PEARS' TWO DOGMAS OF RUSSELI.:S LOGICAL ATOMISM
KONRAD TALMONT-KAMINSKI PhilosophyI Monash University Clayton 3168, Australia [email protected]
INTRODUCTION 1
n the first seven pages of his Introduction to the 1985 Open Court edition of Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism! David Pears I expounds what he takes to be Russell's "two main lines of thought, which must be kept in mind by anyone trying to understand Russell's logical atomism" (p. 7). He charges that any Russellian logical atomist would have to espouse one or the other to support what Pears chinks are two premisses of logical atomism. However, as we will see, Pears' argu ment to this effect fails because it is based upon false premisses. In dealing with Pears' argument, I will show that a Pragmatic option, which Pears explicitly rejects in his argument, turns oue to be far more condign than either of the two options Pears settles for. Leaving aside,. for the moment, consideration of the Pragmatic Approach, the two lines of thought Pears sees in Russell's work Pears dubs the Empirical and the Rationalist Approaches:
The difference between them is not a difference ofopinion about the nature of things, but only about the way to establish what their nature is.... A philos opher who uses the Rationalist Approach will claim that this conclusion is self evidently true, or, at least, that it can be established from apriori reasoning. The
I William Demopoulos and Tim Kenyon,both at the UniversityofWestern Ontario, wereinvaluablein pushing my thinking on the issuesdiscussedin this paper. 1 The edition also includes "LogicalAtomism" (1924).
russell: tho )ournzl of the Ikrtrmd Russell Archive, n.S. 18 (winter 1998-99): 117-15 McMaster University Press ISSN 0036-016)[ lI8 KONRAD TALMONT-KAMINSKI Pears' Two Dogmas ofRussell'sLogicalAtomism 119
Empiricist Approach, on the other hand, leads to the claim that it is established atomism. Surprisingly, though, Pears does not mention the difficulty, by actual logical analysis. (P 6) offers only a brief and unsatisfYing argument and supports it wirh but a single footnote. One may ask how Pears justifies the claim that these "Approaches" Pears' strategy is to quote Russell's descriprion of logical atoms as are part and parcel of Russell's logical atomism. He does it by arguing particulars, qualiries and relations, and to conclude that: from what he considers to be two basic "premisses" of Russell's logical atomism; correspondence realism and che existence of simples. He ... he is evidently relying on the fact that, when we look at reality from a makes these premisses explicit in writing that, "there must be a general logical point of view, it seems to reduce to panicular things possessing certain qualities and standing in cenain relations to aile another. (Pp. 1-2) correspondence between the ways in which we divide up reality in thoughc and speech and the ways in which it divides up in fact" and, In an important sense what Pears concludes here is ambiguous; the "the twO ... processes of analysis do not continue indefinitely" (p. 2). ambiguity being what is meant by "reality". The two relevant meanings Having stated the putative premisses of logical atomism, Pears derives are the "reality" of sensa and the "reality" of physical objects. In claiming the two approaches (Empirical and Rationalist) by claiming that if we that Russell is a correspondence realist Pears seems to be settling for the "start from the assumption that there isa general correspondence second meaning. This is made evident when he makes claims such as between language and reality", then, to show "that reality is composed of that, "che divisions traceable in logic correspond to real divisions in the logical atoms which are not further analyzable" we must use either the nature of things" (p. 2). Rationalist or the Empiricist Approach (p. 4)· The two approaches, Perhaps Pears has in mind Russell's opening truism of the Lectures therefore, are alternative ways of showing the existence of simples, given the world contains facts (p. 40; Papers 8: (63). If so, however, Pears (the assumption of) correspondence realism. seems to have overlooked a central point of Russell's philosophy, for Rather than examine Pears' argument in detail, let us investigate the when Russell comes to discuss this "world" that facts are in, his concep truth of che propositions upon which Pears bases his argument viz., thac tion of it turns out to be strikingly minimalist: logical atomists have to be correspondence realists, and chac they require 3 the existence of simples. The simplest imaginable facts are those which consist in the possession of a quality by some particular thing. Such facts, say, as "This is white". They have THE ONTOLOGICAL AGNOSTICISM OF LOGICAL ATOMISM to be taken .in a very sophisticated sense. I do not want you to think about the piece of chalk I am holding, but of what you see when you look at the In the opening paragraph of "Logical Atomism" Russell writes, regarding chalk. (P. 59; Papers8: 176) realism, "I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress" (p. 157; Papers So, when Russell talks about facts, he is talking about objects of sense 9: 162). In light of this comment one would expect Pears to provide and their arrangement (p. 62; Papers 8: 179) and not full-blown, out thorough support for his own claim that realism is a premiss of logical there objects. Clearly, one who is a realist about their sense-data is a realist of some stripe. However, Pears appears to be using the word in.a different 'and much stronger way when he sees the "realism" of a logical atomist as opposed to the stance of an idealist. After all, realism with 1 In showing both of Pears' premissesto be incompatible with Russell'sown writings respect to sensa is congenial even to solipsism. I limit myself to the contents of the Open Coun edition of The PhiLosophyofLogicaL Atomism (La Salle, IlL, (985) that Peats introduces. The Introduction replacesthat of the We can see, therefore, that the only "reality" to which a logical original edition. titled RlISseU.} LogicaLAtomism. ed. David Pears (London: Fontana! atomist is strictly committed is the reality of sense-data; a position which Collins. 19T~).Both editions, incidentally, have an index to other writings by Russellin does not entail correspondence realism. which key ropies in PLA are discussed.
