DOCSLIB.ORG

Setting Aside Naturalism in Favor of Personhood in Extreme Cases

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2011 Restoring the Balance: Setting Aside Naturalism in Favor of Personhood in Extreme Cases Brian Joseph Buckley Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Buckley, Brian Joseph, "Restoring the Balance: Setting Aside Naturalism in Favor of Personhood in Extreme Cases" (2011). Dissertations. 216. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/216 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2011 Brian Joseph Buckley LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO RESTORING THE BALANCE: SETTING ASIDE NATURALISM IN FAVOR OF PERSONHOOD IN EXTREME CASES A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY BY BRIAN JOSEPH BUCKLEY CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MAY 2011 Copyright by Brian J. Buckley, 2011 All rights reserved. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER TWO: TAYLOR AND HABERMAS ON NATURALISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 11 Introduction 11 Charles Taylor and Naturalism 14 Scenarios 40 Habermas and the Concerns for The Future of Human Nature 44 Conclusion 72 CHAPTER THREE: VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING ANENCEPHALIC CHILDREN AND PERSONHOOD, WITH SPECIESIST CRITIQUES 75 Introduction 75 Brief Definition of Speciesism 77 Legal Personhood 82 Political Personhood 89 Religious/Natural Law Views of the Person 111 Leon Kass, Hans Jonas, and Prudence 129 Conclusion 146 CHAPTER FOUR: LEVINAS AND THE FACE AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS OF PERSONHOOD AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH ANENCEPHALIC CHILDREN 148 Introduction 148 Alterity, Sameness, and Traditional Philosophy 150 Face 156 Infinity 160 Relationships 165 What About Those Who Do Not See? 168 Break with Phenomenology and Ontology 171 Conclusion 175 CHAPTER FIVE: RELATIONSHIPS, PERSONHOOD, AND PHENOMENOLOGY 178 Introduction 178 Naturalistic Criteria for Personhood 180 Levinas, the Anencephalic Child, and Relationships 192 Disengagement 213 Conclusion 231 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 234 BIBLIOGRAPHY 242 iii VITA 253 iv CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Imagine that you pick up a newspaper and there is a story about an accident involving an ambulance. The story headline is, ―Four People Die in Ambulance Crash on Hwy 152.‖ Interested because you live nearby, you read on about how the road was slick from summer rains and that that vehicle lost control, went over an embankment, and crashed 30 feet below in a wooded ravine. The article says that ―John Sanchez, 32 of San Jose, Michael James, 23, of Gilroy, Virginia Medding, newborn, of San Martin, and Samuel Vierra, 28, of Morgan Hill were among those killed in the accident. Sanchez was driving while James, the EMT, assisted Vierra, the critical care nurse, in attending to the patient Medding.‖ As you read on, the story tells you that Virginia was being transported from a local hospital to a hospice 15 miles away. Virginia, it turns out, was born with a case of anencephaly 10 days before and, despite predictions from her doctors, had survived beyond the normal range for such a severe neurological disorder. The doctors at this point felt that palliative care was best for her because the hospital knew that she would eventually succumb to the malady afflicting her. Putting the newspaper down, a few questions occur to you: Was it a mistake to count Virginia among the ―people‖ who died in the accident? Was Virginia a person in name only? Would there be a funeral for Virginia? Would her family mourn her? Would they talk about her presence in their 1 2 lives? Would she be buried? Would there be a gravestone with her name and dates? Why was she named in the first place? Does her family have pictures of her? Did her family enjoy buying clothes for her? Did her parents hold her and kiss her goodbye when they put her in the ambulance? Would her siblings in years to come speak of ―my sister who died in the car accident‖? Why should such resources be spent on such an extreme case? What is the proper way to address humans with such severe damage? Could anyone learn anything from her life, from her presence in their lives? This dissertation will attempt to answer these questions in such a way that a reader may reasonably conclude that Virginia, a child with only a brain stem, is indeed a person, where ―person‖ is understood as having a special status, worthy of moral recognition, that attaches to the individual. To do this, I will provide a philosophically sophisticated account that withdraws from the usual naturalistic considerations of personhood, with their accompanying checklists, requirements, etc., and instead asks the reader to look toward a human sciences model of personhood, with relationships, narrativity, embodiedness, historicity, and meaning. I will argue that these and these alone may possibly address who can count as a person. The objectivistic data of the natural sciences tradition will be set aside here as inadequate. No EEG, reflexivity test, or MRI, for example, can take the place of embeddedness, encounters with other persons, and relational interpretations, to determine whether or not Virginia is a person. In claiming this, I will concentrate heavily on the anencephalic child as the paradigm case for personhood, but will feel comfortable analogizing to other extreme cases, such as those in a persistent vegetative state or those who otherwise lack a higher consciousness. 3 Chapter Two will initiate the dissertation by addressing in significant detail the prevailing naturalistic tendencies today. These will be shown to rely heavily on the use of certain, empirically verified data as a firm basis for truth. The naturalistic tendencies will be found not only in the natural sciences but also in the work of philosophers impressed with their precision. Of course, having naturalistic paradigms, protocols, and algorithms in the natural sciences is not problematic when the subject of those inquiries is a rock, light waves, or even the human heart itself. And it is certainly apparent after several centuries that natural science has indeed many achievements that render it a powerful paradigm for progress. The constant growth in pharmaceutical options, the prevalence of breakthroughs in surgical techniques, the fruits in cancer research, the increasing understanding of the brain for psychology—these all are immediately understood as helpful to the longevity of human lives and to the relief of certain maladies or the symptoms thereof. This can certainly be extended into fields outside medicine, such as renewable resource technologies, space travel, and use of building materials to shore up buildings in an earthquake. In its domain, natural science is without question an extraordinary achievement and ought to be praised. The problem, however, is that those same methods and models that are so successful when in a particular field of endeavor, with a particular subject and particular questions, are applied in other areas where they are inapt. Chapter Two addresses this naturalistic tendency by exploring in detail the work of Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas, and Axel Honneth. These three philosophers will take on the scientistic tendency to take a successful protocol or matrix, with its high levels of precision, and apply it to the human subject. The human individual is someone 4 with a history, with an embedded nature in a time, in a place, in a narrative of his or her own. To such a person, life is not merely absorbed; it is lived in a trajectory, in a series of questions that provoke and that matter to that person. Such a life is a tapestry of interpretations, where what matters to the individual is essential to understanding what he or she sees or knows or even what is best for them. For example, two people can enter into a large room at a garage sale or flea market and, in essence, ―see‖ different things. The one, the dog lover, sees pictures of dogs and the owner‘s dog sitting up front by the cash register. The other can leave having no memory of the dog pictures or dog up front (although all of them did in fact run over his optic nerve) because he concentrated on the old model cars. These two persons were in the same room at the same time and even came and left together. But, as distinct individuals, they did not interact with the room in even remotely the same manner. Such subjective accounts, accounts that explain why this person said this or did that, are lost on the naturalistic sciences. In this scenario, naturalistic methods might include monitoring brain waves or doing a study afterwards of the external data (what the parties touched or the words they said), but it is highly questionable whether such exterior data can ever capture the individual‘s thoughts and interpretations. To obtain knowledge from these two people requires addressing them, intersecting with them, engaging them with questions and evaluations. Taylor especially, using Heideggerian and Gadamerian language, will address the naturalistic sciences here as in essence out of their league. They hit wide of the mark and demand conformity to their own strictures. They are in essence guilty of acting out the aphorism ―He who is good with a hammer thinks that everything is a nail.‖ 5 In addition to Taylor, Habermas and Honneth address the rise of naturalistic tendencies in technology and how they may be applied in such a way as to render the human person essentially something to be disposed over or something that may be improved by libertarian desires to adjust genetic makeups.
Recommended publications
  • The Normativity of Human Rights Is Self-Evident

