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Issue 99 REPORT 1‐15 June 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-6 The IMF rescue of four INGO staff mem- with occurrences in Nangarhar and Logar 7-12 Northern Region bers from mixed AOG/ACG elements in this cycle, while criminality also weighed Western Region 13-15 northern Badakhshan drew attention to the heavily into the NGO security environ- perceived vulnerabilities of NGOs working ment in Kabul. Overall, the trending clear- Eastern Region 16-21 in remote border areas. However, it equal- ly indicates a consistent operating environ- ly cast a light on just how rarely such ment for NGOs despite the recent outliers, Southern Region 22-26 events actually occur. With the staff safe, although it is yet to be determined whether 27 ANSO Info Page and the immediate threat of the armed this will sustain in the coming months, as group involved reduced, NGOs turned NGO incident volumes tend to spike over their gaze towards the residual implications the summer, see graph p. 2. HIGHLIGHTS of how perceptions of NGOs - by host The above is in line with the shift that both communities, GOA structures, and IMF and AOGs have made towards em-  IMF rescue of NGO AOG/ACGs - may change with direct phasizing activities more significant to a staff in Badakhshan IMF involvement. This is a dynamic which political narrative than tactical gains. Alt- has the potential to materialize through the hough projected AOG and IMF initiated  NGO fatality in Sar-e resentments of marginalized GOA actors Pul incident volumes for June will not reach going forward. those of last year, a series of significant  Civilian casualties The inherent risks of operating in a conflict attacks by AOG – such as suicide ventures in IMF and AOG op- environment were further highlighted by and complex attacks in Kandahar, erations the death of a NGO ambulance driver in Uruzgan, Kapisa, Nangarhar, Nuristan, an IED blast Sar-e Pul. However, it Kunar, Khost, and Faryab - continue to marked one of only four NGO direct inci- allow for an effective AOG counter- dents this cycle, and 54 thus far in 2012. narrative to transition despite this general Shifting local dynamics are likely to create decrease. Similarly, IMF conducted their ANSO is supported by occasional outliers, such as this circumstan- first significant operation in Nuristan since tial incident, or the May killing of a NGO their withdrawal in 2009, but withdrew member in Ghor by an AOG looking to from parts of Laghman, and continue prep- increase its profile, but the 54 incidents arations for their withdrawal from Kunar. thus far mark an almost 40% decrease Meanwhile, their transition narrative in the compared to the same period in 2011, with North, Central and West is clearly linked to the four incidents this cycle a mere third of the roll out of new ALP programs. the 12 recorded over the same period last The strategy both sides are employing year. Further to this, 2012 has witnessed makes it likely that neither will see signifi- four NGO fatalities in four separate NGO cant strategic gains at present, but state- direct incidents, a decrease when contrast- ment operations may coincide with an in- ed to the nine deaths in seven incidents creased risk to civilian populations as illus- over the same period in 2011. trated in Paktya, Khost, Kandahar and In counterpoint to the above, NGO Logar. In fact, the civilian casualty count demining and health care projects continue for June alone accounts for 13% of the to feature regularly in incident reporting, total civilian casualties recorded this year.

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C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL K ABUL Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 3 Kabul was home to the majority 40 of the central region’s NGO inci- opportunity. 30 dents during the past fortnight. In the final NGO incident, an 20 Two of these were a result of NGO driver was accosted by two 10 predatory criminality, consistent (unarmed) men on a motorcycle 0 with the primary forms of threat on the Daraluman road, who that the NGO presence in the warned him not to work with a national capital currently witness- ‘foreign organisation’. Given the KABUL AOG KABUL Crime es. In the first instance, an NGO location in the city, there is a cred- staff member exiting the Standard ible possibility that those respon- in relation to the ministerial conference that Chartered bank in Wazir Akbar sible were affiliated to the armed took place from the 13th-15th of the month, no Khan after withdrawing a large opposition; however, the wide- such activity manifested itself. However, Ka- sum of personal cash was tricked spread NGO presence in this part bul remains statistically overdue for some form into taking a ‘taxi’ by a man pos- of the city also suggests that this of complex attack against a high profile politi- ing as a taxi driver outside the may have instead been a personal cal or security force target, a fact NGOs are bank, who instead picked up two dispute in disguise. Of final note encouraged to keep in mind, especially given armed accomplices shortly after on criminal targeting relevant to the prevailing absence of other forms of armed and then proceeded to rob the NGOs, an international staff opposition activity in the capital so far this staff member of thousands of member working for a non-NGO year. dollars. In another incident, the organisation was robbed at knife- owner of a fleet of vehicles re- point while walking home alone in Opposition activity did manifest itself outside cently rented to an NGO was fol- the Qala-ye Fatullah area late at the city however. On Highway 7 (the Kabul- lowed from the AIB branch in night midway through the period; Jalalabad Road), an AOG unit attacked an Qowai Markaz by two armed men given the growing level of petty ANP vehicle in the Gugamunda area of Suro- on a motorcycle, after he had criminality in the city, it is increas- bi, just south of Mahipar, at roughly 1700 hrs. cashed the cheque he had received ingly unwise to do so. Early in the morning two days later, an IED detonated against an ANP vehicle in the for the fleet’s rental. The men Apart from the above, security stopped him on the pretence of Tunal-e Khaki, just south of Gugamunda, kill- incidents in the city were almost ing two policemen and injuring three more. poor driving before demanding at entirely comprised of ANP ac- gunpoint that he hand over the These incidents serve to illustrate the presence tions, mostly arrests for criminali- of an AOG unit in this area of the Highway, money. In both of these instanc- ty of various forms, including es, it can be seen that the criminal who likely descend from the Koh-e Safi moun- home robberies, criminally- tains to conduct their operations – as well as groups responsible were much motivated murders, narcotics pos- more aggressive in their targeting the ongoing importance of adhering to the session and petty street robbery. 0900-1500 hrs travel window for the road. of individuals exiting banks, in- Worthy of note, however, was an cluding surveillance at the banks Similarly in Musayi, two RCIEDs detonated on NDS operation in PD 5 which led the main district road, one of which was aimed involved and direct confrontation to the arrest of six Nangarharis of the individuals, rather than in at a passing ANA convoy but which instead suspected of association with the killed two local students who happened to also previous robberies which have armed opposition. often relied on distractions such be passing. The other appeared to have prem- Moreover, while there was poten- as slashed tyres to provide the aturely detonated, striking nothing. tial for armed opposition activity

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 13th of June 2012. NGO incident counts include the total for all incidents attributed to all actors. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KAPISA K APISA Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 The most significant development in Kapisa during the first half of that the attack was intended to 30 June took the form of a BBIED demonstrate that the armed oppo- 20 attack against an IMF patrol in the sition in the province is capable 10 not only of effectively defending immediate vicinity of the Nijrab 0 DAC, the first time that a suicide themselves against recent ANSF attack has taken place in this dis- expansion in Tagab and Alasay, trict. As an IMF vehicle patrol but also to open up more serious was waiting in Bazaar-e Shahrani, fronts and to conduct such high- KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime impact attacks in relatively less roughly 300m from the DAC, ground for the upcoming ALP programme in with a number of IMF soldiers conflict-afflicted districts such as Nijrab. Alasay, expected to commence in the next two standing outside their vehicles, a to three months. However, these attacks BBIED operative approached There were, during the period, demonstrate the difficulty that the security also examples of such effective them in a burqa and detonated his forces will have in these areas, particularly with defence against ANSF expansion vest; the blast killed four IMF an IMF detachment on the way out without in Tagab. Most importantly, soldiers and two interpreters, and having effected significant damage to the injured five further soldiers and AOG units conducted a number armed opposition presence in the province. three civilians. ANP later stated of direct assaults against a new that the intended target was be- ANSF presence in the eastern part Indeed, the armed opposition instead contin- lieved to be a local Nijrabi MP, of Tagab that borders Alasay, ues to strengthen its position in Kapisa, which and that the attack, which was where a number of new ALP CPs this year represents the only central region coordinated from Tagab, was have been established in recent province that has seen an increase in AOG- therefore opportunistic in nature. weeks. During the period, three authored activity over last year’s levels, and a Regardless of this point however, such attacks were recorded, in significant increase at that. As such, the securi- the deployment of such an attack- Joybar, Qorghal and Tatar Khel, ty force expansion later in the year is likely to er to Nijrab likely demonstrates the last of which saw six ALP face concerted opposition by AOG cadres in the intention by the recently- killed and another injured, and the the southern districts, including a continuation appointed district shadow gover- AOG unit steal six AK-47s from of high-profile attacks in Mahmud Raqi and nor of Nijrab, who is based in the the deceased local policemen. other parts of the province where the balance AOG-dominated Alasay, to force- This new ANSF presence in these of power lies more in favour of the govern- fully introduce himself to the dis- AOG-dominated areas of eastern ment. trict. Furthermore, it is also likely Tagab is intended to prepare the

ANSO: Total NGO Incidents, all authors, countrywide, 2006‐2012 (Note:figures in red demark yearly incident peak) 30 Jul: 28 Jun: 27 Jul: 25 25

20 Aug-Oct: 18 Sept: 17 Jul & Sept: 16 15

10

5

0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB APR APR APR APR APR APR APR OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT JUNE 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents ARDAK WARDAK W Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 While in neighbouring Logar IMF 40 operational intensity has been recorded – an IMF air strike 30 high in recent weeks, in Wardak against an AOG location in the 20 southern Saydabad village of Dan- the security environment has in- 10 stead been characterised by an dokay – was targeted against almost exclusively intra-Afghan AOG cadres pressuring this stra- 0 conflict paradigm. This is true tegically important transport ar- tery; three Pakistani AOG fighters both in the AOG-ANSF realm, as WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime well as with regard to the annual were killed in the strike. Kuchi-Hazara conflict, which The remaining AOG activity con- Dai Mirdad. So far, three separate armed flared up again during the past centrated on the northern Maidan clashes have taken place between the rival fortnight. Shahr-Bamyan road, running communities, the first of which occurred in the through the capital district and In relation to the first dynamic, Dahan-e Baghak area of Behsud 1, which led neighbouring Jalrez, which has armed opposition cadres staged a to the killing of one Kuchi and the injury of been a long-term focus for AOG number of fatally effective opera- two Hazaras. Some days later in the Kajaw operations. Most significantly, an tions against security forces, par- valley in Markazi Behsud a more serious clash IED detonation on a secondary ticularly along the Kabul-Ghazni occurred, leading to the death of four Hazaras, road in the Kata Sang area of highway and in the northern dis- injuries to three, and the kidnapping of two Jalrez killed five ALP, a particular- tricts west of Maidan Shahr. In more by armed Kuchis. Then on the final day ly high death toll, and one that has all, nine separate AOG-authored of the fortnight, the latest clash took place in the potential to weaken ALP re- incidents were recorded on the Dai Mirdad’s Dasht-e Yorud, in which two solve in the area. Also in the dis- highway, all but one of which local Hazaras were injured. took place in Nirkh and Saydabad, trict, armed fighters attacked the Complicating the picture, earlier in the fort- and which together accounted for convoy of the leading Hazara MP night armed Kuchis ambushed an ANA con- exactly half of recorded AOG in the Mulakhel area as it was re- voy in the Tezak area of Behsud 1, killing four kinetic activity during the fort- turning from Bamyan; fortunately soldiers and injuring two more. It is certain night. Seven of these incidents for the MP, he had flown to Ka- that there are elements of the Kuchi communi- successfully targeted security forc- bul separately, but two of his bod- ty working with the armed opposition, who are es or IMF-contracted supply con- yguards were injured and one ve- likely eager to exploit what is ultimately an eco- voys, with one of the incidents hicle damaged. While it is possi- nomic conflict in order to embarrass the gov- leading to the death of a truck ble that this attack was a targeted ernment and inflict the occasional casualty driver, and three policemen in- one, with foreknowledge of the against the security forces. However, Kuchis jured in two of the other inci- convoy’s identity and movement most likely do this for pragmatic (rather than dents. However, one pressure timing, it is much more likely that ideological) reasons. For one, there have been plate IED in the Haft Asyab area this was simply an opportunistic allegations previously made that ALP in the of Saydabad detonated against a attack against a high-profile ar- northern districts have been overly partisan in local vehicle, killing five civilians moured vehicle convoy, which favour of local fellow Hazara communities, and injuring two others – this inci- was conducting a risky maneuver and this may be felt by Kuchi communities vis- dent demonstrating the indiscrim- by travelling through the area so a-vis other parts of the security forces and gov- inate nature of such IEDs, which late in the evening. ernment too. As such, this issue and its result- are unfortunately the type of IED The other major development in ing violence is likely to continue only as long as favoured by AOG cells along the the province during the period there is a failure by leaders of both communi- highway. was the commencement of this ties to agree on a mutually acceptable solution year’s clashes between indigenous With such a focus on the highway, – which, however, currently appears unlikely. it is understandable therefore that Hazara communities and migrat- the only security force operation ing Kuchis in the Behsuds and THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents L OGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 Logar was home to an NGO inci- 40 dent during the period, which oc- ar the most casualty-heavy prov- curred in the provincial capital. ince in Central during the fort- 30 After a firefight between ANP night. 20 and AOG fighters, a number of These operations focused on 10

