Botswana at a Glance: 2001-02
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COUNTRY REPORT Botswana At a glance: 2001-02 OVERVIEW The domestic political scene will remain relatively stable. A change of leader in the Botswana National Front may help to reunify the leading opposition parties. Foreign policy will focus on improving the country’s image abroad in order to attract foreign investment and offset any consumer reaction to the “conflict diamonds” campaign. Increased spending on HIV/AIDS will prevent budget surpluses. Monetary policy will continue to closely shadow policy in South Africa, and the rand will retain the greatest weight in the basket against which the pula trades. Limited scope for higher diamond production will restrict real GDP growth to 4.8% in 2001/02 and 5% in 2002/03. Lower diamond exports will reduce the current-account surplus to US$218m (3.9% of GDP) in 2001 and US$322m (5.4% of GDP) in 2002. Key changes from last month Political outlook • Some leading members of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party will be challenged at the party congress in July. The congress may result in some factional realignment, but will have little implications for policy direction. Economic policy outlook • There will be no change in economic policy; it will be based on prudent policies aimed at attracting foreign investment to diversify the economy from its dependence on minerals. Economic forecast • Rents for state-owned housing are to increase by 15-25% in May and, although this will cause a spike in inflation, we are maintaining our forecast for annual average inflation in 2001 of 7.4%. May 2001 The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent St, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. 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ISSN 1356-4021 Symbols in tables “n/a” means not available; “–” means not applicable Printed and distributed by Redhouse Press Ltd, Unit 151, Dartford Trade Park, Dartford, Kent DA1 1QB, UK Botswana 1 Outlook for 2001-02 Political outlook Domestic politics Although the domestic political scene will be quiet, public dissatisfaction with the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) will be expressed through industrial action, resistance to actions such as the removal of established squatters, and hostility towards foreigners perceived to be taking jobs from locals. This will present the BDP with a dilemma: on one hand, the ruling party has built a reputation for sound economic policy and an open and facilitative attitude to foreign investment; on the other, it cannot ignore the calls for more intervention to create employment for locals. Trying to balance popular demands with an investment-friendly economic environment may well be the BDP’s greatest challenge in the forecast period. The BDP will not be helped by its internal disunity. The president, Festus Mogae, who remains on course for another term in office, is still trying to establish full control of his party. He faces the difficulty of trying to please the BDP’s old guard—spearheaded by the former minister and party chairman, Pontashego Kedikilwe—as well as the young vice-president, Ian Khama. Mr Khama appears to be enjoying his role of cabinet enforcer, so the likelihood that he will leave politics has lessened. However, his campaign against the complacency and lethargy that characterise the civil service will continue to place him at odds with many in the cabinet. There is a possibility, albeit small, that one or more of the old guard may challenge Mr Khama for the vice- presidency at July’s party congress, but the EIU does not expect any challenge to be successful. Mr Mogae’s attempts to calm factional politics within his party may be working, and we do not foresee any significant split in the BDP during the forecast period. Attempts by the main opposition party, the Botswana National Front (BNF), to capitalise on the BDP’s weaknesses will be hampered by its own internal problems, leaving it with no clear agenda or platform from which to attack. The BNF’s leadership struggle will come to a head in mid-2001, when the party’s long-standing leader, Kenneth Koma, has declared that he will step down. The party congress in July will be important in determining whether the BNF will remain mired in factional infighting, or whether a new leader will emerge who can reunite the opposition and mount an effective challenge to the BDP. Much will depend on how much influence Mr Koma can exert on the party after he stands down. International relations Foreign policy will aim to raise the country’s international profile and to differentiate it from its neighbours. In particular, it will try to offset the effect of any campaign against conflict diamonds, by promoting the “diamonds for development” theme. This will probably succeed, unless there is a severe consumer boycott of diamonds, which we feel is unlikely. Greater international awareness of the country—complemented by the two credit ratings it was awarded in March—should help to increase investment flows, though not dramatically. © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2001 EIU Country Report May 2001 2 Botswana Botswana will also take a larger role in regional and international forums to work towards stability in the region and to enhance the country’s international image. Of particular concern will be the threat posed by the uncertain situation in Zimbabwe and by the possibility of destabilisation due to an influx of Namibian and Angolan refugees from Namibia’s Caprivi strip. A collapse in Zimbabwe would have negative implications for foreign investment and for the pula. Economic policy outlook Policy trends Prudent economic policy will characterise the forecast period, with the central aim of accelerating economic diversification. The privatisation programme will remain sluggish, but the government will continue to pursue broadly investor- friendly policies. Attempts to combat unemployment and the impact of HIV/AIDS will also be high on the policy agenda. Fiscal policy will continue to focus on improving expenditure control and increasing receipts, though it is likely to have only limited success. Monetary policy will remain tight in order to control inflation and the growth of private-sector credit. A resurgence in public disquiet over foreign investors, who are accused—in many cases correctly—of taking advantage of Botswana’s investment incentives, will have some impact on policy. Indeed, this pressure saw the government make some limited concessions to the citizen empowerment lobby in this year’s budget. However, we do not expect such concessions significantly to affect Botswana’s business-friendly operating environment during the forecast period; this issue will be played out mainly on the domestic stage. Nor do we expect concerns raised by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), about the government’s generous range of financial inducements to attract foreign investors, to reshape investment policy. Fiscal policy The budget for the 2000/01 fiscal year (April-March) yielded yet another surplus, as diamond earnings exceeded their target following strong sales in 2000. However, overspending on the Eighth National Development Plan is pushing up total spending, as is reconstruction work after the floods in early 2000. Reconstruction costs and extra HIV/AIDS-related spending are respon- sible for the deficit of P527m (US$95m) projected in the 2001/02 budget. Historically, forecast deficits have usually turned into surpluses, but this is unlikely in 2001/02. The budget statement is careful to warn that the expenditure projection is likely to be exceeded, because public-sector pay rises have yet to be agreed and supplementary HIV/AIDS-related expenditure is likely. However, it is probable that this will be offset, as we do not expect the government to achieve its target of increasing development spending by 37%. Currently it is not clear whether De Beers’ Diamond Trading Company (DTC) will try to control prices through stockpiling (see International assumptions); it is also unclear whether the DTC will purchase all the unsold diamonds (the tax on which brings in around 50% of government revenue), so the revenue target may be difficult to attain.