Simon Greenleaf on Desuetude and Judge-Made Law: an Unpublished Letter to Francis Lieber
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Reexamining the Seventh Amendment Argument Against Issue Certification
Pace Law Review Volume 34 Issue 3 Summer 2014 Article 2 July 2014 Reexamining the Seventh Amendment Argument Against Issue Certification Douglas McNamara George Washington University Law School Blake Boghosian George Washington University Law School Leila Aminpour Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr Part of the Civil Procedure Commons Recommended Citation Douglas McNamara, Blake Boghosian, and Leila Aminpour, Reexamining the Seventh Amendment Argument Against Issue Certification, 34 Pace L. Rev. 1041 (2014) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Reexamining the Seventh Amendment Argument Against Issue Certification D. McNamara, * B. Boghosian** & L. Aminpour*** I. Introduction Issue certification is a controversial means of handling aggregate claims in Federal Courts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 23(c)(4) provides that “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”1 Issue certification has returned to the radar screen of academics,2 class action counsel,3 and defendants.4 The Supreme Court’s decision regarding the need for viable damage distribution models in Comcast v. Behrend5 may spur class counsel in complex cases to bifurcate liability and damages. * Douglas McNamara is Of Counsel at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll, PLLC, in Washington, D.C. He is an adjunct faculty member of George Washington University Law School and has practiced sixteen years in the area of complex civil litigation and class actions. -
THE CURRENT STATUS of the CONTRACT CLAUSE the Contract
STILL IN EXILE? THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE JAMES W. ELY, JR.* The Contract Clause is no longer the subject of much judicial solici- tude or academic interest.1 Since the 1930s the once potent Contract Clause has been largely relegated to the outer reaches of constitu- tional law.2 This, of course, was not always the case. On the contrary, throughout the nineteenth century the Contract Clause was one of the most litigated provisions of the Constitution. In 1896, Justice George Shiras astutely commented: “No provision of the constitution of the United States has received more frequent consideration by this court than that which provides that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.”3 A brief survey of the evolution of con- tract clause jurisprudence helps to put into perspective the current desuetude of the Clause. I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The first provision protective of contractual rights was contained in the Northwest Ordinance of July 1787.4 Its adoption anticipated * Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus, Vanderbilt University. This Article is an expanded version of remarks presented at the Fifteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at the College of William & Mary on October 5, 2018. I want to thank Katie Hanschke of the Massey Law Library of Vanderbilt University for her valuable research assistance. I also wish to thank David F. Forte for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article. 1. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution provides, in part: “No State . shall pass any . -
Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery Paul Finkelman University of Tulsa College of Law
Roger Williams University Law Review Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 4 Fall 1999 Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery Paul Finkelman University of Tulsa College of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR Recommended Citation Finkelman, Paul (1999) "Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 4. Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol5/iss1/4 This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery Paul Finkelman* From the Revolution until the Civil War Southern intellectu- als, professionals, and politicians developed and articulated elabo- rate defenses of slavery. The most significant proslavery legal scholar was Thomas R.R. Cobb, a Georgia attorney, law professor and one-time reporter for the Georgia Supreme Court. His trea- tise, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of America,' profoundly illustrates the way antebellum Southern lawyers and judges used their learning and talents to support slavery. Proslavery advocates, such as Cobb, emphatically insisted on the justice and morality-the essential rightness-of slavery. Cobb believed that racially based slavery was a prerequisite for a truly "republican equality"2 because only in such a system were all whites equal in status, regardless of their wealth, property, or sta- tion in life. -
Harvard Law School's Promotional Literature, 1829-1848