casualties suspected to be from Baraki Barak (four), Puli Alam 0 the armed opposition were (three), Mohammad Agha and brought to an NGO hospital in Charkh (one each). In Baraki Bar- Puli Alam for emergency medical ak, each of the clearing operations LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime treatment. ANP quickly arrived recorded were part of a larger op- on scene and removed two of the eration to pressure the entrenched village itself, had been closed, and remains so patients from the hospital prior to AOG cadres operating with con- at the time of writing. receiving treatment, in clear viola- siderable strength in the district, While casualty-heavy developments focused on tion of established humanitarian and which therefore unsurprising- Baraki Barak, it was an operation in the Babus, principles. After requests by the ly generated the heaviest casualties Alozai and Sar-e Sang villages in neighbouring NGO to provincial ANP leader- of the period (19 of the 32 killed Puli Alam that led to the majority of deten- ship were rebuffed, it raised the overall). This was also true for tions – 28 of the 32 in all – while also seizing a issue with the provincial governor, civilians, when an air strike during large cache of arms, motorcycles and IEDs. who successfully intervened and a clearing operation in Sejawand This operation can be understood to relate had the patients returned to the killed five AOG fighters who had directly to the IMF priority of securing the hospital, albeit under armed staged themselves in a local house, highway, which during the period saw three guard; the next day, however, af- as well as 13 civilians in neigh- AOG attacks on ANA convoys, all in the vi- ter they had received the neces- bouring houses who had gathered cinity of the operation conducted. The re- sary emergency medical treatment, for a wedding. This fatal mistake maining AOG activity took place in Baraki the police again removed them led to an angry local reaction; the Barak, all in the form of direct attacks on from the hospital against the following day a large convoy of ANSF targets, as well as two IDF attacks on wishes of medical staff. This issue villagers set out for Puli Alam, and the Puli Alam and Charkh ANP HQs. is likely to become more common in two separate confrontations if ANSF expand nationally with- with ANP in the Baraki Barak In all, Logar continued to see considerable out developing the appropriate DAC area and on the outskirts of conflict activity primarily authored by the secu- knowledge of their obligations on Puli Alam, a number of ANP rity forces, although overall its kinetic intensity these fronts. were injured and one villager is significantly down from last year. Much of this decrease can be attributed to a pragmatic Beyond this event, incident vol- killed by police gunfire. While the AOG decision to reduce their presence while umes were evenly distributed be- airstrike generated a negative po- IMF intensity is high in this and neighbouring tween AOG and IMF operations; litical reaction at the Kabul level, provinces south and southeast of Kabul – however, qualitatively the IMF and caused IMF leadership to is- while continuing to deepen their socio-political had a much more substantial im- sue stricter guidelines on air position in local society. This strategy comes pact on the province during the strikes in populated areas, locally with the consequent likelihood that as IMF fortnight, including in the realm the result was for the armed op- scale down in the province from next year, the of civilian casualties. Clearing position (and supportive parts of armed opposition will be able to quickly in- operations and air strikes com- the local community) to declare crease their presence and operational intensity prised the bulk of their activities, that schools should be closed for on the basis of the socio-political foundations which cumulatively led to 32 three days in the district in pro- on which they are currently building. AOG fighters being killed and a test. However, it was confirmed further 32 detained – making Log- that only one school, in Sejawand THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents P ARWAN Year to Date 0 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 An IO supply convoy bringing 40 food goods to Bamyan was ac- The first incident of the month, as 30 costed by an AOG unit in the with those in May, saw armed 20 Tangi Lala area of Sheikh Ali, east opposition forces focus their ki- 10 netic attention on ANSF, with a of the DAC, with 2 of the trucks 0 set on fire, ANP responders were pressure plate IED striking an quickly engaged in an SAF attack, ANP vehicle in the Chardeh area of the highway and injuring three which led to the destruction of PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime another truck, although no casual- ANP policemen. The next day ties were inflicted on any side. however, another pressure plate diffuse geographical spread of the armed op- The implication of targeting such IED struck the vehicle of the new position units focused on the highway will a humanitarian convoy – as with Shinwari DG as he was moving make it difficult for the security forces to ef- previous instances of robbery of through the Sokhta Chenar area fectively hold back such attacks; the relatively local travellers by AOG members to the DAC for the first time, low number of ANSF assigned to this stretch along the road – is clear enough: quickly followed by an SAF attack of the highway, even during such operations, is that the armed opposition cadres by opposition fighters lying in also a significant obstacle to securing the road. are willing to target a range of wait. While the attack only led to A case in point was the final incident of the actors to communicate their mes- some damage to the vehicle, and period, which occurred in the same area as the sage that travel to a major provin- no casualties, the message was second ANSF operation, on the same day; an cial centre is growing more diffi- clear. RCIED detonated in front of the convoy of cult, a message which seeks to One point worthy of note is that the Parwan provincial governor, quickly fol- embarrass the government and these incidents demonstrated a lowed by a SAF attack by opposition fighters demonstrate AOG capabilities in wide geographical spread – from lying in wait – in a near identical incident to the realm of political coercion. eastern Sheikh Ali to the Shin- the previous attack on the Shinwari DG. In wari-Jabal Saraj border – and as Security developments in Parwan the fighting, two ANP were killed and another such the existence of multiple have focused almost exclusively two injured. Given the challenges of geogra- highway-focused AOG units op- on the ongoing armed opposition phy and a weak ratio of ANSF to AOG, we erating across a relatively large effort to constrict access to can thus expect this insecurity to persist until area. This is relevant to the com- Bamyan along the stretch of the the Autumn in spite of likely further clearing mencement of ANSF clearing highway that runs through Shin- operations. wari, Ghorband and Sheikh Ali, operations, on June 10th, in some Outside of the Highway corridor there were which started to spike from the of the side valleys that bisect the just two incidents of note. First, as a Panjshiri beginning of May; of the seven highway in Shinwari and Ghor- ANA commander was transiting through Syed AOG-authored incidents in the band districts. In the first opera- Khel to Kabul late in the evening with his fam- province, five took place in this tion, focused on Dara-ye Kafshan ily, his convoy was stopped and attacked by corridor, while ANSF operations in Shinwari, ANSF (including three AOG fighters with automatic weapons; were also concentrated here. ALP and NDS) killed four AOG the commander and five members of his fami- Moreover, during the period these fighters and injured another three, ly were killed in the attack, with the remaining opposition efforts expanded in also sustaining two ANP injuries. th three suffering serious injuries, in what seems scope, moving away from a sole In another operation on the 13 , to have been a targeted assault rather than an focus on attacking security forces in the Abakan and Chardeh areas opportunistic one. The other incident was – although these remained the of Ghorband, ANSF clearing op- more harmless, taking the form of an inaccu- primary target – to also targeting erations killed eight AOG fight- rate and inconsequential IDF attack on provincial political leadership and, ers, again sustaining two ANP Bagram Airfield. as above, a humanitarian supply injuries. convoy. However, the aforementioned THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

B AMYAN NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 50 Bamyan town saw its first notable This Report Period 0 40 live-fire incident in more than two respond with SAF of their own. 30 years this period, in an incident As often occurs, politically sensi- 20 obscured by the fog of political tive incidents such as this were 10 sensitivity. The leading Hezb-e initially denied by officials in the 0 Wahdat figure and prominent MP province, who instead argued that had travelled to Bamyan to com- the guards had only fired warning memorate the first anniversary of shots at suspicious individuals, but BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime the targeted killing of former confirmed after the Hezb-e Bamyan provincial council chair Wahdat leader had departed for likely intended primarily to politically embar- Ahmed Jawad Zohak, which had Kabul by helicopter. In spite of rass him by demonstrating his vulnerability – been a statement attack intended ongoing AOG activity along the hence the early denials. to announce a much more con- Bamyan-Kabul highway, the cur- certed effort on the part of the rent lack of demonstrated AOG The only other incident that took place in the armed opposition to constrict incidents suggest that no armed province was the ANP seizure of five anti-tank road access to Bamyan through opposition cadres operate in cen- mines from a coal truck driving east on the the Ghorband corridor - an effort tral Bamyan, given its ethnic ho- Kabul-Bamyan highway in south-eastern Shi- that continued with force during mogeneity and history of opposi- bar. This incident can be understood to be this period too. While staying in tion to the IEA. Rather, this at- part of ongoing opposition efforts to constrict the main party office in Bamyan tack was highly likely to come access along this stretch of the highway (see bazaar, late one evening it appears from an element of the Bamyan Parwan for further analysis), efforts which that three men armed with AK- political elite that is in friction source a percentage of their materiel from 47s fired briefly at the office, with the Hezb-e Wahdat leader Baghlan through Shibar district. which caused the office guards to and his allies, and as such was

