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Home , Golan, Hauran, Khirbet Ghazaleh, Southern Syria

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

The Last Bastion of the Syrian Revolt WP Southern Offers Non-military Venues to Strengthen the Moderates

Khaled Yacoub Oweis S

After almost four years of civil war, most of Syria since has been carved up between the regime, Kurdish militia and Jihadists, with the exception of the south, where civic organizations in areas outside regime control have room to operate and Western and Arab support has helped moderate rebels remain significant players. Yet, their position has become tenuous as the local al-Qaeda affiliate has taken the lead in fighting the Assad regime in the south and as the priority of the United States shifted to curbing hardline Jihadists through airstrikes in Syria and Iraq. Saving the south as a model that could halt the disintegration of Syria would require a change in the ambivalent posi- tion of outside powers to help Western-backed rebels advance against the regime. Ger- many and other European countries doubtful of a military approach can still help open the to more streamlined civilian support and shape a stalled UN ceasefire initia- tive focused on to be tried in the south, where the military balance is less tilted toward Assad and the stakes are higher if breaches occur.

Street demonstrations against President Composition of Syria’s South Bashar al-Assad’s rule first erupted in The south is comprised of the three prov- March 2011 in the city of Deraa, weeks after inces of Deraa, Qunaitira, and Suwaida, the arrest of 15 children who scribbled which contains the wheat-producing graffiti inspired by pro-democracy slogans plain and borders . Deraa, in Tunisia and Egypt. The seizure and tor- the largest governorate, is marked by the ture of the children might have become a influence of large families (ashaer), its social footnote in the Assad regime’s history of mobilization in times of need (faza’a), as violence had it not been for the close-knit well as high levels of schooling, as com- society in the Deraa governorate and dis- pared to the rest of Syria. content at the time over abuses by the Decades of divide-and-rule tactics by the region’s security chief, who was a relative Assad regime altered Syrian society, and of Assad. Indeed, the south’s sense of iden- a new avenue for upward mobility became tity was awakened by the dismissive reac- holding membership in the ruling Baath tion of the ruling Alawite elite to the popu- Party. Its brand of national socialist dogma lar outrage over the children’s arrest. and support for peasants found some appeal

Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “The fragmentation of Syria. Halting the slide towards a failed state” SWP Comments 5 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) and funded by the German Foreign Office. February 2015

1 in the south, and party membership was was defense minister at the time, for losing more widespread in Deraa compared to their land. When the revolt broke out in other parts of Syria. At the same time, def- 2011, one of the first street slogans in Deraa erence continued to be paid to established mocked Bashar’s brother Maher, who heads clans. The society is deeply conservative, the elite Fourth Armored Division, daring but religion has been imbued with a local him to send his troops to liberate the . tradition of moderation dating back to al- Indeed, the division’s forerunner, the so- Nawawi – a 13th century religious scholar – called Defense Brigades, had overrun the and other Islamic jurists from Deraa. city of in 1982. The division has re- Geographically, the - mained geared toward internal repression, highway cordons off the province into a although it is the army’s best-equipped and flat western sector that includes the city of -trained unit. Deraa, where the Aba Zeed, al-Mahameed, and al-Masalmeh clans are prominent. Other large Deraa families, such as Zu’bi Pressure Boils Over and al-Rusheidat, are split up between Confident in the security apparatus, Deraa and Jordan. East of the highway lie Bashar al-Assad publicly belittled any need the ancient town of Busra al-Sham, which for democratic reforms and showed little has a Shiite minority, and Busra al-Harir, interest in defusing brewing unrest in home to the Hariri family, Hauran’s biggest Deraa. His cousin Atef Najib, head of Mili- clan. from the Shummar tribe, tary Intelligence in Deraa and de facto which has a large presence in Syria, Iraq, viceroy of the city, refused to release the 15 and Saudi Arabia, inhabit a rough rocky arrested children at a meeting with Deraa terrain known as al-Lajah. notables in March 2011. In the following The region extends to the outskirts of weeks and months, hundreds of demon- Damascus and it has served traditionally as strators were killed in the south before the a haven for smugglers and illicit activities. revolt began militarizing in the second half Ties between the south and the Arab Gulf of 2011. By 2013, the rise of jihadist brigades states have been enhanced by thousands would undermine the Free of engineers, teachers, doctors, and other (FSA), the nucleus of the armed effort professionals from Deraa who fled to Saudi against the Assad regime. Arabia during the rule of Assad’s father, the Mass discontent had been gathering late Hafez al-Assad, in the 1980s to escape a momentum for years against Najib, whose bloody persecution of the Muslim Brother- grip on Deraa was marked by extortion hood. In addition, poor neighborhoods that that reached into people’s daily lives and ring Damascus from the south, such as Hajar restrained a new class of Sunni entrepre- al-Aswad and Qadam, are largely inhabited neurs that had emerged as a consequence by people from Deraa and its of economic liberalization but hit a wall hinterland. Administratively, the Israeli- of bureaucracy and corruption. In the agri- occupied Golan Heights are part of the gov- culture sector, security bans on the sale of ernorate of Qunaitira, west of Deraa. The fertilizers became lucrative business for two provinces are linked economically, mostly Alawite intelligence operatives, who with Qunaitira, which is mainly pasture- allowed farmers to buy fertilizers in return land, providing cattle and dairy products for bribes. Restrictions were also placed on for Deraa and the rest of Hauran. property transactions in the south under After the Israeli occupation of the Golan the pretext of it being a border region. The Heights in the 1967 war, Golan Heights regulations translated into income for refugees and their descendants poured into Najib and his cohorts. Damascus and sank into poverty and desti- Regionally, the Assad regime had be- tution. Many blamed Hafez al-Assad, who come more closely associated with Shiite

