The Borat Problem in Contract Law: Fraud, Assent, and Standard Forms
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Paul Rudd Strikes a Comedic Pose While Bowling for Children Who Stutter
show ad Funnyman with a heart of gold! Paul Rudd strikes a comedic pose while bowling for children who stutter By Shyam Dodge PUBLISHED: 03:33 EST, 22 October 2013 | UPDATED: 03:34 EST, 22 October 2013 30 View comments He's known for being one of the funniest men working in Hollywood today. But Paul Rudd proved he's also got a heart of gold as he hosted his second annual All-Star Bowling Benefit for children who stutter in New York, on Monday. The 44-year-old actor could be seen throughout the fund raising event performing various comedic antics while bowling at the lanes. Gearing up: Paul Rudd hosted his second annual All-Star Bowling Benefit for children who stutter in New York, on Monday The I Love You, Man star taught some of the fundamentals of the sport to the children gathered for the event. But when it came his turn to demonstrate his bowling prowess it appeared he may have needed some practise in the art. Performing a comedic kick in the air after seeming to land the ball in the gutter the surrounding kids erupted into both applause and giggles. Getting a rise: The 44-year-old actor looked to have missed his mark during the event The set up: Rudd got his form down before letting loose But the antics also seemed to have been choreographed to entertain the youngsters, who the star was intent upon helping. Wearing brown suede loafers and tan chinos, Rudd went casual in a simple chequered button down shirt. -
The Problem with Borat
Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 9 December 2007 The rP oblem with Borat Ghada Chehade Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/taboo Recommended Citation Chehade, G. (2017). The rP oblem with Borat. Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education, 11 (1). https://doi.org/10.31390/ taboo.11.1.09 Taboo, Spring-Summer-Fall-WinterGhada Chehade 2007 63 The Problem with Borat Ghada Chehade There is just something about Borat, Sacha Baron Cohen’s barbaric alter-ego who The Observer’s Oliver Marre (2006) aptly describes as “…homophobic, rac- ist, and misogynist as well as anti-Semitic.” While on the surface, Cohen’s Borat may seem to offend all races equally—the one group he offends the most is the very group he portrays as homophobic, racist, misogynist, and anti-Semitic. Or in other words, the real parties vilified by Cohen are not Borat’s victims but Borat himself. The humour is ultimately directed at this uncivilized buffoon-Borat. He is the butt of every joke. He is the one we laugh at, and are intended to laugh at, the most inasmuch as he is more vulgar, savage, ignorant, barbaric, and racist than any of the bigoted Americans “exposed” in the 2006 film Borat: Cultural Learn- ings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan. This would not be quite as problematic if the fictional Borat did not come from a very real place and did not so obviously (mis)represent Muslims. While the 2006 film has received coverage and praise for revealing the racism of Americans, very few people are asking whether Cohen’s caricature of a savage, homophobic, misogynist, racist, and hard core Jew-hating Muslim is not actually a form of anti-Muslim racism. -
Rights As Signals
RIGHTS AS SIGNALS DANIEL A. FARBER* ABSTRACT Because rights operate as trumps over normal governmental interests, they have an inherent cost. Consequently, by entrenching protection for human rights, govern- ments can signal a willingness to give up power in the short term to obtain long- term benefits. Investors can infer from this that the government has a low discount rate and is less likely to pose a threat of expropriation. Similarly, when courts vig- orously enforce human rights, they dramatize their judicial independence, which is valuable to investors, who themselves may have no interest in human rights. Thus, human rights enforcement may help encourage investment and thereby indirectly foster economic growth. I. INTRODUCTION CAN developing countries afford human rights and the rule of law? Perhaps not, according to Richard Posner. Posner advises poorer countries against "creating a first-class judiciary or an extensive system of civil liberties."' Although he is by no means opposed to judicial independence and human rights, he argues that they should largely await economic growth.2 From this point of view, the dramatic recent expansion of constitutionalism is a bit perplexing, if not a mistake. Posner's argument can be challenged on several grounds. Although he minimizes the importance of an independent judiciary to development,' the current consensus among economists is apparently to the contrary.' Some * McKnight Presidential Professor of Public Law, Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, and Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, University of Minnesota. Thanks to Jim Chen, David McGowan, Eric Posner, and Tom Ulen for helpful comments. 'Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 World Bank Research Observer 1, 9 (1998). -
Borat in an Age of Postironic Deconstruction Antonio López
Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 10 December 2007 Borat in an Age of Postironic Deconstruction Antonio López Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/taboo Recommended Citation López, A. (2017). Borat in an Age of Postironic Deconstruction. Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education, 11 (1). https://doi.org/ 10.31390/taboo.11.1.10 Taboo, Spring-Summer-Fall-WinterAntonio López 2007 73 Borat in an Age of Postironic Deconstruction Antonio López The power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them. ... To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed, to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take account of the reality which one denies—all this is indispensably necessary. Even in using the word doublethink it is necessary to exercise doublethink. For by using the word one admits that one is tampering with reality; by a fresh act of doublethink one erases this knowledge; and so on indefinitely, with the lie always one leap ahead of the truth. —George Orwell, 19841 I will speak to you in plain, simple English. And that brings us to tonight’s word: ‘truthiness.’ Now I’m sure some of the ‘word police,’ the ‘wordinistas’ over at Webster’s are gonna say, ‘hey, that’s not really a word.’ Well, anyone who knows me knows I’m no fan of dictionaries or reference books. -
Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship
Responses Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship Ian Ayrest I. INTRODUCTION Eric Posner has written a thoughtful and provocative indictment of the modem economic analysis of contracts. His essay makes two central claims1 about the failings of scholars "to produce an 'economic theory.' Specifically, Posner claims that the economic approach "does not explain the current system of contract law" and that it does not "provide a solid basis for criticizing and reforming contract law."2 In other words, Posner claims that modem scholarship fails as either a descriptive or a normative theory, in that it fails to give an account of what current law is or what efficient law should be. The descriptive criticism deserves only brief comment. Although he claims that modem scholarship has failed to achieve "what its proponents set out as the measure of success, ' 3 Posner sadly distorts reality by claiming that the leading scholars have been engaged in an attempt to use economic theory to predict the content of current legal rules. This is a straw man. Of course, decades ago this was the project of Richard Posner. 4 But the thought that efficiency analysis would provide a mechanism to predict the details of current doctrine is a serious misreading of the aims of modem scholarship. t William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School, [email protected]. Alan Schwartz provided helpful comments. 1. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?,112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003). 2. Id. 3. Id.at 879; see also id, at 831 ("[Tjhe original aspiration[] of the economic analysis of contract law [was] to provide an explanation of existing legal rules ...."). -
With No Catchy Taglines Or Slogans, Showtime Has Muscled Its Way Into the Premium-Cable Elite
With no catchy taglines or slogans, Showtime has muscled its way into the premium-cable elite. “A brand needs to be much deeper than a slogan,” chairman David Nevins says. “It needs to be a marker of quality.” BY GRAHAM FLASHNER ixteen floors above the Wilshire corridor in entertainment. In comedy, they have a sub-brand of doing interesting things West Los Angeles, Showtime chairman and with damaged or self-destructive characters.” CEO David Nevins sits in a plush corner office Showtime can skew male (Ray Donovan, House of Lies) and female (The lined with mementos, including a prop knife Chi, SMILF). It’s dabbled in thrillers (Homeland), black comedies (Shameless), from the Dexter finale and ringside tickets to adult dramas (The Affair), docu-series (The Circus) and animation (Our the Pacquiao-Mayweather fight, which Showtime Cartoon President). It’s taken viewers on journeys into worlds TV rarely presented on PPV. “People look to us to be adventurous,” he explores, from hedge funds (Billions) to management consulting (House of says. “They look to us for the next new thing. Everything we Lies) and drug addiction (Patrick Melrose). make better be pushing the limits of the medium forward.” Fox 21 president Bert Salke calls Showtime “the thinking man’s network,” Every business has its longstanding rivalries. Coke and Pepsi. Marvel and noting, “They make smart television. HBO tries to be more things to more DC. For its first thirty-odd years, Showtime Networks (now owned by CBS people: comedy specials, more half-hours. Showtime is a bit more interested Corporation) ran a distant second to HBO. -
THE INFLUENCE of Two DECADES of CONTRACT LAW SCHOLARSHIP on JUDICIAL RULINGS: an EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
SMU Law Review Volume 57 Issue 1 Article 5 2004 The Influence of woT Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis Gregory S. Crespi Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Gregory S. Crespi, The Influence of woT Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105 (2004) https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol57/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. THE INFLUENCE OF Two DECADES OF CONTRACT LAW SCHOLARSHIP ON JUDICIAL RULINGS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Gregory Scott Crespi* I. INTRODUCTION VER the last two decades, a substantial and diverse body of con- tract law scholarship has been produced. Some of this work lim- its itself to applying traditional doctrinal categories and analytical approaches to new problems, while some also engages in eco- nomic analysis of various legal regimes, and some is empirical as well as analytical in nature. Much of this work is of a rather theoretical and ab- stract character. Consequently, one wonders whether this literature has had any discernable impact upon judicial practice, particularly in light of the declarations made by both prominent jurists and leading practitioners that most current legal scholarship has very limited relevance for attor- neys and judges,' and given recent studies that suggest declining rates of 2 citation of law review articles in judicial opinions. -
LEAVING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW WHERE IT Is: GOLDSMITH and POSNER's the LIMITS of INTERNATIONAL LAW
LEAVING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW WHERE IT Is: GOLDSMITH AND POSNER'S THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW David M. Golove* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 334 II. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................ 336 A. Self-Interested States? ................................ 337 B. The Supposed Weakness of Customary InternationalLaw ..... 343 Im. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY: GOLDSMITH AND POSNER' S APPROACH TO HISTORY ....................................347 IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CIVIL WAR ........ 350 V. CONCLUSION ........................................... 377 * The Hiller Family Foundation Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. For helpful comments, the author is indebted to Eyal Benvenisti, John Ferejohn, Thomas Franck, Barry Friedman, Clay Gillette, Dan Hulsebosch, Stephen Holmes, Lewis Kornhauser, Mattias Kumm, Daryl Levinson, Susan Lewis, Rick Pildes, and all of the participants in the symposium. This Essay was presented at a symposium on The Limits of InternationalLaw, University of Georgia Law School, October 28-29, 2005. GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 34:333 I. INTRODUCrION International legal scholarship has long suffered from too much normative theorizing and too little positive analysis about how the international legal system actually works. This inattention to the empirical and descriptive has alienated international legal scholars from their colleagues in political science departments and lent much of international law scholarship an utopian air. Whatever the historical source of this state of affairs, however, it is rapidly fading. A new generation of scholars, steeped in a variety of social scientific methodologies, has turned its sights on international law and is actively employing positive theories of state behavior to enhance legal analyses. These scholars have also begun to undertake empirical studies in an effort to provide support for their theoretical claims. -
Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success Or Failure? Eric A
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Economics 2002 Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure? Eric A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Eric Posner, "Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?" (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 146, 2002). This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHICAGO JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 146 (2D SERIES) Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure? Eric A. Posner THE LAW SCHOOL THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO This paper can be downloaded without charge at: The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=304977 Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure? Eric A. Posner1 Abstract: Law and economics has failed to produce plausible descriptive theories of contract doctrines. This paper documents these failures and suggests that they are due to a methodological problem involving the concept of transaction costs. If transaction costs refer to writing or information costs, then rational individuals would agree to complex contracts that are not in fact observed, and contract law would, for the most part, have no other function than that of specifically enforcing contracts. -
Book Review Rationalism and Revisionism in International Law
BOOK REVIEW RATIONALISM AND REVISIONISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. 262. $29.95. Reviewed by Oona A. Hathaway*and Ariel N. Lavinbuk** INTRODUCTION International law has moved from the periphery to the center of public debate in the course of only a few short years. The ever- quickening globalization of politics, culture, and economics has prompted new efforts to find global solutions to global problems. In- ternational law now touches an astonishing array of activities. It gov- erns everything from the goods and services that cross state borders and the greenhouse gases that industries and consumers produce, to the circumstances that justify intervention in humanitarian disasters and the treatment afforded suspected terrorists. Of increasingly urgent concern, then, is whether all of this law actually makes much of a difference. Legal scholars have traditionally argued that it does. They have, for the most part, portrayed international law as a powerful and much-needed external limit on states' pursuit of their own short-term interests. Over the last half decade, however, Professors Jack Gold- smith and Eric Posner have aspired to revolutionize policymaking and scholarship by arguing precisely the opposite - an argument now pre- sented fully in The Limits of InternationalLaw. In their view, interna- tional law does not check self-interest but instead "emerges from states acting rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power" (p. 3). * Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Carnegie Scholar 2004. -
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2005 Judicial Independence in International Tribunals Eric A. Posner John C. Yoo Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Eric Posner & John C. Yoo, "Judicial Independence in International Tribunals," 93 California Law Review 1 (2005). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. California Law Review VOL. 93 JANUARY 2005 No. 1 Copyright © 2005 by California Law Review, Inc. Judicial Independence in International Tribunals Eric A. Posnert and John C. Yoot TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ............................................................................................. 3 I. Background on International Dispute Resolution ............................ 8 II. Independence and the Role of International Tribunals ..................... 12 A. Independence in the Domestic and International Spheres ....... 12 B. Why States Use International Tribunals ..................................... 14 1. Information Disclosure in Treaty Disputes ........................... 15 2. Information Disclosure in Customary International Law D isputes ............................................................................. 18 3. The Dispute Resolution Mechanism -
In the Shadow of Borat Gayane Torosyan
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Louisiana State University Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 4 December 2007 In the Shadow of Borat Gayane Torosyan Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/taboo Recommended Citation Torosyan, G. (2017). In the Shadow of Borat. Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education, 11 (1). https://doi.org/10.31390/ taboo.11.1.04 Taboo, Spring-Summer-Fall-WinterGayane Torosyan 2007 5 In the Shadow of Borat Gayane Torosyan Kazakhstan has become an international punch line thanks to Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan (Gregorian, 2007). But the Kazakhs “are not willing to let the joke be on them.” The tabloid New York Post and the Chronicle of Higher Education report that President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s relatives are buying multi-million-dollar apartments in New York City, getting into Ivy League schools, and suing American companies for underestimat- ing their intellectual worth (Farrell, 2007). Aside from author Sacha Baron Cohen, the only people who seem to “make benefit” from this sort of “cultural learnings” are the former Soviet “oligarchs,” or tycoons, who harvest free publicity at the expense of the distorted images of their exploited countrymen (Lesova, 2006). Cohen’s mocumentary has been so widely publicized that the name “Borat” has come close to being perceived as a common noun. Because of this popularity, there is no question about the power of the film’s impact on audiences.