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DAVID RUSSELL JENKINS Curriculum Vitae January 2020 Department of Philosophy Email: [email protected] Tel Aviv University Tel: +972 58-7001319 P.O. Box 39040 Website: davidjenkinsphilosophy.wordpress.com Tel Aviv, Israel ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT Tel Aviv University, Postdoctoral Fellow, October 2018 - Present EDUCATION King’s College London, Ph.D., Philosophy, January 2019 Thesis: How inference isn’t blind: self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency Examiners: Professor Jennifer Hornsby; Dr Conor McHugh Supervisors: Professor Matthew Soteriou; Professor Bill Brewer University of Leeds, M.A. (distinction), Philosophy, September 2013 University of Leeds, B.A. (first class honours), Philosophy, July 2012 AREAS OF SPECIALISATION Philosophy of Mind; Epistemology; Philosophy of Action AREAS OF COMPETENCE Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language PUBLICATIONS ‘Luminosity in the stream of consciousness’ Synthese (forthcoming) doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1801-0 ‘The role of judgment in doxastic agency’ Thought: A journal of philosophy (2018) 7(1):12-19 UNDER REVIEW/IN PROGRESS ‘Reasoning as a locus of doxastic agency’ (revise and resubmit stage at Inquiry) ‘Reasoning’s relation to bodily action’ (revise and resubmit stage at Ratio) ‘The activity of reasoning’ (under review) ‘Reasoning and responsibility’ (under review) ‘Reasoning as self-determination’ (under review) ‘Inference and self-consciousness’ (in progress) 1 ‘Reasoning, agency and control’ (in progress) INVITED AND REFEREED TALKS ‘Reasoning, agency and control’ Department Colloquium, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, January 2020 Department Colloquium, University of Haifa, January 2020 ‘Three conceptions of self-consciousness’ Israeli Philosophical Association, Ben Gurion University, February 2019 ‘Epistemic agency as a chain-undertaking’ London Mind Group, Institute of Philosophy, December 2018 ‘Scepticism about epistemic agency as bad faith’ Department colloquium, University of Haifa, November 2018 ‘Doxastic agency and “making up our minds”’ Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Postgraduate Session, University of Oxford, July 2018 London Intercollegiate Philosophy Graduate Conference, Institute of Philosophy, March 2018 ‘Inference and self-consciousness’ Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Open Session, University of Edinburgh, July 2017 ‘Intentional reasoning and believing for reasons’ UNC-KCL workshop on reasons, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, June 2017 ‘Inference and appreciation’ King’s College London Department of Philosophy Cumberland Lodge Retreat, October 2016 ‘How inference isn’t blind’ (respondent: David Kinney (LSE)) London Intercollegiate Philosophy Graduate Conference, Institute of Philosophy, March 2016 ‘Why intuitions are not reasons’ (respondent: Professor Guy Longworth(Warwick)) Mind Grad 2015, University of Warwick, December 2015 ‘Finding a middle way with the epistemology of inference’ (respondent: Simon Wimmer (Warwick)) London-Warwick Mind Forum, University of Warwick, November 2015 ‘Why intuitions are not reasons’ Open Minds X, University of Manchester, July 2015 ‘How knowledge and uncertainty coexist’ Arts and Humanities PG Conference on 'Uncertainty', King's College London, June 2015 ‘Rational intuition and externalism about reasons’ OZSW Graduate Conference, Radboud University, April 2015 RESPONSES To Vanessa Carr (UCL) ‘Movement of the body and causation by the agent’ London Intercollegiate Philosophy Graduate Conference, Institute of Philosophy, March 2017 2 To Dr Anil Gomes (Oxford, Trinity) ‘Unity, objectivity, and the passivity of experience’ Mind, Metaphysics and Psychology Seminar, King’s College London, October 2016 To Professor M. G. F. Martin (UCL) ‘Hume on objective experience’ Mind, Metaphysics and Psychology Seminar, King’s College London, May 2016 To Sophia Dandelet (Berkeley) ‘Partial desires, blinkered beliefs’ 12th London-Berkeley Conference, UC Berkeley, May 2015 SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS Graduate Teaching Assistant Award, King’s College London, 2017-18 Peter Goldie Award, King’s College London, 2017-2018 LAHP/AHRC Doctoral Studentship, King’s College London, 2014-2017 School of Humanities MA Full Fee Studentship, University of Leeds, 2012-2013 Students as Scholars Award, University of Leeds, 2011 & 2012 TEACHING EXPERIENCE At King’s College London Belief and Decision Under Uncertainty (for MBBS module ‘Doctor & Society and Introduction to Clinical Skills’), 2018 Philosophy of Mind, 2017 Philosophy of Psychology, 2017 (summative marking only) Epistemology II, 2016 (Including some lecture cover) Metaphysics I, 2016 Introduction to Philosophy: Metaphysics, 2015 At the University of Leeds Philosophy of Mind, 2013 History of Philosophy: Descartes, 2013 Other Teaching Experience Teaching assistant in Philosophy and Religious Studies, Cumberland School, Newham, 2013-2014 Conversational English Language Teacher, Refugee Integration and Employment Service, 2010 PROFESSIONAL SERVICE International conference co-organiser (funded by 60,000 shekel ISF grant and 7,00 shekel TAU grant): ‘Reasoning and Agency’, Tel Aviv University, May 2020 Founder, co-organiser and chair: London Mind Group (https://londonmindgroup.wixsite.com/philosophy), King’s College London/University College London, 2017 – 2018 Termly graduate workshop, co-organiser: London-Warwick Mind Forum, King’s College London/University College London/Warwick, 2016 – 2017 3 International graduate conference, co-organizer (funded by KCL department grant): ‘(Ir)rationality: Understanding Irrational Belief, Action, and Reasoning’ (with Professor Neil Levy), King’s College London, February 2016 Reviewing: Dialectica; European Journal of Philosophy; Ratio; Southern Journal of Philosophy; Synthese; Theoria REFERENCES Professor Matthew Soteriou Chair in Philosophy of Mind, King’s College London [email protected] Professor Jennifer Hornsby Professor of Philosophy, Birkbeck [email protected] Professor Bill Brewer Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy, King’s College London [email protected] Dr Conor McHugh Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Southampton [email protected] Dr Yair Levy Lecturer in Philosophy, Tel Aviv University [email protected] 4 .
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