DOCSLIB.ORG

SIM Cards for Cellular Networks an Introduction to SIM Card Application Development

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
SIM Cards for Cellular Networks an Introduction to SIM Card Application Development Mid Sweden University The Department of Information Technology and Media (ITM) Author: Peter Edsbäcker E-mail address: [email protected] Study program: B. Sc. in engineering, computer engineering, 180 ECTS Examiner: Åke Malmberg, Mid Sweden University, [email protected] Tutor: Örjan Sterner, Mid Sweden University, [email protected] Scope: 31699 words inclusive of appendices Date: 2010-06-12 B. Sc. Thesis within Computer Engineering C, 15 ECTS SIM cards for cellular networks An introduction to SIM card application development. Peter Edsbäcker SIM cards for cellular networks An introduction to SIM card application development Abstract Peter Edsbäcker 2011-06-12 Abstract A SIM, Subscriber Identity Module, is the removable circuit board found in a modern cellular phone. It carries the network identity information and is a type of smart card which can also be found on payment cards (EMV), ID cards and so on. A smart card is basically a small computer, providing a safe and controlled execution environment. Historically smart card software was very hardware dependent and mostly developed by the manufacturers themselves. With the introduction of the open Java Card standard created by Sun Microsystems (Oracle) this was meant to change. However, information still remains scattered and is hard to obtain. This paper is meant to serve both as an introduction to the field and also as a good foundation for future studies. It begins with a theoretical discussion about smart card hardware and software architectures, network standards in the context of SIM cards, typical applications, coming trends and technologies and ends off with an overview of the Java Card standard. The following section discusses the supplied example SIM card application coupled with an introduction how to use the Gemalto Developer Suite for application development and testing. The paper ends with an extensive appendix section going in depth about some of the more important subjects. Keywords: SIM, Smart card, GSM, 3G, LTE, SIM Toolkit, Java Card, Global Platform, TPDU, APDU, Gemalto Developer Suite. SIM cards for cellular networks An introduction to SIM card application development Acknowledgements Peter Edsbäcker 2011-06-12 Acknowledgements This bachelor‟s thesis was conducted during autumn 2010 and spring 2011. I would like to thank my teachers Örjan Sterner (for his dedication reading my many intermediate versions of this thesis) and Börje Hansson (for his inspiration). Both are based at Mid Sweden University. Also I would like to thank my old colleagues at Seamless Distribution AB [43]; it was through my work there that I came into contact with the field of SIM application programming, an interesting and to most developers, quite unknown, field of software engineering. A big thank you goes to Google; whose excellent search engine helped me during the countless hours spent navigating the vast sea of Internet knowledge which serves as the basis of this thesis. Physical book references have mostly been avoided, the modern developer works and lives on the Internet in one way or another and books becomes obsolete very quickly. Another thank you goes to Gemalto N. V [2] for providing the (for evaluation purposes) free Gemalto Developer Suite that was used during development and testing of the example application provided with this thesis. SIM cards for cellular networks An introduction to SIM card application development Contents Peter Edsbäcker 2011-06-12 Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Background and motivation ..................................................................................... 1 1.2. Overall aim ............................................................................................................... 2 1.3. Scope ........................................................................................................................ 2 1.4. Disposition ............................................................................................................... 2 1.5. Audience .................................................................................................................. 3 1.6. Method ..................................................................................................................... 3 2 Smart cards .............................................................................................................. 4 2.1. The smart card hardware platform ........................................................................... 5 2.1.1. The smart card hardware interface ................................................................... 7 2.2. The smart card software platform ............................................................................ 7 2.2.1. Open platform / GlobalPlatform ....................................................................... 8 2.3. Java Card platform components ............................................................................... 9 2.3.1. Low level operating system ............................................................................ 10 2.3.2. Java Card virtual machine (JCVM) ................................................................ 10 2.3.3. Java Card API (framework classes) ............................................................... 11 2.3.4. GlobalPlatform API ........................................................................................ 11 2.3.5. Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) ...................................................... 