Wright State University CORE Scholar University Libraries' Staff Publications University Libraries 10-1978 Marxism and Behaviorism: Ideological Parallels Stephen Paul Foster Ph.D. Wright State University - Main Campus, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/ul_pub Part of the Philosophy Commons Repository Citation Foster, S. P. (1978). Marxism and Behaviorism: Ideological Parallels. Dialogue, 21 (1), 1-8. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/ul_pub/134 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Libraries at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in University Libraries' Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978 MARXISM AND BEHAVIORISM: IDEOLOGICAL PARALLELS Stephen Foster Western Michigan University Marxism, as a philosophical system, into political programs, that is, both attempts to provide an accurate an- envisage their systems as potential so- alysis of man and his social institu- cial systems which vastly improve hu- tions. Behaviorism, as a system of psy- man conditions. chology, claims that its method is I take the term "ideology" specifical- fundamental to an understanding of ly to apply to a system of thought in human nature. Both systems justify which the political dimension is con- their claims on the grounds that they nected to the whole system in such a are employing methods which are sci- way that it serves as a moral postulate entific in character. Marxism bases its for the entire system and, in effect, method on historical analysis, maintain- closes it off such that to question the ing that history unfolds in an orderly, presuppositions is to betray vital moral- predictable manner and that a proper political purpose. While this character- analysis of it reveals scientific laws. ization has long been conceded by many The general methodology of the nat- to be true of Marxism (we frequently ural sciences is the model for behavior- hear of Marxist ideology) it has not ism. Behaviorists point to the successes been widely extended to the system of of the natural sciences and claim that behaviorism. Yet I believe that behav- they employ the scientific method thor- iorism suffers from a similar flaw, one oughly and more consistently than any in which a methodological rigidity is previous or current psychology. More- tied to a social theory and as a conse- over, they claim that behavioristic psy- quence inhibits the development of chology has been mindful of and faith- creative intellectual activity. ful to the scientific goals of predicta- I propose to examine Marxist and bility and control of the subject matter behaviorist thinking and draw what I and has advanced the study of human think are significant parallels. I shall psychology to the extent that it can do this by developing three separate call itself objective and genuinely sci- points: entific. (I) Marxism and behaviorism as My use of the term "Marxism" in sciences this paper will refer to the thought and (II) Marxism and behaviorism as writings of Karl Marx and Fredrich social philosophies Engels. I will take B. F. Skinner to be (III) Marxism and behaviorism as the principal representative of behav- ideologies. iorism. It is my contention that both I Marxism and behaviorism as complete Marxism claims to apply a scientific views of man (which they both claim method to the study of social phenom- to be) are forms of dogmatic ideology. ena. The method employed is one de- I take the term "ideology" generally as veloped by Hegel, who attempted to the Oxford English Dictionary defines account for human social development it "ideal or abstract speculation; in a by interpreting it to a process of dia- deprecatory sense, unpractical or vision- lectical assent. He believed that the ary theorizing or speculation." I would natural world, including human soci- emphasize the term "visionary" in this ety, was a phenomenal manifestation definition and apply it to both Marxism out of which the Ideal (the rational and behaviorism to emphasize the fact essence of reality) develops to a state that both systems extend their visions of perfect self-realization through a se- 1 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978 ries of contradictions whose resolutions comes to see his efforts as a genuine advance the development and status of contribution to the study of human af- the Ideal to its perfect state.1 fairs, a contribution which takes the Marx adopted this method and modi- form of an objective social science. fied it. He criticized Hegel for abstract- "These two great discoveries, the ma- ing the content out of his philosophy, terialistic conception of history, and the attempting to account for reality in a capitalistic production through surplus value, we owe to Marx. With these dis- wholly abstract fashion, imputing con- 5 tent and meaning to a purely ideation- coveries socialism becomes a science." al realm while failing to recognize the Modern physical science is the major substance and effect of material reality.2 source of inspiration for behaviorism. Its advocates point to the advances in Marx and Engels applied Hegel's the physical sciences and claim that its method to social-economic history. They method applied to human behavior can were convinced that the real content yield similar progress. Concomitant with of history was located in economic de- this desire to emulate the methods of velopment and that this development the physical sciences is a rejection of took place in the form of class struggle: psychology prior to behaviorism as be- ing laden with vague metaphysical It was seen that all past history with the terminology. I refer to B. F. Skinner's exception of its primitive stages, was the book, Behavior of Organisms, 1938. In history of class struggles: that these war- this work Skinner registers his dissatis- ring classes are always products of the faction with the progress of psychology. modes of production and exchange, in a Riddled with imprecise and subjective word, of the economic conditions of their terminology, dominated by burden- time; that the economic structure of society some theoretical constructions, psychol- always furnishes the real basis starting from ogy for Skinner requires a method which we can alone work out the ultimate which is free from obscurantist and in- explanation of the whole superstructure of trospective accounts of human be- judicial and political institutions as well havior. as of the religious, philosophical and other 3 There is a striking parallel between ideas of a given historical period. Skinner's concept of the efficiency and economy of his method and Marx's The science of man for Marx and En- view of his own method. Both are con- gels is economics interpreted in an his- cerned to rid their inquiries of excess torical context. This science provides, speculative, theoretical baggage. In the they maintain, what we today expect German Ideology Marx makes this from any legitimate scientific disci- claim the premise of the materialist pline, predictability. Human history is conception of history: subject to the rule of laws as is the natural material world. "He (Darwin) The premises from which we begin are not dealt the metaphysical conception of arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real prem- nature the heaviest blow by his proof ises from which abstractions can only be that all organic beings, plants, animals made in the imagination. They are the real and man himself are products of a proc- individuals, their activity and the material ess of evolution going on through mil- conditions of their life, both those which lions of years."4 A study of history re- they find already existing and those by veals the social economic laws to which their activity. These premises can thus be mankind is subject. Thus the future verified in a purely empirical way.6 course of human social events can be charted and predicted once the his- Skinner in his description of the in- torical laws are understood. Marx ception of modern behavioral science 2 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978 sees its advance as contingent upon its This view, however, has a significant ability to displace methods which re- political implication. Scientific under- sort to explaining behavior by some standing provides the possibility of pre- cause or process anterior to behavior. diction and control and thus leads to a "When a science of behavior had once technology of human affairs. This tech- rid itself of psychic fictions: either it nology in Marxist terms is a revolution- might leave their places empty and ary activity, in Skinnerian terms a be- proceed to deal with its data directly, havioral technology. The scientific ob- or it might make replacements,"7 Em- jective detachment of Marx and Skin- pirical data is Skinner's tool. ''There ner is linked to social-political com- is only one way to obtain a convenient mitment. Indeed, the social goals are and useful system and that is to go di- the ultimate justifications for both sys- rectly to the data."8 tems. Both Marx and Skinner are striving To conclude: there are three factors for an objective approach to their re- which inhere in Marxism and behavior- spective subject matters in order to ism which makes the systems parallel yield empirically verifiable laws which in their claims for scientific objectivity. can be used to predict and control the First, both view their methods as being course of human affairs. They take scientific, dealing with strict empirical positions of primary materialism, that data and shunning speculation. Second, is, they reject any attempt to account they both see man as an interperter of for any human phenomenon by ap- himself as a strict physical-material en- pealing to any concept of mind.