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The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS Max Velmans Susan Schneider Science Editor Philosophy Editor Advisory Editors Science of Consciousness: Jeff rey Gray, John Kihlstrom, Phil Merikle, Stevan Harnad Philosophy of Consciousness: Ned Block, David Chalmers, José Bermúdez, Brian McLaughlin, George Graham Th e Blackwell Companion to Consciousness THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS Max Velmans Susan Schneider Science Editor Philosophy Editor Advisory Editors Science of Consciousness: Jeff rey Gray, John Kihlstrom, Phil Merikle, Stevan Harnad Philosophy of Consciousness: Ned Block, David Chalmers, José Bermúdez, Brian McLaughlin, George Graham © 2007 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd blackwell publishing 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148–5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia Th e right of Max Velmans and Susan Schneider to be identifi ed as the Authors of the Editorial Material in this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. First published 2007 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd 1 2007 Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data Th e Blackwell companion to consciousness / edited by Max Velmans, science editor and Susan Schneider, philosophy editor p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN- 13: 978–1– 4051–2019–7 (hardback) ISBN- 13: 978–1– 4051–6000–1 (pbk.) 1. Consciousness. I. Velmans, Max, 1942– II. Schneider, Susan, 1968– III. Companion to consciousness. BF311.B5348 2006 153—dc22 2006026291 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Set in 10/12.5 pt Minion Pro by Th e Running Head Limited, Cambridge, www.therunninghead.com Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall Th e publisher’s policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid- free and elementary chlorine- free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. For further information on Blackwell Publishing, visit our website: www.blackwellpublishing.com Contents List of fi gures and tables ix Notes on contributors xi Introduction 1 Susan Schneider and Max Velmans Part I Problems of Consciousness 7 1 A brief history of the scientifi c approach to the study of consciousness 9 Chris Frith and Geraint Rees 2 Philosophical problems of consciousness 23 Michael Tye Part II Th e Domain of Consciousness 37 Origins and Extent of Consciousness 39 3 Consciousness in infants 41 Colwyn Trevarthen and Vasudevi Reddy 4 Animal consciousness 58 Colin Allen and Mark Bekoff 5 Rethinking the evolution of consciousness 72 Th omas Polger 6 Machine consciousness 87 Igor Aleksander Some Varieties of Conscious Experience 99 7 Normal and abnormal states of consciousness 101 J. Allan Hobson 8 Aff ective consciousness 114 Jaak Panksepp 9 Clinical pathologies and unusual experiences 130 Richard P. Bentall vi CONTENTS 10 Altered states of consciousness: drug- induced states 141 Edward F. Pace- Schott and J. Allan Hobson 11 Meditation 154 David Fontana 12 Mystical experience 163 David Fontana Breakdowns and the Unity of Consciousness 173 13 Th e case of blindsight 175 Lawrence Weiskrantz 14 Split- brain cases 181 Mary K. Colvin and Michael S. Gazzaniga 15 Philosophical psychopathology and self- consciousness 194 G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham 16 Coming together: the unity of conscious experience 209 Barry Dainton Part III Some Contemporary Th eories of Consciousness 223 17 Th e hard problem of consciousness 225 David Chalmers 18 Th e global workspace theory of consciousness 236 Bernard J. Baars 19 Th e intermediate level theory of consciousness 247 Jesse Prinz 20 Representationalism about consciousness 261 William Seager and David Bourget 21 Higher- order theories of consciousness 277 Peter Carruthers 22 Th e information integration theory of consciousness 287 Giulio Tononi 23 Quantum mechanical theories of consciousness 300 Henry Stapp 24 Daniel Dennett on the nature of consciousness 313 Susan Schneider 25 Biological naturalism 325 John Searle 26 Mysterianism 335 Mark Rowlands 27 Dualism, reductionism, and refl exive monism 346 Max Velmans 28 Naturalistic dualism 359 David Chalmers CONTENTS vii Part IV Some Major Topics in the Philosophy of Consciousness 369 29 Anti- materialist arguments and infl uential replies 371 Joe Levine 30 Functionalism and qualia 381 Robert Van Gulick 31 Th e knowledge argument 396 Torin Alter 32 Th e causal effi cacy of consciousness 406 Jaegwon Kim 33 Th e neurophilosophy of consciousness 418 Pete Mandik 34 Type