INFORMAL LOGIC XY.2, Spring 1993

It's All Very Well for You to Talk! Situationally Disqualifying Ad Hominem Attacks

ERIK C.W. KRABBE Rijksuniversiteit Groningen DOUGLAS WALTON University of Winnipeg

Key Words: Fallacies; argumentation; ad hominem cates in her argument is a policy or opinion arguments; personal attack; bias; poisoning the well that is inconsistent with commitments de­ argument: character attack; pragmatic inconsistency. termined by her own personal circum­ Abstract: The situationally disqualifying ad stances. The first kind of argument is hominem attack is an argumentative move in criti­ called the 'abusive' or direct ad hominem cal dialogue whereby one participant points out and the second is called the circumstantial certain features in his adversary's personal situa­ type of ad hominem argument. Some au­ tion that are claimed to make it inappropriate for thors use other labels, such as tu quoque or this adversary to take a particular point of view, to argue in a particular way, or to launch certain crit­ poisoning the well to characterize types of icisms. In this paper, we discuss some examples personal attack. Sometimes such labels of this way of arguing. Other types of ad hominem function merely as another name (tu argumentation are discussed as well and compared quoque for the circumstantial type, for in­ with the situationally disqualifying type. The so­ stance), sometimes as names for SUbtypes, called Houtlosser Dilemma highlights the danger or for alleged new types that do not fit in of unconditionally condoning ad hominem argu­ ments. We propose a classification of ad hominem, with either of the two standard types. and a more restrictive use of the term 'circumstan­ Indeed, it is not hard to think of cases tial'. Finally, we discuss whether ad hominem ar­ of personal attack that are not easily de­ guments are (always?) to be rejected as fallacious. scribed as either "abusive" or circumstan­ tial. In this paper we want to introduce and briefly discuss one particular type of case 1.Introductionl that seems to have been neglected thus far. The following example may suffice as a first The argumentum ad hominem or "ar­ indication of what we are after in this paper: gument against the person" is the kind of argument whereby one participant in a dia­ CASE I [Holland, December 1990J A re­ tired major general argues in front logue uses a personal attack to attempt to of his relatives that the Dutch gov­ discredit or refute the tenets or the argu­ ernment must give more substan­ ment of another participant. There are at tial support to the allied efforts in least two standard or common ways to do the Gulf Area. "We ought to send this, and both of these ways have been ground forces," so he claims. His widely recognized in logic textbooks as grandson retorts: "It's all very types of ad hominem arguments; One way well for you to talk, grandpa! You don't have to go there." is to attack the person directly, by arguing that she has a bad character, especially a The grandson's point (if he has a point!) is bad character for veracity, and cannot that grandpa's actual situation, his being a re­ therefore be trusted to be sincere or to be a tired person who will not be sent out anyhow, reliable participant in the dialogue. The disqualifies him (morally?) as a defender other way is to claim that what she advo- of the present point of view. We shall 80 E. C. W. Krabbe and D. Walton shortly present some other examples of this Case 2 shows how a circumstantial ad type of personal attack. But first we shall hominem argument may underly, and shift briefly survey the other types of ad hominem into, a direct personal attack. It is easy to so that we may assign our type, which may imagine that, but for the chairperson's in­ be called situationally disqual(fying ad terference, this direct attack could have hominem its proper place among them. We continued by further alleged examples of hope, in this paper, to make clear what is the politician's lack of justice. distinctive about the species, and to start the A third variant of the ad hominem ar­ discussion about its fallaciousness as con­ gument is the bias type of attack, where tingent upon different contexts of dialogue.2 one arguer claims that the other is not an impartial or honest proponent of her point of view because she has personal commit­ 2. Varieties of Ad Hominem ments or interests at stake, or something to gain, financially or otherwise, by support­ It is not at all easy to classify ad hom­ ing that point of view. inem arguments by sharp and unambigu­ CASE 3 a. In the panel debate of Case 2 the 3 ous criteria. One can see already that the journalist remarks that this poli­ direct (abusive) and the circumstantial tician is just following the party types overlap in some cases. Often, for ex­ line. ample, the circumstantial argument is used b. The journalist remarks that her as a kind of lead-in attack which is then ex­ adversary's point of view will tended or developed into a direct ad hom­ "no doubt gain him a lot of votes." inem attack. In such a case, the arguer's c. The journalist points out that the personal circumstances are said to be in politician has just bought an connict with his argument, implying that enormous quantity of stock of the arguer is therefore dishonest, insincere, an important arms industry that hypocritical, or otherwise deficient in stands to make profit in case of character for veracity. war. d. The journalist urges that the pol­ CASE 2 [December 1990] In a panel debate itician. being a member of his about whether or not, ultimately. party, can never objectively as­ force should be used to enforce sess the pro's and con's of the