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10-1978

Marxism and Behaviorism: Ideological Parallels

Stephen Paul Foster Ph.D. Wright State University - Main Campus, [email protected]

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Repository Citation Foster, S. P. (1978). and Behaviorism: Ideological Parallels. Dialogue, 21 (1), 1-8. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/ul_pub/134

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MARXISM AND BEHAVIORISM: IDEOLOGICAL PARALLELS Stephen Foster Western Michigan University Marxism, as a philosophical system, into political programs, that is, both attempts to provide an accurate an- envisage their systems as potential so- alysis of man and his social institu- cial systems which vastly improve hu- tions. Behaviorism, as a system of psy- man conditions. chology, claims that its method is I take the term "" specifical- fundamental to an understanding of ly to apply to a system of thought in human nature. Both systems justify which the political dimension is con- their claims on the grounds that they nected to the whole system in such a are employing methods which are sci- way that it serves as a moral postulate entific in character. Marxism bases its for the entire system and, in effect, method on historical analysis, maintain- closes it off such that to question the ing that history unfolds in an orderly, presuppositions is to betray vital moral- predictable manner and that a proper political purpose. While this character- analysis of it reveals scientific laws. ization has long been conceded by many The general of the nat- to be true of Marxism (we frequently ural sciences is the model for behavior- hear of Marxist ideology) it has not ism. Behaviorists point to the successes been widely extended to the system of of the natural sciences and claim that behaviorism. Yet I believe that behav- they employ the scientific method thor- iorism suffers from a similar flaw, one oughly and more consistently than any in which a methodological rigidity is previous or current psychology. More- tied to a and as a conse- over, they claim that behavioristic psy- quence inhibits the development of chology has been mindful of and faith- creative activity. ful to the scientific goals of predicta- I propose to examine Marxist and bility and control of the subject matter behaviorist thinking and draw what I and has advanced the study of human think are significant parallels. I shall psychology to the extent that it can do this by developing three separate call itself objective and genuinely sci- points: entific. (I) Marxism and behaviorism as My use of the term "Marxism" in sciences this paper will refer to the thought and (II) Marxism and behaviorism as writings of and Fredrich social Engels. I will take B. F. Skinner to be (III) Marxism and behaviorism as the principal representative of behav- . iorism. It is my contention that both I Marxism and behaviorism as complete Marxism claims to apply a scientific views of man (which they both claim method to the study of social phenom- to be) are forms of dogmatic ideology. ena. The method employed is one de- I take the term "ideology" generally as veloped by Hegel, who attempted to the Oxford English Dictionary defines account for human social development it "ideal or abstract speculation; in a by interpreting it to a process of dia- deprecatory sense, unpractical or vision- lectical assent. He believed that the ary theorizing or speculation." I would natural world, including human soci- emphasize the term "visionary" in this ety, was a phenomenal manifestation definition and apply it to both Marxism out of which the Ideal (the rational and behaviorism to emphasize the fact essence of reality) develops to a state that both systems extend their visions of perfect self-realization through a se- 1 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978 ries of contradictions whose resolutions comes to see his efforts as a genuine advance the development and status of contribution to the study of human af- the Ideal to its perfect state.1 fairs, a contribution which takes the Marx adopted this method and modi- form of an objective . fied it. He criticized Hegel for abstract- "These two great discoveries, the ma- ing the content out of his philosophy, terialistic conception of history, and the attempting to account for reality in a capitalistic production through surplus , we owe to Marx. With these dis- wholly abstract fashion, imputing con- 5 tent and meaning to a purely ideation- coveries becomes a science." al realm while failing to recognize the Modern physical science is the major substance and effect of material reality.2 source of inspiration for behaviorism. Its advocates point to the advances in Marx and Engels applied Hegel's the physical sciences and claim that its method to social-economic history. They method applied to human behavior can were convinced that the real content yield similar . Concomitant with of history was located in economic de- this desire to emulate the methods of velopment and that this development the physical sciences is a rejection