SWP Comments 5 February 2015

2 Iran and encouraged proselytization drives Map: financed by Iran to convert rural Sunni Southern Syria to Shiism. Several Shiite places of worship, known as hussainiyat, were built in the south. In contrast to poorer eastern of Syria near Iraq, the campaign did not gain traction, but “Shiitization” contributed to rising resentment against Assad and the secret police in Deraa.

Military Balance Before the uprising, up to one-third of the Syrian army, around 90,000 troops, was deployed in Hauran, which was regarded as the primary defensive line against . After the revolt militarized, dozens of bases belonging to Assad’s army and intelligence dotting the hills of Qunaitira and Deraa slowly but steadily fell in attacks, mostly spearheaded by the al-Nusra Front – the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria – with the partici- pation of FSA brigades grouped under the Deraa Military Council umbrella and backed and Deraa provinces, boosted by guerrillas by a US-led Military Operations Center from the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, (MOC) in Jordan. who deployed in areas facing Israeli troops The presence of the Nusra Front in on the Golan and in Busra al-Harir. Several Qunaitira was strengthened by several armored divisions and regime intelligence hundred fighters who fled to the area after units are headquartered in the towns of ’ they were routed from the eastern province and Sanamayn on the Damascus–Amman of Deir al-Zor in June 2014 by the so-called highway and in the province of Suwaida, Islamic State – the other al-Qaeda offshoot whose population has remained that had declared a . The Nusra largely on the sidelines of the current con- Front has intensified its attacks in Qunai- flict. The regime also holds the Nassib border tira since then, capturing several positions crossing east of Deraa, and container trucks facing Israeli troops in the Golan across a – mainly carrying produce from UN-patrolled armistice line, including old and Syria to Jordan and the Gulf – still pass Qunaitira – which had been almost com- Nassib via a Suwaida detour. In the city of pletely flattened by Israeli troops before Deraa, the FSA and jihadist brigades hold they withdrew from what then became the most of the old city as well as a secondary buffer zone in 1974 – and a nearby crossing border crossing with Jordan that has been on the armistice line. Al-Harra, one of the closed. The regime is concentrated in the positions that fell, apparently served as an eastern sector of Deraa, from where Assad’s eavesdropping base under Russian com- forces fire artillery across the city and on mand. The presence of UN peacekeepers in nearby rebel and towns. the buffer zone eventually became unten- A 2012 regime campaign of aerial and able. Most of the mission was forced to with- artillery bombardment against residential draw to Israeli-controlled territory in 2014. neighborhoods across the Hauran drove But the Assad regime still maintains large tens of thousands of families to Jordan at military and security bases in the Qunaitira the same time as a refugee influx from