the U.N. resolutions about Kuwait, matter. a politician defends the point of view that this may be necessary to This type of personal attack, which can of­ maintain international legal order ten seriously damage the credibility of and justice. His adversary, a jour­ one's adversary, is distinct from either of nalist, opposes this view. "You the two standard types. Unlike with the di­ weren't talking this way as the U.N. rect (abusive) personal attack there need were passing resolutions about the not be an assault on one's adversary's char­ Palestinians. Whence this sudden concern for international law?" acter. Of course there may be mergers She then expands this argument, with, or shifts into, the direct type of ad insisting on the parallelism be­ hominem: It is not hard to imagine how tween the two cases, and on the Case 3c could develop into pure abuse. politician's complete lack of con­ But, with the bias type of ad hominem, cern for the enforcement of previ­ character, whether character in general, or ous U.N. resolutions. "In view of this," she concludes, "we may more specifically character for veracity, is wonder whether you are the one to not the issue. What is under attack is one's teach us a lesson about justice." At adversary's aptitude to be a serious and that moment the chair stops her. sincere discussant in this particular It's All Very Well for You to Talk! 81 dialogue. Circumstances are adduced that inconsistency in the arguer's position. Part would lead to doubt about this aptitude. In of this position consists of propositions this respect the bias type is similar to the that were explicitly or implicitly asserted circumstantial type. But in another respect within the dialogue. If nothing more is the bias type is rather the opposite of the used, one would not, usually, speak of a circumstantial type. Whereas in the cir­ circumstantial ad hominem. Pressing a cumstantial ad hominem one tries to con­ man with the consequences of what he strue the position of the other party as himself, within the same context of dia­ inconsistent, a bias type of attack, para­ logue, has granted to be the case may, ap­ doxically, decries the overwhelming con­ propriately, be called a Lockean ad sistency that obtains between a hominem (after John Locke, who described discussant's affiliations and interests and the genre). A Lockean ad hominem is in it­ his expressed point of view. self an impeccable way of arguing, even A particularly harsh subspecies of the though defeating one's adversary in this bias type is exemplified by Case 3d. This is way may lead one to an exaggerated esti­ the poisoning the well type of ad hominem, mate of the solidity of one's own point of where the arguer attacked is said to be so view. It is typical for the circumstantial ad dogmatic, fanatical, or dishonest that noth­ hominem, however, that part of the propo­ ing he might say can ever be trusted as reli­ sitions that constitute an arguer's alleged able. This is an extreme form of ad hominem position are inferred from circumstances. attack which appears to leave the attacked This may be done in several ways: (i) one party no room available at all for defence may adduce assertions made by the same or further participation in the dialogue. adversary in other circumstances (Case 4a, The implication is that this person is so below); (ii) one may adduce assertions that slippery or duplicitous that you can never were never explicitly made by one's adver­ really engage in a serious discussion with sary himself, but to which he appears to be him at all. It has the effect of excluding the committed by virtue of his affiliation to participant from the dialogue tout court. some party or group (Case 4b), or (iii) one Sometimes the term poisoning the well may infer particular points of view from is used to cover all the cases of the bias one's adversary's present or previous ac­ type. Whatever terminology one prefers, it tions (Case 4c; this includes silence on an seems useful to distinguish attacks like issue, as in Case 2). Case 3d from the other, presumably less ambitious, ones. Case 3a claims that the ar­ CASE 4 a. Like Case 2; the journalist points guer is biased by a preset commitment, or out that the politician had been opposed to the enforcement by at least looking at the issue from a particu­ armed troops of a U.N. resolu­ lar point of view. In Case 3b it is suggested tion about Korea. that some personal gain is involved which b. The journalist wonders how the blocks an open-minded dialectical inter­ politician. as a member of the change. In Case 3c this gain is financial, Christian Committee for Peace, and the charge may easily be developed can hold on to this point of view. into a severe attack on character. But in c. The journalist points out that the none of these cases is the threat to a fruitful politician used to be a conscien­ tious objector. continuation of the dialogue as great as it is with Case 3d. The label tu quoque ("you too") is often There are many subspecies of the cir­ used as a synonym for what is here called cumstantial ad hominem. According to our the circumstantial ad hominem. For in­ definition, a circumstantial ad hominem at­ stance, Woods and Walton (1977) distin­ tack consists of an attempt to point out an guish four types of what they call tu 82 E.C. W. Krabbe and D. Walton quoque according to the way one is to con­ On the other hand, Case 1 shows that strue the inconsistency in the position of situational disqualifiers display some simi­ the arguer thus attacked.4 1t is also possible larities with each of the other types. The to have a more stringent signification for retired major general is blamed for having the