D AYKUNDI NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 Daykundi continued to see ex- This Report Period 0 40 30 tremely low incident volumes, Secondly, ANP arrests of individ- characterised by incidents of uals for possession of illegal 20 armed criminality and national arms/materials were reported 10 security force actions. During this from Shahristan and Miramor. In 0 report period, four incidents were the former district, in the Bazaar reported., two of which related to Ul-Qan area, ANP arrested a local different forms of armed criminal- man at a CP, when they discov- DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime ity, and two to ANP arrests. ered 3 kg of explosives in his vehi- Firstly, in the Siyah Jangal area of cle. In the latter district’s Nadak as the only form of firearm that does not need Kiti, two men shot and injured village, in the Chadsad Khana val- governmental registration. another local as he was riding a ley, ANP detained a local man Such an incident pattern is likely to continue to motorcycle, before stealing his after seizing two shotguns during characterise the remote province, although we valuables and escaping the area. a local search. However, the man can expect a small number of armed opposi- The following day, in an incident was later released by the police tion incidents to emerge from the southern catalysed by a personal dispute, an after the intervention of local two districts of Kajran and Gizab. armed group opened fire at a community representatives; this number of farmers in Sangi Ta- was likely facilitated by the fact khat’s Bandar village. that shotguns are not illegal per se, THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents S AR- E PUL Year to Date 2 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 1 50 Two unusual incidents—an IED 40 This cycle, two of the three IED detonation against an NGO am- 30 bulance and a complex attack detonations occurred around 20 against the Sar-e Pul jail (initiating Qush Tepa village (this one and a a jail break)—illustrated increasing detonation on the 5th against an 10 AOG activity in Sar-e Pul prov- ANA vehicle) while the third was 0 ince—particularly in Sar-e Pul part of the complex attack that acted as a catalyst to the jail break district—as accented by the rela- SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime tively new use of IEDs. in Sar-e Pul City. While it is un- likely that the ambulance was the On 11 June, an ambulance con- intended target, it demonstrates picked up on and which cost the relatively new structed of an old Russian van not only the increased AOG ac- provincial chief of ANP and the chief of the was sent to Qush Tepa village to tivities, but a potential shift in jail their jobs. The use of relatively powerful pick up a woman and bring her to tactics (towards IED strikes) wor- IEDs along with complex operations initiated an NGO run clinic when it hit an thy of note to NGOs. The num- inside of Sar-e Pul city (virtually unheard of in IED on its return. The detona- ber of casualties in the two IED the last two years despite the shrinking sphere tion killed three passengers— strikes around Qush Tepa includ- of GOA control outside of the city) demon- including the NGO driver and ed the five civilians noted above strate the capability and robust nature of two relatives of the patient—and as well as two ANA killed and one AOGs that are operating in the district from injured an additional two (the pa- wounded in the strike against the the borders of Sayyad to the north-western tient and another relative). The ANA vehicle, with the extent of Shiram area, a presence that continues to in- incident marked a significant out- the casualties suggesting that these crease. lier in two manners, firstly, in AOG are capable of producing Almost all of the other incidents in the prov- terms of targeting trends, the in- capable and effective devices. ince—all of which took place inside Sar-e Pul creased AOG activity has thus far district—were initiated by AOG and targeted displayed strong tendencies to- The third IED strike in the dis- trict was part of a jail break or- ANSF targets, with the exception of a wards the targeting of RPG/machine gun fire attack against a private ANSF/IMF/ALP forces, with chestrated in Sar-e Pul city on the evening of the 7th. The break— truck in the middle of the day on 03 June, and few other civilian casualties rec- a brief round of SAF initiated by ANP sta- orded this year due to AOG au- set off by a complex attack involv- ing RPG and SAF against the jail, tioned at the prison on the night of the 14th, thored events, and almost none due to the misidentification of a target (likely directly targeting civilians (outside followed by an IED detonation that allowed prisoners to escape because of increased anxiety in the wake of the of attacks on telecommunications previous week’s jail break). The attack against structures). It also marked the while the guards were engaged and thus distracted—marked a the truck occurred in the Balghali area of the third IED related incident to oc- Sar-e Pul – Kohistanat road, and likely marked cur in the district this reporting significant deviation from the usu- al shoot and run tactics and illegal another effort by AOG to assert themselves in cycle following an extensive peri- the AOG stronghold, and strike back against od where IED activity was almost checkpoints/abductions that AOGs have thus far typically run the ongoing ALP training program existent in entirely absent. In fact, prior to the mountainous southern district (although, these three detonations, only one in the province. Unlike those pri- or incidents, which involved unlike the last few periods, no actual attacks other IED-related incident had against ALP were recorded in Kohistanat this occurred in the district this year, mostly spotters and a physical presence, this attack involved sig- cycle). The shooting marked the second attack when an IED detonated against in this area over the last three weeks. an ANSF patrol in the often con- nificant planning and assets, and tested Shiram area in mid-May. created an event that the media THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents B ADAKHSHAN Year to Date 3 BADAKHSHAN This Report Period 0 50 The abduction of four INGO 40 their capacity to regenerate and to staff in Yaftali Sufla on midday of 30 what extent they will be willing to May 22nd came to an end this 20 reporting period (after roughly exert any form of overt presence one week in captivity) when considering the recent outcome. 10 IMF—claiming actionable intelli- The lack of a regular IMF pres- 0 gence concerning an imminent ence throughout the province risk to those abducted— means that the risk of NGOs be- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime conducted a night operation late ing overly associated with the in- on June 1st that resulted in at least ternational military due to the general security landscape of Badakhshan five casualties amongst the abduc- IMF rescue operation is primarily where the significant pockets of conservative tors, and the safe return of all four mitigated. However, it should be populations, despite being rather permissive of abducted staff members. While noted that the province saw no NGO presence, overlap with cross-border the NGO staff were originally less than three IMF operations drug trafficking networks that permeate a vari- abducted by an ACG (from Argo this reporting period in Shahri ety of provincial actors including AOG, ACG, or Shahri Buzorg), the abductors Buzorg, Argo, and an unrelated and GOA. In this environment, the large eventually linked up with an AOG operation on the 14th in Warduj. NGO community represents a high-value and (from Ragh) as they marched How this plays out with individual easily accessible target, in particular during north and west from the abduc- NGOs will be very much depend- movements through remote and poorly po- tion site to an isolated location ent on where the NGOs are liced areas where an encounter with an armed where they set up camp. Various working, their specific local pro- group of criminal, political, or mixed nature is indicators suggested that the file, and the steps they take going not out of place. NGO staff remain prone to AOG/ACG had relatively low forward. It should be noted the same environment-specific risks as any community acceptance and the though that a perceived associa- other entity associated with more significant abducted staff remained un- tion with IMF does not necessari- financial assets would face in most remote are- harmed throughout their captivity. ly affect perceptions of NGO as. The only difference is that NGOs work to neutrality any more than strong There are however two key issues maintain strong community ties and assuranc- local ties to GOA actors in the requiring further analysis follow- es—which are directly linked to the assets area such as district governors, ing this incident in relation to the those NGOs bring to communities—which ANP, and NDS. extent of any residual threats: one provide considerably more security in areas stemming from the remaining It is also important to situate this with questionable command and control fidelity and capacity of the groups incident into the broader context. (unlike areas that are under tight GOA or responsible for the abduction and The abduction marks a strong AOG control). While NGOs will work to fig- the second involving the impact outlier in a province that has wit- ure out where vulnerabilities in their own of the IMF rescue. While it is nessed 33 NGO-direct incidents movements or areas of operation may be, for unclear to what degree those in- over the past seven years, but not the meantime the incident is not indicative of a volved in this abduction still pose a single NGO abduction prior to threshold event and remains a strong outlier a threat—as the initial rescue op- this. The district where it hap- similar in nature to other notable events in the eration was followed by an opera- pened had never witnessed an North such as the attack on UNAMA in tion in Argo that further depleted NGO incident, and the present Mazar in April last year (that did not symbolize leadership from groups potentially case also marked the first NGO a change in the security situation for NGOs) involved—it is certain that this abduction to occur in the North or the killing of internationals in Kuran Wa particular’s groups capacity has outside of Faryab since 2010. On Munjan in 2010 (owed directly to foreign been deteriorated following the the other hand, as to the actors AOG). operation. A key related factor is involved, the case underlined the THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents B ALKH Year to Date 1 BALKH 50 This Report Period 0 Chimtal and Chahar Bolak contin- 40 ue to account for the majority of districts have nearly drawn even 30 over the last month and a half, incident reporting in Balkh. How- 20 ever, increased levels of AOG with 27 occurring since May first, activity are also being recorded in a close second to the 31 recorded 10 Sholgara (seven security incidents over the same period in 2011. 0 in the last month and a half, in- The activity has been relatively cluding four authored by AOG IED heavy, with this period BALKH AOG BALKH Crime and one IED discovery) and occa- notching two significant IED det- sionally in the northern districts, onations (out of four) causing a suggesting that robust IED emplacement will most recently in Dawlatabad relatively high volume of civilian likely continue over the coming summer (where four of the seven security casualties. As in Sar-e Pul, this months. Of note, one of the other two IED incidents this year have occurred suggests that AOGs have in- detonations in Chimtal also killed two civilians over the last month and a half, creased not only their presence, (in Moqoriha village on the 1st), while the third three authored by AOG with the but their assets, and are focused was a premature detonation. fourth being an IED discovery). on retaking land that was relative- Nevertheless, while insecurity is ly calm over the first quarter of The first IED detonation of the year in Chahar likely to continue to display mar- 2011 amidst heavy ANSF, IMF, Bolak (against an ANP ranger in the district ginal increases in these peripheral and CIP deployments. center at 0900 on the 12th), killed three civilians districts over the summer The more notable amongst these (including a child) and injured five ANP, fur- (including potentially in Nahri was an IED detonation that oc- ther illustrating the risk of collateral involve- Shahi—where the most active curred approximately 10 meters ment. The IED was attached to a motorcycle, AOG leader from the area has from a mosque on the afternoon and was reported to have been remotely deto- recently resurfaced—as well as of the fifth in the Arab Mazari nated. Although this appears to denote an Kishindeh and Shortepa), AOGs area of Chimtal. The detonation outlier, the general pattern of increased activity are expected to remain focused on took place just after the conclu- falls in line with existing seasonal trends. Chimtal and Chahar Bolak, the sion of a Shura where local elders AOGs are pushing to make sure their presence AOG strongholds in the province. discussed the election of CDC is felt, resulting in decreased security through- out the district, however, the vast majority still The most recent reporting period members (with NGO staff pre- expressly target security forces. Of note to has demonstrated trending in sent). The IED killed two—a this, reports indicate that the CIPs will be Chimtal and Chahar Bolak that is village elder and a militia mem- turned over to the ALP program in the near close to that of 2011. Of the 15 ber—and injured four others, alt- future, although the exact manner this will be security incidents recorded, 11 hough the NGO staff involved in implemented (whether they will be trained ex- occurred in these two districts, the CDC process were not direct- ternally, mentored by ANSF on the spot, or with five in Chahar Bolak—three ly effected by the strike. The tar- just turned into ALP overnight) remains un- authored by AOG and the other get of the IED remains unclear, clear. two being IED discoveries—and but the proximity in location and six in Chimtal, all authored by time strongly suggests it was di- Outside of these two districts, notable inci- AOG. This is nearly equal to the rected against local leadership (or dents included an armed attack on a private same period in 2011 (13, six au- even the CDC process), as Arab construction company site that was building a thored by AOG and five IED Mazari has seen significant AOG bridge for an IO—setting the worksite on fire discoveries). While no conclu- activity, and this may have been but not stealing anything or injuring anyone— sions should be made from this an attempt to intimidate locals to in Dawlatabad, and two incidents in Sholgara two week period alone, it is nota- abandon alternative governance, (a fight between PGMs and an AOG attack on ble that despite the lower overall although attacks dedicated to the an ANP checkpoint). volume of security incidents the targeting of civilians remain ex- two districts have recorded thus ceptionally rare in the district this far in 2012 (54 as compared to 71 year. 12 of the last 22 incidents in through mid-June in 2011), the Chimtal have been IED-related, THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents J AWZJAN Year to Date 1 JAWZJAN This Report Period 0 50 This period saw two notable inci- 40 attack on an ANP checkpoint and dents recorded in the district; the 30 temporary detainment of two IO the assassination of two CIPs in contracted trucks returning from their local residence—neither of 20 delivering food along the Qush which pose any shift to existing 10 trends—in combination with the Tepa – Darzab road on the even- 0 ing of the 8th, and a rare IED temporary detainment noted detonation inside of Shibirghan above. The truck stoppage oc- JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime City near the house of a GOA curred in the vicinity of Teraghali employee on the morning of the Arabia, a kinetic area that has only approximately 200 meters from the home 14th. Although Jawzjan has main- been responsible for 40% of the of General Dustum, whose supporters have tained a significantly lower overall incidents recorded in the district recently been investigated for obstructing the volume of incident reporting than this year, and although the target- Chinese run oil project taking place in Sar-e occurred in 2011, with only 84 ing of IO contracted vehicles is Pul. incidents on file through the mid- not new to the region, it marks an dle of June as opposed to 121 in outlier to the usual incidents rec- Rounding out the picture, two incidents this 2011, incident reporting—most orded in the district (which pri- period included IED discoveries in Darzab notably that pertaining to AOGs marily have consisted of attacks and Mardyan. While Darzab—part of the (attacks and IED emplacement)— on hard targets, specifically TPA—has been a traditional AOG stronghold is increasing throughout the prov- ANSF, IMF, or CIP). While in- along with Qush Tepa (and an IED discovery ince, primarily in the Tri- security is increasing, other than is not irregular there, as activity is likely to in- Provincial Area (TPA— this incident, only two others have crease the next months), any notion of in- specifically in Qush Tepa, which expressly targeted civilians creased AOG activity in Mardyan is more un- had recorded four security inci- (including the abduction and re- common, and involves a location with a rea- dents before late reporting), but lease of the son of an elder from sonably sized NGO population. This IED also elsewhere in the district, as this same area in late January). was discovered at 0800 hours on 09 June along witnessed by recent IED-related The other notable incident in the the often travelled Mardyan – Aqcha road. activity in the less kinetic districts province—and perhaps an even Although it marked only the fourth incident to the north of the province. greater outlier than the stop- recorded in the district this year, two others consisted of an IED detonation and an abduc- In the TPA, the temporary detain- page—was the detonation of an tion. While in the past, there have been ment of IO contracted truck driv- IED in Shibrighan city against known to be relatively small criminal groups ers with their trucks (released a civilians (although in close prox- active in the area, multiple reports from the mere two hours later due to the imity to a GOA official’s house) area suggest that Mardyan—along with fact that they were local to the which injured 11 civilians, includ- Mingajik and Fayzabad—are seeing move- area and well known amongst the ing the wife of the head of the ments of AOGs throughout much of their community), as well as continuous election commission (whose territory, especially in the late evenings, and in targeting of CIPs suggests that the house the detonation occurred in fact, other IED discoveries or detonations CIP project has been unable to front of). The detonation marked have occurred over the last month and a half maintain stability in the area since only the second IED-related inci- in Mingajik, Qarqin, Fayzabad, and Khaniqa, AOGs have moved back and rei- dent in the city this year (the first suggesting that—as reported by locals—AOG nitiated operations. AOG activity being an IED discovery in Febru- movements are increasing in the northern dis- in the TPA—although still well ary), although others have oc- tricts, likely in connection with increased AOG under last year’s cumulative to- curred in the district along the activity in Chimtal and Chahar Bolak in Balkh tals—is increasing at a rate to put contested Sar-e Pul – Shibrighan as well as in Sar-e Pul. However, it is yet to be it relatively in line with predicted road. It remains unclear who seen if AOG activity will increase to the level seasonal trends, and likely to con- planted the IED and to what end, of movements being recorded, as has begun to tinue to increase for the coming while it likely targeted the GOA occur in Sar-e Pul. summer months. This period, official, it was also located in close such activity took the form of an proximity to a local mosque and THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents K UNDUZ Year to Date 1 KUNDUZ 50 This Report Period 0 Two armed guards working for a 40 private construction company nine in Chahar Dara and eight in 30 Kunduz (traditional centers of implementing a project for an 20 INGO (as financed by an IO) AOG activity), but followed 10 were killed in Khanabad. The closely by seven in Khanabad. guards were recent additions, only Although the recently increased 0 hired after the head of the con- security reporting appears unlikely to reach that of the same period in struction company received two KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime threatening phone calls to halt the 2011 (35), the reality is that de- spite a slow start, AOGs are now project. Such targeting is not an comfortable asserting their physical presence, exception in Khanabad, the home executing a significant volume of operations (primarily against hard denoting greater confidence in their numbers of a large number of competing and assets. militias, and it appears likely that a targets). IED-related incidents local power broker was attempt- continue to make up a large por- Thus far in 2012, January (38) and May (37) ing to elicit protection pay or stop tion of these (six detonations— have recorded the highest volume of security a project that might benefit a rival. three in Chahar Dara—and five incidents, both totals that June appears likely At this time, the attack appears to discoveries this period), but con- to surpass. Lastly, cases involving the abuse of have been directed at the compa- tributed proportionately less than civilians by ALP and PGM are being reported, ny, not the NGO or IO. usual, accounting for approxi- and as IMF forces draw down, these could mately one third as opposed to further fracture communities and cause in- In a reporting period vaguely rem- nearly half this period. This sug- creased conflict. iniscent of 2011, Kunduz record- gests that AOGs are feeling more ed 29 security incidents, led by

