cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities essential to moral action. This holistic understanding reflects an emerging trend in both moral psychology (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009) and self psychology more generally (Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Consistent with these ideas,

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job THE MORAL SELF we deﬁne the moral self as a complex system of self-deﬁning moral attributes involving moral beliefs, orientations, dispositions, and cognitive and affective capacities that engage regulatory focus toward moral behavior.

Review of Empirical Research on the Moral Self

To be as comprehensive of the published empirical work as possible, we searched abstracts of published articles appearing in EBSCO and ABI Inform databases, using search terms derived from our moral self definition and further targeted studies referring to one of the terms “moral” or “ethic.” Our review of the empirical research reveals five categories of moral self constructs (moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, self-conscious moral orientation, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength), which we depict in an emergent process model of the moral self (Figure 1). Below, we describe the five categories of moral self constructs and then summarize empirical work examining them. Our review describes research that empirically tested the specific constructs that fit within our moral self definition and does not include results of correlates outside of these moral self variables.

Emergent moral self constructs

The five categories of moral self constructs are as follows: (i) moral centrality (the degree to which morality is pivotal to one’s self-understanding; e.g., moral identity and moral self-concept); (ii) moral judgment disposition (the stable tendency to take a specific moral perspective in decisions and action; e.g., ethical ideology and ethical predisposition); (iii) self-conscious moral orientation (an orientation to perceive and reflect on moral implications of one’s experiences; e.g., moral attentiveness and moral sensitivity); (iv) self-conscious moral emotions (the degree to which

Figure 1. Synopsis of empirical work on the moral self

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job P. L JENNINGS ET AL. morality evokes evaluative and affective aspects of the self; e.g., guilt, shame and pride); and (v) moral strength (the degree to which morality is an enduring quality that provides the capacity and conation [impetus to act] to achieve moral ends; e.g., moral potency and moral character). Constructs associated with moral centrality have received the most research attention in emergent moral self theory. Constructs included in the other four categories are less researched and less frequently associated with moral self theory but nonetheless capture important aspects of the moral self. In particular, constructs associated with moral judgment disposition and self-conscious moral orientation tend to emphasize the “having” side, as they involve the internalization of morality into a person’s sense of self and identity. Constructs associated with self-conscious moral emotions and moral strength emphasize the “doing” side, or moral agency. Although these ﬁve categories are not likely all-inclusive, they are the most prevalent in the literature. We describe each category and the constructs aligned within them.

Moral centrality A large body of research has explored how central morality and being a moral person are to one’s self-concept (Table 1). Although a number of constructs and labels for moral centrality have emerged (e.g., moral identity and moral self-concept), each involve the degree to which moral qualities, concerns, commitments, or goals are significant definitional components of the self. Much of this literature on moral centrality (approximately 70 percent of the empirical work) has adopted Aquino and Reed’s (2002) concept of moral identity,defined as “a self-conception or- ganized around a set of moral traits” (p. 1424). Consistent with the having and doing bases of the moral self, their approach offers two moral identity dimensions: internalization (or the degree to which moral traits, such as being caring, compassionate, and fair, are central to one’s self-concept) and symbolization (or the degree to which such moral traits are reflected in choices and actions). The internationalization dimension aligns with the “having” side of the moral self, whereas the symbolization dimension aligns with the “doing” side of the moral self.

Moral judgment disposition Moral judgment disposition refers to how morality is internalized into a person’s self-concept to form a distinct moral perspective that informs moral judgments. We review three types of moral dispositions: (i) ethical ideology (Forsyth, 1980), (ii) ethical predisposition (Brady & Wheeler, 1996), and (iii) moral communion (Schwartz, 1992) (Table 2). Each of these constructs derives from different philosophical and theoretical traditions. For instance, ethical ideology describes a tendency to adopt ideal or relative principles in moral decisions (Forsyth, 1980). Idealism reflects a “right” course of action—an absolute ethical solution—in all situations. Relativism reflects a consideration for contextualizing ethical judgments and action choices. These two axis create four “types” of ethical ideologies: (i) situationism (relying on context analysis to assess morally questionable actions), (ii) absolutism (relying on universal moral principles), (iii) subjectivism (relying on personal values), and (iv) exceptionism (understanding exceptions apply, instead of moral absolutes). Alternatively, Brady and Wheeler (1996) proposed that ethical predispositions represent ethical “lenses,” or the tendency to rely on utilitarianism or formalism in decisions. Utilitarianism reflects a reliance on considering consequences in ethical processing, whereas formalism reflects a reliance on rules, principles, and guidelines. Last, in his work on cultural values, Schwartz (1992) proposed that individuals may hold a tendency to advance the interests of others, called a moral communion.

Self-conscious moral orientation Self-conscious moral orientation refers to the internalization of moral notions that invokes a sensitivity or responsiveness to moral implications in ethical and moral issues (Morton, Worthley, Testerman, & Mahoney, 2006; Reynolds, 2006; Sparks & Hunt, 1998). We review research related to two self-conscious moral orientations: moral sensitivity and moral attentiveness (Table 3). Moral sensitivity represents a general orientation toward moral implications on the basis of past decisions and behaviors (Morton et al., 2006; Sparks & Hunt, 1998). Moral attentiveness is “the extent to which one chronically perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experiences” (Reynolds, 2008, p. 1028). Reynolds (2008) found that there are two dimensions of moral attentiveness:

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Table 1. Empirical work on moral centrality. Antecedents of Moral self Other variables Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) studied on outcomes of the moral self

Aquino and Neutralization Experiment; 192 Moral attributes (Z) Psychological Neutralization Becker (2005) strategies, MBA students distress (IV) -Minimization self-concept Ethical climate (IV) -Denigration theory, theories Moral of the self consequences (IV) Lying (IV)

Aquino Social-cognitive Study 1: Experiment; Internalization moral Moral prime (IV) Intention to donate et al. (2009) theory (SCT), 92 undergraduate identity (Z) Financial prime (Z) money theories of self, business students Reward size (Z) Intention to lie and moral identity Study 2: Experiment; Feedback on others’ 55 undergraduate choices (Z) business students Study 3: Experiment; 224 undergraduate business students Study 4: Experiment; 33 undergraduate business students

Aquino Theories of Study 1: Experiment; Moral identity Acts of uncommon Prosocial behavioral et al. (2011) emotion (moral 436 undergraduate -Internalization (IV) goodness (Z) intentions elevation) students -Symbolization (IV) Moral elevation (M) Prosocial behaviors and the self Study 2: reﬂection -Money allocation (self-regulation survey; 443 Ipsos -Donations and moral identity) panelists Study 3: Experiment; 63 undergraduate students Study 4: Experiment; 129

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. undergraduate students H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: Aquino and SCT, theories of Study 1: Instrument Moral identity Volunteerism Reed (2002) self, and moral development; EFA -Internalization (IV) Intrinsic identity sample: 363 -Symbolization (IV) satisfaction to undergraduate students; volunteering

(2014) CFA sample: 347 alumni, working adults (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self TAL. ET Study 2: Convergent Perceived validity: 124 freedom of undergraduate students volunteering Study 3: Nomological and Depth of discriminant validity: 55 involvement to master’s student. volunteering Study 4: Cross-sectional, Donation single-source survey behavior study; 160 high school students Study 5: Cross-sectional, single-source survey study; 330 undergraduate students Study 6: time-lagged, single-source survey study; 145 high school students

Aquino Theories of self, Study 1: Reﬂection-based Internalization moral Moral Intent to punish et al. (2007) neutralization, cross-sectional, single- identity (Z) disengagement (IV) wrongdoer moral source survey study; 104 Negative disengagement university employees emotions Study 2: Experiment; 69 undergraduates, administrative staff, and community members of NE U.S.A.

Barriga Theories of moral Cross-sectional survey; Moral self- Moral Antisocial .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. et al. (2001) judgment and 193 undergraduate relevance (IV) judgment (IV) behavior moral self-concept students Self-serving cognitive O:10.1002/job DOI: distortion (IV) Gender (IV) (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self

Brebels Theories of the Study 1: Experiment; 68 Moral identity Regulatory focus Procedural et al. (2011) self, self- undergraduate students (internalization and -Promotion- justice regulation, and Study 2: Cross-sectional, symbolization focused (Z) enactment moral identity single-source survey; 270 combined) (IV) -Prevention- organizational supervisors focused (Z) Study 3: Cross-sectional, single-source survey with multiple sources (focal and coworker); 103 employee–coworker matched dyads

Caldwell and Theories of moral Scenario-based Moral identity Ethical culture (IV) Moral Moberg (2007) imagination, the experiment; 164 (internalization and imagination self, and moral undergraduate students symbolization identity combined) (Z)

Christensen, Theories of self Time-lagged, single- Moral self-concept (IV) Self-concept Neglect of Brayden, (self-esteem and source survey; 609 dimensions (IV) birthed child Dietrich, self-concept) women who received -Physical Physical abuse McLaughlin, prenatal care at a hospital -Personal of birthed child and Sherrod -Family (1994) -Social Total conﬂict (IV) Social identity (IV) Self-satisfaction (IV) Maladjustment (IV) Psychosis (IV) Personality disorder (IV) .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. Neurosis (IV) Deviant signs (IV) Defensive H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: positive (IV) Integration index score (IV) (2014) (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P.

Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the

Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self AL. ET

Conway and Theories of moral Study 1 only: Scenario- Internalization moral Empathy (IV) Deontological Gawronski judgment and based experiment; 112 identity (IV) Perspective inclination (2013) disassociation undergraduate students taking (IV) Utilitarian Need for inclination cognition (IV) Faith in intuition (IV) Religiosity (IV)

Conway and Theories of moral Scenario-based Moral identity vs. Personal Donation Peetz (2012) licensing and the experiment; 151 American immoral identity (IV) identity (Z) intention moral self Mechanical Turk participants

Côté et al. Theories of Scenario-based survey: Moral identity Emotional Prosocial (2011) emotion regulation, 131 undergraduate (internalization and regulation behavior the self, and moral students symbolization knowledge (Z) identity combined) (IV)

Daniels et al. SCT, theories of Cross-sectional, single- Moral identity Ethical culture (Z) Ethical (2011) self, and self- source scenario-based Internalization (IV) sensitivity consistency survey; 155 working Symbolization (IV) adults (recruited from Ethical sensitivity (DV) Craigslist and current and recent MBA and MA graduates)

DeCelles et al. Theories of power, Study 1: Scenario-based Internalization moral Power (IV) Self-interested .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. (2012) self-interest, the experiment; 173 working identity (Z) behavior self, and moral adults (recruited from identity Qualtrics.com) O:10.1002/job DOI: Study 2: Experiment; 102 undergraduate students (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self

Detert et al. SCT, theories of Multi-wave (3 time periods), Internalization moral Empathy (IV) Unethical (2008) moral single-source survey; 307 identity (IV) Trait cynicism (IV) decision making disengagement, business and education moral agency, the undergraduate students Change in locus self, and moral of control (IV) identity Internal locus of control (IV) Power locus of control (IV) Moral disengagement (M)

Doron et al. Theories of self, Study 1: Experiment; 43 Moral self- Self-relevant Physical (2012) self-perception, undergraduates perceptions (IV) information (Z) contamination and cognitive Study 2: Experiment; 150 concerns theory community participants Study 3: Experiment; 86 community participants

Frimer and Theories of self- Multi-wave (3 time periods), Moral centrality Moral behavior Walker (2009) interest, the self, single-source survey and -Communal (coded) moral centrality, interview (coding procedures for values (IV) and moral some variables); 191 students -Agentic values (IV) judgment recruited from public posting in student clubs

Grubisic and Time-separated, single-source Country status Ethical values (DV) Ethical values Goic (1998) survey; 2248 undergraduate (in transition students from 24 institutions or not) .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. from 14 countries

(Continues) H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P.

Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self AL. ET

Hardy et al. Theories of Cross-sectional, single- Parenting style Moral identity Social (2010) psychological source survey; 1059 high -Responsiveness (IV) -Symbolization (IV) dominance distance, the self, school students -Autonomy -Internalization (IV) orientation and moral identity granting (IV) Circle of moral -Demandingness (IV) regard

Hardy et al. Theories of social Cross-sectional, single- Religious Internalization moral Empathy (2012) control, the self, source survey; 502 commitment (IV) identity (M) Aggression moral identity, and secondary school students Religious moral cognitions involvement (Z)

Haynes (1990) Theories of self Cross-sectional, single- Moral self-concept (IV) Self-concept Classroom and self-concept source survey; 60 teachers dimensions (IV) behavior of 142 randomly selected -Physical Group middle school children -Personal participation -Family Attitude toward -Social authority

Johnston and Theories of Vignette-style interview; Moral self-concept (IV) Moral norm Antisocial Krettenauer emotion, the self, 205 adolescents regarded behavior (2011) and moral self emotions (IV) Moral norm Prosocial disregarded behavior emotions (IV)

Jordan et al. Theories of self- Recollection-based, cross- Recalled (coded) Moral identity .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. (2011) completion, social sectional, single-source moral behavior -Internalization (IV) cognition, the self, survey; 61 MBA students -Symbolization (IV) and moral identity O:10.1002/job DOI:

Kavussanu et al. Theories of the Experiment, using Internalization moral Evoked emotion Startle reaction (2012) self, moral identity, emotive pictures; 94 identity (IV) (pleasant, Pain-related (2014) and emotion athletes unpleasant, and reaction neutral) (Z) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self

Kochanska, Theories of Time-lagged, multi-source Fear (IV) Moral self (DV) Moral self Gross, Lin, and socialization, the surveys/interviews (coded Mother’s power- Guilt (IV) Nichols (2002) self, and self- observations); 112 assertive discipline (IV) development mothers with their newborn children (recruited via an ad in the community)

Kochanska et al. Theories of the Longitudinal study of Moral self (IV) Internalization of Socialization (2010) self, self- two-parent families with mother and father development, and infants (recruited via ad in rules (IV) moral self community), assessments Empathetic made at 25, 38, 52, 67, concern for each and 80 months. Across parent (IV) each, N varied from 43 to 100 families. Observations coded

Kouchaki Theories of self, Study 2 only: Scenario- Credentials of Internalization moral Willingness to (2011) self-concept, and based experiment; 190 applicant (IV) identity (IV) express moral self undergraduate students Ethnicity of prejudice applicant (IV)