term tu quoque. In this restricted sense, presented his argument in favor of sending tu quoque denotes just those cases of the ground forces to the Gulf area, so it may be circumstantial ad hominem where the crit­ claimed that at least one aspect of the gen­ ic replies to a previous ad hominem attack eral's character is criticized here: he by saying something to the effect of: should know better when to shut up. Also, "What about you? You are just as bad even though there is no claim of inconsist­ yourself!" In principle, replying to one ad ency with respect to the general's position, hominem argument with another is not the grandson may be said to claim that unreasonable-in some cases this is a there is a clash of some sort between the highly effective and appropriate type of general's situation and his argument. response-but all too often such personal Third, if the group of people that have no ripostes are a sign of a shift to a quarrel. chance to be sent to the Gulf is, somewhat Having surveyed these different types forcefully, constructed as a party with of ad hominem we may now state a nega­ views and interests of its own, Case 1 tive result about situational disqualifica­ comes pretty close to Case 3a. tion, the type of ad hominem exemplified by Case I: it cannot be subsumed under any of these extant types. Let us have a 3. The Houtlosser Dilemma second look at Case 1 to make this clear. First, there is no assault on character (or In this section, we shall have a closer character for veracity). Of course the at­ look at the bias type of ad hominem argu­ tack in Case 1 could be further developed ment, which is in many respects similar to into a direct personal attack, but as we saw the situationally disqualifying type. In a this holds for any indirect personal attack. sense, bias arguments form themselves a The likelihood of such an extension is no subspecies of situational ad hominem argu­ reason to say that Case 1 in itself consti­ ments. (But we shall presently propose a tutes a direct ad hominem. Also, there is no stipulative definition of situational ad inconsistency implied in the position of the hominem argument that will keep the two major general. Here we have to be careful, apart.) and use the word 'position' in the same What is so bad about the bias argu­ sense as we did when discussing the cir­ ment? Often they seem dialectically strong cumstantial ad hominem. An arguer's posi­ and rhetorically effective. One tempting tion is a set of propositions to which he is point of view is to say that the more severe committed as may be inferred from the ar­ type of bias ad hominem argument, illus­ guer's utterances, his affiliation, and his trated by Case 3c for instance, is such a actions.5 The "it's all very well for you to powerful kind of attack that it cuts off fur­ talk"-argument in Case 1 does not suggest ther dialogue altogether. No matter what that there is anything wrong with the major the politician says, because of his financial general's position in this sense. Finally, it involvement, his argument is bound to be is not suggested or implied that there is a discredited. It may seem to follow then, lack of impartiality on the major general's that in this kind of case, the ad hominem side. Rather, it is objected that the gener­ argument is fallacious, beeause it leaves al's concern with the matter, now that he is the politician no further room to argue. So retired, is too slight to make him a suitable conceived, this ad hominem argument partner in the dialogue. would be a "situationally disqualifying" It's All Very Well for You to Talk! 83

argument (because of the politician's critical discussion on acid rain. Whatever financial involvement) that "poisons the point of view she takes in this discussion, well" by cutting off the possibility of she will be in a vulnerable position. further credible argumentation by the The difficult situation exhibited by this politician in the dialogue. type of case represents a general problem There is something in this situation hat called the Houtlosser Dilemma, represent­ can be brought out by examining the case ed by Figure 1 below. 6 'Bee represents of the bias type of ad hominem attack the initial situation, where Wilma is on the below, taken from Walton (1989, p. 149). board of a coal company. CASE 5 Bob and Wilma are discussing the problem of acid rain. Wilma ar­ gues that reports on the extent of the problem are greatly exaggerat­ ed and that the costs of acti on are prohibitive. Bob points out that Wilma is on the board of directors of a U.S. coal company and that therefore her argument should not be taken at face value. Figure I Bob is suggesting that Wilma is not a sin­ Given that Wilma is on the board of the cere participant in the critical discussion coal company in the first place, she is in a on acid rain because of her financial in­ bad fix no matter which way she tries to ar­ volvement with the coal company. Assum­ gue. If she tries to argue that acid rain is ing that Wilma did not, at the beginning of not a hard problem, then, as we saw, she is the discussion, inform the other partici­ open to a bias type of ad hominem attack pants of this involvement, Bob's criticism (especially if she conceals her relationship that she is biased is a powerful attack on with the coal company). However, if she her sincerity. In the acid rain case, the ad were to try to argue for the opposite point hominem attack on Wilma's arguments, on of view, and take up the thesis that acid the ground that she is biased, seems at face rain is a hard problem, curiously, she value to be a reasonable type of ad hom­ would be open to the tu quoque type of ad inem argument, and