of took place in the form of class struggle: psychology prior to behaviorism as be- ing laden with vague metaphysical It was seen that all past history with the terminology. I refer to B. F. Skinner's exception of its primitive stages, was the book, Behavior of Organisms, 1938. In history of class struggles: that these - this work Skinner registers his dissatis- ring classes are always products of the faction with the progress of psychology. modes of production and exchange, in a Riddled with imprecise and subjective word, of the economic conditions of their terminology, dominated by burden- time; that the economic structure of some theoretical constructions, psychol- always furnishes the real basis starting from ogy for Skinner requires a method which we can alone work out the ultimate which is free from obscurantist and in- explanation of the whole superstructure of trospective accounts of human be- judicial and political as well havior. as of the religious, philosophical and 3 There is a striking parallel between ideas of a given historical period. Skinner's concept of the efficiency and of his method and Marx's The science of man for Marx and En- view of his own method. Both are con- gels is interpreted in an his- cerned to rid their inquiries of excess torical context. This science provides, speculative, theoretical baggage. In the they maintain, what we today expect German Ideology Marx makes this from any legitimate scientific disci- claim the premise of the materialist pline, predictability. Human history is conception of history: subject to the rule of laws as is the natural material world. "He (Darwin) The premises from which we begin are not dealt the metaphysical conception of arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real prem- nature the heaviest blow by his proof ises from which abstractions can only be that all organic beings, plants, animals made in the imagination. They are the real and man himself are products of a proc- individuals, their activity and the material ess of evolution going on through mil- conditions of their life, both those which lions of years."4 A study of history re- they find already existing and those by veals the social economic laws to which their activity. These premises can thus be mankind is subject. Thus the future verified in a purely empirical way.6 course of human social events can be charted and predicted once the his- Skinner in his description of the in- torical laws are understood. Marx ception of modern behavioral science 2 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978 sees its advance as contingent upon its This view, however, has a significant ability to displace methods which re- political implication. Scientific under- sort to explaining behavior by some standing provides the possibility of pre- cause or process anterior to behavior. diction and control and thus leads to a "When a science of behavior had once of human affairs. This tech- rid itself of psychic fictions: either it nology in Marxist terms is a - might leave their places empty and ary activity, in Skinnerian terms a be- proceed to deal with its data directly, havioral technology. The scientific ob- or it might make replacements,"7 Em- jective detachment of Marx and Skin- pirical data is Skinner's tool. ''There ner is linked to social-political com- is only one way to obtain a convenient mitment. Indeed, the social goals are and useful system and that is to go di- the ultimate justifications for both sys- rectly to the data."8 tems. Both Marx and Skinner are striving To conclude: there are three factors for an objective approach to their re- which inhere in Marxism and behavior- spective subject matters in order to ism which makes the systems parallel yield empirically verifiable laws which in their claims for scientific objectivity. can be used to predict and control the First, both view their methods as being course of human affairs. They take scientific, dealing with strict empirical positions of primary , that data and shunning speculation. Second, is, they reject any attempt to account they both see man as an interperter of for any human phenomenon by ap- himself as a strict physical-material en- pealing to any concept of mind. Marx's tity: and third, they both view their replaces German systems as alternatives to outmoded metaphysical idealism, Skinner's scien- and benighted idealistic or mentalistic tific materialism replaces the mind-mat- conceptual schemes. ter dualism presupposed by such prom- inent predecessors as Freud and James. II In both Marxism and behaviorism In the first section I mentioned the man's role becomes that of interpreter technological implications of the two of the forces that shape him. This is systems as being the most effective in- accomplished by analyzing the dispo- struments of . The im- sition and dynamics of material forces. petus here is a kind of moral-social For Skinner: "The task of a scientific idealism, a realization of the vast dis- analysis is to explain how the behavior parity between man as he is and man of a person as a physical system is re- as he could be, and a revulsion