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The Cambridge Companion to Augustine the Cambridge Companion to Augustine THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AUGUSTINE THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AUGUSTINE EDITED BY ELEONORE STUMP St. Louis University AND NORMAN KRETZMANN published by the press syndicate of the university of cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom cambridge university press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK www.cup.cam.ac.uk 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011–4211, USA www.cup.org 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain © Cambridge University Press 2001 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2001 Typeface Sabon MT 10/13pt System QuarkXPress™ [se] A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library isbn 0 521 65018 6 hardback isbn 0 521 65985 x paperback Transferred to digital printing 2003 CONTENTS List of contributors page ix Preface xiii List of abbreviations xiv Introduction 1 1 Augustine: his time and lives 8 james j. o’donnell 2 Faith and reason 26 john rist 3 Augustine on evil and original sin 40 william e. mann 4 Predestination, Pelagianism, and foreknowledge 49 james wetzel 5 Biblical interpretation 59 thomas williams 6 The divine nature 71 scott macdonald 7 De Trinitate 91 mary t. clark 8 Time and creation in Augustine 103 simo knuuttila 9 Augustine’s theory of soul 116 roland teske 10 Augustine on free will 124 eleonore stump vii contents 11 Augustine’s philosophy of memory 148 roland teske 12 The response to skepticism and the mechanisms of cognition 159 gerard o’daly 13 Knowledge and illumination 171 gareth b. matthews 14 Augustine’s philosophy of language 186 christopher kirwan 15 Augustine’s ethics 205 bonnie kent 16 Augustine’s political philosophy 234 paul weithman 17 Augustine and medieval philosophy 253 m. w. f. stone 18 Post-medieval Augustinianism 267 gareth b. matthews Bibliography 280 Index 297 viii CONTRIBUTORS mary t. clark, RSCJ is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Manhattanville College. Among her books on Augustine are Augustine, Philosopher of Freedom; Augustinian Personalism; Augustine, An Introduction to His Thought. She also wrote the Analytical Introduction to and translation of Marius Victorinus: Theological Treatises on the Trinity. Her articles on Augustine have been published in Augustinian Studies; Revue des etudes Augustiniennes; Augustinus; and Studia Patristica. bonnie kent is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Syracuse University and the author of Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century. Her articles include “Moral Provincialism” and “Moral Growth and the Unity of the Virtues.” christopher kirwan is Emeritus Fellow in Philosophy at Exeter College, Oxford. He is author of Augustine in the Arguments of the Philosophers series, and his articles include “Augustine on Souls and Bodies” and “Avoiding Sin: Augustine against Consequentialism.” simo knuuttila is Research Professor in the Academy of Finland and Professor of Theological Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Helsinki. He is the editor of The New Synthese Historical Library and the author of Modalities in Medieval Philosophy and many articles on the history of logic, semantics, the philosophy of mind, and philosophical theology. scott macdonald is Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies at Cornell University. His many publications in medieval philosophy include “Primal Sin” and “Aquinas’s Incompatibilist Account of Free Choice,” and he has recently co-edited (with Eleonore Stump) Aquinas’s Moral Theory. He edits the journal Medieval Philosophy and Theology. ix list of contributors william e. mann is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vermont. He has written extensively on topics in medieval philosophy and the philosophy of religion. His recent articles include “Inner-Life Ethics” (on Augustine) and “Duns Scotus on Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. gareth b. matthews is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He is the author of Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes and the editor of The Augustinian Tradition. gerard o’daly is Professor of Latin at University College London. He is the author of Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, The Poetry of Boethius, and Augustine’s ‘City of God’: A Reader’s Guide, and is on the editorial board of the Augustinus-Lexikon. james j. o’donnell is Professor of Classical Studies and Vice Provost for Information Systems and Computing at the University of Pennsylvania. He is author of a three-volume edition of and commentary on the Confessions and more recently of Avatars of the Word: From Papyrus to Cyberspace. john rist is Professor Emeritus of Classics and Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He is author of various books and articles mostly on ancient phi- losophy and patristics, including Eros and Psyche, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, and Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized. m. w. f. stone is Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion, King’s College London. He is the editor with Jill Kraye of Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy and author of the two-volume work, The Subtle Arts of Casuistry. He has published articles on late medieval philosophy and early modern scholasticism. eleonore stump is the Robert J. Henle, S.J., Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University. She has written extensively on various topics in medieval philosophy as well as in philosophy of religion and metaphysics. Her books include Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, Boethius’s In Ciceronis Topica, and Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic. Her recent articles include “Ockham on Sensory Cognition,” in the Cambridge Companion to Ockham, “Aquinas on Justice,” and “Saadya Gaon and the Problem of Evil.” roland teske, S.J., is Professor of Philosophy at Marquette University in Milwaukee. He is author of Paradoxes of Time in St. Augustine and of many articles on Augustine and on William of Auvergne. He has also translated six volumes of the works of Augustine, including all the anti-Pelagian writings. x list of contributors paul weithman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He has published articles in medieval political theory, contem- porary political philosophy, religious ethics, and medical ethics. He is the editor of Religion and Contemporary Liberalism and the co-editor, with Henry Richardson, of the five-volume The Philosophy of Rawls. james wetzel is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Colgate University. His publications include Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, “Snares of Truth: Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,” in Augustine and his Critics, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless, and “Time After Augustine.” thomas williams is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. His work in medieval philosophy includes articles on John Duns Scotus and translations of Augustine’s On Free Choice of the Will and Anselm’s Proslogion and Monologion. xi PREFACE When this project was conceived, Norman Kretzmann had had multiple myeloma for a long time; but he and I were fairly confident that he would live long enough to hold the finished book in his hand. As it turned out, that did not happen. The disease took a sudden turn for the worse, and he died on 1 August, 1998. His death was a great loss for the field of medieval philosophy, as well as for philosophy of religion, where his influence was also widely felt. His death was an incalculable loss for me. He was my teacher, my mentor, and my friend; and everything I did, I did better because of him. Although I finished this project without him, it is entirely fitting that his name should appear on the book as co- editor. He and I shared in conceiving and launching the project, and his stamp and influence are apparent everywhere in it. No doubt the final product would have looked different if he had been able to participate in all its stages; but I think that, if he could have seen it, he would have been very pleased with this volume as it stands. More ordinary debts also need to be acknowledged here. Hilary Gaskin, the Cambridge University Press editor for this series, was helpful at every stage of the process of production, and the volume is much better for her input to it. My secretary Betty Andrews is responsible for whatever organization there was in the process that begins with commissioning chapters and finishes with the acknowl- edgment of the final drafts. Bryan Cross suffered with the task of producing harmony across chapters in the citations of Augustine’s works, and Chris Pliatska labored at the bibliography and the proofs. I am very grateful for all these contributions to the volume. The final stages of this volume were completed at the National Humanities Center, where I was a Lilly Foundation Fellow for the academic year 1999–2000. It is hard to imagine a more pleasant environment in which to work, or one more conducive to research, than the National Humanities Center, and I am grateful to the Center and to the Lilly Foundation for my year there. Eleonore Stump xiii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Series CCSL Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum PL Patrologia Latina Titles of Augustine’s works Adnotat. in Job Adnotationes in Job Conf. Confessiones C. Acad. Contra Academicos C. ep. Pelag. Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum C. ep. fund. Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti C. Faust. Contra Faustum Manichaeum C. Gaud. Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum episcopum C. Max. Contra Maximinum Arianorum episcopum C. Mend. Contra Mendacium C.
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