not a fallacious use of hominem attack-her critics could say that this type of argumentation. We would say, she is arguing it is a hard problem, one that in this case, that the ad hominem argument presumably ought to be corrected or elimi­ against Wilma is a valuable contribution to nated, while in fact she is contributing to the dialogue and, in that sense, a good ar­ that problem herself by working for the gument. But we have to be careful in judg­ coal company. She is between a rock and a ing just how good a contribution it really hard place. is. The ad hominem argument is such an The moral seems to be a bit paradoxi­ overpowering argument in many cases pre­ cal: never join the board of a coal company cisely because it is very easy to overesti­ (some people may actually like this con­ mate its weight, and think of it as a clusion), but, if you do, don't get involved decisive refutation-a kind of "last word" in a critical discussion on acid rain. This that leaves no room for reply or defense. would mean that certain people are exclud­ If you look at the situation from ed from participating in a discussion on Wilma's point of view, you can see that the certain issues. initial situation is not very favorable for The dilemma is that if you are in a situ­ her. She is on the board of a coal company, ation like Wilma's, you seem to invite an and she has to take some stand in the ad hominem attack whatever you say. The 84 E. C. W. Krabbe and D. Walton situation seems to leave you no room to ar­ 4. The Discredit the Non-Victim gue at all, at least not in an inoffensive Argument way. When you are in a Houtlosser Dilem­ ma, it is as though the "well is poisoned," To gain a better understanding of what because you have no way of carrying on is involved in a situationally disqualifying with a line of argument that cannot be ad hominem attack (or situational ad hom­ closed off by ad hominem attacks. inem for short), we shall quote a case dis­ The solution to the Houtlosser Dilemma cussed by Steven Lukes (1987). The case is to recognize that, in this type of case, the is taken from an interview of Mrs. Thatcher, argumentum ad hominem makes sense as a about her South Africa policy, with Hugo contribution to the discussion, and there­ Young, published in The Guardian: fore may be thought of as a good (non falla­ CASE 6 We now approached the central cious) type of argument, but also that it is a thrust of the prime ministerial ar­ type of argumentation that is inherently gument, that part of it which elic­ defeasible, and that one should not allow ited her most withering scorn .... such arguments to close off the dialogue The matter in question was the altogether. Some room must be left for moral case for sanctions. "I must Wilma to reply successfully. tell you I find nothing moral about people who come to me, worried For example, in the present case, about unemployment in this coun­ Wilma might hold that acid rain is a bad try, or about people who come to problem, and concede that the the coal us to say we must do more to help company is contributing to that problem, Africa-particularly black Afri­ but add that she and the others on the board cans. I find nothing moral about are trying to do something about it. Some them sitting in comfortable ci­ room must be left open, in principle, for cumstances, with good salaries, inflation-proof pensions, good this line of argument, or one like it, to be jobs, saying that we, as a matter of successful in carrrying the dialogue further. morality, will put x hundred thou­ Similarly, if Wilma's position is that sand black people out of work, acid rain is not so bad a problem, she might knowing that this could lead to concede that this point of view is more or starvation, poverty and unemploy­ less to be expected from someone on the ment, and even greater violence." board of a coal company, but add that such I tried to intervene."So the black leaders who ... " But Mrs.Thatcher happens to be the outcome of a recent in­ was thumping the table."That to vestigation conducted by an independent me is immoral. I find it repugnant. agency. Again-, in good dialogue, such a We had it at the Community meet­ line of defense should be given a hearing. ing. Nice conference centre. Good In short, what we should recognize in jobs. And you really tell me you'll this type of case is that the effect of the ad move people around as if they are hominem argument in a context of dia­ pawns on a checkerboard, and say that's moral. To me it's immoral."7 logue is such that (in accord with reasona­ ble rules of dialogue) it shifts a burden of As Steven Lukes points out, there are two presumption against the proponent, but we arguments ad hominem here, arguments should regard the burden as one that can be "which seek to undermine the case for met. The ad hominem is a defeasible type sanctions by attacking its advocates." Ac­ of argument that, correctly used, does shift cording to the first ad hominem, which is a weight of presumption against a partici­ called the Discredit the Non-Victim Argu­ pant in dialogue. But we must not overesti­ ment by Lukes, the advocates of sanctions mate that weight by thinking of it as "are held to be in no position to argue their sealing off the dialogue. case, because of their own distance or It's All Very Well for You to Talk! 85 immunity from their effects. They stand 5. Other Disqualifiers accused of, in effect, advocating the suffering of others, whom they thereby We have seen that a situational disqual­ treat like 'pawns on a checkerboard.' ifier does not necessarily involve a claim Presumably, then, only the potential suffer­ of moral impropriety. But we may general­ ers from sanctions