materialism for phenomenal consciousness 431 Brian P. McLaughlin 35 Sensory and perceptual consciousness 445 Austen Clark 36 Self- consciousness 456 José Luis Bermúdez 37 Consciousness and intentionality 468 George Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson Part V Major Topics in the Science of Consciousness 485 Topics in the Cognitive Psychology of Consciousness 487 38 Attention and consciousness 489 Nilli Lavie 39 Inattentional blindness, change blindness, and consciousness 504 Alva Noë 40 Preconscious processing 512 Phil Merikle 41 Implicit and explicit memory and learning 525 John F. Kihlstrom, Jennifer Dorfman, and Lillian Park 42 Consciousness of action 540 Marc Jeannerod Topics in the Neuroscience of Consciousness 551 43 Methodologies for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness 553 Geraint Rees and Chris Frith 44 A neurobiological framework for consciousness 567 Francis Crick and Christof Koch 45 A theory of micro- consciousness 580 Semir Zeki 46 Global disorders of consciousness 589 Nicholas D. Schiff viii CONTENTS 47 Large- scale temporal coordination of cortical activity as a prerequisite for conscious experience 605 Wolf Singer 48 Duplex vision: separate cortical pathways for conscious perception and the control of action 616 Melvyn A. Goodale 49 Consciousness and anesthesia 628 John F. Kihlstrom and Randall C. Cork 50 Neural dominance, neural deference, and sensorimotor dynamics 640 Susan Hurley 51 Benjamin Libet’s work on the neuroscience of free will 657 William P. Banks and Susan Pockett First- Person Contributions to the Science of Consciousness 671 52 Cognition, fringe consciousness, and the legacy of William James 673 Bruce Mangan 53 Phenomenological approaches to consciousness 686 Shaun Gallagher 54 Eastern methods for investigating mind and consciousness 697 Jonathan Shear 55 An epistemology for the study of consciousness 711 Max Velmans Appendix List of useful web resources in consciousness studies 726 Name Index 729 Subject Index 735 List of Figures and Tables 3.1 Primary human consciousness of objects and persons 46 3.2 Sharing songs and games 49 3.3 Confi dence in sharing a task and consciousness of meaning 50 3.4 Th e fi rst 30 months of human life 51 3.5 Formation of the sensory-motor organs of the 8-week human fetus; the rhythm of behaviors in protoconversation with a 2-month-old child 53 6.1 Th e Sloman-Chrisley CogAff schema 90 6.2 A minimal architecture with axiomatic/depictive properties 96 7.1 Sleep cycle basics 104 7.2 Behavioral states in humans 105 7.3 Th e Activation-Input Source-Neuromodulation model (AIM). Illustration of three-dimensional state space 109 7.4 Normal transitioning within the AIM state space from waking to NREM and then to REM 109 8.1 Neural defi nition of an emotional system 117 18.1 A schematic diagram of global access 240 22.1 Eff ective information, minimum information bipartition, and complexes 291 22.2 Information integration for prototypical neural architectures 293 24.1 Pandemonium 317 27.1 A dualist model of perception 347 27.2 A reductionist model of perception 348 27.3 A refl exive model of perception 349 38.1 Gorilla-man from the video clip used in the Simons and Chabris (1999) experiment 492 38.2 Load procedure in the inattentional blindness study of Cartwright-Finch and Lavie 499 38.3 An example of a typical display used in Rensink, O’Regan, and Clark’s change blindness experiments 500 38.4 Load procedure in the Beck and Lavie change blindness study 501 45.1 Visual areas V4 (a) and V5 (b) of the human brain, specialized for color and motion, respectively 581 x LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 45.2 Th e fl ow of visual information from the retina to V1 and V5 583 46.1 Schematic diagram of localized lesions producing global disorders of human consciousness 591 46.2 Th e functional connectivity of the neuronal populations 595 46.3 Co-registration of FDG-PET measurements of resting cerebral metabolism and structural MRI images 599 48.1 Retinal input to the dorsal and ventral streams 617 48.2 Maximum grip aperture and manual estimation of object width by a patient with optic ataxia from bilateral lesions of the posterior parietal cortex 620 48.3 Maximum grip aperture and manual estimation of object width by a patient with visual form agnosia from bilateral lesions of the ventrolateral occipital cortex 621 48.4 Grasping the Ebbinghaus illusion 622 48.5 Th e “simultaneous tilt illusion” and the “rod and frame illusion” 624 50.1 Neural dominance vs. neural deference 641 50.2 Synesthesia
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