Krettenauer and Moral emotions Cross-sectional, single Self-importance of Context type Guilt Johnston (2011) theory and source, scenario-based moral values (IV) -Prosocial Pride principles of survey; 155 teenagers, Guilt (DV) action (IV) Other emotions moral self grades 7 through 11, with Pride (DV) -Temptation (IV) (embarrassment, a sample of 50 -Antisocial (IV) fear, sadness, undergraduate students happiness, .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. anger, and satisfaction)

Positive or SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: negative emotion

(Continues) (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 1. (Continued) Antecedents of Moral self Other variables Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) studied on outcomes of the moral self

(IV)

Kurpis et al. Theories of moral Scenario-based, cross- Religiosity Commitment to Importance of AL. ET (2008) judgment, the sectional, single- moral self- ethics moral self, and source survey; 242 improvement (IV) Ethical problem moral commitment undergraduate recognition students Ethical behavioral intentions

Lee et al. (2008) Goal theory, theory Cross-sectional, Moral values (IV) Competence Prosocial attitude of planned single-source survey; values (IV) Antisocial attitude behavior 491 secondary school Task orientation (M) students from school Ego orientation (M) or club competitions

Lu and Chang Theories of self, Scenario-based, cross- Moral self-concept (IV) Self-consciousness (Z) Intention to help (2011) moral self, and sectional, single- without beneﬁtto self-deception source survey; 160 the self undergraduate students

Mayer et al. Theories of social Study 1: Multi-source, Leader moral identity Unit-level perceived Unethical behavior (2012) learning, moral cross-sectional -Internalization (IV) ethical leadership (M) Relational conﬂict identity, and social survey; employees -Symbolization (IV) cognition and supervisors from the same work unit recruited via convenient sampling technique; data for 137 departments (range of 1–5 employees within .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. each department) but included only units with 3+ response sets; O:10.1002/job DOI: ﬁnal N = 115 Study 2: Same design/ procedure as Study 1; 195 departments (with (2014) 891 employees and 195 supervisors) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Table 1. (Continued) Antecedents of Moral self Other variables Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) studied on outcomes of the moral self

McCuddy Theories of self Scenario-based, Student cheating (IV) Ethical self- Ethical self- (2007) and self- cross-sectional, Ethical norms of enhancement (DV) enhancement enhancement single-source cheating (Z) survey; 388 Other students’ undergraduate approval of cheating (Z) students

McFerran et al. Theories of moral Study 1: Cross- Moral identity Moral personality Ethical (2010) personality, the sectional, single- -Internalization (IV) (conscientiousness, ideology (Study1DV) self, and moral source survey; 52 -Symbolization (IV) agreeableness and Citizenship identity female employees of Ethical openness to behavior mid-sized speech ideology (Study 1 DV) experience Propensity to therapy services combined) (IV) morally disengage organization Ethical Study 2: Cross- ideology (Study 2 M) sectional, single- source survey; 145 undergraduate students

Michaelidou and Scenario-based, Ethical self-identity (IV) Food safety Intent to purchase Hassan (2008) cross-sectional, concern (IV) organic food single-source Health survey; convenient conscientiousness (IV) sample of 222 Organic food shoppers attitude (M)

O’Fallon and Theories of Cross-sectional, Internalization moral Coworkers Observers’ .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. Butterﬁeld cognitive moral single-source identity (Z) organizational organizational (2011) development and survey; 655 deviance (IV) deviance

social information undergraduate Need for SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: processing students afﬁliation (Z) Introversion (Z) Negative relationships (Z) (2014) (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Antecedents of Moral self studied on Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes of the moral self TAL. ET Patrick and Theories of Multi-source survey Parental discipline (IV) Moral identity (DV) Moral identity Gibbs (2012) socialization, the design (); 102 -Induction Perceived fairness self, and moral adolescents and their -Power assertion Experience guilt identity mother participated -Love withdrawal Positive/negative emotion

Perugini and Theories of Study 1: Implicit moral self- Honesty– Cheating behavior Leone (2009) moral Experiment; 46 concept (IV) humility (IV) Moral temptation development undergraduates intention and judgment, Study 2: Scenario- Moral evaluations and implicit based experiment; personality 112 individuals

Pratt et al. Theories of Time-lagged, single- Community Moral qualities of Moral qualities of (2003) socialization and source survey; 896 involvement (IV) self-ideal (DV) self-ideal moral reasoning high school students Parental moral emphasis (Z)

Rancer et al. Theories of the Cross-sectional, Moral self-esteem (IV) Effectance (IV) Verbal aggression (1992) self (self-esteem single-source Social self- and moral self- survey; 132 esteem (IV) concept) undergraduate Body image (IV) students Defensive self- enhancement (IV)

Reed and Theories of the Study 1/Sample 1: Moral identity In/out-group (IV) Circle of moral Aquino (2003) self (moral self- Cross-sectional, -Internalization (IV) American regard .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. concept and single-source -Symbolization (IV) identity (IV) Willing to self-protection) survey; 137 Response type (IV) exchange and moral undergraduate resourcesPerceived O:10.1002/job DOI: identity students worthiness Study 1/Sample 2: Willingness to Time-lagged, single- donate Perceptions source survey; 55 of acceptable (2014) MBA students deaths Moral evaluation oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright

Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Antecedents of Moral self studied on Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes of the moral self

Study 2: Scenario-based, single-source survey study; 75 undergraduate students Study 3: Scenario-based, single-source, multi-wave design, where data were collected 5 weeks apart in 3 phases; 58 undergraduate students Study 4: Scenario-based experiment, 2-wave design, where data were collected 2 months apart; 85 undergraduate students

Reed et al. Theory of the self Study 1a: Scenario-based, Moral identity Charitable Moral evaluation (2007) and moral identity cross-sectional, single-source -Internalization (Z) behavior of Donation survey; 242 undergraduate -Symbolization (Z) company (IV) preference students Corporate giving Donation intention Study 1b: Scenario-based type (time or Charitable giving experiment; convenient money) (IV) Cheating behavior sample of 58 undergraduate Position status (IV) students, administrative staff, Moral and local community organization (IV) residents Study 2: Cross-sectional, single-source survey; 274 full-time alumni .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. Study 3: Scenario-based experiment; convenient

sample of 179 undergraduate SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: students, administrative staff, and local community residents (2014) (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Antecedents of Moral self studied on Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes of the moral self TAL. ET Reynolds (2008) Study 1: Item Moral attentiveness Correlates development for moral -Perceptual (IV) (Study 2) attentiveness measure: -Reﬂective (IV) -Normlessness cross-sectional, single- Moral identity (DV) -Nurturance source survey; 123 -Moral identity undergraduate students -Agreeableness Study 2: Validity -Conscientiousness evidence: 241 Moral behavior undergraduates Moral awareness Study 3: Cross-sectional, single-source survey; 242 managers recruited from StudyResponse. com Study 4: Cross-sectional, single-source survey; 159 MBA students Study 5: Cross-sectional, single-source survey; 74 undergraduates and 81 MBAs

Reynolds and Theories of moral Study 1: Cross-sectional, Moral identity Consequentialist Ceranic (2007) judgment, moral single-source survey; -Internalization (Z) moral judgment (Z) Charitable giving self, and moral 226 undergraduate -Symbolization (Z) Formalist moral Cheating behavior identity students judgment (Z) Behavioral intention Study 2: Cross-sectional, single-source scenario- based survey; 292

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. managers employed in a variety of organizations recruited through

O:10.1002/job DOI: StudyResponse.com (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright

Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self

Rosenberg Theory of moral Scenario-based, cross- Moral values (IV) Business goals (IV) Ethical (1987) values, personality sectional, single-source behavioral survey; 142 undergraduate intentions students

Rosenbloom Theories of self Cross-sectional, single- Moral self-concept (IV) Gender (Z) Reported et al. (2009) and self-concept source survey; 100 dangerousness undergraduate students of driving

Rupp and Bell Theories of deontic Experiment and coding Moral self-regulation Retributive Punishing a (2010) justice, moral self- design; 156 undergraduate motives (IV) motives (IV) harmdoer regulation, and students Self-interested self-interest motives (IV) Equality motives (IV) Sachdeva et al. Theory of moral Study 1: Experiment, Positive moral traits Donation (2009) self-regulation recall survey with a (e.g., internalization behavior coding design; 46 moral identity Cooperative undergraduate students traits) (IV) behavior Study 2: Experiment, Negative moral recall survey with a trait (IV) coding design; 39 undergraduate students Study 3: Experiment, Neutral moral trait (IV) recall survey with a coding design; 46 undergraduate students

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. Sage et al. Theories of the Cross-sectional, single- Internalization moral Task goal Prosocial (2006) self, moral identity, source survey; 210 male identity (IV) orientation (Z) functioning and goal football players, recruited Ego goal Prosocial

(Z) SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: orientation from clubs and orientation judgments competitions Antisocial functioning Antisocial

(2014) judgments (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self TAL. ET Skarlicki and Dual processing Scenario experiment; Symbolization moral Supervisor Retaliatory Rupp (2010) theories, deontic 185 managers enrolled in identity (Z) mistreatment (IV) intentions justice, theories of an executive MBA Experiential or the self, and moral program rational prime (Z) identity

Skarlicki et al. Retaliation and Cross-sectional, single- Moral identity Customer Job performance (2008) deontic justice source survey that -Internalization (Z) interpersonal principles, theories adopted critical incident -Symbolization (Z) injustice (IV) of the self, and technique; performance Customer-directed moral identity was provided by human sabotage (M) resources of the company; 358 customer service representatives employed in a call center

Stets and Carter Theories of the self Study 1: Cross-sectional, Internalization moral Task ability (Z) Perceptions of (2011) and moral identity single-source survey; identity (IV) immoral 545 undergraduate Moral identity behavior students discrepancy (IV) Positive/ Study 2: Experiment; negative with same students as emotion Study 1

Stets and Carter Control systems Time-lagged, single- Moral identity Moral Guilt (2012) approach of source survey; 369 -Internalization (IV) meanings (IV) Shame identity theory undergraduate students -Symbolization (IV) Feelings rule (IV) Guilt (DV) Moral identity .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. Shame (DV) discrepancy (M) Moral behavior (M) O:10.1002/job DOI: Van der Wal and Cross-sectional, single- Employer type (public Moral self-image (DV) Moral self- de Graaf (2006) source survey; 778 or private sector) (IV) image managers from public

(2014) organizations and 500 managers from private organizations oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Table 1. (Continued) Antecedents of Moral self Other variables studied Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) on outcomes of the moral self

Vitell et al. Self-regulation Cross-sectional, Religiosity Moral identity Moral identity (2009) theory, theories of single-source -Intrinsic (IV) -Internalization (DV) -Internalization self-control, the survey; 110 -Extrinsic (IV) -Symbolization (DV) -Symbolization self, and moral undergraduate identity students

Vitell et al. Moral justiﬁcation Cross-sectional, Moral identity Institutionalization Moral justiﬁcation (2011) and rationalization single-source -Internalization (IV) -Implicit (IV) principles, theories survey; 205 business -Symbolization(IV) -Explicit (IV) of the self, and practitioners Religiosity moral identity recruited from a -Intrinsic (IV) random sample of -Extrinsic (IV) 2500 from a national commercially provided mailing list

Weichun Transformational Study 1: 672 Transformational Moral identity (DV) Moral identity et al. (2011) leadership theory, participants from leadership theories of the self research panel Transactional and moral identity (Zoomerang.com); leadership 336 cases used to test exploratory factor structure of moral identity measure; 336 cases used to test predictions Study 2: Scenario- based experiment; .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. 215 teachers from several public school systems participated H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: in web-based experiment

(Continues) (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 1. (Continued) Other variables Antecedents of Moral self studied on Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes of the moral self TAL. ET Winterich, Social-cognitive Study 1: Experimental Recognition of Moral identity Prosocial behavior Aquino, theory; theories of survey; 293 adults from prosocial behavior -Internalization (Z) et al. (2013) the self and moral an online research -Symbolization (Z) identity panel in U.S.A. Study 2: Experimental survey; 231 adults from online research panel in U.S.A.

Winterich, Social-cognitive Study 1: Experimental Moral identity Recognition of Donation behavior Mittal, theory, consumer survey; 410 adults from -Internalization (Z) donation behavior et al. (2013) identity theory, an online research -Symbolization (Z) -General theories of the self panel in U.S.A. recognition (IV) and moral identity Study 2: Experimental -Private survey; 197 adults from recognition (IV) online research panel in -Public U.S.A. recognition (IV) Study 3: Experimental survey; 267 adults from an online research panel in U.S.A.

Winterich Social identity Study 1: Scenario- Internalization Inclusion of other Donation intention et al. (2009) theory; theories of based experiment; 143 moral identity (IV) in self (M) the self and moral undergraduates Gender identity (Z) identity Study 2: Scenario- Donation group based experiment; 258 type (Z) undergraduates Study 3: Scenario-

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. based experiment; 233 adults from an online marketing research

O:10.1002/job DOI: panel across the U.S.A.