NGO Incidents T AKHAR Year to Date 0 TAKHAR This Report Period 0 50 Although no tests have yet deter- 40 mined what caused female stu- an effected school and stoned the 30 building, protesting the perceived dents to fall ill in nine separate 20 inability of the GOA to protect incidents—five of them this peri- 10 od—the GOA were quick to an- their children. While the arrests 0 nounce a number of arrests in appear to have calmed things Takhar and Kunduz in relation to down, it should be noted that the the alleged poisonings, in a con- incidents (which took place pri- TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime certed effort to calm a civilian marily in Taloqan, but also in population that was quickly be- Rustaq, Farkhar, and most recent- ly in Bangi) continued during— cause of these or because people calmed down coming anxious to the point of after the arrests remains unclear. panic. More than 15 arrests were and even after—the arrests, alt- made this period, including those hough only one occurred after 05 It is worth noting the low levels of AOG activ- of two well known AOG com- June (when on the 14th a small ity recently recorded in Takhar. The majority manders in Takhar and one con- number of girls fell ill in Bangi). of incidents this cycle consisted of ANSF ar- tributing pharmacist in Kunduz The narrative has increased local rests (most notably in Khwaja Ghar, in con- (who was allegedly importing GOA and civilian rhetoric against junction with increased activity in northern chemicals from outside the coun- AOGs, but no AOG has openly Kunduz), with the most notable exception be- try). taken credit (and the IEA does ing an IED detonation in Bangi against the not denounce female education). private residence of the head of a local Shura. The arrests began as the situation It should be noted that the strong The detonation marked only the third incident appeared to be getting out of community pressures created a recorded in the district (two of them IED- hand, with a short, unplanned need for arrests, but whether the related), but locals sources have held firm that demonstration occurring in “poisonings” slowed down be- it involved a personal conflict, not AOGs. Farkhar, when parents marched to THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents F ARYAB Year to Date 3 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 After recording 72 security inci- 40 April, and only three other suc- dents in May, the 19 this period 30 cessful suicide attacks over the last represented a respite from the 20 high level of AOG activity that six years (Shirin Tagab in 2011, 10 has characterized the province in Khwaja Sabz Posh in 2010, and 0 2012, despite the notable inclu- Qaysar in 2008), with one at- sion of two BBIED detonations. tempted BBIED in Qaysar in Oc- tober 2011. Neither of the cur- The three most insecure districts FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime in the province (Qaysar, Almar, rent BBIEDs detonated in the and Pashtun Kot) accounted for vicinity of any high profile target, with the first one in Qaysar Qaysar sees a high level, although only one only 12 security incidents—five other IED incident—a discovery—was report- authored by AOG—in contrast to against ANBP and the second in Maymana against an undefined ed there this period. Anecdotal reports suggest a total of 44 (16 AOG-initiated) that the BBIED in Qaysar was deployed accumulated throughout May. target, leading many to suggest it had detonated prematurely. In against a GOA official, but detonated prema- Locals from the area have sug- turely when the ANBP happened upon him. gested that the overarching lull total the BBIEDs resulted in three deaths—two of which were the However, this appears impossible to confirm. may be due to recent ANSF/IMF Looking forward, IED-related activity is likely operations, but it is not expected vest bearers—and 12 casualties (10 civilians and two ANBP ). to continue at a significant level in Qaysar to persist. (despite the current lull), but at current, the use In terms of IED activity, May- Suicide attacks have been ex- of BBIEDs marks a significant outlier, and tremely rare in the province, with mana generally witnesses a rela- these incidents do not necessarily suggest any tively low volume, marking the similar acts limited to a VBIED in new trend. Maymana against an IMF patrol in attack as a further outlier, but