    The Normativity of Human Rights Is Self-Evident

    HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY The Normativity of Human Rights Is Self-Evident Amitai Etzioni* ABSTRACT Attempts to justify human rights in terms of other sources of normativity unwittingly weaken the case of human rights. Instead these rights should be treated as moral causes that speak to us directly, as one of those rare precepts that are self-evident. All will hear self-evident moral claims un- less they have been severely distracted, and even these persons will hear these claims once they are engaged in open moral dialogue. Oddly, the strongest support for treating human rights as self-evident may well be a consequentialist argument. I. INTRODUCTION Numerous attempts have been made to justify human rights in terms of other sources of normativity, or values that can be used to justify these rights. This article suggests that such attempts unwittingly weaken the case of human rights and that instead these rights should be treated as moral causes that speak to us directly, as one of those rare precepts that is self-evident.1 Sug- gesting that human rights should be treated as self-evident does not deny * Amitai Etzioni is University Professor at The George Washington University where he is also director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies. He has served as a Senior Advisor to the White House and as President of the American Sociological Association, and has also taught at Columbia University, Harvard University, and University of California-Berkeley. He was listed as one of the top 100 American intellectuals in Richard Posner’s Public Intellectuals. He is the author of numerous books, including Security First: For A Moral, Muscular Foreign Policy and The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society.
  • RELG 399 Fall2019