Note: Moral self variables that also represent dependent variables in the studies are indicated with the DV designation and are repeated in the “dependent variable” column. IV = independent variable; DV = dependent variable; M = mediator variable; Z = moderator variable. (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Table 2. Empirical work on moral judgment disposition. Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes the moral self

Angelidis and Principles of Cross-sectional, Ethical Emotional Ibrahim (2011) emotional single-source ideology (IV) intelligence intelligence and survey; 344 ethical ideology managers enrolled in executive MBA program from 5 universities

Brady and Principles of Cross-sectional, Ethical Character trait Wheeler (1996) ethical disposition single-source, predisposition and ethical scenario-based -Utilitarianism (IV) decision making survey; 141 -Formalism (IV) employees of large ﬁnancial institution

Forsyth (1980) Individual Cross-sectional, Ethical Ethical attitude differences single-source ideology (IV) principles, survey; 108 theories of undergraduate moral self and students moral thought

Forsyth (1985) Individual Cross-sectional, Ethical Consequence Moral judgment differences single-source, ideology (IV) type (IV) principles, scenario-based Moral standard (IV) theories of survey; 64 Conformity to moral self and undergraduate norms (IV) moral thought students

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. Forsyth (1993) Individual Cross-sectional, Ethical Motive type (IV) Self evaluation differences single-source, ideology (IV) Outcome type (IV) Self-esteem (IV) principles, scenario-based Gender Cognitive reactions SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: theories of survey; 164 moral self and undergraduate moral thought students (2014) (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 2. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes the moral self TAL. ET Frimer et al. Principles of Cross-sectional, Communion moral Agency Evaluation of (2011) agency and critical incident/ orientation (IV) orientation (IV) moral exemplar moral personality recollection-based, single-source survey; 111 students recruited from student clubs

Luzadis and Goal orientation Cross-sectional, Ethical ideology Goal orientation Gerhardt (2011) theory, principles single-source -Idealism (IV) -Learning goal of ethical ideology survey; 321 -Relativism (IV) -Performance- undergraduate approach goal students -Performance- avoidance goal

Marta Principles of Cross-sectional, Corporate ethical Ethical ideology Ethical intentions et al. (2012) ethical ideology single-source values (IV) -Idealism (Z) survey; 453 -Relativism (Z) individuals (recruited members from the American Marketing Association)

McFerran Theories of moral Study 1: Cross- Moral identity Moral personality Ethical et al. (2010) personality, the self, sectional, single- -Internalization (IV) (conscientiousness, ideology (Study 1 DV) and moral identity source survey; 52 -Symbolization (IV) agreeableness, and Citizenship behavior female employees Ethical openness to Propensity to of mid-sized ideology (Study 1 DV) experience morally disengage speech therapy combined) (IV) .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. services Ethical organization ideology (Study 2 M) Study 2: Cross- O:10.1002/job DOI: sectional, single- source survey; 145 undergraduate students (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Reynolds (2006) Principles of moral Study 1: Scenario- Presence of Ethical Moral awareness awareness, moral based experiment; harm (IV) predisposition intensity, and ethical 120 MBA students Norm -Utilitarianism (Z) predispositions Study 2: Scenario- violation (IV) -Formalism (Z) based experiment; 33 MBA students

Ruiz-Palomino Cross-sectional, Relativistic ethical Ethical policies (IV) Ethical behavioral and Martinez- single-source ideology (IV, Z) Ethical intentions Cañas (2011) survey; 525 leadership (IV) employees from large branch ofﬁces of banking and insurance companies

Schminke Principles of gender Cross-sectional, Ethical Decision frame (1997) and morality and single-source, predisposition agreement ethical predispositions scenario-based -Utilitarianism (IV) experiment; -Formalism (IV) convenient sample of 175 full-time managers and undergraduate students

Schminke Structure theory and Cross-sectional, Organizational Ethical Ethical (2001) principles of ethical single-source size (IV) predisposition predisposition predispositions survey; 209 Organizational -Utilitarianism (DV) -Utilitarianism employees from a structure -Formalism (DV) -Formalism variety of -Participation (IV) industries within -Authority the Midwestern hierarchy (IV) U.S.A. who were -Formalism (IV) recruited from the

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. author’s College Board of Advisors H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: Schminke et al. Theories of Cross-sectional, Procedural Ethical Procedural justice (1997) organizational justice single-source fairness (IV) predisposition perceptions and principles of survey; 209 Outcome -Utilitarianism (Z) Distributive justice ethical predispositions employees from 11 fairness (IV) -Formalism (Z) perceptions

(2014) primarily (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 2. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes the moral self TAL. ET Midwestern organizations, recruited through the authors’ College of Board of Advisors

Schminke and Principles of ethical Time-lagged, Leadership style Change in ethical Change in ethical Wells (1999) predispositions, group single-source -Initiating (IV) predisposition predisposition processes, and survey; 117 -Consideration (IV) -Utilitarianism (DV) -Utilitarianism leadership style graduate and Group -Formalism (DV) -Formalism undergraduate -Cohesiveness (IV) students -Performance (IV)

Singhapakdi Cross-sectional, Country Ethical ideology Ethical ideology et al. (2001) single-source, (Australian vs. -Idealism (DV) -Idealism scenario-based American) -Relativism (DV) -Relativism survey; 453 Perceptions of individuals ethical problem recruited from an Intent to resolve American problem Marketing Corporate Association ethical values membership mailing list

Sparks and Ethical decision- Ethical ideology: Subject type (IV) Ethical sensitivity Hunt (1998) making theory and relativism (IV) Research course (IV) principles of ethical Ethical sensitivity (DV) Socialization sensitivity -Organizational (IV) .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. -Professional (IV) Perspective taking (IV) O:10.1002/job DOI: Emotional contagion (IV)

Treise, Weigold, Cross-sectional, Ethical ideology Evaluation program (2014) Conna, and single-source Idealism (IV) content for children Garrison (1994) survey; 292 Relativism (IV) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright participants recruited from a large mall in southeastern U.S.A.

Walker and Theories of moral Cross-sectional, Communion moral Agency Evaluation of Frimer (2007) development, moral single-source orientation (IV) orientation (IV) moral exemplar action, personality survey and follow- Nurturing principles up interview personality (IV) (which was coded); Generative 267 moral personality (IV) exemplars who Optimistic were recipients of a personality (IV) national award

Walker et al. Situationalist Cross-sectional, Communion moral Agency Evaluation of (2010) perspective of social single-source orientation (IV) orientation (IV) moral exemplar psychology, survey and follow- personality principles up interview (which was coded); 50 moral exemplars who were recipients of a national award

Wilson (2003) Social dominance Cross-sectional, Ethical ideology Gender (IV) Social dominance theory, principles single-source -Idealism (IV) Age (IV) orientation of ethical ideology survey; 160 -Relativism (IV) undergraduate students

Yetmar and Principles of ethical Cross-sectional, Ethical ideology Role conﬂict (IV) Ethical evaluation Eastman (2000) sensitivity, ethical single-source -Idealism (IV) Role ambiguity (IV) ideology, and ethical survey; 870 -Relativism (IV) Job satisfaction (IV) ﬁ

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. decision making Certi ed Public Professional Accountants commitment (IV) recruited from the H OA SELF MORAL THE

O:10.1002/job DOI: Institute for Certiﬁed Public Accountants

Zhang and Person-organization Study 1: Cross- Perceived company Ethical Applicant attraction (2014) Gowan (2012) ﬁt theory and sectional, performance predisposition to the organization single-source, (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. TAL. ET

Table 2. (Continued)

Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes the moral self

principles of ethical scenario-based -Economic (IV) -Utilitarianism (Z) Probability of predisposition survey; 201 -Legal (IV) -Formalism (Z) accepting the undergraduate -Social job offer students responsibility (IV) Study 2: Cross- Machiavellianism (IV) sectional, single-source, scenario-based survey; 66 undergraduate students

Table 3. Empirical work on self-conscious moral orientation. Other variables Antecedents of studied on Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self Moral self variable(s) outcomes of the moral self

Ameen et al. Socialization Cross-sectional, Gender (IV) Ethical sensitivity to Ethical sensitivity to (1996) principles single-source, questionable questionable scenario-based activities (DV) activities survey; 285 undergraduate students

Blodgett et al. Ethical decision- Cross-sectional, Power Ethical sensitivity for Ethical sensitivity (2001) making theory and single-source, distance (IV) -The company (DV) -For the company principles of scenario-based Uncertainty -Customers (DV) -For customers cultural differences survey; from avoidance (IV) -Competitors (DV) -For competitors Taiwanese and U.S. Individualism (IV) -Colleagues (DV) -For colleagues managers from 12 different companies in 3 cities

Lützén et al. Stress theory; Cross-sectional, Moral sensitivity (IV) Moral Moral stress (2010) principles of single-source climate (IV) ethical climate and survey; 49 nurses moral sensitivity from a convenient sample

Morton et al. Cross-sectional, Spiritual Moral sensitivity (M) Moral reasoning (2006) single-source maturity (IV) survey; 149 medical students

(IV) (DV) Ozdogan and Cross-sectional, Gender Ethical sensitivity Ethical sensitivity Eser (2007) single-source

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. College survey; 667 major (IV) undergraduate Age (IV) (IV) students SELF MORAL THE

O:10.1002/job DOI: Grade Family income (IV) School (IV)

(2014) ownership (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 3. (Continued)

Other variables Antecedents of studied on Outcome variables Study Theory used Research design the moral self Moral self variable(s) outcomes of the moral self TAL. ET Reynolds Study 1: Item Moral attentiveness Correlates (2008) development for -Perceptual (IV) -Normlessness moral attentiveness -Reﬂective (IV) -Nurturance measure: cross- -Moral identity sectional, single- -Agreeableness source survey; 123 -Conscientiousness undergraduate Moral behavior students Moral awareness Study 2: Validity evidence: 241 undergraduates Study 3: Cross- sectional, single- source survey; 242 managers recruited from StudyResponse.com Study 4: Cross- sectional, single- source survey; 159 MBA students Study 5: Cross- sectional, single- source survey; 74 undergraduates and 81 MBAs

Sparks and Ethical decision- Cross-sectional, Student vs. Ethical ideology: Ethical sensitivity Hunt (1998) making theory single-source practitioner (IV) relativism (IV) and principles of survey; 188 Course in marketing Ethical sensitivity (DV) .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. ethical sensitivity marketing research research (IV) practitioners Organizational recruited from the socialization (IV)

O:10.1002/job DOI: membership of the Professional American Marketing socialization (IV) Association Perspective taking (IV)

(2014) Emotional contagion (IV) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright

Whitaker and Social-cognitive Cross-sectional, Moral Employee Moral imagination Godwin theory and principles multi-source data; attentiveness (IV) creativity (Z) (2013) of moral imagination 162 supervisor– subordinate dyads; subordinates were undergraduate students working at least part-time and provided permission for the researchers to contact their supervisors; the subordinate survey was scenario-based; supervisors reported on subordinate creativity

Wurthmann Social-cognitive Cross-sectional, Education in Moral attentiveness Perceptions of the (2013) theory and principles single-source business ethics (IV) -Reﬂective (M) role of ethics and of cognitive moral survey; 224 -Perceptual (M) social responsibility development undergraduate students

Note: Moral self variables that also represent dependent variables in the studies are indicated with the DV designation and are repeated in the “dependent variable” column. IV = independent variable; DV = dependent variable; M = mediator variable; Z = moderator variable. .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: (2014) P. L JENNINGS ET AL. perceptual moral attentiveness (“a perceptual aspect in which information is automatically colored as it is encoun- tered” [p. 1028] by individuals’ experiences) and reflective moral attentiveness (“a more intentional reflective aspect by which the individual uses morality to reflect on and examine experience” [p. 1028]).

Self-conscious moral emotions Although there are different families of moral emotions, such as other-condemning emotions of anger and disgust, self-conscious moral emotions are uniquely tied to the moral self because they occur when people judge themselves relative to their internalized moral standards (Haidt, 2003; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Like other moral emotions, self- conscious moral emotions emerge from situations in which others are at risk or are harmed (Haidt, 2003). However, self-conscious moral emotions derive from self-reflection on the moral acceptability of one’s anticipated or engaged behavior. These self-reflective processes can occur consciously or intuitively, beneath the level of awareness (Haidt, 2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). The focus on self-reflection and monitoring makes these emotions an integral part of the moral self (Tangney et al., 2007). Although these emotions are important to one’s sense of self and identity (i.e., the “having” side; Peterson & Seligman, 2004), when experienced, they motivate and regulate behavior (i.e., the “doing” side; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). We review four primary self-conscious moral emotions: guilt, shame, pride, and embarrassment (Table 4). Guilt is experienced when one is the cause or anticipated cause of others’ suffering or harm. Shame is experienced by a self-appraised wrong or defect with one’s sense of self. Pride is experienced when the person “is responsible for a socially valued outcome or for being a socially valued person” (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995, p. 66). Embarrassment is experienced when aspects of one’s self and social identity are damaged or threatened.

Moral strength Moral strength is the capacity and conation (impetus to act) to achieve moral ends and is a category associated with the “doing” side of the moral self. For instance, moral character reflects individuals’ enduring moral qualities that promote upholding moral principles (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Other moral strength constructs include moral attitudes (Jackson et al., 2008), moral confidence (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006), moral chronicity (Narvaez et al., 2006), and moral conviction (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Recent work has examined moral potency (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011), which is a psychological state involving a sense of ownership over the moral aspects of one’s environment (moral ownership), reinforced by beliefs in the ability to act to achieve moral purposes in that domain (moral efficacy), and the courage to perform ethically in the face of adversity and persevere through challenges (moral courage). Research has also assessed individuals’ duty orientation, which is a state-like volitional orientation to loyally serve and faithfully support other members of the group, to strive and sacrifice to accomplish the tasks and missions of the group, and to honor its codes and principles (Hannah, Jennings, Bluhm, Peng, & Schaubroeck, 2013). Each of these moral strength concepts reflects the intensity with which individuals rely on and seek to integrate moral notions in their behavior (Table 5).

Antecedents of the moral self

Moral self theory (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984) draws from self-regulation and social-cognition principles (Bandura, 1991, 1999; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996) to explain how the moral self is based on individual characteristics and social interactions with others. In other words, central factors of the person and social interactions with others that have moral implications accentuate morality in one’s sense of self. Thus, we review empirical work on individual characteristics and social factors as antecedents of the moral self.

