California State Legislator University Ofcalifornia, Berkeley
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California State Archives State Government Oral History Program Oral History Interview with ART AGNOS California State Legislator 1977-1987 November 5, 12, December 3, 10, 2002 January 7,21, February 4, 11, 18, March 19, April 2, 16, 28, 2003 Berkeley, California VOLUME 2 By Laura McCreery. Regional Oral History Office University ofCalifornia, Berkeley RESTRICTIONS ON THIS INTERVIEW None. LITERARY RIGHTS AND QUOTATIONS This manuscript is hereby made available for research purposes only. No part ofthe manuscript may be quoted for publication without the written permission ofthe California State Archivist or Regional Oral History Office, University of California at Berkeley. Requests for permission to quote forpublication should be addressed to: California State Archives 1020 O Street Sacramento, California 95814 or Regional Oral History Office The Bancroft Library University ofCalifornia Berkeley, California 94720-6000 The request should include information onthe specific passages and identification oftheuser. It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows: Art Agnos, Oral History Interview, Conducted 2002 and 2003 by Laura McCreeiy, Regional Oral History Office, University of California atBerkeley, for theCalifornia State Archives State Government Oral History Program. SESSION 9, February 18, 2003 [Minidisc 9] 379 Signing Pacific Gas & Electric [PG&E] contracts as mayor—San Francisco Public Utilities Commission—HetchHetchy Reservoir—establishing zero-based budgeting— policeand fire department budgetissues—development plans for MissionBay—roleof the planning commission—grovvth limits of propositions M and I—planning director Dean Macris. SESSION 10, March 19, 2003 [Minidisc 10] 416 Moscone Convention Centerandthe Yerba Buenadevelopment project—Olympia & York developersand how they forfeited developmentrights—MartinLuther King, Jr., memorial at Yerba Buena Gardens—controversyover homeporting the battleship U.S.S. Missouri— Dolores Huerta's injury at hands ofSan Francisco police during demonstration—Frank Jordanresigns as police chief to run for mayor—successor police chief Will Casey— appointing a new fire chief, Fred Postel—fire commission. SESSION 11, April 2, 2003 [Minidisc 11] 469 San Francisco's 1988 bid for the 1996 Olympic Games—efforts towards a new baseball stadiumfor the San Francisco Giants—failure ofballpark initiative after Loma Prieta earthquake, 1989—ballparkopposition from political foes—later indictment of"Ballpark Five"—^Loma Prieta earthquake—episodes with Red Crossand Vice President Quayle— confronting the longstanding problem ofhomelessness—views ofhomelessness over the years—"Camp Agnos" and establishment ofmultiservice centers for the homeless. SESSION 12, April 16, 2003 [Minidisc 12] 539 Exploringthe concept and benefits ofregionalism—^working with mayors of Oakland, Berkeley, San Jose, and with other counties—more on San Francisco budget, business climate, tourism—losing reelection bid to former police chief Frank Jordan, 1991— appointmentby Willie Brown to Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. SESSION 13, April 28, 2003 [Minidisc 13] 588 Appointment to Clinton administration as regional HUD administrator, 1993—summary on political life and the government bureaucracy at all levels—major issues as federal housing administrator—Geneva Towers example—^volunteer visits to foreign countries for "democratic capacity building"—serving as a bank director in retirement—other volunteer activities—national advisory boardfor UCBerkeley's Institute of Governmental Studies—reflections on career and the political life. 379 [Session 9, February 18, 2003] [Begin Minidisc 9] McCREERY: We wanted to talk this morning about some ofthe events ofyour first year or two as mayor, and I know you were thinking ofone thing that happened very early on, which was a change offire chiefs. Shall we start with that? AGNOS: Yes. I recall a distinct thematic difference between virtually every part ofthe job ofbeing mayor and the job ofbeing a state legislator. We've talked a little bit about that. The job ofa state legislator is to be an advocate, to introduce new ideas and flesh them out for the executive to implement, once you've passed the legislature. But there isn't a lot ofthought given to implementation and what it means to get it on the ground to the person or persons or communities for whom the idea is intended. When you are the mayor, that hits you right from the start. You are asked to make executive decisions. In my case, it started even before I got sworn in, and that was to sign some contracts with PG&E [Pacific Gas and Electric] over the delivery ofwater,and power to the city that had been negotiated by Mayor Feinstein for the previous two and a halfyears in intensive negotiations that were part ofmy orientation process, to learn about. 