11 2.3.6. Application layer (Applets) ............................................................................ 12 2.3.7. Smart card manufacturing, issuing and deployment ...................................... 12 2.4. Over the Air distribution of applications ............................................................... 13 2.5. Typical commercial applications ........................................................................... 13 2.5.1. Financial services ........................................................................................... 13 2.5.2. Electronic signatures ...................................................................................... 14 2.5.3. Roaming control ............................................................................................. 15 2.5.4. Value added services on a SIM ...................................................................... 15 2.6. New technologies ................................................................................................... 15 2.6.1. USAT (Extended S@T) ................................................................................. 15 2.6.2. Near field communications (NFC) and RFID ................................................ 15 2.6.3. Virtual Sim card ............................................................................................. 16 2.6.4. USB and USB-2 support ................................................................................ 16 SIM cards for cellular networks An introduction to SIM card application development Contents Peter Edsbäcker 2011-06-12 2.6.5. Java Card 3 and GlobalPlatform 3 base technologies .................................... 16 2.6.6. Secure VoIP, Mobile broadcast TV ............................................................... 17 3 SIM Cards and cellular networks .......................................................................... 18 3.1. The historical evolution of the cellular phone standards........................................ 18 3.1.1. GSM ............................................................................................................... 18 3.1.2. CDMAone/CDMA2000 ................................................................................. 19 3.1.3. UMTS and LTE .............................................................................................. 19 3.2. SIM card configurations......................................................................................... 21 3.2.1. SIM network applications .............................................................................. 21 3.2.2. SIM card hardware types ................................................................................ 21 3.2.3. SIM card generations...................................................................................... 22 3.3. GSM network parameters ...................................................................................... 22 3.3.1. Authentication of a cellular phone with the GSM network ............................ 23 3.4. Communication between SIM and Handset ........................................................... 24 3.4.1. Applet-Handset interaction............................................................................. 25 4 Developing SIM applications ................................................................................ 26 4.1. Obtaining SIM cards for development purposes .................................................... 26 4.2. Development environments ................................................................................... 26 4.3. Java Card v2.x Applet basics ................................................................................ 26 4.3.1. Java Card 1.x/2.x limitations (with respect to standard Java) ........................ 28 4.3.2. Java Card 3.x “connected” edition limitations and differences ..................... 28 4.4. Applet intra-vendor compatibility
Load more

Recommended publications
  • An Architecture for Cryptography with Smart Cards and NFC Rings on Android
    OpenKeychain: An Architecture for Cryptography with Smart Cards and NFC Rings on Android DOMINIK SCHÜRMANN, TU Braunschweig, Germany SERGEJ DECHAND, University of Bonn, Germany LARS WOLF, TU Braunschweig, Germany While many Android apps provide end-to-end encryption, the cryptographic keys are still stored on the device itself and can thus be stolen by exploiting vulnerabilities. External cryptographic hardware solves this issue, but is currently only used for two-factor authentication and not for communication encryption. In this paper, we design, implement, and evaluate an architecture for NFC-based cryptography on Android. Our high-level API provides cryptographic operations without requiring knowledge of public-key cryptography. By developing OpenKeychain, we were able to roll out this architecture for more than 100,000 users. It provides encryption for emails, messaging, and a password manager. We provide a threat model, NFC performance measurements, and discuss their impact on our architecture design. As an alternative form factor to smart cards, we created the prototype of an NFC signet ring. To evaluate the UI components and form factors, a lab study with 40 participants at a large company has been conducted. We measured the time required by the participants to set up the system and reply to encrypted emails. These measurements and a subsequent interview indicate that our NFC-based solutions are more user friendly in comparison to traditional password-protected keys. CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy; Key management; Hardware-based security protocols; • Human-centered computing → Mobile devices; Additional Key Words and Phrases: NFC, near-field communication, smart card, ring ACM Reference Format: Dominik Schürmann, Sergej Dechand, and Lars Wolf.