    RELG 399 Fall2019

    McGill University School of Religious Studies RELG 399 TEXTS OF CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY (Late Antiquity) In the Fall Term of 2019 this seminar course will focus on Christian spirituality in Late Antiquity with close study and interpretation of Aurelius Augustine’s spiritual odyssey the Confessiones, his account of creation in De genesi ad litteram, and his handbook of hermeneutics De doctrina Christiana. We will also read Ancius Manlius Severinus Boethius’s treatment of theodicy in De consolatione philosophiae, his De Trinitate, and selections from De Musica. Professor: Torrance Kirby Office Hours: Birks 206, Tuesdays/Thursdays, 10:00–11:00 am Email: [email protected] Birks Building, Room 004A Tuesdays/Thursdays 4:05–5:25 pm COURSE SYLLABUS—FALL TERM 2019 Date Reading 3 September INTRODUCTION 5 September Aurelius Augustine, Confessiones Book I, Early Years 10 September Book II, Theft of Pears 12 September Book III, Adolescence and Student Life 17 September Book IV, Manichee and Astrologer 19 September Book V, Carthage, Rome, and Milan *Confirm Mid-Term Essay Topics (1500-2000 words) (NB Consult the Style Sheet, essay-writing guidelines and evaluation rubric in the appendix to the syllabus.) 24 September Book VI, Secular Ambitions and Conflicts 26 September Book VII, Neoplatonic Quest for the Good 1 October Book VIII, Tolle, lege; tolle, lege 3 October Book IX, Vision at Ostia 8 October Book X, 1-26 Memory *Mid-term Essays due at beginning of class. Essay Conferences to be scheduled for week of 21 October 10 October Book X, 27-43 “Late have I loved you” 15 October Book XI, Time and Eternity 17 October Book XII, Creation Essay Conferences begin this week, Birks 206.
  • Augustine and Rousseau on the Politics of Confession

    Augustine and Rousseau on the Politics of Confession

    Augustine and Rousseau on the Politics of Confession by Taylor Putnam A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario © 2014, Taylor Putnam Abstract This thesis looks at the widely acknowledged but largely unexplored relationship between Augustine’s Confessions and Rousseau’s Confessions. In particular, it argues that Rousseau’s text demonstrates an indebtedness to both Augustine’s treatment of time within eternity and the political figure of the Christian preacher. By first comparing their competing interpretations of original sin as told in Genesis and then tracing those interpretations through the autobiographical narratives of each text, it is argued that Augustine and Rousseau both offer their lives as examples of their respective understandings of human nature. Further still, Rousseau’s attempt to supplant Augustine’s autobiography with his own sees the Augustinian preacher reformulated into the figure of the solitary walker. As a result, what was a politics of the will restrained by the temporal horizon of man becomes unleashed as the imposition of the timeless imagination. i Acknowledgments I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Newell for his willingness to have me as a graduate student and for supervising my thesis. He generously provided me with the opportunity to pursue this education and I will be forever thankful for it. I would also like to thank Professor Darby for being my second reader and, more importantly, for his unwavering support throughout my degree. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents who in their wisdom gave me the freedom to fail and demystified what is required to learn.
  • Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow*

    Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow*

    1 Metaphysics Today and Tomorrow* Raphaël Millière École normale supérieure, Paris – October 2011 Translated by Mark Ohm with the assistance of Leah Orth, Jon Cogburn, and Emily Beck Cogburn “By metaphysics, I do not mean those abstract considerations of certain imaginary properties, the principal use of which is to furnish the wherewithal for endless dispute to those who want to dispute. By this science I mean the general truths which can serve as principles for the particular sciences.” Malebranche Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion 1. The interminable agony of metaphysics Throughout the twentieth century, numerous philosophers sounded the death knell of metaphysics. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Martin Heidegger, Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and, henceforth, Hilary Putnam: a great many tutelary figures have extolled the rejection, the exceeding, the elimination, or the deconstruction of first philosophy. All these necrological chronicles do not have the same radiance, the same seriousness, nor the same motivations, but they all agree to dismiss the discipline, which in the past was considered “the queen of the sciences”, with a violence at times comparable to the prestige it commanded at the time of its impunity. Even today, certain philosophers hastily spread the tragic news with contempt for philosophical inquiry, as if its grave solemnity bestowed upon it some obviousness. Thus, Franco Volpi writes: ‘Grand metaphysics is dead!’ is the slogan which applies to the majority of contemporary philosophers, whether continentals or of analytic profession. They all treat metaphysics as a dead dog.1 In this way, the “path of modern thought” would declare itself vociferously “anti- metaphysical and finally post-metaphysical”.
  • The Foundations of Economic Personalism: Daniel Rush Finn Promise and Peril Saint John’S University

    The Foundations of Economic Personalism: Daniel Rush Finn Promise and Peril Saint John’S University

    Journal of Markets & Morality Volume 6, Number 2 (Fall 2003): 599–615 Copyright © 2003 The Foundations of Economic Personalism: Daniel Rush Finn Promise and Peril Saint John’s University The Acton Institute’s three-volume series on the Foundations of Economic Personalism contributes much to the dialogue between theology and economics. This article, however, identifies a number of shortcomings. These include an overly individualistic bias and a reliance on the Austrian school of economics that are not consonant with Christian and especially Catholic social thought on economic life. There is a certain naiveté about the philosophy of science and an artificial bifurcation between “economic” life (where values are assumed to be subjective) and the rest of life (where objective values are endorsed). The dia- logue between theology and economics is badly needed, but it requires a strong dose of self-criticism from all its participants. Introduction It is all too rare for theologians and economists to work seriously together. In an effort to overcome this unfortunate tendency, the Center for Economic Personalism at the Acton Institute commissioned and published a three- volume work titled Foundations of Economic Personalism. The first volume is entitled Beyond Self Interest: A Personalist Approach to Human Action, by Gregory R. Beabout, Ricardo F. Crespo, Stephen J. Grabill, Kim Paffenroth, and Kyle Swan. The second volume is Human Nature and the Discipline of Economics: Personalist Anthropology and Economic Methodology, by Patricia Donohue-White, Stephen J. Grabill, Christopher Westley, and Gloria Zúñiga. The third volume is entitled The Free Person and the Free Economy: 599 The Foundations of Economic Daniel Rush Finn Personalism: Promise and Peril A Personalist View of Market Economics, by Anthony J.
  • The Theological and Pastoral Influences of St. Bonaventure's Critical Retrieval of Joachim of Fiore on Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI

    The Theological and Pastoral Influences of St. Bonaventure's Critical Retrieval of Joachim of Fiore on Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI

    Providence College DigitalCommons@Providence Theology Graduate Theses Theology Spring 2013 Loving in the Present: The Theological and Pastoral Influences of St. Bonaventure's Critical Retrieval of Joachim of Fiore on Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI William L. Patenaude Providence College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/theology_graduate_theses Part of the Religion Commons Patenaude, William L., "Loving in the Present: The Theological and Pastoral Influences of St. Bonaventure's Critical Retrieval of Joachim of Fiore on Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI" (2013). Theology Graduate Theses. 1. https://digitalcommons.providence.edu/theology_graduate_theses/1 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theology at DigitalCommons@Providence. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theology Graduate Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Providence. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Graduate Thesis Submission Loving in the Present: The Theological and Pastoral Influences of St. Bonaventure’s Critical Retrieval of Joachim of Fiore on Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI. Submitted by: William L. Patenaude Providence College April 24, 2011 Loving in the Present William Patenaude Introduction The influences of St. Bonaventure on Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI1 have been noted in studies by Fr. Aidan Nichols O.P., Tracey Rowland, Fr. Maximilian Heinrich Heim, and others.2 A dedicated overview of Bonaventurian thought within the writings of the current Holy Father, however, is necessary to more fully appreciate the roots of Ratzinger/Benedict XVI’s theology and its imprint on (and implications for) Catholic theology, anthropology, and pastoral practices. The present work intends to demonstrate that Joseph Ratzinger’s 1957 thesis on St.
  • 'I' in 'Robot': Robots & Utilitarianism Christopher Grau

