Curriculum Vitæ
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Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase
NAÏVE REALISM IN KANTIAN PHRASE Anil Gomes Trinity College, University of Oxford Forthcoming, MIND [accepted 2016] Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The effect is a middle-way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant: one which holds that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding. 1. Introduction Our textbook nativity stories often trace the foundation of analytic philosophy back to the rejection of neo-Hegelian idealism in Cambridge at the start of the twentieth-century. It is less often appreciated that this rejection was also a rejection of Kantian idealism and, in particular, a rejection of Kant’s account of the role the mind plays in shaping perceptual access to the world. The birth of analytic philosophy in both Oxford and Cambridge involved a sustained engagement with Kant’s works and many of those involved in this undertaking – G.E. Moore, John Cook Wilson, H.A. -
Perceptual Demonstratives
Departament de Filosofia Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Dissertation: Perceptual Demonstratives and Attention: Conceptual and Epistemological Aspects of Perceptual Consciousness Olga Fernández Prat July 2002 Departament de Filosofia Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Dissertation: Perceptual Demonstratives and Attention: Conceptual and Epistemological Aspects of Perceptual Consciousness Candidate: Olga Fernández Prat Supervisor: Daniel Quesada Casajuana PhD Graduate Programme: Ciència Cognitiva i Llenguatge Anything which we see to be continually changing, as, for example, fire, we must not call “this” or “that”, but rather say that it is “of such a nature”; nor let us speak of water as “this”, but always as “such”; nor must we imply that there is any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the use of the words “this” and “that”, supposing ourselves to signify something thereby; for they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as “this”, or “that”, or “relative to this”, or any other mode of speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to apply “this” to any of them, but rather the word “such”. Plato, Timaeus, 49 d- 50 . Three things are to be considered and differentiated... when seeing any object. First, the object we see; for example, a stone, a flame or any other body perceptible by the sense of vision, an object which can exist even before of beeing seen. Second, the seeing, which did not existed before the sense perceived the object. Third, the attention of the mind, which makes sight rest on the object contemplating it while the seeing lasts. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XI, 2,2. -
Curriculum Vitae January 2020 Department Of
DAVID RUSSELL JENKINS Curriculum Vitae January 2020 Department of Philosophy Email: [email protected] Tel Aviv University Tel: +972 58-7001319 P.O. Box 39040 Website: davidjenkinsphilosophy.wordpress.com Tel Aviv, Israel ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT Tel Aviv University, Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2018 - Present EDUCATION King’s College London, Ph.D., Philosophy, January 2019 Thesis: How inference isn’t blind: self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency Examiners: Professor Jennifer Hornsby; Dr Conor McHugh Supervisors: Professor Matthew Soteriou; Professor Bill Brewer University of Leeds, M.A. (distinction), Philosophy, September 2013 University of Leeds, B.A. (first class honours), Philosophy, July 2012 AREAS OF SPECIALISATION Philosophy of Mind; Epistemology; Philosophy of Action AREAS OF COMPETENCE Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language PUBLICATIONS ‘Luminosity in the stream of consciousness’ Synthese (forthcoming) doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1801-0 ‘The role of judgment in doxastic agency’ Thought: A journal of philosophy (2018) 7(1):12-19 UNDER REVIEW/IN PROGRESS ‘Reasoning as a locus of doxastic agency’ (revise and resubmit stage at Inquiry) ‘Reasoning’s relation to bodily action’ (revise and resubmit stage at Ratio) ‘The activity of reasoning’ (under review) ‘Reasoning and responsibility’ (under review) ‘Reasoning as self-determination’ (under review) ‘Inference and self-consciousness’ (in progress) 1 ‘Reasoning, agency and control’ (in progress) INVITED AND REFEREED TALKS ‘Reasoning, agency and control’ Department Colloquium, -
Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason
Analytic Philosophy Vol. 59 No. 1 March 2018 pp. 1–18 PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE AND EMPIRICAL REASON BILL BREWER King’s College London 1. Introduction What is the role of conscious experience in the epistemology of per- ceptual knowledge? In particular, suppose that I see an object before me and thereby come to know that it is red or round: how exactly are we to understand the contribution that my seeing that thing makes to my epistemic standing in relation to its colour or shape? I assume without argument, following Williamson (2000, esp. ch. 1), that seeing that o is F is a way of knowing that o is F. I also take for granted our intuitive conviction that in certain basic cases of seeing that o is F, the fact that the subject sees o itself is integral to their epistemic status as cases of knowing that o is F.1 My question is how this is to be understood: how should we characterize what is going on in seeing that o is F, in such cases, in order to illuminate the contri- bution of seeing o to their status as cases of knowing that o is F. This will not involve any commitment to the idea that seeing o in such cases constitutes or contributes to their satisfaction of an entirely gen- eral necessary condition on knowing that o is F (see Williamson, 2000, ch. 1, and Roessler 2009). Nevertheless, there is genuine expla- nation and intelligibility to be had; and that is what I aim to offer here. -
Thesis Final
Andrea Giananti Openness to the World: an Enquiry into the Intentionality of Perception Thèse de Doctorat présentée devant la Faculté des Lettres de l’Université de Fribourg, en Suisse. Approuvé par la Faculté des Lettres sur proposition des professeurs Gianfranco Soldati (premier rapporteur), Bill Brewer (deuxième rapporteur) et Heather Logue (troisième rapporteuse). Fribourg, le 25 septembre 2015. La Doyenne Prof. Bernadette Charlier Pasquier. Table of Contents Acknowledgments (p. 4) Abstract (p. 6) Introduction (p. 8) Chapter One: Intentionality (p. 13) Abstract (p. 13) Introduction (p. 13) 1. Objects (p. 15) 2. Content (p. 19) 2.1 Non-Existent Objects (p. 19) 2.2 Modes of Presentation (p. 21) 3. Satisfaction Conditions, Intentionality and Intensionality-with-an-s (p. 25) 4. Perception (p. 29) 4.1 Perception and Intentionality (p. 29) 4.2 Openness to the World (p. 32) Chapter Two: The Way Things Look: a Defence of Content (p. 39) Abstract (p. 39) Introduction (p. 39) 1. The Silence of the Senses (p. 41) 1.1 Setting the Stage (p. 41) 1.2 A Dilemma for the Representationalist (p. 43) 1.3 Phenomenal Looks (p. 49) 1.4 Content and Accessibility (p. 56) 2. The Way Things Look (p. 68) 2.1 Perceptual Content and Perceptual Constancies (p. 68) 2.2 Perceptual Content, Adverbial Modifications and Dynamic Perception (p. 71) 2 2.3 A Sense of the World: Content and Mind-Independent Objects (p. 75) 2.4 Objections and Replies (p. 79) Chapter Three: Perception and Illusion (p. 84) Abstract (p. 84) Introduction (p. 84) 1. Sense-Data (p. 86) 2.