A Model for Future Multi- Ethnic Coexistence?
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
72 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 11|2011 A MODEL FOR FUTURE MULTI- ETHNIC COEXISTENCE? MACEDONIA 10 YEARS AFTER THE OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT Anja Czymmeck is Anja Czymmeck / Kristina Viciska Resident Represen- tative of the Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung in Macedonia and Kosovo. On September 8, 1991 the Republic of Macedonia seceded peacefully from Yugoslavia following a constitutional refe- rendum. However, the complex transition of the country into a liberal democracy suffered a serious setback in 2001. Members of the country’s Albanian population resorted to armed conflict in order to strengthen their demands for greater involvement in Macedonian politics and society. The conflict was settled with the help of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, a treaty designed to guarantee the rights of Kristina Viciska stu- minorities in the Republic of Macedonia. 20 years after the died political science at the Braunschweig country’s independence and ten years after the dramatic University of Techno- turning point brought about by the peace agreement it is logy and the Toulouse now time to take stock. What have been the effects of the Institute of Political Studies and worked in constitutional changes resulting from the agreement? the Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung office in THE CONFLICT, THE AGREEMENT AND THE PARLIAMENT Skopje from August to October 2011. Following the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the Albanian National Liberation Army, the ONA (Albanian acronym), was set up in Northern Macedonia. Their goal was to fight for the rights of the Albanian minority that made up 25 per cent of the population, and in February 2001 they took a number of villages by force and attacked civilian and government buildings. The result was an armed conflict between members of the Liberation Army and the Macedonian security services. The conflict was further inflamed by biased media reporting on both sides that demonised the opponents. While the Macedonians for their part were scaremongering about territorial integrity, because they were worried about plans for a Greater Albania, the 11|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 73 Albanian groups themselves were protesting forcefully for greater political and social recognition, more involvement in state institutions and the retention of the Albanian language.1 Following the military conflict in Kosovo the international community was anxious to resolve the armed conflict in Macedonia as quickly as possible and to avoid yet another civil war in the Balkans. As early as May 2001 a “Government of National Unity” was set up, made up of representatives from the international community. It entered into negotiations with the leaders of both parties to the conflict but progress was very slow. Because of the ongoing clashes between the two groups the international community called for joint talks to be held. The negotiations with the Albanian and Macedonian leadership were led by two diplomats, François Léotard Discussions went on for weeks and the (European Union) and James Perdew (USA). result was a Framework Agreement de- signed to guarantee the integration of The discussions went on for weeks and the the Albanian minority and ensure peace result was a Framework Agreement designed for the people of the country. to guarantee the integration of the Albanian minority and ensure peace for the people of the country.2 The agreement included solutions to the problems of access to public office, languages used, the status of the Albanian minority, decentralisation and a recommendation for a new preamble to the constitution.3 The agreement was signed on August 13, 2001. It was a compromise that offered the Albanian population the rights that they were looking for but it also required the immediate disarming of the Liberation Army in order to bring peace. The explicit exclusion of any federal or territorial solutions ensured that Macedonia’s territorial integrity was also guaranteed. On August 16, 2001 the President, Boris Trajkovski, presented proposals to parliament for amending the constitution.4 As a result NATO was able to start operation 1 | Cf. Boris Tanevski, “The problem between the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups in the Republic of Macedonia and its future”, New Balkan Politics, Vol. 9, 2005, 60-81. 2 | Cf. Heinz Willemsen, “Das politische System Makedoniens”, Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, Wiesbaden, 967-1005. 3 | Cf. Kathrin Ahlbrecht, Annegret Bendiek, Reinhard Meyers and Sabine Wagner, Konfliktregulierung und Friedenssicherung im Internationalen System, Wiesbaden, 2009. 4 | Cf. Sonja K. Delevska, Vest 13./14. August 2011, 8-9. 