NGO Incidents B AGHLAN Year to Date 0 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 Baghlan recorded 12 incidents this 40 in Baghlani Jadid, AOG focused period, six of them in Baghlani 30 Jadid, which continues to contrib- on disrupting IMF supply chains 20 ute the lion’s share of incident by targeting fuel tankers. While reporting. Prior to this cycle, attacks of this nature occurred on 10 Baghlani Jadid accounted for 58 both the Tala Wa Barfak – 0 of 121 incidents in the province Bamyan road and the Puli Khumri – Kunduz road, it was the excep- this year. While the province rec- BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime orded a similar 129 incidents over tional number of “AOG” joining the same period in 2011, the 58 the APRP process which marked the most notable dynamic. remains significant (even though Khost Wa marked a 50% increase for Fering has not recorded a single security inci- Baghlani Jadid, which had ac- Twice in the last two weeks large dent since 2011, nor a single AOG related inci- counted for only 40 the previous groups joined the APRP process, dent since 2010, suggesting that the actual year. This demonstrates the high- first in Puli Khumri, with 83 al- combatants in the district may not equal those ly insecure nature of Baghlani leged AOG members from Khost partaking in the APRP). Jadid this year, but also shows that Wa Fering district joining, and current insecurity has been more then in Khost Wa Fering itself Lastly, the ALP killing of a female and two confined to the northern district, with an additional 45. While it children in Baghlani Jadid marked another and that districts such as Puli remains doubtful that the majority ALP attack against civilians, as has been previ- Khumri, Dushi, and Tala Wa of these consist of actual fight- ously recorded in Baghlani Jadid and Kunduz. Barfak have seen significantly less ers—more likely civilians or fringe The accountability of the various armed activity in comparison to 2011. combatants trying to cash in on groups going forward will constitute a defining dynamic for the north-east as IMF withdraws. Outside of four IED discoveries the process—the large number THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents H ERAT Year to Date 4 HERAT 50 This Report Period 0 Two incidents directly or indirect- 40 ly targeting IOs occurred this cy- not uncommon to Herat prov- 30 ince. Since 2010, six cases have cle. In Guzara, AOG launched a 20 RPG/SAF attack on an IO com- been reported. The first four oc- pound, leaving no casualties or curred along the Herat – Chagh- 10 damage, while in the south-east of charan highway (two in Chishti 0 Adraskan, two IO contracted Sharif in 2010, and one in Pashtun trucks were detained by AOG. Zarghun and one in Karukh in HERAT AOG HERAT Crime 2011), but the most recent two The IO compound in Guzara has cases occurred along the Adras- come under seven different AOG kan–Ghor road within the last the PRP, although the decrease in overall secu- attacks since 2006, although only two reporting periods. While rity incident volumes was limited to 8%. This two of these - including the cur- AOG incident volumes have been change suggests a significant short term shift in rent - have occurred over the last relatively low in areas along this the proportion of AOG to ANSF initiated four years. While in 2008 and pri- road (only two AOG incidents incidents, in favor of the latter (from— or, the attacks mainly consisted of were recorded in 2011), five inci- respectively—16:14 the PRP to 8:18 this peri- IDF, the last two included a com- dents have already been recorded od). This was particularly visible in Shindand, plex attack with suicide vectors in this year, suggesting that AOG where the ration was 2:6 (AOG to 2010 and this current incident. presence and activities are increas- ANSF/IMF) as opposed to 4:1 the PRP. Of Although this does not denote the ing in the area. Further to this, it note, the last ANSF/IMF operation resulted in current attack as a regular occur- should be noted that the southeast the arrest of the district shadow governor rence, it clearly marks that the of Adraskan has areas that have (DSG) and two other prominent commanders compound is actively on the been heavily affected by AOG along with 13 fighters, which is likely to curtail AOG radar for targeting. traffic from the south to the AOG activity for a short period. A lull in con- In Adraskan, the IO-contracted north, and due to the lack of gov- flict in both Kushk and Kushki Kuna marked trucks were carrying food items to ernance and limited information other contributing factors to this decline. Ghor when they were intercepted access, the number of AOG inci- In contrast, AOG activity appeared in Herat by AOG and subsequently trans- dents are likely underreported. City, although it remained confined to subur- ferred to Shindand where the Therefore, the chance of encoun- ban districts. Despite no effective detonations, drivers were released unharmed. tering AOG elements is signifi- two IEDs were located by ANP in the city, The release was likely connected cantly increased due to frequent while in Injil, a RCIED detonated against ANP to an ANP operation that was AOG inflows as well as bad road vehicle. AOG activity in the city has consisted underway, but it appears that the conditions (which slow down the primarily of IED attacks against high-profile drivers were not directly freed by speed of movements through the targets in urban areas, reinforcing the need for ANP’s use of force. area). NGOs to maintain sufficient distance from It is important to note that the In total, Herat recorded eight potential targets. detention of commercial trucks AOG-authored incidents this cy- transferring IO/NGO items is cle, marking a 50% decline over THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents FARAH F ARAH Year to Date 0 100 This Report Period 0 After the intensification of AOG 80 activity the PRP, the volume de- ing from 12:10 to 8:4, particularly 60 as evidenced in Bala Buluk and clined by 45 % this cycle, with 15 40 AOG authored incidents. This Bakwa. In the central districts, 20 appears to be an operational pause two incidents of targeted killings for the reorganization of dis- occurred. In the first case, AOG 0 persed AOG units, and AOG shot and killed an ALP member riding on a motorbike and cap- volumes are likely to rise again FARAH AOG FARAH Crime towards the middle of the sum- tured his rifle and motorbike in mer. However, the pattern of Pusht Rod. In the second case, two AOG members riding on a sulting in the deaths of two AOG members geographical distribution of AOG and injuries of eight others. It appears likely operations remained unchanged. motorbike shot and killed one NDS official (the operational dep- that ANSF/IMF will build ALP/PGMs in the Bala Buluk and Bakwa authored area, as announced by the MOI in April, an 53% of the total AOG incidents, uty head), while he was working on his house in PD1. Target kill- important feature to be monitored in the fu- while the central districts (Khaki ture. Safed, Pusht Rod, and Farah) ings are likely to continue - partic- were responsible for most of the ularly in urban areas - as conflict rest. In terms of tactical patterns, re-intensifies toward the middle of close range attacks with SAF and the summer. RPGs became more dominant as ANSF/IMF stretched their opera- IED attacks decreased, with the tions into the heart of Gulistan, a proportion between these chang- traditional AOG stronghold, re-

NGO Incidents B ADGHIS Year to Date 1 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 This reporting period, AOG activ- 40 and moderate AOG cadres after ity in Badghis continued to de- 30 cline, with eight AOG incidents the withdrawal of IMF from the area the PRP. Stability in Darae 20 recorded, accounting for a 23% 10 drop from the PRP attributed to Boom will be largely dependent 0 decreased AOG activity in Ghor- on how radical AOG cadres in mach and Muqur, which recorded neighboring Nakhchirestan will react to moderate AOG cadres only one AOG-authored incident BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime each. As for Qadis, another AOG and ALPs. active district, the number of In Murghab––the focal point of tive air strike––resulted in the death of four AOG incidents remained un- conflict––the low volume of prominent AOG commanders and four other changed but the geographical fo- AOG activity remained almost AOG members, as well as the arrest of 9 AOG cus of AOG operations shifted unchanged, while IMF military members. from Darae Boom area to Khair operation gained momentum. In Khana area due to successful ne- total, three major operations–– gotiations between ALP elders one of which involved an effec- THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents G HOR Year to Date 5 GHOR This Report Period 0 50 Unlike other provinces in the 40 clearing operation around the vil- West, AOG activity continued to 30 lage which led to a protracted rise this reporting period with 20 eight AOG incidents, roughly fight, resulting in the death of sev- 10 double that of the PRP. This in- en AOG members and four villag- crease was mainly attributed to the ers, as well as injuries to four 0 further deterioration of the securi- AOG members, six villagers, and two ANP. These altercations reit- ty situation in Pasaband as migra- GHOR AOG GHOR Crime tion of Helmandi AOG continued erate the fact that the MOI has to increase following the end of likely begun implementing ineffective coordination between north and the poppy harvest. While five ALP/PGM programs in Ghor, south AOG cadres in the province, is likely to AOG incidents in total were rec- which are likely to increase ten- disrupt AOG operations in the short-term. orded in the district, it is im- sions in the future. portant to note that all of them In the north, AOG activity in Of note to the NGO community, AOG affili- occurred within the first four days Charsada has risen after nearly a ated with the Charsada IEA cadre responsible of the month. Particularly, on the month long lull. AOG under the for the killing of an international NGO staff 4th of June, a local armed group District Shadow Governor at- last month killed the Provincial Primary Court affiliated with Helmandi AOG tacked an ANP CP in Kanak vil- Judge, who had been abducted and transferred assaulted an ANP CP in Kakuri lage on two separate occasions. to Murghab Valley in late May. While the mo- village. The ANP repelled the However, during the second at- tivations of this particular group and their in- attack with the assistance of tack, ANP conducted a preemp- terplay with the local AOG landscape are yet armed villagers in a clash that re- tive strike against them, resulting to be assessed, their demonstrated focus on sulted in the death of three villag- in the death of the district shadow ‘soft targets of value’ emerges as a feature ers and injuries of three others governor (DSG) and two of his worth monitoring in the coming months. and two ANP. The following day, bodyguards. It is important to ANP and the locals conducted a note that his death, along with

ANSO: AOG ATTACKS IN THE WEST (CONVENTIONAL, INDIRECT, SUICIDE ATTACKS) 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