    [Show full text]
  • NEURAL COMPUTING 17 Sailee Chitre – T.Y.B.Sc
    Our Vision is to establish a leading centre of imparting Quality Education in the field of Science, Commerce and Management with emphasis on: ensuring that students learn the fundamental concepts in various disciplines. motivating students to apply the Scientific & Technological knowledge to develop problem solving capabilities. making students aware of the societal and environmental needs with specific appreciation of the emerging global context. Our mission is to provide : an educational environment where students can reach their full potential in their chosen discipline and become responsible citizens without compromising in ethics a scholarly environment where the talents of both, the faculty members and students are nurtured and used to create knowledge and technology for the benefit of the society. 1 INDEX Sr. No. Topic Page No. 1. 3D PASSWORD FOR MORE SECURE AUTHENTICATION 3 Manisha Patel – T.Y.B.Sc IT 2. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN PROGRAMMING 5 Jay Bhosale – T.Y.B.Sc. IT 3. COMPUTER THAT YOU CAN WEAR 9 Shailendra Mane – T.Y.B.Sc. IT 4. ETHICAL HACKING 12 Manali Darandale – T.Y.B.Sc. IT 5. FOOT PRINTING 14 Bhavesh Naik – S.Y.B.Sc IT 6. NEURAL COMPUTING 17 Sailee Chitre – T.Y.B.Sc. IT 7. ORGANIC LIGHT EMITTING DIODE DISPLAY 20 Angad Anand – T.Y.B.Sc. IT 8. VERIZON 4G LTE NETWORK 23 Dhaval Jain – T.Y.B.Sc. IT 9. MEEGO 25 Nivedita Tikadar – T.Y.B.Sc IT 10. A CHANGE FROM IPv4 TO IPv6 33 Vivek Kapadia – S.Y.B.Sc.I.T 11. BLACKBERRY MESSENGER 36 Rahul Nayak – S.Y.B.Sc.I.T 12.
    [Show full text]
  • Ghostscript Wrapper for C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Desktop\Tasks
    Potential Misuse of NFC Enabled Mobile Phones with Embedded Security Elements as Contactless Attack Platforms Lishoy Francis, Gerhard Hancke, Keith Mayes and Konstantinos Markantonakis The Information Security Group, Smart Card Centre, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham Hill, TW20 0EX, Surrey, United Kingdom. Email: {L.Francis, Gerhard.Hancke, Keith.Mayes, K.Markantonakis}@rhul.ac.uk Abstract a turnstile, and the opportunity for a single device to con- tain multiple tokens. The NFC devices can also be used as a In this paper we investigate the possibility that a Near contactless reader that interacts with a variety of contactless Field Communication (NFC) enabled mobile phone, with “smart objects”. For example, a customer could initiate the an embedded Secure Element (SE), could be used as a mo- process to buy a cinema ticket by touching his NFC mobile bile token cloning and skimming platform. We show how an phone against a smart movie poster. More details on the attacker could use a NFC mobile phone as such an attack potential of NFC technology can be found in [2]. platform by exploiting the existing security controls of the Up to now, contactless transactions have been well re- embedded SE and the available contactless APIs. To illus- ceived by merchants and customers due to their inherent trate the feasibility of these actions we also show how to benefits such as ease of use, quick transaction time and lim- practically skim and emulate certain tokens typically used ited maintenance requirements. However, the increased use in payment and access control applications with a NFC mo- of mobile phones in contactless transactions could provide bile phone.
    [Show full text]
  • Secure Element Development
    Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg Secure Element Development Josef Langer, Andreas Oyrer 4th Sept. 2009, Oulu Developers Summit www.nfc-research.at Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg Agenda Part I: 11:45 – 12:30 . What is a Secure Element? . Secure Elements & SmartCards . Components of a Secure Elements . Tools for Developing Secure Elements . Standards www.nfc-research.at © Josef Langer, Andreas Oyrer 2009 2 Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg Agenda Part II 1:30 – 3:00 . Secure Element in Details . Presentation Development Tools . Communicating with the Secure Element: – Mobilephone: J2ME – PC: Reader-Writer mode via PC/SC . Difficulties in Programming Secure Elements . Benefits and Drawbacks with Secure Element Programming www.nfc-research.at © Josef Langer, Andreas Oyrer 2009 3 Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg Abbreviations and Definitions . J2ME: Java Platform Micro Edition . JSR: Java Specification Requests . Midlet: Java-applications running on a mobile phone . Applet: JavaCard-Application running on a SmartCard . APDU: Application Protocol Data Unit . SCWS: Smart Card Web Server www.nfc-research.at © Josef Langer, Andreas Oyrer 2009 4 Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg Abbreviations and Definitions . SWP: Single Wire Protocol . USB: Universal Serial Bus . PC/SC: Smartcard Standard for PC . API: Application Programming Interface . SAT: SIM Application Toolkit www.nfc-research.at © Josef Langer, Andreas Oyrer 2009 5 Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg What is a Secure Element? . Secure storage in your NFC device . Current Secure Element Implementations – Embedded in Mobile Phone – SIM Based – Removeable Secure Element (SD Card) Picture from G&D www.nfc-research.at © Josef Langer, Andreas Oyrer 2009 6 Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg Motivation for Secure Elements .