Individual characteristics Researchers have attempted to understand how certain individual characteristics mold one’s sense of morality. Although research suggests that age does not inﬂuence moral centrality (Krettenauer, 2011), culture-dependent

Table 4. Empirical work on self-conscious moral emotions. Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self

Cohen (2010) Moral emotion Study 2 only: Guilt (IV) Empathy (IV) Intention to theory Cross-sectional, Shame (IV) Perspective- engage in single-source taking (IV) unethical scenario-based behavior survey; 172 MBA students

Cohen et al. Moral emotion Study 1: Item Guilt (IV) Unethical (2011) theory generation of moral Guilt repair (IV) business decision emotions measure: Shame (IV) Illegal behavior cross-sectional, Shame– Deception single-source, withdrawal (IV) Rumination scenario-based Depressive survey; 291 symptoms undergraduate Unethical students bargaining Study 2: Validity behavior test of measure: cross-sectional, single-source scenario-based survey; 862 adults from nationwide online subject pool Study 3: Experiment; 56 MBA students

de Hooge Moral emotion Study 1: Imagined shame (IV) Emotion Prosocial (IV) .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. et al. (2008) theory Experiment; 132 Recalled shame inﬂuence behavior undergraduate Experienced -Exogenous Prosocial students shame (IV) -Endogenous tendency H OA SELF MORAL THE

O:10.1002/job DOI: Study 2: Critical Induced Social value incident shame (IV) orientation experiment; 135 undergraduate

(2014) students (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 4. (Continued)

Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self TAL. ET Study 3: Experiment; 163 undergraduate students Study 4: Scenario- based experiment; 150 undergraduate students

de Hooge Moral emotion Experiment; 142 Guilt (IV) Prosocial or Cooperation et al. (2007) theory and undergraduate Shame (IV) proself Cooperation game theory students orientation (Z) tendency

Else-Quest Moral emotions Meta-analysis of Gender (IV) Guilt (DV) Guilt et al. (2012) and emotion 22,665 articles Ethnicity (IV) Shame (DV) Shame theory Age (IV) Authentic pride (DV) Authentic pride Measure scale Hubristic pride (DV) Hubristic pride type (IV) Embarrassment (DV) Embarrassment Domain of emotion (IV)

Ferguson Moral emotion Interview Norm violation Guilt (DV) Guilt et al. (1991) theory and methodology; 24 -Moral Shame (DV) Shame principles of child ﬁfth-grade children transgression (IV) development -Social blunder (IV)

Fromson (2006) Theories of Cross-sectional, Recounting self- Guilt (DV) Guilt moral emotion single-source discrepancy Shame (DV) Shame (IV)

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. and stress survey using conditions critical incident technique; 98

O:10.1002/job DOI: undergraduate students (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Gausel Moral emotion Cross-sectional, Appraisal Shame (IV) Felt rejection (IV) Shame et al. (2012) theory; theories of single-source -Concern for Felt Withdrawal the self (e.g., survey; 379 condemnation inferiority (IV) Prosocial need to belong, participants of in-group (IV) Contribution to restitution self-concept) -In-group victims (M) defect (IV) In-group identiﬁcation (IV)

Ghatavi et al. Moral emotion Cross-sectional, Current State guilt (DV) State guilt (2002) theory single-source depression (IV) Trait guilt (DV) Trait guilt survey; 56 Past Moral Moral standards outpatients with depression (IV) standards (DV) State shame either a current or State shame (DV) State guilt past major State guilt (DV) State pride depressive episode State pride (DV)

Giner-Sorolla Moral emotions Cross-sectional, Anger (IV) State guilt (DV) State guilt and Espinosa theory single-source Disgust (IV) Trait guilt (DV) Trait guilt (2011) survey; 86 undergraduate students

Grasmick et al. Moral emotion Time-lagged Shame associated Past self- Self-reported (1993) theory, deterrence (collected in 1982 drunk reported drunk drunk driving theory, and theory and 1990), single- driving (IV) driving (IV) of social systems source survey; 330 adults from annual survey of adults from Department of Sociology at the University of Oklahoma

Holmqvist Moral emotion Interview Psychopathy (IV) Shame (DV) Joy (IV) Shame of (IV)

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. (2008) theory and methodology, Sadness criminal behavior psychopathy coding responses; Anger (IV) theory 47 young criminal Fright (IV)

offenders, treated SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: by institutions managed by the National Board of Institutional Care (2014) (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 4. (Continued)

Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self TAL. ET Hong and Chiu Psychological Cross-sectional, Violating moral Guilt (DV) Guilt (1992) theory related single-source norm (IV) Shame (DV) Shame to emotion survey; 321 Personal undergraduate inadequacy (IV) students Presence of others (IV) Personal responsibility for violation (IV)

Kim and Moral emotion Cross-sectional, Pride (IV) Anger (IV) Purchase Johnson (2013) theory and single source Guilt (IV) Empathy (IV) intention for a principles of scenario-based Elevation (IV) social-cause cultural survey; 355 National product differences undergraduate origin (Z) students Independent self- construal (Z) Interdependent self-construal (Z)

Kochanska, Theories of Time-lagged, Power-assertive Moral self (DV) Development Gross, Lin, and socialization, the multi-source mother parenting Guilt (IV) of the self Nichols (2002) self, and self- surveys/ style (IV) Rule violation development interviews (coded observations); 112 mothers with their newborn children (recruited via an ad in the community) .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. Konstam Moral emotion Cross-sectional, Guilt (IV) Anger (IV) Forgiveness et al. (2001) theory and single-source Shame (IV) Empathy (IV) principles of survey, using Pride (IV) Perspective- O:10.1002/job DOI: forgiveness critical incident or taking (IV) recall technique; Detachment 148 graduate process (IV) students Gender (Z) (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright

Krettenauer and Moral emotions Cross-sectional, Context type Guilt (DV) Guilt Johnston (2011) theory and single source, -Prosocial Pride (DV) Pride principles of scenario-based action (IV) Self-importance Other emotions moral self survey; 155 -Temptation (IV) of moral (embarrassment, teenagers, grades 7 -Antisocial (IV) values (Z) fear, sadness, through 11, with a happiness, anger, sample of 50 satisfaction) undergraduate Emotion students

Laible, Eye, and Theories of moral Cross-sectional, Parenting Guilt (IV) Emotion Prosocial Carlo (2008) emotion, emotion single source, style (IV) Shame (IV) regulation (IV) behavior regulation, scenario-based Empathy (IV) Moral conduct and moral survey; 113 Anger (IV) development adolescents (ages 14–18 years) from two public high schools

McDaniel et al. Theories of Cross-sectional, Spirituality (IV) Guilt (DV) Guilt (2010) moral emotion single-source Family Shame (DV) Shame and moral survey; 258 interactions (IV) Empathy development undergraduate students

Moll et al. Moral emotion Clinical Damage to Prosocial moral Prosocial moral (2011) theory observations and frontopolar emotion (e.g., emotion (e.g., functional cortext and guilt, pity, guilt, pity, and magnetic spectal area (IV) embarrassment) (DV) embarrassment) resonance imaging design, integrating a moral sentiment task; 33 patients referred to by

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. specialists in a larger observational study H OA SELF MORAL THE

O:10.1002/job DOI: at the clinical center of the National Institutes of Health

(2014) intramural program (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 4. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self TAL. ET Murray et al. Principles of Cross-sectional, Sexual Guilt (IV) High risk sex (2007) spirituality single-source attitude (IV) Shame (IV) Sex after alcohol and sexuality survey; 176 Spirituality (IV) consumption undergraduate and Sense of Sex with multiple graduate students alienation from partners God (IV)

Olthof et al. Moral emotions Interview-based Emotion-evoking Guilt (DV) Guilt (2004) theory scenarios; 206 event (action Shame (DV) Shame children from 3 vs. identity elementary and 2 threat) (IV) secondary schools

Roos et al. Moral emotions Cross-sectional, Gender (IV) Guilt (DV) Guilt (2011) theory single-source Aggression level Shame (DV) Shame survey; 384 fourth- toward peers (IV) Pride (DV) Pride and ﬁfth-grade Peer witness (IV) Anger students Victim disposition (sad, angry or neutral) (IV)

Rothschild Psychoanalytic Study 1: Scenario- Threat type Guilt (IV) Personal Scapegoating et al. (2012) theory based experiment; Value threat (IV) control (IV) Environmental 114 undergraduate Control advocacy students threat (IV) Study 2: Not No threat (IV) applicable to Viable review scapegoating Study 3: Scenario- target .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. based experiment; available (IV) 64 undergraduate Non-viable students scapegoating O:10.1002/job DOI: target available (IV) (2014) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Stets and Carter Control systems Time-lagged, Moral Moral identity Moral identity Guilt (2012) approach of single-source meanings (IV) -Internalization (IV) discrepancy (M) Shame identity theory survey; 369 Feelings rule (IV) -Symbolization (IV) Moral undergraduate Guilt (DV) behavior (M) students Shame (DV)

Stuewig et al. Moral emotions Cross-sectional, Guilt (IV) Externalization Aggression (2010) theory single-source Shame (IV) of blame (M) survey; Sample 1: Empathetic 250 undergraduate concern (M) students; Sample 2: 234 early adolescents; Sample 3: 507 pre- and post-trial inmates held in a metropolitan area county jail; Sample 4: 250 at-risk youth in middle adolescence

Stuewig Moral emotion Cross-sectional, Guilt Symptoms of HIV status et al. (2009) theory single-source proneness (IV) alcohol Risky needle use survey; 368 Shame dependence (IV) Risky sexual pre- and post-trail proneness (IV) behavior inmates held in 1000-bed metropolitan area county jail

Tangney (1991) Moral emotion Study 1: Cross- Empathy (IV) Guilt (IV) theory sectional, single- source survey; 101 undergraduate

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. students Study 2: Cross- Cognitive Shame (IV) sectional, single- empathy (IV) H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: source survey; 97 undergraduate students (2014)

(Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. TAL. ET Table 4. (Continued)

Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of the Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes moral self

Study 3: Cross- Emotional sectional, single- responsiveness source survey; 213 (IV) undergraduate Affective cue students discrimination (IV) Study 4: Cross- Perspective sectional, single- taking (IV) source survey; 241 Fantasy (IV) undergraduate Personal students distress (IV) Externalization (IV) Detachment (IV)

Tangney Moral emotions Cross-sectional, Guilt (IV) Affective et al. (1996) theory single source, Shame (IV) emotional critical incident Embarrassment (IV) reactions recall survey; 182 Self-report undergraduate perceptions students Social context perceptions

Table 5. Empirical work on moral strength. Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes the moral self

Hannah and Theories of the self Cross-sectional, Moral potency Adherence to Avolio (2010) and self-regulation, multi-source survey; -Moral courage (IV) Army values and principles of 2572 U.S. Army -Moral efﬁcacy (IV) Intention to moral judgment soldiers assigned to -Moral ownership (IV) report others’ and potency 295 squads with unethical acts approximately 9 Tolerance for soldiers per squad mistreatment of others Tolerance for torture Confronting wrongdoers

Hannah, Avolio, Social-cognitive Time-lagged, single- Authentic Displays of moral Ethical behavior (IV) (M) and Walumbwa theory and principles source survey; 162 leadership courage Prosocial behavior (2011) of authentic soldiers attending leadership a training program at a major U.S. Army school

Hannah, Jennings, Principles of moral Study 1/Sample Ethical Duty orientation (M) Organizational Bluhm, Peng, and philosophy, virtue 1a: Cross-sectional, leadership (IV) deviance Schaubroeck ethics, deonance, single-source survey; Transformational Ethical behavior (2013) and reactance 2937 active duty leadership (IV) soldiers in the U.S. Army Study 1/Sample 1b: Cross-sectional, single-source survey; 2937 active duty soldiers in the

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. U.S. Army Study 1/Sample 2: Cross-sectional, H OA SELF MORAL THE

O:10.1002/job DOI: single-source survey; 4043 U.S. Army National Guard and 3383 U.S. Army

(2014) Reservists (Continues) oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright JENNINGS L P. Table 5. (Continued) Other variables Outcome Antecedents of Moral self studied on variables of Study Theory used Research design the moral self variable(s) outcomes the moral self TAL. ET Study 2/Sample 3: Cross-sectional, single-source survey; 2953 civilian (non-military) federal employees of U.S. government Study 3/Sample 4: Time-lagged, single- source survey; 229 full-time employees, recruited through Empanel survey service Study 4/Sample 6: Time-lagged, single- source survey; 376 soldiers assigned to U.S. Army Division in NE U.S.A. Study 5/Sample 5: Time-lagged, single- source survey; 218 soldier trainees from U.S. Army

Hannah et al. Social-cognitive Cross-sectional, Abusive Moral courage (M) Identification Mistreatment of (2013) theory and principles multi-source survey; supervision (IV) with organizational non-combatants of moral agency 1582 U.S. Army Work unit abusive values (M) Intention to soldiers assigned to supervision (IV) report others’ 243 squads; only unethical acts squads with at .Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. least 4 members were included in analyses O:10.1002/job DOI: Jackson Principles of Cross-sectional, Country (China vs. Moral attitude Gender (IV) Acceptability et al. (2008) cultural differences single-source survey; U.S.A.) (IV) of moral online 602 public school behavior (2014) youths oyih 04Jh ie os Ltd. Sons, & Wiley John 2014 © Copyright Krettenauer and Principles of moral Semi-structured Meta-ethical stance/ Confidence in moral Self-attributed moral Confidence in Eichler (2006) emotion and child interviews presenting judgment (IV) judgment (DV) emotions (IV) moral judgment development participants with Delinquent vignettes; 200 behavior adolescents

Narvaez et al. Social information Study 1: Experiment; Moral Moral chronicity (IV) Processing style (Z) Recall about (Z) (2006) processing and 254 undergraduate inference (IV) Decision probe ethical behavior social-cognitive students Time to make theory Study 2: Scenario- inference of based experiment; behavior 120 undergraduate students

Skitka Principles of moral Study 1: Cross-sec- Moral conviction (IV) Source type Social distance et al. (2005) conviction or tional, single-source, (friend vs. distant from attitudinally mandates and attitude scenario-based exper- relationship) (Z) dissimilar other strength theory iment; 91 individuals Physical distance who were recruited from attitudinally from public places dissimilar other (e.g., airport, bus Intolerance of terminal, and dissimilar other Amtrak station) Study 2: Cross- sectional, single- source, scenario- based experiment; 82 individuals who were recruited from public places (e.g., airport, bus terminal, and Amtrak station) Study 3: Experiment; 80 undergraduate students

Note: Moral self variables that also represent dependent variables in the studies are indicated with the DV designation and are repeated in the “dependent variable” column.