2010 2011 2012 THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents N ANGARHAR Year to Date 14 NANGARHAR This Report Period 2 100 Nangarhar’s two NGO incidents 80 have also seen a sustainment of during the first half of June both 60 took the form of robberies of AOG operational intensity when compared with last year. For 40 demining worksites by armed op- 20 position cadres. In Hesarak and Nangarhar, this sustained level of 0 Rodat districts, armed groups ap- activity points most directly to the proached demining field sites and fact that in spite of ongoing IMF stabilization efforts, particularly proceeded to steal those pieces of NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime equipment that are valuable for during the winter lull, armed op- position cadres in the province their IED construction and em- area had one of their vests prematurely deto- placement activities. However, remain stubbornly powerful and well-entrenched. nate, killing both individuals. Moreover, ANP while in Hesarak the armed indi- seizures of two extremely large caches of ex- viduals fired in the air to scare off One of the most overt manifesta- plosive materials – one in Ghani Khel bazaar the deminers, in Rodat they mere- tions of this continuing power and the other in northern Goshta – further ly identified themselves as belong- was seen in Chaparhar during the indicate the scale of operations that the armed ing to the IEA and calmly stated period, where on the evening of opposition continue to plan in the province, th they were going to take some of the 7 , opposition fighters estab- while also demonstrating the ongoing success the equipment, to which the de- lished illegal vehicle CPs on the ANSF are having in disrupting significant per- miners wisely agreed. Such inci- main district road in Terelay, centages of such shipments. dents are unfortunately a fact of Shaghal Dara and Sra Qala, all in life for demining work, given the close proximity to Khalis Family Other developments of significance were two multiple applications of their Colony and the outskirts of Jala- AOG operations targeted at ANSF and GOA equipment, and are extremely labad city. Similarly, the continu- leadership, and an IMF air strike in AOG- hard to prevent; instead, instruct- ing occurrence of high-profile saturated Bati Kot, which killed eight AOG ing field staff to comply entirely suicide attacks during the period – fighters who were sleeping in an open area with armed opposition figures after last period’s failed BBIED near Chardeh. In Bati Kot, on the main high- who approach in such a manner is attack – also pointed to ongoing way, an IED struck the vehicle of the Kot the best course to minimise any AOG resilience in the province COP, but failed to kill him. However, a SAF potential for the use of violence in and in rear areas across the border attack in Shinwar against the district Criminal the acquisition of the equipment. in Pakistan, even if only one of Investigation Department (CID) chief killed him and injured his bodyguard. In the wider conflict, AOG- them managed to strike its target. authored incident levels have fall- Firstly, a SVBIED struck an IMF Finally, the first instance of AOG targeting of en slightly from May levels, con- convoy on the Torkham Highway a girls’ school in Khogyani was recorded dur- sistent with the pattern witnessed in Rodat, near to Bati Kot from ing the fortnight. In the Bar Beyar area on the th last year in the province, where where it was likely staged, causing 10 , an armed opposition group set fire to a May saw the provincial peak after damage to one IMF vehicle. The girls’ school, which led to both structural dam- which volumes fell until the end others were less effective. In the age and the loss of some of the materials inside of Ramadan, after which they be- Joy 25 area of Shinwar, ANP shot the building. This is the latest in a series of gan to rise again. Also of signifi- and killed a BBIED operative nationwide incidents involving girls’ schools, cance, overall opposition incidents who was trying to approach an and its occurrence in an area not known for do not demonstrate a significantly IMF EOD team as they were de- such AOG social conservatism may indicate a different rate this year when com- fusing an IED. Then on the 15th, broader change in thinking at the local level pared to 2011, similar to its neigh- two BBIED operatives riding to- amongst AOG cadres in the province. bours Kunar and Laghman, which wards Jalalabad in the Ghani Khel THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents URISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN N 50 This Report Period 0 In what can only be understood 40 to be deep concern about devel- maintains a degree of nominal 30 opments in a province that has governmental authority – alt- 20 represented the greatest AOG hough in reality only for its HIG 10 victory against international mili- constituency. Indeed, the HIG 0 tary forces in the past decade, leadership came under renewed - IMF re-entered Nuristan in a and escalated - assault during the period in neighbouring Nari, meaningful way after almost three NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime years of absence from the prov- when IEA cadres launched a ince, having been beaten into stra- SVBIED and BBIED strike in a clear attempt to augment their political tegic retreat by numerically and against the leading HIG com- position vis-à-vis those district communities tactically superior armed opposi- mander and a number of other not closely tied to HIG. tion cadres. Their newfound Kamdeshi HIG leaders when they presence has been established in were meeting with security forces In the coming months in Kamdesh, we can the very district from which they in the district (see Kunar section expect significant conflict activity in the dis- beat their final retreat in October for more). trict, including civilian casualties, road block- 2009 – Kamdesh – and represents Because of the new IMF presence, ages and environmental damage, caused by an what appears to be a last-ditch it is not however surprising that IMF presence that will be both eager to do effort to conduct conventional AOG operations in Kamdesh something with the short time it has, and con- clearing operations in advance of decreased during the period, as cerned about the sort of large massed AOG the withdrawal of IMF ground they adjusted to the presence of attacks on their facilities that progressively forces from neighbouring north- their new neighbours, who have drove them from the province three years ago. ern Kunar this Autumn, which already started shelling and con- Elsewhere in Nuristan, a further drone strike will also be when these recently ducting airstrikes on areas thought took place in Waygal, this time in Aranch, deployed forces will be removed. to be home to an AOG presence. which killed four AOG members, including a Yet, while there may be some ki- As such, the only significant kinet- mid-level IEA commander, and injured an ad- netic effect from these new forc- ic operations recorded in the dis- ditional three. The individuals were reportedly es, in the form of AOG fighters trict during the period were secu- on their way to funeral prayers for the former killed, the sheer number of securi- rity force clearing operations, one deputy shadow governor of the province, who ty forces required to have any of which, conducted by ANBP had been killed in the drone strike that took hope in rolling back what appears before the arrival of IMF, killed place the previous period. In Wama, north of to be an inexorably rising tide of eight AOG fighters in Patigal vil- Waygal, NDS arrested two students as they AOG dominance in the province lage on the 6th. Yet prior to IMF were smuggling IEDs into their madrassa, likely are highly unlikely to manifest deployment, there were some po- as storage in advance of operations in the pro- themselves. As such, even efforts litical developments on the AOG vincial capital Parun; this is unusual for the by these forces to improve the side in Kamdesh; most notably, town, and thus of some concern, although pri- effectiveness of recently deployed district AOG leadership informed marily for GOA officials and ANSF. Finally, ANA units to Kamdesh are not local communities that they could in Nurgaram, an IED struck an ANA vehicle likely to prevent AOG consolida- receive food and other assistance in Baba, injured five soldiers, while a SAF at- tion of authority away from the from the armed opposition tack was also staged against the former PRT district centre, where a surround- (sourced from Chitral) in ex- base, which led to the injury of one AOG ed and harassed HIG presence change for their political support, fighter. THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents L AGHMAN Year to Date 2 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 In Dawlat Shah, Alishing and 40 Badpakh districts, and with little ing - likely also drawing strength 30 from opposition cadres across the in the way of media announce- 20 ments, IMF withdrew and handed mountains to the west in Kapisa, 10 over security responsibilities to where the armed opposition are ANSF, leaving behind just a small also developing their capabilities. 0 advisory contingent. This unpub- Moreover, as it is doing across the licised transition took place weeks region, the opposition was also after provincial IMF and GOA recorded in Alishing implement- LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime leadership pushed to bring signifi- ing its increasingly political posi- to Alingar, the only district that continues to cant numbers of HIG fighting tion, aimed at influencing local feature an active conventional IMF presence, cadres into the APRP in Dawlat society; in the Arian area of the another RCIED struck an IMF supply truck, Shah, which can now be under- district, opposition members were causing damage. South of the town, there stood as preparation to experi- forcibly collecting financial and were also three hit-and-run SAF/RPG attacks ment with leaving this outlying goods taxation when they were against ANP CPs; in one, in Palawan Baba, district effectively in HIG hands, accosted by ANP. While on this IMF air assets responded and killed two AOG similar to efforts underway else- occasion their work was disrupted fighters. This level of post-transition AOG where in the eastern region. by police, most of these incidents go unreported, but anecdotal evi- activity in a major provincial center with a sig- However, significant security chal- dence indicates it is slowly but nificant ANSF presence and a highly active lenges remain, in the form of nu- surely increasing. Across Lagh- NDS raises considerable concerns about the merous local AOG cadres that man the IEA have significantly near term future of more rural and AOG- have not been effectively rooted increased such work in the past saturated districts that have just undergone the out – and are likely to see the IMF six months, particularly in Alingar, same change. withdrawal as a retreat, as their and the withdrawal of IMF will In Qarghayi, another transitioned district, neighbours in Nuristan did in only benefit them in this regard. AOG cadres have continued to increase the 2009, and in Kunar’s Pech valley pressure on the ANSF in the Tangi area, at- in 2011. The continued presence In Mehtarlam district, the first tacking CPs on a number of occasions, as well of such cadres was made bluntly part of the province to transition, as attacking the convoy of a Shinwari senator clear the day before the an- this past fortnight gave a taste of as it was transiting through the area in the nouncement, when an AOG unit what lies in store for the newly- evening – injuring two bodyguards but not the established an illegal CP during transitioned districts. In the senator himself. As with previous attacks mid-morning in the Zar Qamar Omarzai area, an RCIED struck a against high-value GOA officials in Qarghayi, area of the main Mehtarlam- motorcycle being driven by a it appears that the opposition has effective Alishing road; this is not a sign of NDS official with another NDS surveillance and intelligence inputs to assist improving security in the district, official riding on the back: one them in such targeting. and further indicates a confident was killed and the other badly and expanded AOG presence in wounded. In Besram, close to the district as IMF are withdraw- Mehtarlam town on the main road

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents K HOST Year to Date 6 KHOST This Report Period 1 100 Khost saw a NGO incident when 80 tained resilience of the Haqqani a UXO detonated while a de- 60 network, which is entrenched just miner was attempting to defuse it 40 across the border; in particular, in southern Tani district; the deto- 20 nation injured the individual in- the large numbers of fighters de- 0 volved. ployed and killed for this opera- tion – just as with the dozens that More broadly, while Khost was comprised the multi-city complex not involved in any of the com- KHOST AOG KHOST Crime attacks last month – demonstrate plex attacks that struck Gardez, the significant manpower that the Jalalabad, Puli Alam and Kabul on faction continues to enjoy both Nadir Shah Kot, Bak, Tani and Tere Zayi, with April 15th, at midday on June 1st, within Afghanistan and in Paki- ANSF and other security force-related targets a very large SVBIED was detonat- stan’s tribal areas. As in other on the receiving end of the majority of the ed at the east gate of Salerno base, neighbouring provinces this year, incidents. From the IMF side, a small number the main conventional IMF base the use of spectacular attacks such of operations were recorded, particularly in in Khost province. The IED, as this is partly about an economy Khost district’s Kundai area, as well as in Saba- rigged to a Hino truck, breached of force effort; for Khost, AOG- ri; in all, 22 AOG fighters were arrested across the main gate and partially col- authored incident levels are about the operations. lapsed the base’s main dining hall 40% lower than last year, much of Finally, in an unusual development that also and shop, which allowed a 14- which is accounted for by drops points to the operational adaptability of the strong team of AOG infantry op- in Sabari and other rural districts, Haqqanis, AOG fighters staged multiple incur- eratives to breach the base’s pe- where a heavy IMF focus has sions from Waziristan into Jaji Maidan, a dis- rimeter defences and engage the made some dents in AOG free- trict which has remained utterly and improba- Afghan and international forces dom of operation. bly free of conflict in the last decade – all the staged inside. These operatives more remarkable for its proximity to Bak and were killed within a short time, However, as in other provinces in Sabari. It is estimated 320 families fled their while the security forces inside the the east, this economy of force homes as a result of the incursions, which tar- base also suffered significant casu- effort is accompanied by a grow- geted local residences and killed one local. It is alties; due to intentional infor- ing political role of the opposition likely that the Haqqani network has finally de- mation secrecy, the exact numbers leadership vis-à-vis local society – cided to open up access routes through Jaji of these casualties aren’t known, most notably demonstrated by the Maidan, given security force pressure both to although at least one IMF soldier appointment of a Haqqani family the north in northern Paktya, and to the south died of injuries sustained in the member to the position of shad- in eastern Khost. It is a tactically sound time firefight. There were also at least ow governor for Khost earlier in for them to do so, as it is late in the day for the 20 civilians injured in the incident, the year, a sign of the growing government to authorise and roll out another but this too, as with the extent of importance the network places on ALP or substantially increase conventional the structural damage and the political relationships in the cru- forces in the district, which is also effectively AOG success at breaching such a cial border province. Moreover, inaccessible to security forces by road, given major IMF facility, were initially the level of opposition activity in the intense insecurity in the districts between kept private by IMF, likely due to Khost remains relatively high Jaji Maidan and Khost city; as such, we are concerns about the perceptions when compared to neighbouring likely to see more such activity in the coming that such an attack would gener- provinces, consistent with its gen- weeks, and as it occurs the strategic priorities ate. erally greater conflict intensity. AOG-generated insecurity fo- of the armed opposition with regard to this This incident highlights the sus- cused around IED deployment in new front will become clearer. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents K UNAR Year to Date 1 KUNAR 140