    [Show full text]
  • Mobile SIM-Based Medical Applications
    Mobile for Development mHealth Mobile SIM-based Medical Applications Michael J. Kleeman, Martin Harris and James Erasmus February 2015 Table of Contents Executive summary ............................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4 A SIM-based approach for medical applications ......................................................................................................................................................... 5 The benefits of SIM-based medical applications ........................................................................................................................................................ 6 Other related applications of SIM technology and current mHealth approaches ........................................................................................... 8 Comparison of existing mHealth applications .............................................................................................................................................................. 8 Comparative mobile communication channels ............................................................................................................................................................ 9 Roles of the various actors ...........................................................................................................................................................................................10
    [Show full text]
  • Certificate of Security Evaluation Upteq NFC422 V1.0
    Certificate of Security Evaluation Upteq NFC422 v1.0 Certification Number: GP-SE-2019/02 Product Name: Upteq NFC422 v1.0 Issuance Date: Sept. 9th 2019 Configurations: --- Sponsor: Gemalto (Thales Group) Platform / Developer: Upteq NFC422 v1.0 / Gemalto (Thales Group) IC / Developer: S3NSEN4 Rev. 1 / Samsung Protection Profile: GSM Association SGP.25 - Embedded UICC for Product Type: R eUICC Consumer Devices Protection Profile, version 1.0 £ embedded LPA R device LPA PP-Modules: £ LPAe Certification Type: R Unrestricted £ Restricted Evaluation Type: R Full £ Delta £ Fast-track £ Reassessment Certification Report: GP-SE-2019/02-CR Security Evaluation Lab: UL This GlobalPlatform Security Evaluation Product Certificate (“Certificate”) remains valid only while the version of the product specified above is posted on the GlobalPlatform website, and means only that such product version has demonstrated sufficient conformance with applicable Security Requirements, determined by a GlobalPlatform-accredited third-party laboratory evaluation. This Certificate applies only to the product version specified, does not constitute an endorsement or warranty by GlobalPlatform, and is subject to the additional terms, conditions and restrictions set forth in the attached GlobalPlatform Security Evaluation Secretariat Certification Report. GlobalPlatform, Inc. Kevin Gillick, Executive Director 544 Hillside Road | Redwood City, CA 94062 | [email protected] | www.globalplatform.org GlobalPlatform Security Evaluation Secretariat Certification Report
    [Show full text]
  • JCOP V2.4.1 JCOP V2.4.1 Secure Smart Card Controller Rev
    JCOP V2.4.1 JCOP V2.4.1 secure smart card controller Rev. 3.2 — 2 September 2009 Product short specification 167532 CONFIDENTIAL 1. General description NXP Semiconductors offers a Java Card Open Platform operating system called JCOP V2.4.1 based on independent, third party specifications, i.e. by Sun Microsystems, the Global Platform consortium, the International Organization for Standards (ISO), EMV (Europay, MasterCard and VISA) and others. JCOP V2.4.1 family based on the SmartMX family which is manufactured in most advanced CMOS 0.14 μm 5 metal layer technology is positioned to service high volume, single- and multi-application markets such as eGovernment e.g. Smart Passport, banking/finance, mobile communications, public transportation, pay TV, conditional access, network access and digital rights management. The Java Card, GlobalPlatform, EMV and ISO industry standards together ensure application interpretability for card issuers as well as application providers. By adhering not just to the standards themselves, but also to their spirit as evidenced in numerous heritage applications, JCOP V2.4.1 ensures large interpretability with third party applets as well as all existing smart card infrastructures. With JCOP V2.4.1 the promise of multi-sourcing any component in smart card solutions becomes true. Even in existing infrastructures, JCOP V2.4.1 equipped with proper applications can substitute any existing smart card. Within its targeted segments, the new JCOP V2.4.1 platform on SmartMX is the most advanced solution available. It is combining standard interfaces as defined in Java Card 2.2.2 (see Ref. 1), GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.1.1 (see Ref.