.Ognz Behav. Organiz. J. IV = independent variable; DV = dependent variable; M = mediator variable; Z = moderator variable. H OA SELF MORAL THE O:10.1002/job DOI: (2014) P. L JENNINGS ET AL. dispositional traits do.1 For example, Eastern cultures and cultural characteristics (e.g., power distance and uncertainty avoidance) more strongly influence moral self constructs (e.g., ethical ideology, Singhapakdi, Marta, Rao, & Cicic, 2001; moral attitudes, Jackson et al., 2008; moral sensitivity, Blodgett, Lu, Rose, & Vitell, 2001) than Western cultures and cultural characteristics (e.g., individualism/masculinity). A review of the influence of individual differences on the moral self suggests that individual differences have implications for behavioral ethics in multi-cultural workplaces, especially given widespread globalization and increasingly frequent interactions between organizations’ members across cultures. Gender has also been widely studied. Socialization principles suggest that women should be more concerned with others and so they are generally stereotyped as having stronger moral qualities than men. Some research supports these ideas, showing that women are more ethically sensitive than men (Ameen, Guffey, & McMillan, 1996; Ozdogan & Eser, 2007) and experience guilt and shame more so than men, who are more likely to experience pride (Roos, Salmivalli, & Hodges, 2011). However, a meta-analysis (Else-Quest, Higgins, Allison, & Morton, 2012) demonstrated that such stereotypes lack robustness in terms of self-conscious moral emotions. Results revealed small gender differences for guilt and shame, yet gender similarities for embarrassment, authentic pride, and hubristic pride. This meta-analysis also revealed that gender differences depend on ethnicity (stronger gender effects for White samples), the type of measure used (stronger gender effects for trait versus state scales, rather than measures based on situations or scenarios), and the domain of the emotion (e.g., body, sex, and food). Thus, results suggest that the influence of gender on the moral self is nuanced. Further, studies have shown that an actor’s past behavior and experienced emotions more strongly influence the “doing” side than the “having” side of the moral self. For instance, moral inferences strengthen moral chronicity (Narvaez et al., 2006). Further, Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, and Alisat (2003) found that community involvement enhances individuals’ moral self-ideals (a moral centrality concept). However, our review of research examining moral identity highlighted differences in effects. For instance, Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011) found that recalling past moral acts positively influenced individuals’ symbolization moral identity (i.e., the “doing” side) and recalling past immoral acts negatively influenced symbolization moral identity; however, the results suggest recalling either past moral or immoral acts does not influence internalization moral identity (i.e., the “having” side). Jordan et al. (2011) concluded that their work demonstrates the compensatory nature of past (im)moral behavior. Because symbolization represents the “doing” side of the moral self, these findings suggest that individuals seek to maintain consistent self-images with their past behavior. Specifically, moral recollections strengthen the moral self, whereas immoral recollections engender a stronger sense of incompleteness, which increases moral strivings. These findings imply that organizational socialization programs and cultures that promote ethical behaviors early in members’ tenure might influence self-consistency motives and moral striving. Research has found that self-conscious moral emotions—another active, “doing” aspect of the moral self—are also strongly influenced by behavior. Unethical actions (I did something bad) have been shown to invoke guilt, but acts that reflect poorly on one’s identity (I am bad) invoke shame (e.g., Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Fromson, 2006; Hong & Chiu, 1992; Olthof, Ferguson, Bloemers, & Deij, 2004; Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012; Stets & Carter, 2012; Tangney, 1991). Further, prosocial acts following a moral transgression have been found to invoke pride but not guilt (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011), and in considering moral norm violations, anger invokes guilt whereas disgust invokes shame (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). Research has shown a similar pattern in groups: an appraisal of the in-group as holding a moral defect predicts felt shame (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012). Differences in the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self have also emerged on the influence of religiosity, the degree to which an individual actively adheres to a religion (Allport & Ross, 1967). Religiosity as a general trait has been found to influence moral self “having” constructs (i.e., moral centrality, Kurpis, Beqiri, & Helgeson, 2008; moral sensitivity, Morton et al., 2006) and “doing” constructs (guilt, McDaniel, Grice, & Eason, 2010; Murray, Ciarrocchi, &

1We recognize that culture is generally considered a social context that influences individuals’ behavioral tendencies. However, we address these specific studies within the set of antecedents that focus on individual characteristics because they specifically examine personality traits associated with cultural differences (e.g., power distance and individualism).

Murray-Swank, 2007; shame, Murray et al., 2007). However, when more active versus passive religiosity concepts are examined, differences emerge. For instance, religious commitment, but not religious involvement, has been shown to positively influence internalization moral identity (Hardy, Walker, Rackham, & Olsen, 2012). Further, Vitell et al. (2009) examined intrinsic religiosity (inherent goals of the person’s religious tradition) and extrinsic religiosity (utilitarian motivations underlying the person’s religious behavior). They found that intrinsic religiosity positively influenced both dimensions of moral identity, whereas extrinsic religiosity negatively influenced only internalization. They also found that self-control did not mediate the effects on internalization but fully mediated the negative effects of extrinsic religiosity on moral identity symbolization. They concluded that extrinsic religiosity depletes one’s self-control, which explains its negative influence on symbolic moral action. As approximately 84 percent of the world’s population and, therefore, labor pool formally identifies with a religion (PewResearch, 2012), organizational researchers should further investigate the differential effects of religiosity on the moral self. A last category of antecedents involves individuals’ mental health, which has been shown to influence the “doing” side of the moral self. For instance, Ghatavi, Nicolson, MacDonald, Osher, and Levitt (2002) found that individuals who were highly depressed experienced more enduring emotions of guilt and shame, and lower levels of pride. They also found that trait guilt was not influenced by depression. Work in this area has yet to investigate whether and how mental impairments influence how individuals define themselves morally (the “having” side).

Social factors Some work in social psychology has focused on various non-work social influences of the moral self (e.g., parents, Hardy, Bhattacharjee, Reed, & Aquino, 2010; socialization, Pratt et al., 2003; college coursework, Ozdogan & Eser, 2007), but limited research attention has been given to organizational antecedents. This work has highlighted the influence of organizational context on both the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. For example, research has shown that perceptions of ethical culture positively influence employees’ moral efficacy (Schaubroeck, Hannah, et al., 2012) and that employees who experience ethics-oriented socialization are more ethically sensitive (Sparks & Hunt, 1998). Organizational structure has also been shown to influence ethical predispositions (Schminke, 2001). In particular, more mechanistic and rigid structures, rather than organic and flatter structures, positively influence employees’ level of formalism and utilitarianism. Similarly, employees within public rather than private organizations have been found to hold stronger moral self-images (Van der Wal & de Graaf, 2006). Further, Kouchaki (2011) found that knowledge about past non-prejudicial hiring actions made by other members of an individual’s group enhanced individuals’ internalization moral identity, which then gave them moral license to act immorally in future hiring actions. Finally, leaders are a strong influence. Studies have shown that positive and ethical leader behaviors strengthen different aspects of employees’ moral self, whereas negative and unethical leader behaviors weaken employees’ moral self. For example, the literature suggests that leaders’ initiating and consideration styles strengthen followers’ utilitarianism and formalism tendencies (Schminke & Wells, 1999), authentic leadership positively influences followers’ moral courage (Hannah, Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2011), ethical and transformational leadership positively influences followers’ duty orientation (Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013), ethical leadership increases followers’ moral efficacy (Schaubroeck, Hannah, et al., 2012), and transformational and transactional leadership positively influences internalization moral identity, with transformational leadership having a stronger influence (Weichun, Riggio, Avolio, & Sosik, 2011). Conversely, abusive leader behavior has been shown to deplete followers’ moral courage and their internalization of organizational values (Hannah, Schaubroeck et al., 2013).

Summary of the antecedents to the moral self Research supports the premise that individual and social factors influence and shape the moral self. The findings reviewed show that ethical aspects of the social context, social role models, and behavioral norms strengthen both the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. However, we found a distinct pattern in the literature associated with the influence of individual characteristics. When characteristics involve how individuals define themselves (e.g., gender, cultural background, and culture), such factors influence the “having” side of the moral self (i.e., internalized aspects of moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, and self-conscious moral orientation) and more weakly influence the

“doing” side of the moral self (i.e., self-conscious moral emotions). In contrast, individuals’ engaged behavior, emotions, active experiences, and context more strongly influence the “doing” side of the moral self (i.e., symbolization moral identity, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength). Thus, the findings align with moral self theory (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). The construction of the “having” side of the moral self seems to be more strongly influenced by self-defining characteristics and through social interactions. The construction of the “doing” side of the moral self is also influenced by social interactions but seems to be more strongly influenced by self-relevant cognitions and evaluations in terms of agentic experiences. At first glance, our review suggests that the “doing” side of the moral self is more malleable to organizations, in that organizational decision makers can create contexts (e.g., structures, climate, and leader or coworker role models) that can influence and strengthen employees’ moral self. However, we believe that it is important to highlight other work on individuals’ traits, such as the Protestant Work Ethic (see Furnham, 1984, for a review) and spirituality (see Karakas, 2010, for a recent review), which suggest that such traits, especially those linking Protes- tant Work Ethic and religiosity to work, highly influence organizational outcomes. Further, it may also be that different aspects of organizational life indirectly influence the moral self through specific characteristics of an individual. For instance, Ghatavi et al. (2002) demonstrated that depression made it less likely for individuals to experience moral emotions—emotions needed to stimulate more ethical choices and behavior when facing ethical dilemmas. These findings, along with the general literature on mental health and work (see Warr, 2007, for a review), suggest that organizations can influence employees’ mental health (e.g., depression) by way of workplace stressors. Such findings suggest that a more refined understanding is needed of how organizations influence the various individual characteristics that impair or facilitate the self-regulatory functioning of the moral self. We note, however, that our conclusions concerning the antecedents of the moral self should be considered in light of the fact that the studies we review hold a static and variable-centric approach to examining the moral self. That is, studies have not examined how the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self influence each other or whether they hold reciprocal effects. Such a dynamic approach is needed to better understand the underlying mechanisms and processes associated with the construction and functioning of the moral self.

Consequences of the moral self

Research exploring the consequences of the moral self has integrated moral self theory (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984) with principles about social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), self-regulation, and social cognition (e.g., Bandura, 1991, 1999). The general premise of these theories is that individuals seek to maintain consistency with their moral self-concepts and, thus, are motivated to align their behavior in various situations with the principles of morality they hold. We review work on three categories of consequences: (i) decision making and motivational states, (ii) behavioral intentions and behavior, and (iii) emotions.

Decision making and motivational states Research on decision making and motivational states explains how the moral self inspires an individual to be a moral person. One general finding is that the moral self heightens the salience of moral principles and ethical characteristics of a situation. For example, research has found that reflective moral attentiveness, moral awareness, idealism, and moral identity (both internalization and symbolization) enhance moral sensitivity (Daniels, Diddams, & Van Duzer, 2011; Reynolds, 2008; Sparks & Hunt, 1998) and attention to moral issues (Reynolds, 2008). Further, studies have shown that moral sensitivity positively relates to moral stress (Lützén, Blom, Ewalds-Kvist, & Winch, 2010). Although one study failed to find a significant influence of the moral self (i.e., ethical ideology, Yetmar & Eastman, 2000) on ethical decision making, most studies have. For instance, internalization moral identity has been found to positively influence deontological and utilitarian moral judgments (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) and ethical beliefs (McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010). Further, research has found that moral judgment disposition (measured in various ways; Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Fisher, Woodbine, & Fullerton, 2003; Forsyth, 1980, 1985;

McFerran et al., 2010; Schminke, 1997) and moral sensitivity (Morton et al., 2006) positively relate to moral reasoning and ethical judgments. Studies have shown that moral self constructs also influence motivational states. For instance, moral attentiveness is positively related to moral imagination, particularly for employees who are more creative (Whitaker & Godwin, 2013). Research on moral judgment dispositions has shown that, compared with idealists, relativists (given their focus on aspects of the situation and rejection of moral absolutes) are more goal-oriented (Luzadis & Gerhardt, 2011). Studies on moral communion have shown that individuals holding both communion and agency, given this balance of both an “other” and “self” focus, are more likely to construe critical life events redemptively, are more frequently identified as helpers, and report more secure attachments (Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee, & Riches, 2011; Walker & Frimer, 2007; Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010). Last, research on self-conscious moral emotions (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996) has shown that experienced shame heightens a sense of isolation and inferiority, motivating individuals to hide and be less motivated to admit wrongdoing, whereas experienced guilt and shame enhance responsibility and regret for moral transgressions. Further, studies have found that moral centrality influences how individuals perceive and accept others. Moral centrality heightens individuals’ concern for others (Doron, Sar-El, & Mikulincer, 2012; Hardy et al., 2010), makes individuals more effective at socializing (Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon, 2010), and decreases social dominance orientation (Hardy et al., 2010). Similarly, Reed and Aquino (2003) found that internalization moral identity (but not symbolization) increases individuals’ moral regard for and willingness to exchange resources with, and donate to, out-group members, and that it lessens desires to wish harm to out-group members. Last, research has shown that moral centrality impairs antisocial attitudes and enhances prosocial attitudes (Lee, Whitehead, Ntoumanis, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2008; Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006).

Behaviors and behavioral intentions Moral self theory suggests that individuals with a strong moral self are more inclined to act ethically and refrain from unethical behavior. Yet, consistent support for this premise has only been found with constructs associated with the “having” side of the moral self (i.e., commitment to moral self, internalization moral identity, moral values, moral judgment dispositions, and perceptual moral attentiveness). For instance, although only a small number of studies have examined the influence of moral self constructs using data from working adults (i.e., Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Van Hiel, 2011; Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah, Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2011; Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013; Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al., 2013; Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012; Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; McFerran et al., 2010; Vitell, Keith, & Mathur, 2011), by and large, empirical findings have shown that “having” moral self constructs motivate ethical and prosocial intentions and behavior. In particular, research has found that “having” moral self-concepts positively influence cooperative behavior (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009), discomfort with others being harmed (Kavussanu, Willoughby, & Ring, 2012), donations and donation intentions (Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Winterich, Mittal, & Ross, 2009), ethical behavior and intentions (Aquino et al., 2011; Frimer & Walker, 2009; Gausel et al., 2012; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; Konstam, Chernoff, & Deveney, 2001; Kurpis et al., 2008; Lu & Chang, 2011; Michaelidou & Hassan, 2008; Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; Rosenberg, 1987; Stets & Carter, 2012; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Stuewig, Tangney, Mashek, Forkner, & Dearing, 2009), organizational citizenship behavior (McFerran et al., 2010), and volunteerism (Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, “having” moral self constructs have been found to negatively influence unethical and counterproductive intentions and behavior, such as aggression (Hardy et al., 2012; Rancer, Kosberg, & Silvestri, 1992), antisocial behavior (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011), dangerous driving (Rosenbloom, Ben-Eliyahu, & Nemrodov, 2009), retaliation (Rupp & Bell, 2010), social dominance behavior (Wilson, 2003), and intentions for and engagement in unethical behavior (Mayer et al., 2012; Perugini & Leone, 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Stets & Carter, 2011). Less consistent empirical findings emerged for research investigating the influence of “doing” side moral self constructs on behaviors and intentions. A relatively steady pattern of results demonstrated that self-conscious moral