As with its southern neighbours This Report Period 0 120 Nangarhar and Laghman, Kunar’s Across the province, a total of 42 100 conflict intensity has remained 80 separate SAF attacks were staged 60 roughly consistent with last year’s by armed opposition forces 40 levels, and the lack of security against ANSF and IMF targets, 20 gains raises questions ahead of the although only a small number led 0 October IMF withdrawal from to fatalities. However, there were the northern districts of the prov- some notable incidents beyond ince, which indeed have seen a the general static of the conflict. notable deterioration in security in KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime First, on two separate occasions recent months - as AOG cadres AOG figures shot and killed unlikely to be able to stabilise itself. have focused on strengthening GOA officials reaching out to their position and infiltration ca- In a second incident worthy of note, a mullah them in regards to joining the pabilities in these areas over the using his house as an IED factory near the APRP process. In Nari’s Saw past eight months. Most notably Chawkay bazaar saw his house catch fire, with valley, where a significant deterio- in Nari, at the end of the period the resulting combination of fire and explo- ration of security has taken place the armed opposition launched a sives causing a large detonation that injured in the past three months, an SVBIED attack against the main him and four of his family members. There armed group shot and killed two IMF/ANSF base in the district, was a distinct intensification of mortar fire APRP officials after inviting them followed by a BBIED operative from Pakistan in the traditional districts of to the area for negotiations. Simi- who attempted to detonate his Dangam and Khas Kunar, related to increased larly, in Dangam an NDS officer vest in the base’s vicinity, but efforts by TTP cadres to target their Pakistani was shot dead while trying to con- failed to do so before being shot military adversaries from rear positions inside vince AOG fighters to join the dead. The detonation came while these Afghan districts. As has happened on APRP. Both of these incidents senior Kamdeshi leadership, pri- multiple previous occasions, this has led to the demonstrate the broad unwilling- marily of a HIG complexion, were displacement of dozens of local families. ness of much of the province’s meeting security forces in the base The only notable IMF operation was a com- internally fragmented but exter- – and can therefore be under- bined ground/air operation in the Sundrey nally powerful armed opposition stood to be a clear escalation in area of Manogai, in which the nephew of one to countenance such negotiations, IEA efforts to pressurise of the most important AOG commanders in and thus the likelihood that even Kamdesh’s reconciled HIG lead- the Pech valley was killed, alongside a col- were there to be a dramatic de- ership, as part of their agenda to league. escalation of conflict in neigh- secure stronger infiltration routes bouring provinces (which remains into, and more de facto political highly improbable), Kunar is very control in Nuristan.

ANSO: AOG ATTACKS IN THE EAST (CONVENTIONAL, INDIRECT, SUICIDE ATTACKS) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2010 2011 2012 THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents PAKTYA P AKTYA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Paktya’s AOG-authored incident 40 levels increased slightly on May’s later, given the geographical and 30 levels, but by much less than the climatic conditions found there). 20 growth rate seen in June 2011, Also in the area of the provincial 10 which saw a near doubling over capital, an IED detonated as an 0 the level of May 2011. However, AOG member was carrying it to this is likely partly a function of an unknown location, killing him the later start to the fighting sea- in the vicinity of the Kabul Bank PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime son in Paktya, given the intense branch in the city, as well as injur- ing 20 civilians. cold weather and extensive snow indication of the AOG focus on this urban Outside the town in the wider cover seen this year, and as such it area as part of their desire to publicly an- district, in an indication of the would not be surprising for cur- nounce their presence and proximity to the rent levels to continue upward in numbers of AOG fighters that government and security forces. the coming six weeks. Supporting have returned to the provincial evidence for this is found in the center, the first illegal CP of the Elsewhere, there were a small number of IEDs seriousness of some of the events season on the Kabul-Gardez road on the Khost road, in Shwak and Wuza Za- recorded in the past two weeks in was recorded on the evening of dran, which resulted in no fatalities; the only the province. Most significantly, the 8th, in Loya Tera, which was fatal IED strike apart from the aforementioned while returning to Gardez from however disrupted by ANP re- Chawni strike occurred in the north in Ahmad- the Chawni area, having conduct- sponders who caused the AOG to abad, which killed two ANA soldiers. From ed a clearing operation, an IMF flee. Also on the main road, on the IMF side, only two of their five operations vehicle was struck by a large IED, three separate occasions AOG were significant. First, a combined ground and killing four IMF soldiers in what fighters attacked ANSF convoys air operation in Zurmat killed six AOG fight- was likely intended as a high- in the Tandan area before with- ers, including a Pakistani, while another such profile statement attack in ad- drawing. There was also a signifi- combined operation led to the death of five vance of this summer’s fighting cant number of IED discoveries AOG fighters in Jani Khel, including a mid- (which in Paktya starts and ends in and near to Gardez town, in an level commander, and the arrest of five more.

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ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents G HAZNI Year to Date 1 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 180 160 Ghazni Province has witnessed 140 another period of high insecurity, hour-long exchange resulted in 120 two AOG fighters wounded and 100 contributing to the overall in- 80 crease of security incidents in the two PSC guards killed. The third 60 ambush by AOG occurred the 40 South Region. What is striking 20 about the incident profile in following day when an AOG 0 Ghazni is that it is almost entirely force returned to Khogyani’s DAC to ambush a joint IM- fueled by a rising work-rate on the GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime part of AOG units in the prov- F/ANP patrol, producing a fire- ince, with 31 direct attacks and fight which left two AOG fighters dead and another wounded and crashed in the past. Two IMF soldiers were targeted killings recorded over the killed in the attack. past two weeks. Unusually, AOG detained. displayed a willingness to both The pace of indirect AOG attacks IED incidents remained a threat in the prov- inflict and absorb casualties, un- did not falter even though direct ince, with 13 separate strikes recorded over the like the standard hit-and-run tac- attacks had risen, and there were past two weeks. Roadside IEDs wounded a tics commonly used by Ghazni- seven incidents of mortar or rock- total of 12 ANP/ANA soldiers in four inci- area AOG. A prolonged attack et fire during the report period. dents; in the first, a roadside IED struck an on the DAC of Rashidan district As has usually been the case, the ANSF foot patrol resulting in the deaths of in which AOG fighters employed majority of these attacks produced two ANP and serious injury to three others. heavy machine guns and RPGs, no damage or injuries however in In Dih Yak district, near the area known as resulted in the deaths of one ANP two cases serious collateral dam- Qala-e-Jawz, three of the district governor’s officer and three AOG fighters. age took place. Two mortar bodyguards were wounded by a RCIED as it An attack two days later on the rounds fired towards an ANP detonated as his convoy was passing. In the DAC of Khogyani district, also post in the area of Puli Matay in third incident, an ANA vehicle was struck by involving the use of heavy weap- Muqur district struck a nearby an IED near the village of Chardewar in Andar ons, ended in the deaths of two civilian residence, killing two chil- district, wounding the five ANA soldiers trav- AOG fighters. Lastly, three direct dren and wounding three ANP elling inside. The last major IED incident oc- attacks on vehicle convoys ap- officers. In another incident, curred in Ghazni’s Deh Khudai Dad area as peared to reinforce the perception AOG fired three mortar rounds another six ANA soldiers were wounded – two that AOG are determined to en- towards the DAC of Qarabagh severely – when a roadside IED struck their gage in more prolonged firefights. that actually struck a nearby public patrol vehicle. However, ANSF personnel First, a well-coordinated ambush health clinic and severely wound- were not the greatest victims of IEDs during of the province’s Chief of Police ed one woman and two children. the report period; rather, civilians took the convoy killed two ANP body- A final AOG engagement de- brunt of fatalities, with a total of nine civilians guards in the Baraki area of Ra- serves some notice. In the Qalbi killed and four injured in three separate inci- shidan district, during which area of Qarabagh district AOG dents. In the Wacha Kala area of Gelan dis- AOG fighters employed both fighters appeared to successfully trict, an IED hit a civilian vehicle, killing all heavy machine gunfire and SAF. down an IMF helicopter with four occupants. The next day, in Khogyani’s This was followed two days later ground fire. IMF issued a rare Pul-e-Dawab area, a roadside IED caused the by an ambush which took place acknowledgement of the success deaths of three more civilians, two female and near the area of Nani, near Ghaz- of the AOG attack; it is far more one male. In the last incident, also in Khog- ni district’s DAC, as an IMF logis- usual for IMF sources to speak yani district, one male and one female civilian tical convoy was attacked with vaguely of ‘technical/mechanical were killed as an IED struck the taxi they were RPG fire as well as SAF. The issues’ when helicopters have travelling in. THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR K ANDAHAR Year to Date 1 100 This Report Period 0 80 Kandahar has reclaimed the dubi- 60 ous distinction of having the most broad change in approach. 40 security incidents in the South Other AOG actions included an- 20 region—76 in total. The vast ma- other 32 direct attacks, primarily jority of these were direct attacks targeting ANP posts and person- 0 by AOG and IED strikes, so the nel. Panjwayi district itself hosted past two weeks were particularly six direct AOG attacks during the bloody, made even more so by a last two weeks, with the most sig- KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime complex suicide attack in Daman nificant occurring in the DAC of district which resulted in an ex- Panjwayi when a fire-fight be- usual civilians bore the brunt of the strikes – ceptional number of civilian fatali- tween AOG and ANP began after near the village of Deh Babur in Ghorak dis- ties, with at least 22 civilians killed an ANP patrol came under SAF, trict, a roadside IED struck a taxi, killing four and another 24 wounded. Target- resulting in the death of one ANP of its civilian passengers and seriously wound- ing the entrance to a major logis- officer and serious injuries to an- ing another three. In Daman’s DAC another tics facility which services Kanda- other three. The DAC of Shah IED struck a Zaranj motorcycle, killing the har Airfield, an SVBIED attacker Wali Kot also hosted several inci- two civilian riders and destroying the vehicle. drove into the area and detonated dents including an AOG ambush, Two other IED strikes, in Zhari and Ar- his device, killing and wounding a using heavy weapons and RPGs, ghandab districts, resulted in a total of six civil- number of the civilian workers of a joint IMF/ANSF patrol. ians wounded. IEDs struck IMF/ANSF tar- and drivers who usually congre- Two IMF soldiers and one ANP gets as well, with the most serious of these gate there. In the aftermath, while were seriously wounded in the incidents taking place in the area of Shinkanay assistance was beginning to organ- exchange. Khakrez district was of Arghistan district when three ANP officers ize, another individual – various the scene for several other violent were killed and another two injured by an reports cite either a BBIED on clashes, including an AOG attack RCIED strike against their patrol vehicle. An foot, or an BBIED on a motorcy- on an ANP post near the village ANP search operation conducted in the same cle – moved into the crowd and of Sagay during which three ANP area following the attack uncovered a sizable detonated his device. GOA officers were killed and another cache of weapons and explosives, including spokesman quickly condemned four were wounded. Targeted four prepared suicide vests and several radios. the claims of responsibility com- killings figured prominently dur- One IMF soldier was killed and another two ing from AOG leadership, stating ing the report period. In the were wounded near the DAC of Khakrez that this demonstrated clearly the DAC of Maruf district, two AOG when their vehicle was struck by another callousness and extremism of gunmen riding on a motorcycle RCIED. A subsequent joint IMF/ANSF op- AOG actions, with the number of shot and killed an off-duty ANP eration in the area netted several prepared civilian casualties making it hard officer outside of his residence. IEDs in a abandoned house. to argue with such statements. In Zhari’s Sechap village another Although logistics operations sup- AOG gunman on a motorcycle IMF/ANSF operations during the report peri- porting IMF units have been regu- shot and killed an ANP officer od appeared to be limited to search and seizure larly targeted as ‘legitimate’ targets just outside of his post, after operations, with a few notable exceptions. A by AOG, the specific manner in which the gunman managed to joint IMF/ANBP patrol in Spin Boldak district which this attack was carried out – escape. Lastly, in Kandahar City’s (in the area of Wankay, lying on the border clearly seeking to maximize casu- District 2, an ANP officer was with Pakistan) encountered an AOG force and alties through its two stages – sug- shot and killed by yet another lone after a lengthy fire-fight, killed a reported 14 gests an abandonment of the sec- AOG gunman riding on a motor- Pakistani fighters. Although foreign fighters ondary aim of AOG strategy, the cycle past an ANP checkpoint. have been encountered throughout the South attempt to appear measured in its region by IMF/ANSF, they have usually been IEDs were a major part of the in small numbers – one or two advisors or spe- fight against the ‘foreign invaders incident profile for Kandahar over and their Afghan puppets’. It re- cialists (such as IED-makers). A force of more the past two weeks, with 33 sepa- than 14 fighters is certainly unusual and it will mains to be seen if this abandon- rate IED incidents recorded. Six ment is temporary or marks a be important to monitor this area to see if sim- of these involved fatalities and as ilar infiltrations are attempted. THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