from lated to conditions under which this in- the spectacle of human destructiveness dividual lives."9 For Marx: "The first and the institutionalization of greed premise of all human history is, of and exploitation. course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be Genuine knowledge provides man established is the physical organization the opportunity to divest himself of of these individuals and their conse- the ugly and brutal conditions which quent relation to the rest of nature."10 have so long determined the lives of so many. Marxism and behaviorism are These two quotes illustrate a similar- prescriptive in disposition. Both claim ity in what Marx and Skinner conceive an absolute right to be believed, that to be the object and purpose of their is, they both see their programs as study. Both men consider themselves being absolutely essential in order to as scientists, as objective interpreters bring about an improved social order of the natural order, eschewing mysti- and they both see their detractors as fication of man's relation to nature. obscurantists or sentimentalists. Skin- 3 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978 ner's view is that the development of for the first time man, in a certain sense is "behavioral technology" is the best finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom and emerges from mere guarantee of avoiding massive social 13 upheaval: animal conditions into really human ones. A behavioral technology comparable in This kind of human ideal described power and precision to physical and bio- above by Engels is to a large extent logical technology is lacking, and those shaped by the concept of human per- who do not find the possibility ridiculous fectability. Human perfeetability is, of are more likely to be frightened by it than course, one of the overriding themes reassured. That is how far we are from of the Enlightenment. "Our hopes for preventing the catastrophe toward which the future condition of the human race the world seems to be inexorably moving.11 can be subsumed under three impor- tant heads; the abolition of inequality Marx is not quite as gloomv. He doesn't between nations, the progress of equal- see the world as moving inexplorably ity within each nation, and the true toward catastrophe, yet in his own time perfection of mankind."14 he foresaw a massive class struggle, Marx grew up very much under the one in which the , the ex- influence of Enlightenment ideals.15 He ploited class of propertyless laborers inherited the optimistic view of eight- would seize social power from the eenth century thinkers such as Con- propertied capitalist exploiters.12 Marx's dorcet who believed that the gradual view of history is pervaded with moral advance of the human mind by means indignation. In his Economic and Philo- of science and art over superstition sophic Manuscripts Marx describes the and ignorance would eventually liber- social and economic conditions which ate the human race from the evils of lead to the dehumanization of working tyranny, injustice and war. This view, class people. His work is not only a which essentially equated vice with ig- critical social analysis but is also a moral norance, exalted the capabilities of the indictment of a social system which mind and interpreted moral social evils he believes is based upon ruthless ex- to be temporary obstructions which ploitation and greed. would yield to the forces of scientific The implicit moral idealism in Marx- advancement. Marx's social analysis ism and behaviorism identifies the produces a more insightful and realistic causes of social evil as being due to ex- explanation of social change. He is ternal environmental imbalances which aware of the non-rational economic are aggravated by man's own ignorance and political forces which create in- of their existence and perpetuated by equities and of the pressures and ten- his misconception of himself as a self- sions which arise when various groups determined agent of social change. compete for social and economic pow- Once however, he has perfected the er. Yet he shares with Enlightenment tools of social analysis and developed thinkers the optimism of the outcome a human engineering science, the con- of this . His belief is that ditions which threaten his well-being man can extend his mastery of the can be eliminated. With Marx, for ex- natural physical world to his own so- ample, a reorganization of the means cial world and in effect liberate himself of production brings this about: from all the evils which have frustrated the complete realization of his human- With the seizing of the means of produc- ity- tion by society, production of commodities Skinner's views are also much ef- is done away with, and simultaneously, the fected by the concept of human per- master of product over producer . . . then fectability. The very title of his book 4 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978