380 I want to hold that and come right back to it in a moment. No, let me just continue with that, since I'm there. During the campaign, I became familiar with a lot ofissues, and one ofthem that affected PG&E was whether I would support the municipalization or the public takeover ofPG&E. I had no position on a takeover, but I was interested in exploring the idea because the case had been made, in my mind, by those who favored the municipalizationor "public power" that we ought to explore it. Sol had taken a position in the mayor's race, in contrast to my opponent, Jack Molinari, that 1would explore that avenue with a study funded by the city to determine what the pros and cons and the benefits and disadvantageswould be to a city-run power company. This came from the left in a very strong way, most symbolized by the Bay Guardian and the publisher, Bruce Brugmann, who still continues to be the chiefproponent ofthat, although since the energy crisis ofthe late nineties that whole idea has taken on much more acceptability. In '88 it was seen as a, quote, "lefty" idea. In '98 it was seen as a more mainstream idea because people were much more ready to believe that the energy companies were abusing—and [they] were. Now we're seeing it. Was it in '99 we had the big—? McCREERY: The big fiasco was in 2001. AGNOS: Oh, 2001, okay. Peoplewere readythen. It's a mainstream idea. I guess I should say it was a mainstream idea by 2001, and it was a mainstream idea because of the fiascos of the energy crisis and the energy companies 381 overcharging consumers. But in'88 it was seen as a decidedly left issue. But I was interested in the idea enough to agree, during the campaign, that I would explore it. But before I became mayor—before I was sworn in, after I was elected. Mayor Feinstein told me I needed to get up to speed on some contracts that were going to be ready for the mayor's signature. She couldn't sign it because they wouldn't be ready by the time she left office, or at least she decided she didn't want to sign them, and I'm not sure what the politics were ofthat. I never did find out why something negotiated under her administration for the better part oftwo and a halfyears would suddenly be something that could not be done on time for her to sign before leaving office. But she left it for me to sign. There are some who believe that those contracts were not the best for San Francisco, mostly argued by the Bay Guardian and the public power people. They asked me not to sign them, and so 1 decided to conduct public hearings. I asked for public hearings by the public utilities commission ofthe city, which was in charge ofthat whole area. I remember that the person who was in charge ofthe—and I'm sorry 1 can't remember his name—Don Birrer, I think his name was. 1 have to check that. Don Birrer, who was in charge ofthat for the public utilities commission, resigned when I said that I wanted to have public hearings over the issue ofthese PG&E contracts with Modesto-Turlock irrigationand the San JoaquinValley entities that were part of the energy 382 negotiations with PG&E, because they have rights along the river and the watershed that we controlled with Hetch Hetchy [reservoir]. So the public utilities commission agreed to conduct the public hearings about these contracts and whether or not I should sign them and whether or not they were sufficiently satisfactory for the city's interest for me to sign them. I sat in on these hearings, the first time a mayor had ever sat in on public hearings ofthat nature vrith a commission. I sat in as a mayor-elect, and then, I believe, for one, maybe two, meetings after I was sworn in. Frankly, it was a very, very complicated issue. You can imagine, two and a halfyears oflegal work, and you're supposed to get up to speed in a hurry on that. Frankly, I was not an expert in this area, just couldn't be, so I had to rely on other experts. One ofthe experts was the incumbent city attorney, who I had a great deal ofconfidence in. Her name was Louise Renne. I remember the clincher for me was when she—and it was the first reality ofdecision- making as an executive versus that ofa legislator, when she came to me and she said, "Art, ifyou don't sign these contracts, we'll be open to hundreds of millions ofdollars oflawsuits. It'll take between twenty and thirty million dollars, maybe forty,"—if I remember correctly—"in legal costs to defend the lawsuits that will come from PG&E, Modesto-Turlock, and all these others if you don't sign these contracts after two and a halfyears ofnegotiations." So here I was, facing the largest deficit in the history ofthe city. I was already in a "how do I save money" mode so that I could put it into whatever programs I needed to to preserve them, and here I have the city attorney telling 383 me I'm looking at twenty to thirty million dollars oflegal costs on top ofa seventy-five to eighty-five million dollar deficit that was growing fast.