have the right to make ize a bit more: the ground for disqualifica­ the case" (1987:179). The second ad tion may be quite different from that in hominem is a circumstantial one: it is the Discredit the Non-Victim Argument. suggested that there is some sort of The issue need not even be a policy or inconsistency in advocating sanctions for practical measure. those that are "worried about unemploy­ CASE 7 a. A schoolboy is accused of somt: ment in this country" or saying "we must act of vandalism. As the head­ do more to help Africa ... ". Steven Lukes master is about to probe for the speaks of the Discredit the Inconsistent boy's motives, one of the boy's Argument. friends tries to get a word in be­ This case illustrates, among other tween, arguing that the accused things, how different species of ad couldn't help it. But the head­ master stops him short. "since hominem may be intertwined in one this young man is quite able to argumentative text. At present we are speak for himself." mainly interested in the Discredit the b. A lawyer has taken on to defend Non- Victim Argument, which may easily an alleged crook. It is a very be identified as a situational disqualifier, complicated affair with all kinds analogous to the one we saw in Case l. In of financial manipulations that both Case I and Case 6, it is claimed that a are hard to unravel. By a clever argument the lawyer succeeds in certain arguer who advocates a certain pol­ giving a plausible interpretation icy (a course of action) may be disqualified to the pile of evidence. Unfortu­ because he will not suffer from this policy, nately, the only possible conclu­ if it is put through, whereas others will. sion seems to be that his client is Case 6, however, has moral overtones that guilty. The judge then dismisses Case I has not. Mrs. Thatcher seems to the argument, claiming that the hold that to advocate sanctions from a lawyer's task is to defend his comfortable distance is immoral. In Case I client, not to prove his guilt. there is a charge of incongruity or impro­ In view of such examples, we prefer to ex­ priety, but 'immorality' would be to strong tend the use of the term situational ad a term. hominem so as to include them. For, even Steven Lukes does not see any force in though in these cases there is no advocacy the Discredit the Non-Victim Argument. He of a policy from which the arguer would formulates two general objections: "First, not suffer, but others would, they are clear­ ... it would prohibit most people from tak­ ly examples of ad hominem attacks that ing moral stands on many issues; second, aim at a situational disqualification, and ... it is the responsibility of politicians to that are, moreover, hard to subsume under take a stand on just such issues as this; any other type of ad hominem. The next .... "8 As these objections show, a general disqualifier brings us close to the direct or admission of situational disqualifiers "abusive" ad hominem: would have a detrimental effect on the pos­ CASE 8 Grandpa and grandson are discuss­ sibilities of dialogue. But are we facing a ing the situation in some distant type of fallacy, or merely a weak. defeasi­ country. Grandson claims that the ble, type of argument? We shall return to regime in that country is immoral, this question shortly. because of its racist policies. He 86 E.C. W. Krabbe and D. Walton

argues that the regime should be under debate, or of any other kind, with the replaced. Grandpa dismisses the exception of evidence for a positional argument, because grandson has inconsistency or a bias. never been to that country, and therefore cannot have an adequate Subspecies of the situational ad hom­ judgment of the situation there. inem are the lack of concern ad hominem (including the Discredit the Non-Victim ar­ Grandpa's attack is aimed at the lack of ex­ gument, Case I and Case 6) and the lack of pertise on the side of his grandson. Such insight (lack of information) ad hominem arguments have often been included (Case 8). But there are also other subspe­ among the direct ("abusive") ad hominem cies, as shown in Case 7a and Case 7b. attacks (e.g., Woods and Walton, 1977). Generally then, we see the situational We have laid it down that an abusive or di­ ad hominem as a type in its own right, sep­ reet ad hominem is a personal attack on arate from the circumstantial type, the di­ one's adversary's character, especially rect type, and the bias type of ad hominem character for veracity. Grandpa's attack argument. In this typology, we are deviat­ does, indeed, concern his grandson's trust­ ing from the traditional treatments of ad worthiness or veracity, but only with re­ hominem in textbooks. The textbooks, very spect to the specific issue under debate. broadly speaking, used to use the term 'cir­ Grandpa does not claim that his grandson cumstantial', as opposed to 'abusive' ad has a bad character (for veracity) in gener­ hominem, to cover quite a variety of argu­ al. Therefore, we propose to include this ments, where we made distinctions into attack among the situational disqualifiers, different types. Doing so, we have used the rather than among the direct ad hominem term 'circumstantial' in a much stricter attacks. (Of course, grandpa could go on sense, to refer to only those cases where and extend the argument to an attack on there is an (alleged) inconsistency involved character, as well as to a poisoning the well in an arguer's position, and where this po­ type of ad hominem.) sition is partly reconstructed from the ar­ guer's circumstances. The traditional texts tended (although not consistently) to in­ 6. A System of Classification clude bias and disqualifying situations as "circumstances", i.e., as targets for ad At this point we, tentatively, propose hominem attacks, but without any recon­ the following definition of the situational struction of an inconsistency in the argu­ ad hominem: the situationally disqualify­ er's position. Thus part of the tradition ing ad homin6l1l attack (or, situational ad tended to lump the bias and the situational­ hominem) is an argumentative move in di­ ly disqualifying type together with tu alogue whereby one participant points out quoque under the heading of circumstan­ certain features in his adversary's person­ tial ad hominem arguments. Moreover, al situation that are claimed to make it In­ those traditional texts that did distinguish appropriate for this adversary to make a several types of "nonabusive" ad hominem certain dialectical contribution. The dia­ (like tu quoque or poisoning the well) dif­ lectical contribution in question may, for fered among themselves in their use of the instance, consist of a statement of a partic­ term 'circumstantial ad hominem'. ular view, or of a presentation of a particu­ Going against this tradition, we have lar argument in favour of this view, or of a confined the term circumstantial ad hominem particular criticism. The objectional fea­ to the narrower range of cases where some tures in one's adversary's situation may be clash of propositions-an inconsistency, such as to yield evidence for a lack of con­ normally a pragmatic inconsistency­ cern for, or a lack of insight in. the issue is essentially involved. Being wary of It's All Very Well/or You to Talk! 87 departing from tradition too radically how­ nonfallacious. Does this conclusion hold ever, we are ready to adapt our preferred for all types? Let us briefly study this ques­ terminology to tradition a little by distin­ tion with respect to the different species of guishing a wider and a narrower sense of ad hominem we have distinguished.9 'circumstantial ad hominem'. Thus we First, consider the direct or abusive ad have arrived at the system of classification hominem. In a way, the name 'abusive' is in Figure 2. misleading, because this first type of ad argumentum ad hominem hominem, though often straightforwardly ______I irrelevant and fallacious, can be a reasona­ direct indirect (circumstantial in a wider sense) ble argument in some instances. For exam­ ple, in evaluating the testimony of a witness in legal cross-examinations, raising inconsistency------I bias type ______situational type questions about the person's character, re­ liability as a witness, past convictions, and :,?r\cation so forth, is regarded, within limits, as a le­ poisL:5 [~L~ the weIl \ gitimate kind of argumentation. So too, in circumstantial other lack of election campaigning in political debates, in a narrower insight raising questions of a candidate's personal sense other integrity and character are recognized as /~ legitimate, again within limits. tu quoque as a other discredit the circumstantial non-victim Brinton (1986) cites character as a pos­ ad hominem itive factor that can be appealed to in argu­ Figure 2 mentation, following Aristotle's remarks in the Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics We really think the narrower type of cir­ that the good man's speech is more credi­ cumstantial ad hominem argument has a ble, especially where opinions are divided special logic of its own, and that it is cru­ and certain knowledge that would resolve cially important to distinguish carefully the issue is not available at the time. Ac­ between it and the bias and situation ally cording to Brinton (1986: 246), an ethotic disqualifying types. Hence our preference argument is an argument in which ethos for using the term 'circumstantial' in the (character) is used to transfer credibility, narrower way, in our preferred system of either positively or negatively, from per­ classification. But we recognize that the sons to a conclusion. If ethos is a legiti­ burden of proof for this apparently radical mate factor in argumentation, it would position is heavy, given the linguistic evi­ seem to follow that the direct ad hominem dence for applying the broad term 'circum­ type of argument can itself be a legitimate stantial' to the bias type and situationally kind of argument in some cases. disqualifying type, as well as to the The same thing could be said about the narrower range of cases characterized by circumstantial ad hominem. Suppose a pol­ an inconsistency. So we are willing to itician has gone on record as advocating compromise, somewhat reluctantly, here. keeping government expenses down by not giving out inflationary salary raises to gov­ ernment officials, but it is later revealed 7. Fallaciousness that, once elected, he has given himself a large increase to his already sizable salary. Are ad hominem arguments fallacious? A critic may then say "You do not practise In our discussion of the Houtlosser Dilem­ what you preach!", using the circumstantial ma, we reached the conclusion that some type of ad hominem argument against the types of ad hominem are (conditionally) politician. In such a case, the ad hominem 88 E.C. W. Krabbe and D. Walton