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL’S PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE, 1829-1848 A REFLECTION OF THE IDEALS AND REALITIES OF THE STORY-ASHMUN-GREENLEAF ERA Michael von der Linn† OEL PARKER, CHARLES WARREN, and later scholars attribute Harvard Law School’s renaissance in the years spanning 1829 to 1848 to the endowment provided by Nathan Dane, the sup- J port of President Josiah Quincy, and the contributions of Jo- seph Story, John Hooker Ashmun, and Simon Greenleaf.1 These were indeed the primary reasons for the school’s remarkable growth. Another, which has received little attention, was an aggres- sive promotional campaign initiated by Story in the 1830s.2 This † Michael von der Linn is the manager of the Antiquarian Book Department of The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1 The law school’s faculty and staff consisted of two people during this period. Story was the superintendent; Ashmun handled most of the administrative duties. They divided the teaching load fairly evenly. This arrangement continued when Greenleaf joined the faculty after Ashmun’s death in 1833. Asahel Stearns, Story’s predecessor, directed the school from its establishment in 1817 to 1829. He was the sole administrator and primary instructor, but he shared his teaching duties with Isaac Parker, who held a joint appointment with Harvard College. 2 I have found two references. Warren, who provides the quote cited in Footnote 6, devotes a paragraph to this topic. Newmyer, perhaps based on his reading of Warren, mentions it as well. Charles Warren, History of the Harvard Law School 13 GREEN BAG 2D 427 Michael von der Linn was not the first time Harvard issued marketing materials, nor was it the first or only school to use them.3 But the size of Story’s cam- paign was unprecedented. -
Finding Room in the Criminal Law for the Desuetude Principle
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES MARCH 11, 2014 FINDING ROOM IN THE CRIMINAL LAW FOR THE DESUETUDE PRINCIPLE Paul J. Larkin, Jr.* A problem facing the criminal justice system today is the phenomenon known as “overcriminalization,” the neologism given to the overuse and misuse of the criminal law.1 Numerous members of the academy,2 former senior Jus- tice Department officials,3 and the American Bar Association4 have been vocal * Senior Legal Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation; M.P.P. 2010 The George Washing- ton University; J.D. 1980 Stanford Law School; B.A. 1977 Washington & Lee University. The views also are the author’s own and should not be construed as representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 1. “Overcriminalization is the term that captures the normative claim that governments create too many crimes and criminalize things that properly should not be crimes.” Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph Over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 657 (2011). 2. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 407 (2008); Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM U. L. REV. 747 (2005); Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law be Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971 (2010); John C. Coffey, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Crimi- nal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. -
Simon Greenleaf and the Case of the Stillborn Bowdoin Law School, 1850–1861
University at Buffalo School of Law Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 12-1-2012 Piety and Profession: Simon Greenleaf and the Case of the Stillborn Bowdoin Law School, 1850–1861 Alfred S. Konefsky University at Buffalo School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal Education Commons Recommended Citation Alfred S. Konefsky, Piety and Profession: Simon Greenleaf and the Case of the Stillborn Bowdoin Law School, 1850–1861, 85 New Eng. Q. 695 (2012). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/811 Originally published 85(4) The New England Quarterly 695-734 (Dec. 2012). © 2012 by The New England Quarterly. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Piety and Profession: Simon Greenleaf and the Case of the Stillborn Bowdoin Law School, 1850–1861 alfred s. konefsky N 1850, a small college in Brunswick, Maine, made a sur- I prising decision: it began to explore the possibility of es- tablishing a school of law. The venture was remarkable on a number of grounds, not least of which was the rather dismal record at midcentury of similarly ambitious proposals. Yale’s law school, which emerged from a private, proprietary school in the 1820s, did not grant degrees until 1843, and Yale “seriously considered dissolving the school” in 1845 and again in 1869. -
The Issue Class Revolution – Gilles & Friedman