Beyond Freedom and Dignity is a re- will be realized when man acknowl- flection of his view that concepts such edges his being acted upon and shaped as freedom and dignity are vestiges of by the material world and also acknowl- a false and metaphysical view of hu- edges that by rearranging material con- man autonomy, a view he believes frus- ditions (for Marx, the termination of trates attempts to implement methods production, for Skinner, a and practices by which men can rid more consistent system of distributing themselves of social evils. "A scientific pleasure and pain) a better world will analysis of behavior dispossesses auton- come into existence. omous man and turns the control he To conclude: both Marxism and be- has said to exert over to the environ- haviorism envision an improved society ment."16 Once man abandons his tena- which can be realized once man recog- cious but misguided commitment to nizes his stature as a material being, the illusion of his autonomy he gains determined by the same processes that a previously unparalleled dimension of shape the rest of the world; and sub- control over his own activity, a control jects his social world to an administra- which enables him to eradicate the tion which reorders existing institutions sources of social evil. Indeed it is the and implements programs in light of concept of morality itself which has man's material determination by natural impeded the process of human per- laws. In effect, both Marxism and be- fection because the of moral- haviorism offer man the opportunity ity presupposes a degree of personal to perfect himself, to realize his posi- responsibility and individual autonomy, tive potentialities in a society which a false presupposition which, for Skin- has effectively eradicated the unwant- ner, results in a failure to examine and ed and unwholesome side of his nature. understand the true causes of human behavior and consequently results in a III failure to remedy basic human mala- Marxism and behaviorism are theo- dies. Skinner's ultimate purpose in this ries of human nature. But unlike some respect is to formulate all human prob- theories of human nature, for example, lems into technological problems. Then stoicism, Thomism, or psychoanalysis, man can establish a process of identi- both Marxism and behaviorism require fying causal relations of human be- a social-political implementation of havior to antisocial and destructive ac- their theories. In order for there to be tivities and a technique of adjusting a better world, a socialist economic those causes to obtain an extinction of order, or a behaviorist the unwanted behavior. The domain of must be brought into existence. In both human affairs which has been tradition- cases there is the assumption that the ally considered ethical is thus trans- quality of human social experience will formed into a strict scientific one and be significantly improved because social thus man, in effect, delivers himself institutions will be based on the recog- without obstacle to his own scrutiny, nition and satisfaction of genuine hu- which is capable of identifying and man needs and these institutions will eliminating his own imperfections. be more knowledgeably and efficiently administered. For Marx, the new so- Skinner's proposed transformation of ciety eliminates the institution of pri- morality into technology is very much vate , an institution he believes analogous to Marx's vision of the with- is responsible for creating dehumanized ering away of the state once the pro- social relations. Its existence requires ductive capacities of society have been that persons treat each other as objects, transformed. Implicit in both views is as commodities to be used and pos- the idea that the greatest human goods sessed: 5 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978

Private property has made us so stupid our institutions are at best meager, and one sided that an object is only ours provisional successes, and at worst dis- when we have it, when it exists for us as mal unmitigated failures. or when we directly possess, eat, drink, wear, inhabit it, etc., in short when The widespread utilization of a sci- we use it.17 ence of human behavior by a society, claims Skinner, greatly increases the extends the concept likelihood that its various social en- and practice of "using" to the ultimate deavors will be much more successful. sphere of human relations so that men What exactly is his measure of suc- cease to exist as creatures with any gen- cess? The successful realization of in- uine content or value in themselves. stitutional goals. But what about more Marx believes that if a society can be general, intangible goals? Skinner's created in which the goal of "possessing general standard of success is survival. things" can be eliminated then people He draws a cultural analogy to physical will treat each other in an intelligent, evolution. Social practices which sur- compassionate, and humane way in- vive are evidence of success. "A scien- stead of exploiting and degrading one tific analysis may lead us to resist the another. more immediate blandishments of free- dom, , knowledge or happiness in considering the long run conse- Skinner's program for improving the quences of survival."20 One can't help quality of social experience