argument could be a quite reasonable con­ same concessions but who chooses another tribution to the discussion. Only if it is car­ line of attack"; (ii) even jf T is so defenda­ ried to excess in some way, or used to seal ble, regardless of the lines of attack chosen off the dialogue, would it become falla­ by the opponent, "this does not guarantee cious. Thus we have already remarked that the truth of T .... " Notice that in this case it the tu quoque (which is a kind of circum­ is not the ad hominem argumentation in the stantial ad hominem) may be indicative of dialogue itself that constitutes the fallacy, a shift to a quarrel. The fallacy in such cas­ for this will be a perfectly reasonable es is a kind of illicit dialectical shift away Lockean ad hominem, but the exaggerated from a critical discussion (discussion aim­ consequences drawn from its success. ing at a reasonable resolution for a conflict Such exaggeration was called the basic ad of opinion) towards a personal quarrel. hominem fallacy by Walton (1987: 318).12 Quarrelling, though it may have its own In a particular case, there may be quite advantages, is not an efficient way of con­ a number of factors to be taken into ac­ tributing to the reasonable resolution of a count in judging whether the given ad conflict. Therefore, from the vantage point hominem argument is fallacious or not. A of norms and rules for critical discussion, good case in point is the well-known such a shift is fallacious. smoking example, studied in detail in Generally, the ad hominem fallacies Walton (1985: 71): can be analyzed as a dialectical failure, that is, a failure of an argument to meet CASE 9 A parent gives a lecture to her son, requirements of a formal structure of arguing that smoking is very bad for your health, and that therefore dialogue. 10 But dialogues of different types one should not smoke. But the require different structures. II This means child replies, "What about you. that what may be described as a fallacy You smoke. So much for your ar­ from one perspective (one type of dia­ gument against smoking!" logue) need not be fallacious from another one. For instance, the ad hominem attack In a case like this, we have to be very careful by the journalist in Case 2 may well be fal­ to try to interpret exactly what the child's lacious according to the rules of some conclusion is supposed to be. If the child is tightly structured system for critical dia­ rejecting the parent's argument that smok­ logue, and yet perfectly reasonable in the ing is bad for your health per se, then he context of a televised debate, where the could be committing a serious ad hominem goal is perhaps not so much to resolve a fallacy. But if the child is only questioning conflict between the direct participants as the sincerity of the parent, seeing that she to make an impression on the audience. is not following her own advice, then he Within the framework of a Lorenzen dia­ could be raising legitimate grounds for doubt logue (a type of dialogue with a particular concerning the practical consistency of the formal structure), Barth and Martens parent's commitments. And if the parent is (1977: 84), interpreting a text of Whately'S inconsistent, why should the child take the (1829: 20 I f.), describe two kinds of what data of the parent's lecture on trust? One can may be called ad hominem fallacy as the easily see from considering this kind of ex­ following types of incorrect inference: (i) ample that each case should be carefully just because the proponent has defended considered on its merits. Sometimes the ad his thesis, T, successfully against his oppo­ hominem argument should be rejected as a nent's criticism ex concessis (Le., on the fallacy, while in other cases it is a reasona­ basis of the opponent's concessions), it ble kind of argument which can quite legit­ does not necessarily follow that T is "de­ imately be used to raise critical questions fendable against a person who makes the or shift a burden of proof in a dialogue. It's All Very Well for You to Talk! 89

Particularly in contexts of argument of joke, that doesn't really belong to the di­ where hard evidence is insufficient to de­ alogue itself. In Case I the major general cide a case, and we have to depend on soft, could perhaps appreciate his grandson's defeasible kinds of arguments like witness remark with a grin, and then go on to dis­ testimony or appeal to authority, the ad cuss the pro's and con's of sending out hominem argument can often be a legiti­ ground forces. In Cases 7 a and 7b, one mate way of testing the credibility of a par­ may even be inclined to say that the dis­ ticipant in dialogue. As such, it can be a qualifiers are quite reasonable moves. But nonfallacious kind of argumentation. 13 this has nothing to do with the norms and The bias type of ad hominem displays rules for critical discussion. In such cases the same possibilities of reasonable and our hunch that the move is innocuous, or fallacious uses. The suspicion of a bias or even applaudable, originates from external special interest may be a very great hin­ considerations that make it advisable to cut drance to a good and efficient argumenta­ off a particular dialogue or argument. tive exchange. Just as in the case of a The idea behind the situational ad pragmatic inconsistency, this suspicion hominem as a reasonable action in dia­ will make one doubt whether one's adver­ logue is that in certain situations people sary is seriously and sincerely cooperating are not in a position to express a particular in the critical discussion. In some such cas­ point of view or criticism, or to argue in a es the bias attack can be very useful to shift particular way. They are not supposed, or the burden of proof to the other side, so not entitled, to do so. From the perspective that the air may be cleared. For instance, in of critical discussion this idea is to be Case 3a it may have been a good question rejected. 