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job P. L JENNINGS ET AL. emotions (i.e., guilt and pride) and moral strength (i.e., moral chronicity and moral character) positively influence ethical behavior and intentions (Cohen, 2010; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Kim & Johnson, 2013; Narvaez et al., 2006) and negatively influence unethical and counterproductive behavior and intentions (e.g., self-reported drunk driving, Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; scapegoating, Rothschild et al., 2012). Still, researchers have found that the effects of self-conscious moral emotions are contingent on moderating and mediating factors. For instance, Cohen, Wolf, Panter, and Insko (2011) examined measurement differences in guilt and shame on the basis of negative self-evaluation (NSE) measures and action tendency measures. Both guilt measures were highly correlated and negatively influenced unethical decision making. Both shame measures were positively related to poor psychological functioning (e.g., neuroticism, personal distress, and low self-esteem), but they were weakly correlated with one another, and effects on unethical decision making did not converge. Shame-NSE was negatively related to unethical decision making, whereas shame-action tendency was not. Further, de Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) predicted and found that experiencing shame motivated prosocial behavior when that felt shame was relevant for the decision at hand, whereas when shame was not relevant, the effects did not hold. Regarding moral strength, Hannah and colleagues (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah et al., 2011; Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al., 2013) found the effects of moral strength depend on leaders’ behavior. For instance, the effects of moral potency (i.e., moral ownership, moral efficacy, and moral courage) on subjects’ adherence to organizational values, intentions to report others’ (un)ethical acts, and tolerance for mistreating others depends on whether leaders are engaged in ethical acts (Hannah & Avolio, 2010). Further, moral courage has been found to mediate the effects of leader behaviors (authentic leadership, Hannah et al., 2011; abusive supervision, Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al., 2013) on followers’ ethical and unethical behaviors. Research has also found that followers’ duty orientation mediates the positive relationships between ethical and transformational leadership and ethical behavior, as well as the negative relationships between ethical and transformational leadership and workplace deviance (Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013). Differing effects on behaviors and intentions have appeared for moral identity, however, depending on how moral identity is conceptualized and whether moderators and mediators are considered. For example, Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) found that symbolization, but not internalization, influenced charitable giving. Other work has revealed non-significant effects for symbolization on prosocial and ethical intentions and behavior (donations and donation intentions, Aquino et al., 2011; Reed & Aquino, 2003; prosocial intentions, Aquino et al., 2011; organizational citizenship behavior, McFerran et al., 2010). Further, when internalization and symbolization were combined into a moral identity composite, the effects did not influence ethical and prosocial behavior unless moderators were considered (e.g., regulatory focus, Brebels et al., 2011; emotion-regulation knowledge, Côté, DeCelles, McCarthy, Van Kleef, & Hideg, 2011). For instance, Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) found that internalization moral identity had positive effects on moral behavior and decisions for individuals high in consequentialism or low in formalism, but negative effects on moral behavior and decisions for individuals low in consequentialism or high in formalism. Mayer et al. (2012) found that internalization (not symbolization) directly influenced unethical behavior and conflict, whereas internalization and symbolization only marginally (p < .10) and indirectly (via the mediator, ethical leadership) influenced those outcomes.

The moral (dis)engagement of behaviors and behavioral intentions. Within the research examining behavior and behavioral intentions, some scholars have examined the relationship between the moral self and moral disengagement. Moral disengagement occurs when individuals use cognitive strategies to “disengage” from moral principles, allowing unethical behavior to occur without self-sanction (Bandura, 1991, 1999). Empirical work has shown that the “having” side of the moral self deters moral disengagement, whereas the “doing” side of the moral self can enhance it. Specifically, internalization moral identity and moral judgment dispositions (i.e., idealism compared with relativism) negatively influence moral disengagement (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer, 2008; McFerran et al., 2010). In addition, Detert et al. (2008) found that internalization indirectly and negatively influenced unethical decision making, as mediated by moral disengagement propensity. However, Vitell et al. (2011) found that whereas internalization lessened moral disengagement, symbolization made it more likely.

Similarly, Skitka et al. (2005) found that moral conviction gave individuals’ license to act badly: individuals with a strong moral conviction socially and physically distanced themselves from attitudinally dissimilar others and were more intolerant of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., friend) and distant relationships (e.g., owner of a store that one frequents). They also found that strong moral convictions lessened individuals’ good will, cooperativeness, and ability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements. By contrast, Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) examined the effects of internalization moral identity on individuals’ moral “engagement.” Results showed that internalization moral identity positively influenced the accessibility of individuals’ moral self-concepts, which was positively associated with ethical behavioral intentions (i.e., charitable donations and contributions to public goods) and negatively influenced unethical behavioral intentions (i.e., lying). Situational context also moderated the effects: Priming moral traits strengthened the effects, whereas financial incentives for unethical acts weakened them.

Emotions Only a handful of studies have examined the inﬂuence of moral self constructs on emotions. In general, this research has shown that constructs centering on the “having” side of the moral self (i.e., self-importance of moral values, internalization moral identity, and level of idealism) enhance individuals’ emotional intelligence (Angelidis & Ibrahim, 2011) and increase the likelihood they will experience self-conscious moral emotions (e.g., guilt and pride, Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011) and other-oriented moral emotions (e.g., empathy; Hardy et al., 2012). Other work, however, has found more nuanced effects. For instance, Stets and Carter (2011, 2012) found that moral identity self- discrepancy (self-ratings of moral identity lower than manipulated ratings) provoked negative emotion (Stets & Carter, 2011) and guilt and shame (Stets & Carter, 2012). Further, Aquino et al. (2011) found that high levels of moral identity internalization (but not symbolization) strengthened the positive effects of acts of uncommon moral goodness on moral elevation (a surge of emotions involving admiration and warmth), which in turn motivated prosocial behavior.

Summary of the consequences of the moral self Overall, researchers have demonstrated that the moral self exerts a significant influence on a variety of outcomes. Individuals with a strong moral self are more attentive to and motivated to act and make decisions that are ethical. Various moral self constructs also invoke a variety of emotional reactions and strengthen emotional intelligence. Our review suggests that considering moderators and mediators can offer a richer understanding of the effects of the moral self. The most notable differences were those between the “having” versus “doing” side of the moral self, specifically for research using Aquino and Reed’s conceptualization and measure of moral identity. Using this measure, internalization was positively and consistently related to ethical behaviors and intentions and consistently negatively related to unethical and counterproductive behaviors and intentions. Conversely, differences emerged for symbolization moral identity. When internalization and symbolization were combined into a composite measure of moral identity, significant results did not emerge unless moderators were considered (e.g., regulatory focus, self-control, group norms, and ethical leadership). The review also highlights some dysfunctional aspects of the “doing” side. That is, symbolization moral identity (Vitell et al., 2011) and moral conviction (Skitka et al., 2005) may enable moral licensing, whereby individuals feel justified to behave unethically. Our review also suggests measurement matters. “Having” side constructs hold a more consistent relationship with attitudes, motives, behavior, and intentions. This makes sense, given the types of moral characteristics that align with individuals’ self-conceptions, such as being a caring and compassionate person or someone who is idealistic or morally sensitive. Yet, the “doing” side should also be influential, particularly because this side of the moral self involves agency. Of the research on the “doing” side reviewed, studies examining self-conscious moral emotions and moral strength demonstrated that these constructs hold more consistent effects on consequences than has moral identity symbolization. The review also shows that self-conscious moral emotions have a strong influence on individuals’ attitudes, motives, and behaviors; however, the effects could be bounded by moderators. Similarly, moral strength constructs also have a strong influence on attitudes, motives, and behaviors to achieve

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job P. L JENNINGS ET AL. moral agency, with these effects influenced by moderating or mediating processes. Consistent results were also found for moral strength constructs of moral potency and duty orientation on various ethical outcomes across multiple organizational field studies. This research suggests that these forms of moral strength exert strong influence on behavior by bolstering the “doing” side of the moral self. Primary differences and inconsistent results emerged when researchers examined the “doing” side of moral identity using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) symbolization moral identity measure. Emphasis on the use of this measure is understandable, as it is the dominant moral identity model in the literature. The measure, however, asks whether participants purchase products, wear clothes, and engage in activities characteristic of moral traits (e.g., being caring, compassionate, and fair). These acts may not be the best representation of moral engagement, or they may represent more superficial and less potent motives associated with moral self-presentation in organizations. Because more consistent findings were found with self-conscious moral emotions and moral strength, these types of constructs may have stronger motivational effects. Last, it is important to note that although theoretical models emphasize the process dynamics of the moral self in which the “having” side informs the “doing” side, research has yet to adequately explore these relationships. Indeed, some studies we review suggest there may be recursive effects across the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self (e.g., Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011; Morton et al., 2006). We encourage researchers to examine the processes by which self-defining moral orientations and dispositions affect (and, in turn, may be affected by) the cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities for moral action.

The moral self as a moderator variable

In general, research has shown that contexts that reinforce ethical behavior (e.g., ethical culture, Caldwell & Moberg, 2007; charitable giving by an organization; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; recognition of donation behavior, Winterich, Mittal, & Aquino, 2013; priming moral context, Aquino et al., 2009; recognition of a focal actor’s prosocial behavior, Winterich, Aquino, Mittal, & Swartz, 2013) generally influence ethical behavior, particularly for individuals with greater moral centrality. Contexts that impair self-regulatory functioning or heighten self-interest fuel unethical behavior (observed coworker unethical behavior, O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2011; power, DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012; primed self-interest, Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010; mistreatment, Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008), particularly for those with lower moral centrality. Additionally, Hannah and Avolio (2010) found that dimensions of moral strength can reinforce one another: The positive effects of moral ownership on ethical behavior were further enhanced for individuals with stronger moral courage; individuals high in both moral courage and moral ownership were more likely to confront others for their unethical acts. Last, research has shown that moral judgment dispositions hold a strong influence on individuals’ reactions to various moral dilemmas. For example, Reynolds (2006) found that whereas both utilitarianism and formalism increase moral awareness, formalists were more apt than utilitarians to recognize norm violations and harm against others. Schminke, Ambrose, and Noel (1997) found that formalism made individuals more sensitive to procedural justice issues (issues involving the fairness of decision-making processes) and utilitarianism made individuals more sensitive to distributive justice issues (issues involving the fairness of decision outcomes). Moreover, moral judgment disposition moderates the effects of organizational contexts on behaviors and intentions, although results are not always consistent. Although Marta et al. (2012) found that relativism strengthened (and idealism weakened) the relationship between perceived corporate ethical values and workers’ ethical intentions, Ruiz-Palomino and Martinez-Cañas (2011) found relativism weakened (and idealism strengthened) the effect of corporate formal ethical policies on employees’ ethical intentions, and they also found that the effect of ethical leadership on employees’ ethical behavioral intentions was stronger for relativists. Last, Zhang and Gowan (2012) found that high formalism strengthened the positive effects of both legal corporate social responsibility (CSR) and ethical CSR activities on job applicant attraction, whereas utilitarianism weakened the effects of economic CSR on job applicant attraction.

Summary of research on the moral self as a moderator Our review suggests that the moral self (i.e., moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, and moral strength) serves to reinforce individuals’ ethical stance and enables them to react to different situations more effectively and ethically than individuals with a weaker moral self. Those with a strong moral self are also better able to refrain from reacting unethically and destructively across situations. Therefore, the ﬁndings show that the moral self motivates individuals to maintain self-consistency, regardless of whether, or how, they deﬁne themselves in terms of moral attributions (the “having” side of the moral self) or are motivated by agency (the “doing” side of the moral self).

Concluding thoughts on the empirical studies of the moral self

In general, research supports moral self theory by showing that factors critical to one’s self-definition shape how morality becomes embedded into the self-concept and self-regulatory functioning, thereby engaging motivation for self-consistency in moral notions. There were some notable trends, however, that emerged from our review. For instance, we found that the literature largely reflects a variable-centric approach. Even though we attempted to synthesize this body of work into an integrative model (Figure 1), an unfortunate consequence of the variable-centric approach is fragmented findings that are difficult to translate into a dynamic and holistic understanding of the structure and functioning of the moral self. Additionally, we observed that the majority of the studies (about 70 percent) adopted Aquino and Reed’s (2002) conceptualization and measures of moral identity. This is not surprising, given that this seminal work produced one of the first measures of the moral self. An over-reliance on this conceptualization, however, neglects other aspects of the moral self. The moral content used in this measure emphasizes nine Kantian-like moral traits (being a caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hard- working, honest, and kind person). This limited range of moral content may mask insights about the moral self, particularly in contexts where other moral traits and content (e.g., honor, duty, and virtue) may be valued and important. A last noticeable trend is that the majority of the studies on the moral self have used samples other than full-time working employees or those in organizations. Considering the negative consequences that (un)ethical behavior yields to organizations (Treviño et al., 2006), clearly more work is needed using organization-based samples to examine how organizational factors influence the moral self, as well as the implications of the moral self to behavioral ethics in organizations. We elaborate on these trends and ideas below.

Emerging Opportunities and Future Directions for Moral Self Research

In this ﬁnal section of our review, we highlight several emerging opportunities for future research on the moral self, including: (i) the need for more applied research in organizational contexts; (ii) the need for clarity on the “having” side of the moral self with regard to both its content and structure; (iii) the need for clarity on the “doing” side of the moral self with regard to the underlying motivational and regulatory processes; and (iv) the need for a moral integrative and holistic understanding of the moral self.

Opportunities for research in organizational contexts

Arguably, the most pressing need is for more applied research on the moral self within organizations and with data from working adults. By and large, the majority of the studies conducted on the moral self use student samples or scenario studies. The work conducted within organizations or using employee samples suggests that organizational factors have a significant influence on employees’ moral self and that the moral self, in turn, significantly affects organizationally relevant outcomes. To this end, much of Aquino and colleagues’ research (e.g., Aquino & Becker,

2005; Hardy et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2007; Winterich, Mittal et al., 2013) has focused on identifying organizationally relevant situational factors that influence moral identity. Although predominately conducted in laboratory settings, their research suggests that moral identity can be influenced by an array of organizationally relevant factors (e.g., ethical climate, financial incentives, and recognition). Additionally, their research highlights how organizations present employees with a variety of morally ambiguous situations that are fraught with conflict between self and organizational interests. Much more research is needed to better understand the relationship between organizational factors and the moral self. To this point, some research has demonstrated that organizational factors may influence the moral self in unexpected and, perhaps, detrimental ways. For instance, Schminke (2001) theorized that a strong work context (i.e., mechanistic structure) would create little need for employees to rely on moral inclinations (their moral self), but he found the oppo- site. Other work has shown the “dark side” of the moral self, which suggests that some contexts may inhibit moral functioning and promote dysfunctional behaviors. For example, Skitka et al. (2005) and Vitell et al. (2011) found that a strong moral self, specifically aspects of the “doing” side (moral strength and symbolization moral identity), promoted a sense of superiority, causing intolerance of dissimilar others and impairing good will and cooperativeness. Thus, it is possible that certain individuals (such as those who believe that they are morally superior or highly idealistic/absolutist) may be inflexible to employees or contexts that oppose their philosophical orientations. These dynamics may also explain why employees sabotage other units or organizational outsiders. More work is needed to shed light on how aspects of organizations and relationships within it (viz. supervisors, coworkers, and customers) strengthen or weaken employees’ moral self and make employees more or less apt to activate or rely on their moral self. Research is also needed to determine the implications of the moral self for the benefit of organizations beyond ethical outcomes. Of particular interest is the influence of the moral self on organizational functioning, behaviors, and performance. In our empirical review, only one study assessed job performance as an outcome (Skarlicki et al., 2008). However, this study did not examine the direct or indirect effects of the moral self on job performance; performance was considered as a distal outcome. Further, although a variety of studies have examined general prosocial acts, far less research examined prosocial work behavior, such as organizational citizenship behavior (see McFerran et al., 2010, for an exception). Last, we know relatively little about the effects of the moral self on collective processes or work outcomes (e.g., group-level performance and engagement; organization-level climate). As argued by Klein and Kozlowski (2000), it is important to consider phenomena at different levels of analysis because “findings at one level of analysis do not generalize neatly and exactly to other levels of analysis, except under very restrictive circumstances” (p. 213). To be sure, very limited research attention has been given to aggregate level phenomena (e.g., Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al., 2013) and its impact on and consequence to moral self constructs.