SWP Comments 5 February 2015

3 in central Syria was underway. Complain- themselves beyond making verbal calls for ing of the costs of hosting the incomers Assad to leave power. Countering indis- and citing security risks, Jordan had quietly criminate killings of civilians became sec- closed its borders in front of the refugees ondary to the risk of jihadists replacing the by October 2014 after having received at regime if Assad fell. In a twisted logic, most least 620,000 people, many of whom have key members of the MOC – the United States, relatives among northern Jordanian fami- Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab - lies. A snowstorm in early 2015 resulted in ates, France, and Britain – began seeing a respite from regime barrel-bombings in their priority as containing the jihadists the Hauran, but by mid-January the bom- rather than supporting military action that bardment had resumed. could undermine Assad, despite blaming The rebels in Deraa and the rest of south- the Assad regime’s mass killing of civilians ern Syria continue to project a sense of for stoking jihadism in the country. moderation and a consensual streak. Major In the south, the Nusra Front was weak confrontations within the armed opposi- until the Deraa Military Council started to tion and splits into alternative administra- stutter. Support from the MOC became ad tive structures in rebel areas that have hoc, to the point that rebels would receive damaged the opposition elsewhere have just enough weapons to hit minor regime been avoided. An opposition Deraa Provin- targets but not enough to mount large-scale cial Council, composed entirely of cadres attacks. For example, this forced Ahmad still living in Hauran, was elected at the end Fahd Ni’mah, head of the Deraa Military of 2014. Among local civic organizations, Council, to order rebel withdrawal from the the Civic Defense Council has managed to contested town of in May plug a gap in municipal services. The group, 2013. The town lies at a strategic road junc- which is run by two doctors, is close to the ture and Jordan did not want a rebel take- National Co-ordination Body for Democrat- over to disrupt cross-border container-truck ic Change, one of the last opposition groups movement. As a pragmatic ex-Syrian Air with members present in the country. The Force colonel, Ni’mah realized that the Supervision and Follow-up Council, which opposition could not afford to antagonize is financed by Abdelbasset Abdelsamad, a Jordan. But the withdrawal from Khirbet Syrian expatriate in Kuwait from the south- Ghazaleh ended up dealing a blow to the ern town of al-Geza, has also been effective. morale and reputation of the FSA in the It has engaged in activities such as building south. A year later, the Nusra Front ab- a hospital and organizing school exams by ducted Ni’mah, and he has not been heard taking a neutral position toward the differ- from since. His disappearance – and likely ent armed brigades. But dithering by the death – ushered in the demise of the Deraa outside backers of the opposition – with Military Council and left FSA brigades little regard to how far to push militarily from choice but to cooperate with the Nusra the Hauran against Assad’s seat of power in Front in attacking a series of regime fortifi- Damascus for fear of a jihadist takeover – cations to preserve their credibility. has actually helped strengthen the Nusra In September 2013, the hardline jihadists Front in southern Syria. received a boost to their efforts to demon- strate what they regard to be the futility of the FSA and cooperation with the West. Nusra’s Restraint This boost came when the United States The emergence of the Nusra Front and the called off airstrikes against Assad’s forces, Islamic State in 2013 as the most formi- which were planned in response to a chemi- dable groups among the plethora of anti- cal weapons attack on rebel positions in Assad forces across Syria provided outside the suburbs of Damascus, in return for a powers justification for hardly extending Russian-brokered deal for Assad to turn in

