The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France Vivian Grosswald Curran
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Hastings Law Journal Volume 50 | Issue 1 Article 1 1-1998 The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France Vivian Grosswald Curran Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 Hastings L.J. 1 (1998). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol50/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Articles The Legalization Of Racism in a Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France by VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN* [P]eople have an easier time experiencing changes in domination than changes in laws. - Portalis** Table of Contents Introduction ...........................................................................................2 I. Historical, Biographical and Theoretical Overview ................ 3 II. Prologue to Suicide: the July, 1940 National Assembly D ebates .....................................................................................15 III. Legality and Legitimacy ..........................................................24 IV. Antisemitic Legislation and the Role of Positivism .............. 30 * B.A. Pennsylvania; M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., J.D. Columbia; Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine. I am grateful to those who read prior drafts of this manuscript, and who provided invariably helpful comments: Ann Begley, Denis Brion, Richard Buxbaum, Martha Chamallas, Pat Chew, Roger Curran, Howard Engelskirchen, Susan Fox, Bernard Hibbitts, Richard Kay, Jules Lobel, Robin Malloy, Robert Ronald, Rhonda Wasserman and Richard Weisberg. Parts of this article were presented as talks at meetings of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (Utrecht, 1996); the Bar Association of the City of New York (New York, 1997); and the Twelfth Round Table of Law and Semiotics (State College, Pa., 1998). I wish to express my gratitude above all to my husband, Roger Curran, whose insights into the Vichy era have taught me much, and whose interest in Vichy France, the world of my parents, has been an unending source of consolation to me since their deaths. "[Lies hommes changent plus facilement de domination que de lois." 14 Discours prdliminaire, in 1 LocRt, LA LtGISLATION DE LA FRANCE 244, 251 (1827), quoted in LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 32 (1940). HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50 V. The Multiplicity and Polysemicity of "True" Frances .......... 45 VI. Democracy's Post-Mortem: Vichy's Systems of Symbols ......... 50 VII. The Frayed Threads of Memory: Post-War Representations and Significations ......................................... 58 VIII. "Entering the Future Backwards": The Trial of Maurice Papon and the Judicial Solution to Understanding Vichy ....... 73 IX. The Contemporary Relevance of Vichy ................................ 94 Introduction This article is the study of how a constitutional democracy can undermine itself from within, despite legal, constitutional and procedural safeguards designed to ensure self-perpetuation. The internal or voluntary road to destruction is only one of many paths that can lead to a democracy's demise. It is also the least visible process, and sheds light on the self-destructive tendencies embedded in the very structures of democracy. The focal point of this study is France's Vichy r6gime, the pro- fascist government of France from 1940 to 1944, named after the spa town of Vichy in which it acquired its legal existence through democratic means. Vichy was the seat of the new French government until 1944. I dwell in particular on Vichy France's antisemitic legislation and policy, as Vichy's antisemitism constitutes a dramatic example of policies and laws that appeared to invert, subvert and transform into their very opposites almost two centuries of constitutional guarantees and egalitarian principles.1 Even in the 1. Throughout this piece, I call France a "constitutional democracy" in reference to attributes of law and justice that were official national traditions, and part of the French body politic and population's self-understanding since 1789. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L'ANCIEN REGIME ET LA RtVoLUTION 317 (1967; originally published in 1856). The term is justified in that it conveys to common law readers an approximation of fundamental systemic attributes which they will associate with constitutional principles, and which were a part of pre-Vichy France. The role of the Constitution in American social and legal consciousness is, however, dissimilar in many ways from the French experience. Much of what we associate with the Constitution in terms of the fundamentals of our system, the French associate with their Civil Code. They have changed constitutions twelve times, but still have the same (albeit amended) code that went into effect in 1804. For excellent discussions of this issue, see Pierre Legrand, Strange Power of Words: Codification Situated, 9 TuL. EUR. & CIV. L. FORUM 1 (1994); Pierre Legrand, Civil Codes and the Case of Quebec: Semiotic Musings Around an Accent Aigu, in SEMIOTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, 195, 202 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1995) ("civil codes help to delineate a... national identity"); Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States, 49 ME. L. REv. 21 (1997); Martin A. Rogoff, The French (R)evolution of 1958-1998, 3COL. J. EUR. L. 453 (1997-98); and Pierre Legrand, Comparer, 2 REVUE INT. DE DROIT COMPARt 279 (1996). France's republican existence also was interspersed with monarchies and empires emerging and reemerging before the advent of the Third Republic, the government in power before the Vichy November 1998] THE LEGALIZATION OF RACISM enactment and implementation of legalized racism, however, precisely where Vichy appeared to break most radically with France's past legal tradition, Vichy constructed itself from the nation's past as much as it broke with it. Just as many of Vichy's roots lay in France's republican past, many of modem France's roots lie in its Vichy past. Coming to grips with Vichy involves connecting numerous, mutually incompatible tendencies that have defined France's various cultural communities, and that also coexisted within individuals. The point of such an exercise is not merely to conclude that complexity and contradictions abound, but to reveal how and why dominant political and legal patterns can shift so dramatically that eventually they undermine themselves. France's institutional mechanisms for perpetuating democracy proved unequal to the task in the face of combined internal and external pressures. Contemporary issues in the United States, discussed under such rubrics as welfare reform, immigration reform, a growing wealth gap, homosexual rights, public school funding, and publicly funded vouchers for private school attendance, create similar potentials for constructing hierarchies and categories of excluded people, of others with lesser rights. The processes by which an excluded other is created can be unobtrusive, and disguised through a rhetoric that extols the very democratic principles and ideals which it serves to erode, or even through procedures originally designed to ensure fairness and egalitarianism. In the coming years, increasingly vocal, diverse communities inevitably will raise still more issues of belongingness, exclusion, sovereignty and statehood, challenging democracy with implosion and explosion, in both the United States and the emerging Europe of the next millennium. 2 The study of Vichy France may be useful, as it encapsulates similar issues in another time, and illuminates the vulnerable and transformable propensities of legal and political theory in periods of crises. I. Historical, Biographical and Theoretical Overview France became a constitutional democracy pursuant to the French Revolution of 1789.3 In July of 1940, within weeks of France's defeat by the German army, democracy in France ended by a vote of democratically elected members of Parliament. As more fully regime. 2. For an exceptionally thoughtful analysis of these issues in the context of the European Union, see J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and the German MaastrichtDecision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219 (1995). 3. See generally DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1. HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. so discussed below, it was a voluntary act of self-destruction, as France's Parliament by an overwhelming majority of 569 out of 649 legislators, committed institutional suicide by voting itself out of existence and creating a dictatorship, all in careful compliance with the French Third Republic's legal procedure. 4 I do not mean to underestimate the importance of Germany's military triumph over France, or of its looming influence as the imminently probable ruler of all of Europe. I mean, rather, to focus on the "Franco-French" nature of Vichy inasmuch as Vichy (1) entered into existence as the choice of autonomous political delegates proceeding under the French law of the Third Republic, not the law of Nazi Germany; and (2) legislated for a time under its