University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Political Science Faculty Publications Political Science 3-22-2011 Pay-for-Performance Reimbursement in Health Care: Chasing Cost Control and Increased Quality through "New and Improved" Payment Incentives Rick Mayes University of Richmond,
[email protected] Jessica Walradt Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/polisci-faculty-publications Part of the Health Policy Commons, Social Policy Commons, and the Social Welfare Commons Recommended Citation Mayes, Rick, and Jessica Walradt. "Pay-for-Performance Reimbursement in Health Care: Chasing Cost Control and Increased Quality through "New and Improved" Payment Incentives." Health Law Review 19, no. 2 (March 22, 2011): 39-43. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Pay-for-Performance Reimbursement in Health Care: Chasing Cost Control and Increased Quality through “New and Improved” Payment Incentives Rick Mayes and Jessica Walradt Abstract associated with fee-for-service reimbursement, which Pay-for-performance (P4P) reimbursement has become is the dominant model in the U.S.1 Instead of simply a popular and growing form of health care payment reimbursing providers more for greater volume and built on the belief that payment incentives strongly intensity of care, P4P pays more to providers whose care affect medical providers’ behavior. By paying more to is deemed to be of higher (or suffi ciently high) quality.2 those providers who are deemed to deliver better care, These plans are intended to lower health care costs over the goal is to increase quality and, hopefully, restrain the long term by increasing preventative care, primary cost growth.