SWP Comments 5 February 2015

4 his chemical weapons and join the Chemi- appear to have managed to establish a cal Weapons Convention. popular base, such as in central and north- Yet, this did not make other Islamist ern Syria. A complete jihadist takeover of brigades more palatable to the Nusra Front. the south therefore appears unlikely. In November 2014, the group assassinated a But on the battlefield against the regime, commander of another Islamist rebel group the Nusra Front reigns supreme, due to its in Qunaitira on suspicion of belonging to willingness to employ suicide bombers and the Islamic State. Kassab Masalmeh was the the expertise of its fighters. Also, an appar- spiritual leader of the Free Yarmouk Mar- ent understanding among the Nusra Front’s tyrs Brigades, named after the mostly Jordanian leadership in the south – tributary that separates Syria from Jordan. namely that it would gain little from hit- Between March and May 2013, the Yarmouk ting Israel or Jordan – has helped shield it Martyrs had briefly abducted 25 UN peace- from US airstrikes that have been targeting keepers from the Syrian side of the Golan the group, as well as the Islamic State, in the frontier before releasing them in a move north and east of the country. that gained them publicity – this was more than a year before the Nusra Front engaged in a similar abduction. The killing of Masal- Israel Loses Golan Stability meh weakened the Yarmouk Martyrs, and Assad’s forces east of the buffer zone had there was a threat that the group would kept the frontier quiet since 1974. This has become another casualty of the rise of the changed since the start of armed confronta- Nusra Front and share a fate similar to that tions in Syria. In June 2011, a pro-Assad of the Syria Revolutionaries Front, a Saudi- Palestinian faction, the Popular Front for backed FSA brigade that collapsed during the Liberation of General Com- a lightning offensive by the Nusra Front in mand (PFLP-GC), sent hundreds of Palestini- the northern province of in 2014. ans in Syria to demonstrate at the Golan Signaling different dynamics in the border, where several were killed by Israeli south, FSA units mobilized to rescue the forces. The mobilization was a message Yarmouk Martyrs and deployed in their to Israel that Assad could destabilize the stronghold of Sahm al-Golan, 10 kilometers region, but it backfired and helped turn north of the . The Nusra Palestinian refugees in Syrian camps against Front backed off, but the killing of Masal- the regime and its Palestinian proxies. meh could make it easier for the Yarmouk The situation has escalated since Hezbol- Martyrs to smooth their relationship with lah deployed with Iranian support on the Jordan, a relationship that had soured over Syrian side of the Golan frontier. Strikes by its refusal to meet Jordanian requests to Israel on Hezbollah targets and retaliation abandon Masalmeh. Indeed, the group by Hezbollah threatened open warfare appears to have received some funding and between the two sides by January 2015. Hez- logistical support from the MOC prior to bollah has claimed that its presence on the the dispute over Masalmeh. Syrian side of the Golan is needed to pre- The survival of the Yarmouk Martyrs vent the Nusra Front from penetrating group illustrates the limits to Nusra Front’s nearby Hezbollah strongholds in south reach as well as the relative capability of Lebanon and has accused Israel of backing FSA units to regroup after the demise of the the jihadist group. Although Israel might Deraa Military Council. Unlike in the north, have lines of communication with jihadists the Nusra Front lacks superiority in numbers in southern Syria, outright support for the against other rebels. Moreover, although it Nusra Front is unlikely. Still, the presence occasionally sends shots across the bow of of the Nusra Front in Qunaitira appears moderate rebels, in the form of assassina- more preferable to Israel than the possibil- tions and kidnappings, the group does not ity of seeing the Islamic State, which has