THE ISSUE CLASS REVOLUTION MYRIAM GILLES* & GARY FRIEDMAN ABSTRACT In 2013, four Supreme Court Justices dissented from the decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, which established heightened requirements for the certification of damages class actions. In a seemingly offhanded footnote, these dissenters observed that district courts could avoid the individualized inquiries that increasingly doom damages classes by certifying a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) on liability issues only and “leaving individual damages calculations to subsequent proceedings.” The dissenters were onto something big. In fact, the issue class and follow-on damages model has broad potential to restore the efficacy of aggregate litigation across several substantive areas after decades of judicial hostility. This Article offers a bold and original vision for the issue class procedure, one that promises scale efficiency while sidestepping the doctrinal land mines that dot the class action landscape. It is a vision rooted in sober pragmatism and an account of the economic incentives confronting entrepreneurial law firms as they consider investing in aggregate litigation. * Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law and Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. For their generous comments and thoughtful interventions, we are grateful to Lynn Baker, Bob Bone, Beth Burch, Zach Clopton, Scott Dodson, Daniel Klerman, Richard Marcus, Linda Mullenix, Morris Ratner, Charlie Silver, David Spence, and Patrick Woolley. We also thank the organizers and participants of the Fifth Annual Civil Procedure Workshop held at the University of Texas School of Law and the law faculties at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, the University of California Hastings College of the Law, and the University of Texas School of Law for the opportunity to present these ideas. -
Losing at Dodge Ball: Understanding the Supreme Court’S Implied Authorization of Consent in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency V
LOSING AT DODGE BALL: UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT’S IMPLIED AUTHORIZATION OF CONSENT IN EXECUTIVE BENEFITS INSURANCE AGENCY V. ARKISON AND WHY REVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 157(B) IS CRITICAL FOR CLARITY Bethany A. Corbin ABSTRACT On June 9, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the latest installment in the jurisdictional saga of bankruptcy courts. As the highly anticipated sequel to Stern v. Marshall, which deprived bankruptcy judges of authority to hear certain core proceedings, Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison was expected to resolve the oft-litigated issue of whether parties could consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction. Practitioners and scholars eagerly awaited the opinion, anxious to determine exactly how far the Court would go in divesting bankruptcy judges of their authority. However, what the nation received instead was a classic attempt by the Court to dodge the ball on the consent issue. In a unanimous decision, the Court resolved the Stern gap by allowing litigants to treat Stern claims as noncore proceedings but refused to address the overarching theme of consent. Tucking their reluctance away in a footnote, the Court expressly reserved the question of consent for another time, another case, and another day. This Article, however, argues that a straightforward reading of the plain language in Arkison impliedly resolves the consent issue. In other words, the Supreme Court has lost at its own game of dodge ball. By broadly applying the entire statutory provision of 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)—which includes subsection (c)(2) on consent—to Stern claims, the Court has plainly stated its approval of consent for certain core proceedings. -
Patti Ogden, Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law: a Story Of
Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Journal Articles Publications 1993 "Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law": A Story of Legal Citation Indexes Patti J. Ogden Notre Dame Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship Part of the Legal History Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons Recommended Citation Patti J. Ogden, "Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law": A Story of Legal Citation Indexes, 85 Law Libr. J. 1 (1993). Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/118 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. "Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law": A Story of Legal Citation Indexes* Patti Ogden** Ms. Ogden presents a history of American legal citation indexes, covering early nineteenth-century attempts, the development of modern citator systems by Frank Shepard and others, online citation systems, and the potentialfor future improvements in an essential tool of legal research. Mastering the lawless science of our law, That codeless myriad of precedent, That wilderness of single instances, Thro' which a few, by wit or fortune led, May beat a pathway out to wealth and fame. Tennyson, "Aylmer's Field" (1793) There is a considerable body of literature on the history of such legal publications as case reports, statutes, periodicals, digests, periodical indexes, and treatises. Lately, a core group of authors has begun speculating about the future of some of these publications.' Legal citators-those "useful but unloved" volumes 2-also have a history and presumably a future, but there exists little documentation or speculation about either. -