Emerging opportunities on the “having” side of the moral self

Our review highlights the need for clarity on the “having” side of the moral self with regard to its content and structure. Speciﬁcally, researchers have relied on a narrow range of moral content (e.g., speciﬁc moral traits, values, principles, ideals, and goals) and a limited dimensional structure (e.g., internalization and symbolization). This narrow focus may obscure or fail to reveal differences in the construction and functioning of the moral self across individuals.

How does the content of the moral self vary and inﬂuence moral functioning? Blasi (1984) emphasized that moral identities can vary in content. That is, moral notions (e.g., moral values, principles, and ideals) that constitute moral identity vary across individuals. Whereas one person may see being compassionate and helpful as central to his or her moral identity, another person may emphasize being fair and just, and yet another being loyal, dutiful, and self-sacriﬁcing. As our empirical review reveals, different moral judgment dispositions embody different moral content; ethical ideology assesses idealistic versus relativistic tendencies, whereas ethical predispositions assess utilitarian versus formalistic tendencies. Moreover, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measures

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job THE MORAL SELF focus only on a handful of Kantian traits (e.g., caring, compassionate). Blasi’s arguments suggest that a broader range of moral content should be considered in moral self research. In line with these ideas, Haidt (2008) described a “great narrowing” in which the domain of morality has been reduced to a limited set of concerns related to harm and fairness. He asked researchers to consider a broader range of moral concerns that would include group-focused moralities related to loyalty and self-sacrifice, respect, and obedience to authority, as well as sanctity and physical and spiritual wholesomeness. To Haidt’s point, some deontic traits, such as duty and loyalty, are not included in Aquino and Reed’s measures but influence work motivation and behavior (Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013; Shamir, 1991). Certainly, employees are likely driven by moral concerns other than those concerning fairness and justice. As an alternative, Walker and colleagues (e.g., Walker & Hennig, 2004; Walker & Pitts, 1998) suggested that different trait clusters represent different types of moral exemplars. They identified three distinct types of moral exemplars based on their structure of moral traits: Brave exemplars are identified by a structure that includes intrepid, confident, heroic–strong, dedicated, and self-sacrificial traits; care exemplars are identified by a structure that includes loving–empathetic, altruistic, and honest–dependable traits; and just exemplars are identified by a structure that includes honest, fair, principled, rational, and conscientious traits. Indeed, the self is highly complex and includes more than traits, such as moral notions associated with social roles, autobiographical narratives, and goal structures, that should be considered in future research on the moral self (Hill & Roberts, 2010; Lord, Hannah, & Jennings, 2011). Such clusters may inform social learning and role modeling effects of leaders in organizations.

How does the structure of the moral self vary and influence moral functioning? The structure of the moral self is more complex than the one or two dimensions reflected in the constructs we reviewed. Two distinctions are discussed below to extend thinking on the dimensional structure of the moral self beyond the current attention to internalization on the “having” side and symbolization on the “doing” side: (i) the distinction between the I-self and Me-self and (ii) the distinction between global and domain-specific moral self-concepts.

The I-self and Me-self distinction. William James (1892/2001) introduced an important distinction between the I-self and Me-self, which has been overlooked in the moral self literature. The I-self refers to the mental presence of a person’s sense of self (Harter, 1999). Constructs associated with the I-self are as follows: (i) self-awareness (the appreciation for internal states, needs, thoughts, and emotions); (ii) self-agency (the sense of authorship over one’s thoughts and actions); (iii) self-continuity (the sense of remaining the same person over time); and (iv) self-coherence (a stable sense of the self as a single, coherent, bounded entity) (Harter, 1999). The Me-self refers to perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of oneself (Harter, 1999). Constructs associated with the Me-self are as follows: (i) self-knowledge (the beliefs of one’s self); (ii) self-concepts, self-identities, and self-schemas (conceptualizations of one’s self); and (iii) self-evaluations (judgments about one’s value or worth as a person; e.g., self-esteem, self-worth, and self-efﬁcacy; Baumeister, 1998). Our review shows that scholars have devoted attention to the Me-self, speciﬁcally self-concepts and identities, such as Aquino and Reed’s (2002) model. Yet, aspects of the I-self have important implications for moral functioning. Blasi (1993) emphasized that people vary in both the degree to which moral notions are central to their self-concept (Me-self) and the degree to which they experience morality within their subjective sense of self (I-self). A recent study on virtues and character strengths found the I-self to be central to moral strength (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). This subjective I-self experience entails (i) a sense of authenticity (“this is the real me”); (ii) a desire to act with character strength; (iii) a feeling of excitement and invigoration as opposed to exhaustion when using the strength; and (iv) positive self-feelings (e.g., subjective well-being, acceptance of oneself, and reverence for life). These subjective I-self experiences are thought to not only be associated with the “doing” side of the moral self (i.e., moral strength) but are also intrinsic to, and a constituent of, the “having” side of the moral self. For instance, they may be an important experiential aspect of moral centrality—that is, how the experience of morality becomes central to one’s self-understanding.

Further, aspects of the I-self hold promise for understanding the construction and development of the moral self. For example, developed capabilities in the I-self (e.g., self-awareness) directly inﬂuence the structure and content of the Me-self (e.g., self-knowledge) at any given developmental level (Harter, 1999). Thus, I-self processes and changes are critical to how and why the content and structure of the Me-self changes. Contemporary developmental psychologists have, therefore, embraced I-self and Me-self distinctions as a framework for understanding these reciprocal inﬂuences (Harter, 1999). To better understand the construction and functioning of the moral self, attention should be given to the I-self and its reciprocal and dynamic relationships with the Me-self.

Global versus domain-specific moral self. Considering how the content and structure of the moral self vary across domains may also prove useful. Much of the work in our review focuses on the global nature of the moral self. This approach assumes the following: (i) individuals possess a unified moral self that is distinct from other aspects of the self and (ii) the moral self can be more or less central to one’s overall sense of self and identity (Aquino et al., 2009). Although this unified approach is thought to be a defining characteristic of selfhood and moral selfhood (Baumeister, 1998), it neglects how the content and structure of the moral self may change across domains, such as the multiple social roles a given individual may take on that are both within and external to his or her organization. To be sure, we reviewed research that showed that context influences the moral self, highlighting the possibility for the moral self to be influenced by domain-specific or situation-specific content and structure across social roles. Along these lines, Hannah et al. (2011) proposed a self-complexity approach (e.g., Linville, 1987; Woolfolk, Gara, Allen, & Beaver, 2004) to moral identity, suggesting sub-identities compose moral identity. These sub-identities are based on social roles, such as parent or manager, and are developed as people perform these roles over time (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Thus, sub-identities may consist of different forms of moral content. For example, Woolfolk et al. (2004) showed that ethics-related attributes (being honest, selfish, scornful, admirable, bad, dependable, and dishon- est) were represented to a greater or lesser extent across individuals’ various sub-identities. Emerging research also shows that individuals’ preferences, values, and ethical judgments and behaviors change when separate sub-identities are primed (LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010), including professional identities (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012). Although the moral self may possess a certain global unity, it is also likely to be highly differentiated across domains (Markus & Wurf, 1987). A self-complexity approach to theorizing and operationalizing moral identity may help explain why moral thought and behavior varies across situations, because of variance in which aspects of the moral self are activated in each situation (Hardy & Carlo, 2005).

Emerging opportunities on the “doing” side of the moral self

Our review also highlights the need for additional research to add clarity on the “doing” side of the moral self. A recent review by Schaubroeck, Kim, and Peng (2012) highlights a suite of constructs important to understanding the motivational and self-regulatory inﬂuence of the self on how people interact with their work environment. We focus on constructs signiﬁcant to the motivational and regulatory aspects of the moral self and ethical behavior in organizations.

How does the moral self motivate moral behavior? A key impetus for research on the moral self was to bridge the judgment–action gap (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). This is particularly important for organizational settings in which individuals may be at risk of losing their job, becoming os- tracized, or receiving threats for speaking up in support of their values, and in which it is often easier to “not rock the boat.” Much more work is needed to determine how moral motivation operates in organizational contexts. We reviewed some research that has addressed the relationship between the moral self and motivations (e.g., self-consistency, Jordan et al., 2011; Vitell et al., 2011; self-improvement, Kurpis et al., 2008). Other studies have investigated how moral identity influences motivational states (e.g., moral elevation, Aquino et al., 2011; self-conscious emotions, Tangney et al., 1996). Still, given the significance of the moral self to moral motivation, it is surprising that little attention has been given to identifying and measuring specific motivations implicated by the moral self.

Self-motivations (Shamir, 1991) may assist with this goal, as they emerge directly from and reﬂect back on the self. The moral self does not function from a purely dispassionate and objective basis. Instead, the subjective experience of and objective beliefs about the self and morality are subject to motivational as well as evaluative and emotive forces (Baumeister, 1998). Moral self (cf. Bergman, 2004) and social psychology theories (cf. Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012) highlight several self-motivations to consider.

Self-consistency. Blasi’s (1993) theory suggests that moral identity creates a psychological need to act consistent with one’s moral principles and ideals. There are three dimensions of self-consistency: (i) consistency in the unity among different aspects of the self-concept at a given point in time (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987), (ii) consistency in the continuity of the self-concept across a period (Turner, 1968), and (iii) consistency in the congruence between the self-concept and behavior—both in situ and chronically over time (Burke & Reitzes, 1981). To date, research has given some attention to consistency between the self-concept and behavior, but only in a limited way. More research is required on this important self-motivation.

Authenticity. Prevailing work motivation theories assume that people are hedonistic and instrumentally oriented (Shamir, 1991). For example, VIE theory (valence, instrumentality, expectancy; Vroom, 1964) incorporates instrumentality directly into the motivational calculus of the individual. Similarly, goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990) directly builds on the idea that individuals are motivated by goals. A less pervasive assumption, but arguably more central to moral functioning, is that people may also act non-instrumentally and be motivated to give authentic expression of their moral self. This approach accounts for behaviors that are irrational, altruistic, and self-sacrificing (Strauss, 1969). The most extreme expressions are supererogatory acts, such as a soldier falling on a grenade to save comrades. Such acts are difficult to explain by instrumental logic but can emerge from motives to engage in ethical behavior for the sake of others, a work unit, organization, or community (Shamir, 1991). Gecas (1986) further suggests that this “authenticity motive” reflects an individual’s real identity or true self. Such an authenticity motive is inherent in conceptualizations of the moral self (cf. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Erikson, 1964; James, 1892/2001) but needs explicit empirical attention in future research.

Self-evaluations and self-enhancement. Individuals are also motivated by the desire to maintain and enhance positive self-evaluations (Baumeister, 1998). Self-evaluations (e.g., self-esteem) can be considered distinct from self- enhancement in that they rely on different evaluative standards. For example, Higgins et al. (1987) proposed that self-evaluations are guided by “ought self” qualities of what a person believes she or he ought to possess, whereas self-enhancement is guided by an “ideal self” of qualities representing what a person aspires to possess. The two types of evaluative standards are internalized as part of a person’s self-concept and suggest that moral behavior can be motivated by a desire to maintain and enhance positive self-evaluations relative to “ought” and “ideal” self-guides (Bandura, 1986).

Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is a person’s beliefs about agentic capabilities (e.g., Bandura, 1986), and, specifically, the motivation to perceive oneself as a causal agent to bring influence on one’s own functioning and environment (Bandura, 2008). deCharms (1968) proposed that individuals strive to be “origins” of behavior, rather than “pawns” of impinging forces. Self-efficacy, then, motivates one to be efficacious or agentive, which some argue lies at the heart of the experience of the self (Erikson, 1964; Gecas, 1986; James, 1892/2001). Scholars have argued that self-efficacy can exist as an aspect of moral self strength and be an important motivator of moral action (Mitchell & Palmer, 2010). Despite its potential significance, we identified only two studies that have examined it (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Schaubroeck, Hannah, et al., 2012).

Self-presentation. Individuals are strongly motivated by the recognition and acknowledgement of others (Baumeister, 1998). People will rarely see themselves as a great artist, good leader, or moral person unless others do and provide afﬁrming feedback. Indeed, individuals’ self-concepts are highly correlated with beliefs of how others

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job P. L JENNINGS ET AL. perceive them (Baumeister, 1998). Self-presentational strategies are used to construct and socially validate one’s sense of self. For example, instrumental self-presentation involves impressing others to achieve an ulterior goal. Ex- empliﬁcation self-presentation involves convincing people that you are a good person. Expressive self-presentation involves making an impression on others to validate one’s true self (Baumeister, 1998). Testing such self-presentation motives may help further explain the differential effects reviewed earlier, for example, between internalization and symbolization of moral identity. These different self-motivations overlap somewhat, but each extend our understanding of the motivational implications of the moral self. For instance, self-consistency is thought to dominate the more cognitive aspects of the self (Me-self), whereas self-expression and authenticity are thought to dominate the more affective aspects of the self (I-self) (Baumeister, 1998). Further, social psychology research suggests that self-enhancement is likely a stronger motivator than self-consistency and that self-expression and authenticity could be strongest of all (Baumeister, 1998; Gecas, 1986). Also, just as the structure of the moral self may be multi-faceted, so are motivations that derive from it. Nucci (2002) observed that people are typically motivated to moral action for multiple self- relevant reasons, suggesting that different self-motivations should be assessed in interaction. This is particularly important as researchers study the moral self in dynamic and complex organizational contexts where, as noted earlier, an array of situational factors can evoke numerous forms of human motivation. In sum, much research is needed before we fully understand the motivational dynamics associated with the moral self.