NGO Incidents Z ABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 50 This Report Period 0 Incident levels in Zabul province 40 appear to level off after experienc- to continue the ill fortune of 30 ing a surge in early May, with the AOG units in the province, as 20 majority of incidents related to some of the 18 incidents attribut- 10 IMF/ANSF activity – primarily ed to IMF/ANSF activity in- 0 patrols and search operations. volved substantial numbers of The lull in AOG activity in Zabul casualties on the part of the AOG province is continuing on from fighters engaged. In the Khwazi ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime the previous report period, as area of Qalat district IMF soldiers fighters launched only a handful killed four AOG fighters during a located and control-detonated two IEDs in the of attacks during the past two raid on a suspected hideout, and same location. weeks. Those that were undertak- in Daychopan’s DAC an IM- en – numbering only six – ap- The IED strikes which were reported – four in F/ANSF patrol engaged a small all – appeared to harm AOG more than their peared to go badly for the AOG AOG force, killing two fighters fighters. Two AOG fighters were intended targets. In Shamulzayi’s DAC an before the rest fled. Another fo- IED detonated while being emplaced, killing killed by ANP fire during a cus of the fighting, however, ap- botched ambush in Qalat district’s four AOG fighters. Near the village of peared to be in the district center Chishmo, in Shahjoy district, an AOG fighter Bawari village on 3 June, and on of Atghar district, where an opera- the following day in the same vil- was killed and another three arrested by ANP tion led by NDS officers resulted when the IED they were attempting to plant lage, another attempted ambush in the deaths of four AOG fight- resulted in the deaths of two more exploded prematurely. The other two inci- ers as they resisted arrest, and the dents, an AP mine strike against an ANP foot AOG fighters, with another six detention of another three fighters fighters wounded and detained. patrol in Qalat and a roadside IED strike who surrendered after a brief fire- against an NDS vehicle in Naw Bahar, did not IMF/ANSF operations appeared fight. Later that day ANP officers result in serious casualties.

NGO Incidents U RUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 50 There was a slight rise in the 40 number of security incidents dur- were reported killed. In an at- ing this report period over the tempted suicide attack on an ANP 30 last, however direct AOG attacks post near Tirin Kot’s Khwaja Ah- 20 were down over the past two mad area, AOG gunmen forced a 10 weeks, and the limited number young boy to lead a donkey with 0 that did take place – five in total – explosives strapped to its back towards a nearby checkpoint. The appeared to adversely affect both URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime sides of the clashes. Chora dis- explosives, however, detonated prematurely, killing the child and trict’s Noori village was the site of As is usually the case with Uruzgan province, an AOG attack on an ANP post, the animal but leaving the ANP personnel unscathed. In another IEDs posed the greatest threat with 22 inci- and a heavy exchange of fire left dents reported. Civilians made up the largest one ALP officers and two AOG incident involving potential sui- cide bombers, ANP officers near list of fatalities. In Khas Uruzgan district, a fighters dead, with another two roadside IED struck a civilian vehicle, killing AOG fighters wounded and de- the DAC of Tirin Kot engaged with four AOG members, includ- its three passengers, and on the same day, 3 tained. A similar attack which June, another IED hit a civilian truck near the took place in the area known as ing two who were equipped with BBIED. After an exchange of DAC of Tirin Kot, killing two civilians and Shalay Nawa in Khas Uruzgan wounding another two pedestrians who were ended in worse fashion for the fire, the two individuals detonated their devices, killing themselves near the blast site. Lastly, two more civilians AOG fighters involved; under were killed by a roadside IED detonation in attack from a force of ANP rein- and wounding one of their fellow fighters. the Kikha area of Tirin Kot, as their vehicle forcements., 11 AOG fighters was struck passing through a crossroads. THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

NGO Incidents AKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA P 100 This Report Period 0 Security incidents in Paktika prov- 80 ince were divided between AOG vehicle that had killed one ALP 60 direct attacks, IMF/ANSF opera- recruit in the same area. In Sarobi 40 tions and IED strikes. The rela- district AOG fighters engaged an 20 tive lull in AOG activity seen dur- ALP post with heavy weapons, 0 ing the previous report period killing two ALP recruits and a appears to be over, with fighters civilian, and enabling them to ab- launching eight direct attacks duct an additional four ALP re- PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime against DACs in the province, as cruits. well as striking ANSF posts in IMF/ANSF operations experi- ber, however the incidents that did take place rural areas on nine occasions. enced some successes during the produced fatalities for both targets and initia- IDF against the DACs of Barmal, report period, as several opera- tors. A roadside IED near the DAC of Jani Gomal and Gayan did not appear tions netted a number of both Khel district caused the deaths of two ANP to cause any significant effects, AOG fighters. In Sarobi’s DAC officers, while a similar strike near Gomal’s however SAF and RPG attacks an IMF patrol arrested five AOG DAC took the lives of two ANBP officers and against an ALP checkpoint in members including their com- severely wounded another two of the border Chenakha village of Urgun district mander and seized a small assort- force. In the village of Babo Khel, in Jani resulted in the deaths of four ment of ammunition and weapons Khel district, however, four AOG fighters AOG fighters and severe injuries during a night-time operation. were killed as they were emplacing a roadside to another five, signifying a rare Similarly, a night operation in IED that detonated prematurely. In the final victory for the new ALP forces in Sharan resulted in the detention IED incident involving fatalities, a child was the area. The attack had been of another three AOG fighters killed and five others wounded when an IED preceded earlier in the day by an near the DAC. exploded in front of an ALP post. IED strike against an ALP patrol IED strikes were limited in num-

NGO Incidents H ELMAND Year to Date 0 HELMAND This Report Period 0 100 Helmand province witnessed a 80 force returned to the DAC and large number of security incidents 60 engaged the AOG unit once of all types during the report peri- 40 od and, although the pace of more, killing 26 of its fighters and 20 AOG direct attacks was some- seizing a substantial amount of what subdued, IED strikes con- ammunition. Similarly, on 3 June 0 tinued to be a major contributor an ANP officer was kidnapped by AOG gunmen in the village of to fatalities and injuries. The last HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime two weeks also featured several Payand as he travelled from his large operations conducted by residence to his duty post. Re- sponding in substantial numbers, of IMF/ANSF promptly arrested seven AOG joint IMF/ANSF units which ap- fighters in the area and seized some radios. peared to be impactful against a joint IMF/ANSF search party located the abductee and engaged Lastly, following an IED strike in the area of local AOG forces. The majority Shurshurak in Nawa-i-Barakzayi district that of IMF/ANSF actions were in his kidnappers. The ANP officer was freed, however one IMF sol- seriously wounded the head of the Tazkeera response to earlier AOG attacks. (Afghan ID card) program on 11 June, a force On 2 June, a sizable AOG force dier was killed and another seri- ously wounded during the rescue of ANA soldiers arrested several civilians (a attacked an IMF/ANSF patrol woman and her two children) who were found near the DAC of Kajaki district mission. On 8 June, two ANP officers were killed when an in a parked car found to contain IED materials with heavy weapons and SAF, and several completed IEDs. disengaging before any casualties RCIED detonated against their could be inflicted on either side. vehicle in Joy Draz village in Musa The next day, a joint IMF/ANSF Qala district; a responding force THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents N IMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ 50 This Report Period 0 This report period was unique for 40 Nimroz province in that there 2011 this number rose to 209. By 30 were no recorded incidents over contrast, this current year has seen 20 the last two weeks. This is in no only 48 security incidents of all 10 way to imply that there were no types take place, and therefore at 0 security incidents at all, as the this rate Nimroz will remain well same dynamics which make re- below historical trend lines. porting challenging also enhances It is also important to note that NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime its value to AOG. The province’s the overwhelming majority of in- vastness, remoteness and sparse cidents in Nimroz consistently NIMROZ: AOG ACTIVITY 2010‐12 population – the most sparsely take place in Khash Rod district, 50 populated province in the country as the district hosts the main high- 40 – make it a transit point for the way leading to Helmand and ac- 30 influx of men and materiel from cess to the Herat-Kandahar High- 20 Iran and Pakistan. way, and the security environment 10 However, this absence of record- of the district and by extension ed incidents does raise the ques- the province can be considered as 0 tion of whether security is im- being shaped by what happens in proving. A brief glance at the last Helmand. A clear example of this 2010 2011 2012 two years suggests this current effect was witnessed during 2010’s situation is unusual; the first two Operation Moshtarak focused on rectly or indirectly impacting NGO or IO pro- weeks of June 2010 featured 13 Helmand’s Marja district. Large viders of humanitarian aid and development incidents, and the same period for numbers of AOG fighters rou- assistance since 2006. Of these, the large ma- 2011 had 23 incidents. However, tinely crossed back into Nimroz jority pertained to AOG activity in 2006 and this period does match the overall to re-group, replenish and carry 2007. trend for Nimroz for 2012. On a on what turned out to be a long The present lull therefore can be seen as sug- year to year basis, Nimroz in 2012 grinding chapter of the conflict. gesting AOG operations in Helmand no long- is certainly experiencing lower This influx produced a surge of er require Nimroz, or that the heavy IMF pres- incident levels than in the recent related incidents in Khash Rod. ence in the Delaram area has impeded AOG past; 2010 witnessed 173 incidents Of note, the same district has also ability to move through the area. of all types for the province and in hosted 13 out of 16 incidents di-

ANSO STAFF AND VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT:

We are pleased to announce that our colleague Mr. Rory Brown has taken over his new role as ANSO RSA Central, based in Kabul, as of the 1st of June 2012. Until the arrival of the new RSA East in July, Rory Brown will also cover the Eastern Region. His contact details are included on the last page of this report. * We are presently recruiting for ANSO RSA South position based in Kandahar and ANSO RSA Mobile. If you have a solid working experience from a conflict environment, a NGO mindset combined with an analytical background, and a desire to be challenged, all the while being a member of a close knit team, you are encouraged to forward a cover letter, CV, and 2 substantive writing samples to [email protected]. Please refer to the appropriate vacancy in the subject line of your email. Contact List Dr. Mukhtar Nathan Rory Peter Camille Brian Tomas COUNTRY CENTRAL Sayed Taro WEST SOUTH Vacant EAST NORTH Firoz Naseer Patrick ‐ od Device Islamic mili Explosive Police ACG Pro

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