14 Some may want to reject the to ask, whether the politician is giving his idea throughout, and therefore spurn all own views or merely mouthing those of his use of situational disqualifiers. But even if party. In other cases, however, the bias at­ one is willing to admit that, sometimes, tack is just an attempt to seal off or ob­ such situations do occur, one should still struct the dialogue: it is not used to clear be severely critical of situational ad the air, but to force a dialectical shift, ei­ hominem in most cases. It is a type of ther to a critical discussion on another is­ move that, like poisoning the well and oth­ sue, or to some type of interchange that is er fallacious ad hominem attacks, tends to no longer a critical discussion at all. This is prematurely close the dialogue. So, if we certainly the case with the poisoning the cherish critical discussions and want to well type of attacks, as in Case 3d. If a poi­ formulate rules and norms to guide them, soning the well move is ever a reasonable the situational ad hominem attack, as a move, this reasonableness must be deter­ fallacy, must be ruled out by these rules mined from another perspective than that and norms. of critical discussion. From the latter per­ If the purpose of some dialogue is spective such a move is always fallacious. other than that of resolving a conflict by As to their fallaciousness, and reasona­ verbal means, different norms and rules bleness, the situationally disqualifying ad apply. For example, both the grandson hominem attacks fare much like the poi­ in Case I and Mrs. Thatcher in Case 6 soning the well attacks. From the perspec­ have chosen an effective means to express tive of norms and rules for critical their feelings, or to make an impression on discussion, we must condemn such attacks a third party, etc. What is a fallacy from throughout. For, instead of furthering the one perspective (critical discussion) can dialogue, they tend to finish it off. In prac­ still be positively valued from other tice though, a disqualifier may sometimes perspectives (eristics, debate, humour, constitute just a playful interlude, or a kind drama, etc.}.I> 90 E. C. W. Krabbe and D. Walton

Notes

An earlier version of this paper (not including Lukes advances are specific for the case. One the Houtlosser Dilemma) appeared in Dutch: is the tu quoque that "Mrs. Thatcher certainly Krabbe and Walton (1991). does not apply this principle elsewhere," and the other points out that "there is compelling The species was brought to our attention by T. evidence that the potential victims of sanctions van de Poel, who attended Krabbe's course on widely endorse them anyway." fallacies in the spring term of 1989. it is from his presentation, in that course, of Case 6 below 9 Of course one may want to make the termino­ that this paper originates. We are grateful to logical decision that a nonfallacious move should Mr. van de Poel for having shared his views not be called ad hominem, but rather, say, per­ with us, both in his term paper on ad hominem sonal argument. However, we prefer not to do as well as in several discussions we had on this so. Ater all, the original term is argumentum type of case. In particular we have made use of ad hominem, not fallacia ad hominem, and it his ideas of "lack of concern" and "lack of in­ has often been used, by John Locke and others, formation" as basic elements in the structure without an implication of fallaciousness. of many situational ad hominem arguments. 10 This idea is already present in Barth and For a somewhat fuller introductory exposition Martens (1977). It has been incorporated in the we refer to Chapter 6 of Walton (1989). pragma-dialectical approach to the study of argumentation: van Eemeren et al. (1986), van 4 Others (e.g. van Eemeren, et al., 1986: 28ff., Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987). van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1987: 285), liOn types of dialogue see Walton (1992), and while using the term tu quoque in a similar Walton and Krabbe (l994? ch. 3). way, employ the term circumstantial to cover what we have called the bias type of 12 Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1986: 158, 159) and ad hominem attack. It may also be argued van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987: 291). that the tu quoque is not restricted to ad 13 Walton (1985) is an extensive study of falla­ hominem exclusively. We shall return to the cious and nonfallacious ad hominem arguments. issue of terminology and classification in Cf. also Govier (1987: 278), who stresses that Section 6. argumentative "exchange presumes the sincer­ 5 It is not necessary, at present, to discuss the ity of participants," and that the "insincerity different types of commitment sets that togeth­ that we infer from pragmatic inconsistency up­ er make up an arguer's position, see Walton sets the credibility of the arguer because it and Krabbe (1994?). leads us to think that he or she is not really par­ ticipating in an argumentative exchange." 6 This dilemma was pointed out by Peter Houtlosser at the Summer Institute in 14 Cf. van Eemeren et al. (1986: 23, Regel I) and Argumentatiop at McMaster University, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987: 284, Hamilton, Ontario, in June 1991, during a dis­ Rule I). cussion of Case 5 following Douglas Walton's 15 For simplicity we have not discussed the plu­ presentation of a lecture on parts of Walton rality of models (systems of norms and rules) and Krabbe (l994'!). for critical discussion itself. What is a fallacy 'Why Sanctions Are Ineffective and Immoral', according to one model, may not be one ac­ The Guardian, Wednesday, July 9th, 1986, p. 23. cording to another, more lenient, model. Cf. Krabbe (1991). and Walton and Krabbe 8 Lukes, 1987: 183. The other two objections (l994?, chs. 3 and 4). It's All Very Well for You to Talk! 91

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