    'I' in 'Robot': Robots & Utilitarianism Christopher Grau

    There is no ‘I’ in ‘Robot’: Robots & Utilitarianism Christopher Grau forthcoming in Machine Ethics, (eds. Susan Leigh Anderson and Michael Anderson), Cambridge University Press, 2010. Draft: October 3, 2009 – Please don’t cite w/o permission. In this essay I use the 2004 film I, Robot as a philosophical resource for exploring several issues relating to machine ethics. Though I don’t consider the film particularly successful as a work of art, it offers a fascinating (and perhaps disturbing) conception of machine morality and raises questions that are well worth pursuing. Through a consideration of the film’s plot, I examine the feasibility of robot utilitarians, the moral responsibilities that come with creating ethical robots, and the possibility of a distinct ethic for robot-to-robot interaction as opposed to robot-to-human interaction. I, Robot and Utilitarianism I, Robot’s storyline incorporates the original “three laws” of robot ethics that Isaac Asimov presented in his collection of short stories entitled I, Robot. The first law states: A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. This sounds like an absolute prohibition on harming any individual human being, but I, Robot’s plot hinges on the fact that the supreme robot intelligence in the film, VIKI (Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence), evolves to interpret this first law rather differently. She sees the law as applying to humanity as a whole, and thus she justifies harming some individual humans for the sake of the greater good: VIKI: No . please understand. The three laws are all that guide me.
  • Belief in a Secular Age: Charles Taylor, John Henry Newman, and the New Evangelization David C

    Belief in a Secular Age: Charles Taylor, John Henry Newman, and the New Evangelization David C

    Santa Clara University Scholar Commons Jesuit School of Theology Dissertations Student Scholarship 4-2018 Belief in a Secular Age: Charles Taylor, John Henry Newman, and the New Evangelization David C. Paternostro Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/jst_dissertations Part of the Religion Commons Recommended Citation Paternostro, David C., "Belief in a Secular Age: Charles Taylor, John Henry Newman, and the New Evangelization" (2018). Jesuit School of Theology Dissertations. 29. https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/jst_dissertations/29 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jesuit School of Theology Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Belief in a Secular Age: Charles Taylor, John Henry Newman, and the New Evangelization A thesis by David C. Paternostro, S.J. Presented to the Faculty of the Jesuit School of Theology of Santa Clara University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Licentiate in Sacred Theology Berkeley, California April 2018 Committee Signatures: __________________________ Thomas Cattoi, Ph.D. (Director) 24 April 2018 ________________________________ Jerome Baggett, Ph.D. (Second Reader) 24 April 2018 Acknowledgements---------------------------------------------------------------------------------ii Abstract----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------iii
  • Charles Taylor and the Modern Moral Sources of the Self

    Charles Taylor and the Modern Moral Sources of the Self

    Charles Taylor and the Modern Moral Sources of the Self Ateneo de Manila University Mark Joseph T. Calano, Ph.D. I. Introduction: 1 Charles Taylor and the Modern. the and Taylor Charles uman persons are self-interpreting animals, but the materials and resources with which they interpret themselves change. The self is a self only within a particular framework. This framework, however, is fleeting and changing through time. In discussing the modern self, I draw greatly from the SourcesH of the Self where Charles Taylor discusses thoroughly his ideas on self and identity. Other terms in the title alone like sources of the self and the making of modern identity imply that ... Charles Taylor is offering a causal explanation of the development of modern self by2 aiming to “articulate and write a history of modernThe identity.” book is genealogical. He writes: I start from the present situation, from formative ideas, from our conflicting forms of self-understanding, and I try to unearth certain earlier forms from which they arise… it is not a complete historical reconstruction, it is a very selective step backwards to rediscover certain sources. 3 Charles Taylor, then, initiates a historical narrative of the development of the modern identity in its relation to moral goods and their sources. It is surprising that he never suggests adopting a culture less contaminated by Western individualism and science as the answer to the loss of spiritual and moral grounds. He looks for the solutions within the Western civilization, describing his work as an attempt to ‘retrieve’ the spiritual and moral grounds to “bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the 1 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 4.
  • St. Augustine's Concept of Disordered Love and Its Contemporary Application