    [Show full text]
  • Sar-Pr-2011-15
    Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät II Institut für Informatik Display-Javakarte mit dynamischer eID-PIN für den neuen Personalausweis Paul Bastian Bachelorarbeit Betreuer: Dr. Wolf Müller Frank Dietrich Gutachter: Prof. Jens-Peter Redlich Dr. Manfred Paeschke Berlin, den 7. November 2011 Inhaltsverzeichnis Abbildungsverzeichnis III Tabellenverzeichnis IV Abkürzungsverzeichnis VI 1. Einleitung 1 1.1. Der neue Personalausweis . 1 1.2. Angriffsszenario . 1 2. Konzept 3 2.1. Teildynamische PIN . 3 2.2. Varianten . 4 2.2.1. Statische Positionierung . 4 2.2.2. Randomisierte Positionierung . 5 2.2.3. Alternative Varianten . 5 3. Wahrscheinlichkeitsbetrachtung 7 3.1. Statische PIN . 7 3.2. Dynamische PIN mit statischer Positionierung . 7 3.3. Dynamische PIN mit randomisierter Positionierung . 8 3.4. Alternative Varianten . 9 4. Der neue Personalausweis 11 4.1. eID-PIN . 11 4.2. CAN . 11 4.2.1. Dynamische CAN . 12 4.3. Anwendung der teildynamischen PIN auf den nPA . 13 4.4. Kompromiss zwischen Komfort und Sicherheit . 14 4.5. Auswertung . 15 5. Chipkarten 17 5.1. Aufbau . 17 5.2. Kommunikation . 18 5.3. Java Card . 19 I 6. Implementation 21 6.1. Aufbau, Hardware und verwendete Software . 21 6.2. Entwicklung . 23 6.2.1. AusweisApp . 23 6.2.2. Konzept . 25 6.3. PACE . 27 6.4. Secure Messaging . 31 6.5. Auswertung . 32 7. Ausblick 34 A. APDU-Trace PACE 35 B. APDU-Trace PACE mit Secure Messaging 37 Literatur 39 II Abbildungsverzeichnis 2.1. Funktionsweise der teildynamischen PIN und des Keyloggerangriffs . 4 2.2. Displaykarte mit statischer Positionierung der Zufallszahlen . 5 2.3.
    [Show full text]
  • Identity Applet V3.4 / Eidas on NXP JCOP 4
    Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico Direzione generale per le tecnologie delle comunicazioni e la sicurezza informatica Istituto Superiore delle Comunicazioni e delle Tecnologie dell'Informazione Schema nazionale per la valutazione e certificazione della sicurezza di sistemi e prodotti ICT (DPCM del 30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004) Certificato n. 12/20 (Certification No.) Prodotto: IDentity Applet v3.4/eIDAS on NXP JCOP 4 P71 (Product) Sviluppato da: ID&Trust Ltd. (Developed by) Il prodotto indicato in questo certificato è risultato conforme ai requisiti dello standard ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria) v. 3.1 per il livello di garanzia: The product identified in this certificate complies with the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria) v. 3.1 for the assurance level: EAL4+ (ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.5) Il Direttore (Dott.ssa Eva Spina) [ORIGINAL DIGITALLY SIGNED] Roma, 28 ottobre 2020 Fino a EAL2 (Up to EAL2) Fino a EAL4 (Up to EAL4) This page is intentionally left blank Page 2 of 35 OCSI/CERT/SYS/08/2016/RC Ver. 1.0 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico Direzione generale per le tecnologie delle comunicazioni e la sicurezza informatica Istituto Superiore delle Comunicazioni e delle Tecnologie dell'Informazione Certification Report IDentity Applet v3.4/eIDAS on NXP JCOP 4 P71 OCSI/CERT/SYS/08/2016/RC Version 1.0 28 October 2020 Page 3 of 35 OCSI/CERT/SYS/08/2016/RC Ver. 1.0 Courtesy translation Disclaimer: this translation in English language is provided for informational purposes only; it is not a substitute for the official document and has no legal value.