Law and Empire in Late Antiquity
job:LAY00 17-10-1998 page:3 colour:0 Law and Empire in Late Antiquity Jill Harries job:LAY00 17-10-1998 page:4 colour:0 published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge cb2 1rp, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK http://www.cup.cam.ac.uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, USA http://www.cup.org © Jill D. Harries 1999 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1999 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge Typeset in Plantin 10/12pt [vn] A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data Harries, Jill. Law and empire in late antiquity / Jill Harries. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0 521 41087 8 (hardback) 1. Justice, Administration of – Rome. 2. Public law (Roman law) i. Title. KJA2700.H37 1998 347.45'632 –dc21 97-47492 CIP ISBN 0 521 41087 8 hardback job:LAY00 17-10-1998 page:5 colour:0 Contents Preface page vii Introduction 1 1 The law of Late Antiquity 6 Confusion and ambiguities? The legal heritage 8 Hadrian and the jurists 14 Constitutions: the emperor and the law 19 Rescripts as law 26 Custom and desuetude 31 2 Making the law 36 In consistory -
The Heterogeneity of Tort Law
The Heterogeneity of Tort Law John Murphy* Abstract–This article tests the plausibility of several leading, explanatory theories of tort by reference to the fact that tort law possesses neither the juridical nor the structural unity that the relevant theories ascribe to it. It considers a wide range of tort actions that reveal a much more heterogenous body of law than any of the targeted theorists admit exists. It concludes that, taken together, tort law’s varying liability bases, its departures from the requirement of a rights infringement, its structural variations and its remedial diversity combine to belie the various reductionist claims the theorists in question make. Keywords: Tort law; corrective justice theory; rights theory A Introduction Only stutteringly, over the course of more than a century, did jurists come to regard tort as a distinct legal category. As Milsom wrote: Only at the end of the seventeenth century does our sense of tort begin to appear; and it was not a commonplace until much later ... In 1720 there was a book published called The Law of Actions on the Case ... [yet] [a]s late as 1873 Underhill still thought some explanation desirable: his title was Law of Torts, or Wrongs Independent of Contract. Pollock, in 1887 seems to have been the earliest to use Law of Torts [alone]’.1 Pollock was the first to speak of ‘the law of torts’ without qualification. He made it his aim ‘to show that there really is a Law of Torts, not merely a number of rules of law about various kinds of torts … a true living branch of the Common Law, not a collection of heterogeneous instances’.2 But Pollock struggled to find a unifying thread; and the problem still persists. -
Desuetude-Based Severability: a New Approach to Old Morals Legislation
File: Encarnacion14 Created on: 1/26/2006 6:47 PM Last Printed: 2/8/2006 11:01 AM Desuetude-Based Severability: A New Approach to Old Morals Legislation ERIK ENCARNACIÓN* Sometimes officials fail to enforce a statute despite its widespread viola- tion over a long period of time. Under the doctrine of desuetude, such statutes are considered void and therefore may be abrogated by judges. This Note articulates and defends a version of the doctrine that would pre- vent arbitrary and capricious enforcement of obsolete morals legislation, while simultaneously preserving the residual symbolic value that other- wise obsolete morals legislation may retain for citizens. Judges would ac- complish this by invalidating the punishment-enabling provisions of mor- als legislation as desuetudinal, while preserving the offense-defining pro- visions that may still have symbolic value. I. INTRODUCTION What should a court do when deciding whether to enforce ob- 1 solete morals legislation, such as a statute banning fornication? * The author would like to thank Ankush Khardori, Patty Li, Peter Romer- Friedman, Matthew Vogele, and Professor Kendall Thomas for their valuable input. Above all, the author would like to thank his parents Claudia and Jose Luis Encarnación for their constant love and support. 1. This Note uses “morals legislation” broadly to refer to regulations of so-called “victimless crimes,” including, but not limited to, criminal regulations on consensual sex- ual activity. For a similar usage, see Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminiliza- tion: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 750 (2005) (suggesting that morals legislation often criminalizes “common and innocuous” behavior).