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5 established a foothold in southern Damas- northern Syria by the Nusra Front. When cus and in Lajah in eastern Deraa, on its brigades were formed to protect their home- borders. The mid-2014 ouster of Nusra Front towns during the early days of the uprising, fighters from Deir al-Zor and their redeploy- southern FSA units were mostly formed ment in Qunaitira have resulted in the according to local roots rather than reli- Nusra Front becoming a bulwark of sorts gious ideology. against the Islamic State in southern Syria. In Kanaker, 30 kilometers southwest of Amid the chaos, Israel also prefers that Damascus, the local FSA brigade struck a Assad not fall and that Syrian regime troops deal with regime forces surrounding the remain on the opposite side of the Golan town, which resulted in a tacit ceasefire front, instead of having to face Hezbollah in 2014. Under the deal, the regime has there. In September 2014, Syrian dissident refrained from shelling the town while the Kamal al-Labwani, a former political pris- rebels do not target the garrison next to oner who was at the forefront of the opposi- it. In Deraa also, both sides have largely tion to Assad before the revolt, visited Israel. refrained from targeting the infrastructure, His visit might encourage others in the op- as Deraa provides water for areas under position to follow, but Israel was uncom- the control of the regime in Suwaida, and fortable with Labwani’s remarks that the Suwaida sends electricity to Deraa. should make peace with Mergers between different FSA-allied Israel in return for Israeli help in over- groups could lead to a more effective com- throwing Assad. Israel’s experience in Leba- mand-and-control structure, helping to ease non has made Israeli policy-makers wary of US concerns about sophisticated weapons unreliable proxies. Therefore, the extent of going to extremists. But the Western-backed Israeli involvement in the conflict has brigades will continue to play catch-up remained limited to occasional air strikes, to jihadists unless they can show that they reconnaissance, and helping wounded have regained the initiative militarily Syrian fighters and civilians. against the regime. In this, the Nusra Front is not their only hardline rival. In 2013, the Muthanna Battalion, a small Salafist move- Moderates Regroup ment, emerged as a strong player in the Since the Nusra Front abducted Ni’mah, city of Deraa. The group attracted members two moderate southern commanders have away from the FSA largely due to its repu- emerged, each regrouping FSA brigades tation for discipline and paying salaries on in largely separate operating theaters and time. It has coordinated with the al-Mu’ta- under the MOC umbrella. In December sim Billah Brigade, an FSA unit set up by a 2014 Bashar al-Zu’bi, a commander who cleric from the al-Masri clan. comes from a civilian background, formed the Southern Hawks Alliance, comprised mainly of his own Yarmouk Army, itself Outside Backers Overreach an amalgamation of Liwa al-Bara and Liwa The success of the Nusra Front in spear- Aisha. Weeks after, Colonel Saber Safar be- heading attacks on regime forces in the came head of what is called the First Army, south and the ease with which Ni’mah was a merger mainly between his al-Hamza Bri- captured cast doubt on the effectiveness of gade in northwest Deraa and the al-Omari the support for southern rebels. Indeed, the battalion of Lajah Bedouins to the east. The support appears to have dried up in 2014 Omari battalion fought several battles at against the backdrop of the change in US the end of 2014 with Islamic State fighters priorities described above. Nonetheless, a who had penetrated Lajah. Previously, the major regime base in the town of Shaykh battalion was a division of the Syria Revo- Maskeen, north of Deraa, fell in January lutionaries Front, which was chased out of 2015 to an offensive by jihadist units, in-

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6 cluding the Nusra Front, and the FSA. The ruary 2015, has enforced official views that town had served as the headquarters of the Assad is not the most immediate threat. 82nd Air Defense Battalion. But the rebel Thus, the authorities have refrained from advance appears not to have been the result public criticism of Assad, like that expressed, of a strategic plan but rather a reaction to a for example, by Saudi Arabia, which has regime attack on opposition positions sur- been Jordan’s main financial backer in times rounding Shaykh Maskeen. of need. The kingdom has also opposed the In general, the treatment of southern Qatari and Turkish approaches to Syria, rebels by their backers as mere proxies with seeing them as encouraging jihadism, and disregard for their cause has created frus- has prevented southern opposition figures tration. In 2014, the MOC asked Ibrahim – perceived as being linked with Qatar – Habbous, a southern commander with a from operating through Jordan. reputation for competence, to attack Islamic Jordanian recruits, who swelled Nusra State fighters who fled to Hajar al-Aswad Front ranks, and a lack of US appetite for after being expelled from the eastern military action to oust Assad, alarmed the Damascus suburbs of al- by Salafist kingdom further. The country’s intelligence fighters loyal to Zahran Alloush, the Sala- branch, the mukhabarat, became heavily fist head of the Saudi-backed Army of Islam. involved in the Syria file. Dozens of Syrian Habbous did not consider turning his guns activists and their families, almost all from against the Islamic State to be a priority Deraa, were expelled to Syria in the last few and declined the MOC request. Had he weeks of 2014 after having communicated agreed, he would have found it difficult to with their home regions or having trans- convince his own men to forego fighting ferred money back there. the regime. Consequently, Arab and West- ern support was cut off from Habbous, and his Tahrir al-Sham brigade was diminished. Conclusions and Recommendations Still a respected figure among moderate Jordanian officials largely see the conflict in rebels, Habbous maintains lines of com- Syria as becoming a choice between al-Qaeda munication with Jordan. and the Assad regime, in which they prefer the latter. The resilience of the moderate rebels and civic organizations in the south Jordan’s Priorities contradicts this view, which has neverthe- Under pressure from its allies, Jordan, less been gaining traction internationally. along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, has Meanwhile, the UN Special Envoy has pur- hosted US training for several thousand sued a “local ceasefires” or “local freezes” fighters since 2012. The kingdom has also plan that the Syrian opposition fears will taken part in the US-led bombing campaign result in surrendering contested cities and against jihadist targets in Syria and Iraq. towns to the regime and burying the 2012 Yet, Jordanian interests in the Syrian con- Geneva plan for a political transition. flict have been focused – almost from the Build up an international aid mechanism: beginning of the revolt – on maintaining In the absence of agreement to impose internal security and commercial transport much-talked-about no-fly zones to protect links with Syria. Jordan has not been keen civilians, Germany should help build an on democratic transformation to its north, international aid mechanism to develop nor would it have liked to see Islamists the civilian institutions operating in the empowered in Syria, thereby emboldening south. These administrative bodies have the kingdom’s own Muslim Brotherhood. been undermined by the lack of a unified Video footage showing the burning of a structure within the Syrian opposition and Jordanian pilot by the Islamic State, which among the international community to was broadcast by the group in early Feb- channel aid. A non-lethal equivalent of the