involves the but wonder what interest a society design of a science of human behavior. would have in surviving without these Advances in this science mean that so- "blandishments." cial affairs can be subject to a much greater degree of rational management The aim of both Skinner and Marx and control. When the power to pre- is the institution of a society relatively dict and control is substantial and well free of exploitation and destructiveness, organized then undesirable and destruc- and absolutely committed to creative tive elements can be eliminated. In his and endeavors. Both, how- book Science and Human Behavior ever, share what I believe is a con- Skinner proposes that the experimental ceptual flaw which permits their genu- method of the physical sciences be ex- inely useful insights to be contaminated tended to the domain of human soci- by substantial dogmatism. The flaw, I ety. In fact he sees society itself as a think, lies in their mutual disparage- type of experiment. "A given ment of the theoretical dimension of is, in short, an experiment in be- 18 intellectual activity. With Marx this havior." Society is analogously, a lab- disparagement manifests itself in a re- oratory in which the institutions are pudiation of philosophy itself. His re- designed to elicit the kind of social jection of philosophy, particularly Ger- behavior that advances the standing of man philosophy, arose from his convic- the institution. Skinner defines govern- tion that its preoccupation with ideas ment as, "the power to punish" and betrayed commitment to the problems law as, "statement of contingency rein- of the material world. forcement."19 and its con- stituent agencies thus secure compli- Since the Young Hegelians consider con- ance to their rules by administering a ceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the very complex system of punishments products of consciousness, to which they and rewards. Thus the situation be- attribute an independent existence, as the comes one in which institutions are real chains of men (just as the Old Hege- highly successful in realizing their ends, lians declare them the true bonds of hu- unlike our present situation, in which man society), it is evident that the Young 6 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978

Hegelians have to fight only against these the major problem is to break it into illusions of consciousness . . . they forget, simple, manageable, and measurable however, that they themselves are opposing analytic units. These analytic units be- nothing but phrases to these phrases, and come the clear unquestionable build- that they are in no way combating the real ing blocks of scientific explanation. existing world when they are combating Theory then is superfluous and adds solely the phrases of this world.21 only what must ultimately be discarded.

Skinner's opposition to theory takes This is the point where Skinner's form in his delineation of the pro- work is most vulnerable to ideological cedure of scientific explanation. His degeneration. The reaction against the- aim is to formulate scientific explana- ory and against speculation and imag- tion so that it is free from terms which ination and the exaltation of practice cannot be operationally defined. The- over theory, grossly inhibits the influx ory, for Skinner, means a set of law- of new ideas. That raw sense data sup- fully connected statements and not an plies certainty is a philosophical asser- abstracted conceptual construction. "He tion that involves a number of difficult (Skinner) criticizes the construction, in and complex epistemological and meta- psychological theories, of causal chains psychological problems such as the on- in which a first link consisting of an ob- tological status of perceptions and their servable and controllable event is con- determination in time and space. To nected with a final ('third') one of the downgrade the role of theory in scien- same kind by an intermediate link which tific explanations is to deprive the enter- usually is not open to observation and prise of opportunities for growth and control."22 A scientifically constructed development. Theory is needed for new explanation of a given phenomena thus and imaginative systematization of data, ought to utilize terms which can be and the offering of fertile hypothesis translated into direct observational data. which suggest new interpretations. "A reflex is not, of course, a theory. "Theoretical terms cannot be replaced It is a fact. It is an analytical unit without serious loss by formulations in which makes an investigation of be- terms of observables only."24 havior possible."23 The methodological goal is reduction. The further an ex- The parallel between Marx's dispar- planation is from expression in sensory agement of philosophy and Skinner's units the more likely it is to be laden rejection of theoretical constructs points with terms representing entities, quali- to a similar ontological view that re- ties or relations which can neither be ality is ultimately material, and that measured nor confirmed and thus the thought itself is a material