    [Show full text]
  • Identity Applet V3.4 / QSCD on NXP JCOP 4
    Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico Direzione generale per le tecnologie delle comunicazioni e la sicurezza informatica Istituto Superiore delle Comunicazioni e delle Tecnologie dell'Informazione Schema nazionale per la valutazione e certificazione della sicurezza di sistemi e prodotti ICT (DPCM del 30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004) Certificato n. 11/20 (Certification No.) Prodotto: IDentity Applet v3.4/QSCD on NXP JCOP 4 P71 (Product) Sviluppato da: ID&Trust Ltd. (Developed by) Il prodotto indicato in questo certificato è risultato conforme ai requisiti dello standard ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria) v. 3.1 per il livello di garanzia: The product identified in this certificate complies with the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria) v. 3.1 for the assurance level: EAL4+ (AVA_VAN.5) Il Direttore (Dott.ssa Eva Spina) [ORIGINAL DIGITALLY SIGNED] Roma, 28 ottobre 2020 Fino a EAL2 (Up to EAL2) Fino a EAL4 (Up to EAL4) This page is intentionally left blank Page 2 of 31 OCSI/CERT/SYS/07/2016/RC Ver. 1.0 Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico Direzione generale per le tecnologie delle comunicazioni e la sicurezza informatica Istituto Superiore delle Comunicazioni e delle Tecnologie dell'Informazione Certification Report IDentity Applet v3.4/QSCD on NXP JCOP 4 P71 OCSI/CERT/SYS/07/2016/RC Version 1.0 28 October 2020 Page 3 of 31 OCSI/CERT/SYS/07/2016/RC Ver. 1.0 Courtesy translation Disclaimer: this translation in English language is provided for informational purposes only; it is not a substitute for the official document and has no legal value.
    [Show full text]
  • Systemanforderungen Governikus Signer
    Systemanforderungen Governikus Signer Governikus Signer, Release 2.9.6 © 2021 Governikus GmbH & Co. KG Governikus Signer Systemanforderungen Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Anforderungen Arbeitsplatzcomputer ............................................................................... 3 1.1 Unterstützte Client-Betriebssysteme ........................................................................ 3 1.2 Unterstützung von Terminalservern ......................................................................... 3 1.3 Java Laufzeitumgebung ...........................................................................................4 1.4 Ausstattungsanforderung für das digitale Signieren ................................................. 4 1.5 Voraussetzung für die Nutzung von Diensten .......................................................... 5 2 Ab- und Ankündigungen für Folge-Releases .................................................................... 5 3 Unverbindliche Erläuterung zum End of Lifecycle ............................................................ 6 4 Unterstützte Signaturkarten und Chipkartenleser ............................................................. 7 4.1 Aktuelle Hinweise .....................................................................................................7 4.2 Hinweis zu Änderungen getesteter Produkte ........................................................... 7 4.3 Notwendige Schutzvorkehrungen für diese Anwendung .......................................... 8 4.4 Unterstützte Betriebssysteme und JRE ...................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Assessment of Today's Mobile Banking Applications from the View
    Munich Personal RePEc Archive Assessment of Today’s Mobile Banking Applications from the View of Customer Requirements Pousttchi, Key and Schurig, Martin University of Augsburg 2004 Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2913/ MPRA Paper No. 2913, posted 25 Apr 2007 UTC Pousttchi, K.; Schurig, M.: Assessment of Today’s Mobile Banking Applications from the View of Customer Requirements. Copyright 2004 IEEE. Published in the Proceedings of the Hawai'i International Conference on System Sciences, January 5 – 8, 2004, Big Island, Hawaii. (Preprint) Assessment of Today’s Mobile Banking Applications from the View of Customer Requirements Key Pousttchi Martin Schurig University of Augsburg, Chair of Business Tecways AG Informatics and Systems Engineering (WI2) e-mail: [email protected] e-mail: [email protected] Abstract restraint affects notebooks and sub notebooks, which are easily transportable, but whose use is typically stationary. The typical connection for these mobile devices up to Mobile banking is a subset of electronic banking which now is realized through mobile communication. Most underlies not only the determinants of the banking busi- relevant is GSM/GPRS, also typical are comparable 2G ness but also the special conditions of mobile commerce. standards (e.g. IS-136, IS-95) and soon will be evolving This paper analyzes customer needs and expectations 3G-technologies (EDGE, CDMA-2000, UMTS). We do from the mobile applications’ view and from the banking not focus on WLAN scenarios. The use of a banking view in order to derive a defined set of requirements. application on a laptop computer with a WLAN connec- Based on these results, existing mobile banking applica- tion underlies the rules of electronic banking, not the tions are assessed.
    [Show full text]