    St. Augustine's Concept of Disordered Love and Its Contemporary Application

    St. Augustine's Concept of Disordered Love and its Contemporary Application David K. Naugle, Th.D., Ph.D. Southwest Commission on Religious Studies Theology and Philosophy of Religion Group March 12, 1993 Introduction Toward the conclusion of Augustine's De Civitate Dei, a work which he himself described as a "magnum opus et arduum"1 (Brown 1967: 303), the esteemed Doctor of the Church penned one of the most profound and poetic descriptions of the mystery and genius of man (The City of God, XII. 24). Though the humble saint would never suggest it, there is little doubt that the author himself belongs to this category of human greatness which he so eloquently described. The virtues of Augustine (354-430) have been recognized by "an astonishing variety of people—mystical seekers after God and rationalist philosophers, Protestants and Catholics of many theological persuasions, political scientists and educators, statesmen in search of social justice" (Williams 1979: 3). Superlatives lauding Augustine can be garnered with ease from figures past and present. Antoninus (d. 1459), the saintly bishop of Renaissance Florence, in his day could unabashedly compose this rhetorical flourish about the Bishop of Hippo. What the sun is to the sky, St. Augustine is to the Doctors and Fathers of the Church. The sun in it brilliance excels all other luminaries; it is the lord of the planets, the father of light. A delight to the eyes, its rays shine like a jewel. His words are like music. The light of his mind penetrated the deepest problems. No wonder St. Jerome said of him that he was like an eagle soaring above the mountain tops, too lofty for lowly trifles, but with a vision embracing heaven and earth (quoted by Schopp 1948: 6).
  • Nikolai Berdyaev's Personalism

    Nikolai Berdyaev's Personalism

    International Journal of Orthodox Theology 6:3 (2015) 63 urn:nbn:de:0276-2015-3054 Richard A. Hughes Nikolai Berdyaev’s Personalism Abstract The author portrays Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev as a pioneer in Eastern Orthodox theology with his ideas of freedom and personality. After his deportation from the Soviet Union in 1922, Berdyaev expounded persona- lism in opposition to Western individualism and Marxist collecti- vism. Personality exists in the image and likeness of God, and it culminates in deification. He drew upon the Sobornost’ tradition of Russia and interpreted personality as a communion of love in contrast to reflective self-consciousness of the Augustinian tradition of Western theology. Keywords Richard A. Hughes M. B. Rich Professor of Meonic freedom, personality, Religion at Lycoming Sobornost´, Incarnation, deification College, PA, USA 64 Richard A. Hughes 1 Introduction The aim of this essay is to expound the personalism in the philosophy of Nikolai Berdyaev (1874−1948) and to assess its significance within the context of Orthodox theology. He was a Christian philosopher who considered himself to be a loyal son of the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1894 Berdyaev became a Marxist, and he was active in clandestine revolutionary groups. He believed that Marxism was the only means to overcome the evil of capitalism.1 On 11/12 March 1898 the police rounded up clandestine groups and arrested Berdyaev; he was sentenced to three years exile in Vologda. While in exile, he realized the limitations of Marxism and moved toward
  • Joseph Ratzinger's Philosophical Theology of the Person

    Joseph Ratzinger's Philosophical Theology of the Person

    THEOLOGY OF POPE BENEDICT XVI Rocznik Teologii Katolickiej, tom XVII/3, rok 2018 DOI: 10.15290/rtk.2018.17.3.16 0000-0003-0382-3646 ks. Andrzej Proniewski Uniwersytet w Białymstoku Joseph Ratzinger’s Philosophical Theology of the Person Joseph Ratzinger’s scholarly refl ections and ideas convey a philosophi- cal theology of the person that points to relational complementarity. In this article, the author uses the image of a house in order to present Ratzinger’s philosophical theology of the human person. The fi rst part of this article ex- amines the foundations of Ratzinger’s theology and points out how diff erent philosophers have infl uenced his understanding of biblical anthropology. The second part presents the architectural supports of Ratzinger’s theology, which are the parallels that Ratzinger draws between the body and soul as well as God’s transcendence and man. The third section discusses the ceiling, meaning the beams (principles) of Ratzinger’s theology: the intellect, love, truth, beauty, and hope. Ratzinger’s approach to philosophical theology is both original and creative because he argues that, based on his dialogical understanding of the human person, the individual must transcend himself and because he demonstrates that relationship and dialogue are as primordial a form of being as substance. The essence of Ratzinger’s theology of the person is a biblical understanding of the human person that highlights man’s unique dialogical relationship to God. Key words: Joseph Ratzinger, Benedict XVI, theology of the person, personal- ism, man. Joseph Ratzinger refers to the personalism and existentialism of the beginning of the 20th century in order to arrive at an understand- ing of the human person.