activity. explanation becomes an abstraction Thus it is matter and not ideas which from real analyzable quantities into less determines the content and direction real unanalyzable qualities. of human endeavor. Since it is matter which determines ideas and not the One of the weaknesses of this view reverse, the political implication is that is the fact that it easily degenerates society should structure its institutions into an overly mechanistic construc- so that are related to the tion which fails to account for the crea- material world in a way which satisfies tive and innovative aspects of human basic needs and impulses. And since experience. Theoretical constructions ideas are the outcome of this system, serve as tools, as instruments to gener- there is a tendency to measure them ate new interpretations of factual data. as consistent or inconsistent with the For Skinner it is as though raw sense social design. Those ideas which con- data is simply there for the asking and tradict the ends of the system are con- 7 DIALOGUE OCTOBER, 1978

sidered to be not only false, but per- spective conceptions of the relation of nicious and destructive. Truth then, the mind and thought to the other becomes a standard of ideological pu- aspects of human experience, a moral- rity and the intellectual virtues of hon- ism which takes it justification by the esty, clarity and creativity are over- contention that human society is per- riden by the social requirements of loy- fectible and that the readjustment of alty and conformity. Thus, as I stated social institutions will bring about this at the beginning of this paper, Marx- perfection by eliminating destructive- ism and behaviorism are dominated by ness and exploitation, a moralism that arises out of their re-

FOOTNOTES 1. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, translated from the German by J. B. Baillie (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), pp. 373-412. 2. Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State," in Early Writings, introduced by Lucio Collette and translated by Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 58-74. 3. Frederick Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," in Karl Marx and Frederick Engets: Selected Works, prepared by the Institute of Marxism- under the of the of the (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), Vol. 3, p. 132. 4. Ibid., p. 129. 5. Ibid., p. 133. 6. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels "," in Karl Marx, Frederick Engets: Collected Works, translated by W. Lough (New York: , 1976), Vol. 5, p. 31. 7. B. F. Skinner, Behavior of Organisms (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1938), p. 5. 8. Ibid., p. 7. 9. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 14. 10. Marx, "The German Ideology," p. 31. 11. Skinner, Beyond Freedom, p. 11. 12. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, , translated by Samuel Moore (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1964), p. 57-80. 13. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," p. 149. 14. Antoine-Nicolas De Condorcet, The Progress of The Human Mind, translated by June Barraclough (New York: Noonday Press, 1955), p. 173. 15. , Karl Marx: His Life and Environment (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 14-15, 85-89. 16. Skinner, Beyond Freedom, p. 205. 17. Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts," p. 35. 18. B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1953), p. 430. 19. Ibid., p. 335, 339. 20. Ibid., p. 436. 21. Marx, "German Ideology," p. 30. 22. Carl G. Hempel, "The 's Dilemma," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven and Grover Maxwell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), Vol. 2, p. 49. 23. Skinner, Behavior of Organisms, p. 9. 24. Hempel, "Theoreticians," p. 87. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Callahan, Daniel, Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972. Flood, Dom Peter, ed. New Problems In Medical . 3rd ed. Maryland: The Newman Press, 1965. Healy, Edwin F., Medical Ethics. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956. Ramsey, Paul, On Updating Procedures For Stating That A Man Has Died. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970 Articles High, Dallas M., "Death, Its Conceptual Elusiveness." Soundings 55 (1972): 438-58. Hursh, Harold L. "Death: A Medical Status or Legal Definition." Case & Comment 79 (1974): 27-30. Louisell, David, "Euthanasia and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing." Linacre Quarterly 40 (1973): 234-258. May, William E., "Euthanasia, Benemortasia and the Dying." Linacre Quarterly 41 (1974): 114-124. McCormick, Richard E., "To Save or Let Die." America (1974): 6-10. Riga, Peter, "Euthanasia." Linacre Quarterly 41 (1974): 55-65. Rizzo, Robert F., and Yonder, Joseph M. "Definition and Criteria of Clinical Death." Linacre Quarterly 40 (1973): 223-233. Veatch, Robert M., "Choosing Not To Prolong Dying." Medical Dimensions (1972): 8-10. Weber, Leonard J., "Human Death as Neocortical Death: The Ethical Context." Linacre Quarterly 41 (1974): 106-113. 8