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7 MOC would help prevent duplication and often bomb targets right at the Syria-Jordan facilitate access by local organizations to border, also raising the need for contingen- outside support. cy plans to react to possible Syrian regime Facilitate the Syrian interim govern- retaliation against Jordan if rebels down ment’s work in the south diplomatically: jets in the border zone. Curbing Assad’s air On the opposition side, Germany and other force would boost the popularity of the FSA European countries have pledged to work and help lessen the indiscriminate killing with the Istanbul-based National Coalition of civilians, and thus work against the radi- of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces calization of the local population. and its provisional government. But links of Address the long-term challenge of refugee- the latter with the south are weak, partly hood in Jordan: Steps also have to be taken due to Jordan’s caution about dealing with to improve the lot of Syrian refugees in opposition figures it regards as being sup- Jordan, where cuts in UN food aid in 2014 ported by Qatar and Turkey, especially the have driven back many refugees into gloomy

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Muslim Brotherhood. Germany has been refugee camps in the desert and raised ten- Politik, 2015 lending technical assistance to the provi- sions between the refugees and the indig- All rights reserved sional government to accelerate the award- enous population. The kingdom has com- These Comments reflect ing of projects and monitoring and evalu- plained that it is not being compensated for solely the author’s views. ation mechanisms. Helping extend the the strain on its schools and infrastructure. SWP reach of opposition technical cadres in exile But with doubts over whether the kingdom Stiftung Wissenschaft und to the south would require diplomatic is committed to using aid money specifical- Politik German Institute for work in order to heal rifts between Jordan, ly to help deal with the refugees, reaching International and Qatar, and Turkey over Syria and to lift an agreement with Western governments Security Affairs Jordan’s objections about certain opposi- on how to assist the kingdom has been dif- Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 tion figures. ficult. Germany, which has a large water- 10719 Berlin Implement lessons learned with regard assistance program in Jordan and regular Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 to local ceasefires: Germany has been highly access to Jordanian officials, could help in www.swp-berlin.org supportive of the UN initiative focused this regard. At the same time, it should [email protected] on trying to reach local ceasefires. But the help the kingdom to develop a strategy that ISSN 1861-1761 south, as the Kanaker experience shows, conforms with international human rights might be better grounds to pursue a deal norms to address what will likely be a long- than Aleppo, where efforts are currently term refugee presence. So far, Jordan has centered. Local ceasefires were struck in not taken steps that would encourage the 2013–2014 in besieged neighborhoods on refugees to stay in the country, such as op- the outskirts of Damascus, where the rebels portunities for legal access to the labor mar- were militarily weak, leaving the regime ket – a step Turkey took at the end of 2014. with little incentive to honor terms of the deals, such as allowing the delivery of regu- lar food supplies. Ceasefires can work when there is a balance of power, and interests. With its relative stability and a more lim- ited reach of al-Qaeda, the south could become a model in providing an alternative administration to the regime and a testing ground for functional ceasefires. Curb the reach of the regime’s air force: Eventually, however, Western and Arab gov- ernments comprising the MOC will need to equip southern rebels with weapons to curb the reach of Assad’s air force. Syrian planes

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