74 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 11|2011 “Essential Harvest” to disarm the Albanian Liberation Army on August 27, 2001. Despite the concessions on both sides the implementation process dragged on longer than planned due to the need to get a broad consensus on the changes to the constitution. A two-thirds majority, i.e. 80 votes out of 120, was required to pass the motion.5 The process was also delayed by the many lengthy discussions in parliament on the contents of the agreement itself and it was not possible to meet the original deadline of 45 days envisioned in the agreement. The last bills relating to the agreement were passed into law by parliament in September 2002. The reaction of parliament can be seen as relatively cooperative, bearing in mind the fact that only the leadership were able to influence the contents of the agreement and that internal party consensus had to be sought after the event. In parallel to the political process NATO, and later the Orga- nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), set about the process of disarmament. In 2003 this process was taken over by the first EU mission – Concordia. Apart from one or two isolated incidents, clashes between the parties were successfully avoided following the signing of the agreement. With the help of the international missions there was a controlled disarmament of the rebels and the establishment of peace. CONTENT, IMPLEMENTATION AND ACTUAL EFFECTS Alongside the political reaction to the Ohrid Framework Agreement within Macedonia itself and within international organisations, civil society and academics – especially from the fields of political and social science – also took a close interest in the agreement. In recent years a wide range of analyses and case studies have been published on the effects of the agreement.6 Because of all the different 5 | Since the elections in 2011 the Macedonian parliament now has 123 seats. Three constituencies have been created to represent Macedonians living abroad. 6 | A good overview of the wide range of case studies carried out can be found in the work of the Macedonian Center for Interna- tional Cooperation: Ohrid Framework Agreement, Studii na Slucaj, Sveti Kliment Ohridski, Skopje, 2011, http://mcms.org. mk/images/docs/2011/ohridski-ramkoven-dogovor-2011.pdf (accessed September 12, 2011). 11|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 75 aspects studied by the researchers we now have a whole body of work that allows us to gain an insight into how multi-ethnic coexistence in Macedonia has been able to progress. The Ohrid Framework Agreement is made up of ten articles and three appendices. The articles are divided into paragraphs relating to specific areas: 1. Securing peace (Articles 1 and 2), 2. Decentralisation and use of emblems (Articles 3 and 7), 3. Regulations relating to minorities (Articles 4 and 5) and 4. Education and use of languages (Article 6).7 Article 8 covers the implementation of the laws that are listed in Article 9. The text of these laws reflects to a large extent the provisions formulated in the previous articles but also state to which part of the constitution they refer and which laws will be replaced or amended. Article 10 offers the possibility for further laws to be created. This states that further legislative provisions may be enacted in so far as they are necessary to give full effect to the agreement. 1. Securing peace At the heart of the Framework Agreement The introduction of new institutions is the creation of a stable and long-lasting and mechanisms for power sharing was designed to bring about a settle- peace for the benefit of all the people of ment of the conflict. Macedonia. The introduction of new institu- tions and mechanisms for power sharing was designed to bring about a settlement of the conflict, while the institu- tionalised strengthening of the inclusion of minority groups was seen as a step in the right direction in the creation of a multi-ethnic democracy.8 The desire of the Macedonian government to become part of the European Union also helped to speed up the negotiation 7 | The original English version of the Framework Agreement: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/seerecon/macedonia/ documents/framework_agreement.pdf (accessed September 12, 2011). 8 | Cf. Merle Vetterlein, Konfliktregulierung durch power-sharing- Modelle: das Fallbeispiel der Republik Makedonien, Baden- Baden, 2010. 76 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 11|2011 process between the government and the Liberation Army. Even while the conflict was going on, the Macedonian government was able to sign a stabilisation and association agreement with the EU that opened up the possibility of future membership for Macedonia but which at the same time obliged it to recognise and implement the 1991 EU Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.9 The first and most important agreement of the framework treaty was the complete and unconditional voluntary disar- mament of the rebel groups (article 1, paragraph 1, Ohrid Framework Agreement). As a quid pro quo the Macedonian government would agree to significantly strengthen the rights of the minorities through constitutional changes and to actively promote governmental decentralisation. This article of the Framework Agreement also established the basic principles for all the agreements contained within the document. The disarmament activities covered by article 2 and carried out by international missions successfully helped to avoid the outbreak of new conflicts.