What factors contribute to successful moral self-regulation? Baumeister (1998) argued that the capacity to change and control oneself is one of the most fundamental, useful, and adaptive aspects of the self. Higgins (1996) further emphasized the sovereignty of self-regulation. To this end, the moral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart et al., 1998). Research has examined facets of moral self-regulation (e.g., regulatory focus, Brebels et al., 2011; self-control, Vitell et al., 2009; moral disengagement/engagement, Aquino et al., 2009; Detert et al., 2008). However, attention to other self-regulatory capacities, such as those that contribute to moral self-regulation success and failure, would be useful. Social psychology suggests that successful self-regulation requires (i) clear and viable standards, (ii) effective self-monitoring, and (iii) potency to act and create change. Failed self-regulation involves (i) confused or conﬂicting standards, (ii) poor self-monitoring, or (iii) a lack of strength or capacity to produce change (Baumeister et al., 1994). These ideas may provide a basis for future research to enhance our understanding of the self-regulatory dynamics associated with the moral self.

Self-regulatory focus. The first two criteria for successful self-regulation involve clear and viable standards and effective self-monitoring. Regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) explains how people are motivated differ- ently depending on their desired end state. “Strong oughts” represent beliefs about duties, obligations, and responsibilities, and “strong ideals” represent hopes, wishes, and aspirations (Higgins, 1997). RFT proposes that the focus of self-regulation differs in relation to strong oughts versus strong ideals. Ought self-regulation involves a “prevention focus” or sensitivity to avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997), thereby promoting one to be pru- dent, precautionary, and vigilant in avoiding wrongdoing, mistakes, and omissions related to the desired end state (fulfilling duties, obligations, and responsibilities). Ideal self-regulation involves a “promotion focus” or sensitivity to achieving positive outcomes (Higgins, 1997, p. 1281), thereby promoting advancement, growth, and mastery toward achieving a desired end state (achieving virtue, aspirations, and excellence). RFT can inform moral self theory. The “ought selves” and “ideal selves” serve as two types of evaluative self-guides or standards that may directly implicate and operate together with certain self-motivations (e.g., self-enhancement) and self-regulatory processes (e.g., self-regulatory focus). Research has not investigated how these and other aspects of the moral self, motivations, and self-regulation operate together as a system, as opposed to discrete variables. As organizations impose role definitions, norms, and reward and punishment systems on members, more robust study of how strong

“oughts” and “ideals” operate on individuals is needed. Further, a study of ideal selves may inform why individuals develop into moral exemplars in organizations and may perform virtuous supererogatory acts that inspire others.

Self-regulatory strength. The ability to control and strengthen the self is a crucial resource for self-regulation. Scholars contend that self-regulation can involve strength, consistent with the concept of willpower (Baumeister et al., 1994) and akin to muscular strength (e.g., Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999). That is, self-resources associated with moral action can be strengthened over time. In this view, impulses that emerge in response to temptation have a certain strength or intensity, and overcoming them requires a corresponding form of self-regulatory strength. Our review highlights recent research focusing on moral strength (e.g., moral potency, moral character, moral attitude, moral confidence, and moral conviction) and shows patterns consistent with the strength approach to self-regulation; moral strength constructs positively influence ethical behaviors and negatively influence unethical behaviors. There are three potential avenues to extend this work on self-regulatory strength to moral self theory. First, self- regulation research suggests that it is a depletable (but renewable) capacity that operates much like a muscle (Bauer & Baumeister, 2011; Muraven et al., 1999). Like a muscle that grows tired and weak after exercise but strengthens over time with continued exercise, self-regulatory capacity can be strengthened as well with repeated exercise of self-control. This differs from the perspective of self-regulation as a cybernetic control system, operating like a ther- mostat on the basis of feedback (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998). The strength model suggests that self-regulation can be enhanced or depleted by interaction with personal and situational factors (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). Indeed, organizational research has shown that organizational factors, such as abusive supervision (see Martinko, Harvey, Brees, & Mackey, 2013, for a review), can impair self-regulatory functioning, which prompt unethical and destructive work behavior (e.g., Hannah, Schaubroeck et al., 2013; Thau & Mitchell, 2010). It would be useful for scholars to explore how organizations can strengthen employees’ self-regulation through building the strength of their moral self. Second, the study of virtues and character strengths from positive psychology is also relevant. This work suggests two dimensions of moral strength—negative and positive—operate through two self-regulatory routes that corre- spond to a prevention and promotion focus (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In the negative dimension, character strengths enable a person to persevere and keep to one’s moral commitments despite obstacles, temptations, or con- fusing circumstances (Kupperman, 1991). This involves forms of moral strength and conation, such as moral discipline and moral self-control, which can override and restrain base impulses to limit moral distress, disorder, or corruption (Baumeister, Gailliot, & Tice, 2009). In the positive dimension, character strength enables goal-directed pursuits of morally praiseworthy activities critical to moral fulfillment and flourishing (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). This involves positive forms of moral strength and conation (e.g., ego strength, moral courage, and moral efficacy) associated with realizing moral commitments. This research suggests that moral self-regulation involves dual negative/prevention and positive/promotion modes of functioning (Bandura, 2008). Third, the experience of moral strength is closely associated with the I-self in that it involves the experience of authenticity, excitement, consistency, and enthusiasm, as well as enhancement and well-being (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). These subjective experiences appear closely related to the self-motivations described earlier and, when combined with positive and negative self-regulatory modes, suggest a dynamic system-like linkage among these different aspects of the moral self. Indeed, we believe that one of the most needed and promising lines of theory building will be to examine these system-like dynamics among moral self constructs. Such an integrative approach is consistent with an emerging theoretical trend toward a more holistic understanding of the moral self (cf. Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009), which we address next.

Toward a more holistic understanding of the moral self

We have framed the moral self as a set of self-relevant moral constructs that constitute a dynamic mode of functioning. This holistic understanding of the moral self is considerably broader than those represented in our empirical review. There are two primary reasons to consider a more holistic approach to the moral self. First, differential

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job P. L JENNINGS ET AL. effects in research findings exist across the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self. The “having” side—both the content and structure of the moral self—is multi-faceted and dynamic and may have a certain global unity as well as domain-specific qualities. Understanding how these dimensions create differential effects requires examining how they implicate motivational and regulatory aspects of the “doing” side of the moral self. Second, there are recursive interactions between the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. As noted earlier, both self-motivation and self-regulation of the “doing” side involve complex cognitive, emotive, and evaluative processes that influence the “having” side of the moral self. This recursive functioning makes it somewhat artificial to separate the “having” side of who a person is from the “doing” side of how a person acts.

Integrative views of the moral self More integrative theories of the moral self have begun to emerge in the literature but are largely untested. For example, working from a “having” side perspective, McAdams (2009) provided a multi-level framework for the moral self that begins at Level 1 with broadband dispositional traits inherited from evolutionary design, advances to Level 2 with socially learned dispositional traits that show cross-situational consistency and developmental continuity, then transitions to Level 3 with characteristic adaptations that involve cognitive-affective self-regulatory mechanisms that are highly responsive to situational cues, and ends at Levels 4 and 5 where characteristic adaptations emerge into moral self-defining life narratives (Level 4) that are expressed differentially in broader social and cultural contexts (Level 5). McAdams’ theory is noteworthy because it provides a multidisciplinary perspective that integrates the dispositional “having” side with the self-regulatory “doing” side of the moral self to account for both cross-situational stability and variability (adaptability) of moral self functioning. Other theorists have started from a “doing” side perspective to build integrative frameworks on the basis of social cognitive and information processing theories. For example, Narvaez (2008) provided what she calls a “triune ethics theory” of the moral self that builds on a social-cognitive view of the moral self and incorporates insights from personality and evolutionary psychology, as well as from neuroscience. Her theory suggests a dynamic view of the moral self, expressed as three moral orientations rooted in evolved strata of the brain. These moral orientations (security, engagement, and imagination) can be dispositional or situationally activated, influencing perceptual processing and goal salience. Narvaez’s theory is noteworthy because it also integrates the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self, accounts for cross-situational stability as well as variance, and emphasizes moral self-development, which has been neglected in extant empirical research. Hannah et al. (2011) also offered an integrative framework inclusive of moral cognition capacities (moral maturation, moral meta-cognitive ability, and moral identity complexity) and moral conation capacities (moral potency as described earlier). This framework attempts to describe the capacities needed to process ethical issues from the stage of moral awareness, through judgment, intention, and, ultimately, behavior. Thus, the trajectory of theorizing on the moral self is toward more integrative theoretical approaches that offer more dynamic and holistic understandings. To date, the theoretical advances toward this end are far ahead of the empirical research, which still uses a discrete variable-centric approach that fragments our understanding of the moral self. Yet, an integrative approach is critical to better understand behavioral ethics in the complexity of organizational settings. The mere making of a moral judgment does not inform why someone will attend to moral issues in the first place, why they will feel the need to act, or why they will overcome pressures and temptations to act unethically. Therefore, an integrative approach that provides a more holistic understanding is critical to resolving the judgment–action gap. To conclude this review, we briefly discuss two final topics that can inform a more holistic view of the moral self.

Evolutionary psychology and neuroscience Organizational researchers are increasingly drawing on evolutionary psychology and neuroscience to deepen our understanding of the internal workings of organizational behavior phenomena, such as work attitudes, workplace discrimination, and perceptions of fairness and organizational justice (Becker, Cropanzano, & Sanfey, 2011). These disciplines have gained interest among moral self theorists in part because of Haidt and colleague’s (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) social intuitionist model of moral self functioning. For parsimony, Haidt’s model was not included in our empirical review. However, this approach is compelling because it challenges long-held ontological and theoretical

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job THE MORAL SELF assumptions about the nature of the moral self. The social intuitionist approach is similar to the social-cognitive approach (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002) in that both allow for the automaticity of moral functioning but also differs in significant respects. First, it puts the locus of the moral self in innate moral intuitions derived from socio-biological processes instead of a cognitively constructed moral self-concept or identity derived through social interactions. Second, it posits that humans are equipped through biological and evolutionary inheritance with intuitive ethics—innate pre- paredness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving others (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Whereas the social-cognitive approach emphasizes cognitively based self-regulatory mechanisms (e.g., chronicity, activation of moral schemas), the social intuitionist approach emphasizes affective self-regulation (e.g., moral intuitions and moral emotions). Third, the social intuitionist approach asserts that moral cognition follows rather than precedes moral behavior, in that moral reasoning rationalizes (im)moral judgments or behavior post hoc. These ideas contrast with many core ideas of moral self theory (e.g., Blasi, 1984). Some of the key research questions provoked by the social intuitionist approach (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2009) include the following: (i) How do cognition and emotion interact to produce moral judgments and actions? (ii) To what extent do sophisticated moral capacities (e.g., moral centrality, moral judgment dispositions, self-conscious moral orientation, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength) rely on evolutionary-based motivational systems? (iii) What are the neural bases of moral knowledge, moral sentiments, and moral values? And (iv) how do biochemical and electrical activity in biological matter of the brain give rise to the sense of self and self-conscious moral orientation in the first place?

Cultural psychology and the moral self Organizational researchers have long recognized the importance of culture to how individuals form attachments to social groups, including social identities, involvement, commitment, loyalty, psychological contracts, and citizenship behavior (Beyer, Hannah, & Milton, 2000). Similarly, moral self theorists also recognize that culture plays a pivotal role in the construction of the moral self, on the basis of the Aristotelian premise that morality is culturally situated (Haidt, 2008; Hunter, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Solomon, 1992; Triandis, 1989). Although our empirical review highlights a few studies addressing the influence of culture on the moral self, research is needed to uncover how cultural differences, including differences in organizational culture, influence the moral self, and, specifically, its content and structure. In terms of moral content, morality is culturally relative and particularistic to certain societies, institutions, commu- nities, and organizations (Hunter, 2000; Leavitt et al., 2012). Thus, variations in morality exist across cultures (and within cultures). Our review highlights that much research focus is given to Western cultural notions of morality, which tend to focus on a small set of moral concerns related to harm/care and justice/fairness (Haidt, 2008). Researchers should broaden the scope and consider how other types of cultural moral content affect the moral self. In terms of the structure of the moral self, cultural psychology has shown that cultures vary in the relative emphasis they place on a variety of self-relevant factors (e.g., relative emphasis placed on the private versus the public versus the collective self; Triandis, 1989; dimensions including individualism versus collectivism, complexity versus simplicity, and independence versus interdependence; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus, research should examine how the structure of the moral self varies along cultural dimensions.

Conclusion

Over the last 25 years, the role of the self in moral functioning has gained increased theoretical and empirical attention. Organizational behavior ethics researchers have taken an interest in the moral self as a way to better understand ethical behavior in the workplace. Overall, our review of the empirical work supports the central thesis of moral self theory, as findings show that the self generally plays a significant role in human moral functioning and ethical behavior. Yet, this growing body of research on the moral self has produced a diversity of constructs that, although informative, have provided highly fragmented findings that contribute to a lack of clarity as to the essential nature and functioning of the moral self. Further, much of the literature has examined factors that influence the moral self

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014) DOI: 10.1002/job P. L JENNINGS ET AL. and its inﬂuence outside of an organizational context. To continue to advance research on the moral self and its implications to organizations, future research needs to adopt a more process-oriented, multidisciplinary, and integrative approach, with speciﬁc focus on organizational and work contexts.

Author biographies

Peter L. Jennings is as an Assistant Professor of Management at the Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara Uni- versity. His current research focuses on the psychology of moral identity and character, and its signiﬁcance to the practice of leadership. Marie S. Mitchell is an Assistant Professor of Management in the Terry College of Business at the University of Georgia. Her research focuses on “dark,” destructive, and unethical behavior, examining antecedents and consequences of such behavior and which factors make these behaviors more or less likely. Sean Hannah is Professor of Management and the Wilson Chair of Business Ethics at Wake Forest University School of Business and is a retired US Army Colonel. He studies exemplary forms of leadership as well as leader and character development.

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