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... I confess it seems obvious to me (as it did to Leibniz) that what is com The section near the close of Lecture II that Pears quotes is: plex must be composed ofsimples, though the number of constituents may be [T]har is, of course, a quesrion thar mighr be argued-wherher when a ching is infinice. (P. 173; Papers9: I73) complex ir is necessary that it should in analysis have constituents that are simple. I rhink it is perfectly possible to suppose that complex rhings are capable Again, Russell merely asserts here that he thinks there are such atoms. In ofanalysis ad infinitum, and that you never reach the simple. I do not think it is itself, however, this is no more imeresting to the investigation of logical true, but it is a thing that one might argue, certainly. (P. 64: Papers8: 180) atomiSm than the fact that Russell was a realist (at the time he wrote "Logical Atomism"). The proposition Pears seeks to prove is much Pears argues that, if there were no simples, the connection between stronger than that-that simples are essential to logical atomism. language and "reality" would be undermined, and this would add up to Pears may perhaps be able to argue against this distinction between a "negation of logical atomism". Pears claims this is the reason why what Russell believed and what he believed a logical atomist is forced to Russell thinks there are simples. Even what Pears does quote gives less believe. However, this is not the only problem he faces here. than unequivocal support to this claim. However, what he fails to quote Thus far I have assumed that what Russell means by "simples" is shows this is definitely not Russell's position. Continuing the quote with unambiguous. But, as Pears himself observes, "simple" can be under the very next question put to Russell: stood in at least two different ways: "There are things that are simple for us, and there are, or may be, things that are really simple" (p. 7)· Mr. Carr: You do not mean that in calling the thing complex, you have In the first sense, a "simple" is just what is left when we've analysed asserted that there really are simples? our sensa far enough for our current purposes. To use a physical anal Mr. Russell: No, I do not think that is necessarilyimplied. ogy, at this point in the development of physics, quarks are physical simples in just this sense. To state that there are such apparent simples in 5 Here, Russell's ontological agnosticism is unambiguous. our understanding of our observations is to say that we have only What Pears sees as Russell's statement of what a logical atomist is analysed our observations to a finite degree. The existence (or not) of a necessarily tied to, must then be seen as only Russell's avowal of his own limit to all possible analysis is irrelevant here. personal position. Just as we saw in the case of realism, Russell's personal In the second sense Pears points to, "simples" are the actual logically ontological commitments go far beyond those which are necessitated by ultimate building-blocks of our observations. As such, the claim that the philosophy of logical atomism. Thus, while Russell is happy to say there are actual simples is equivalent to saying that the analysis of our that he thinks that there are simples he is also able to say that logical observations can only be carried to a certain point and no further. It is in atomism does not require this to be true. this sense, therefore, that Pears generally uses the term "simples" and it is This also seems to be Russell's point in the passage from "Logical in this sense that Pears claims logical atomism requires "simples". Atomism" that Pears quotes to further his claim that all logical atomists One should ask then which of these two senses Russell employs when must believe in simples: talking about logical "simples". Unfortunately, Pears, having recognised the possibility of the two ways of understanding Russell, brushes the issue aside, considering it unimportant. Therefore, the possibility that
5 Mter failingro fullyquote Russell,Pearsgoeson to suggesrthat, when, yearslater, Russell is talking about apparent simples remains open and the relevance Russell referred back to thac discussion to support his agnosticism on the issue of of the quotation is doubly questionable. This leaves Pears' assertion that simples,there was"someconfusionin [Russell's]recollectionofhis own earlieride::as"(p. logical atomism requires actual simples without support in Russell's 4). Pears'grounds for suggestingconfusion on the pan of Russellis simply to say that Pears'ownRarionalistand EmpiricistApproachesto logicalatomismrequirerhar Russell writings. must nor havemeant what he said. If norhing elserhis argument isclearlycircularsince We have seen both of Pears' fundamental assumptions dissolve under Pearsis supposedro be givingreasonsto accepthis analysisof Russell'swork. 124 KONRAD TALMONT-KAMINSKI Pears'Two Dogmas ofRussett'sLogicatAtomism 125 examination. It is apparent that logical atomists need not be correspon The question of the existence of a limit to all possible analysis does dence realists nor that they must assume some limit to all possible analy not enter into the picture and neither does the question of the relation sis. Without the support of the assumption Pears was making, the ship between the sensa we are analysing and the real world. Empirical and Rational Approaches that Pears develops are unnecessary, Given that this view of Russell's atomism can only be arrived at once as Pears only calls for them to solve what we have seen to be a non-exist Pears' assumptions are discarded, it is not very surprising that the view· is ent problem. In itself, however, this is a purely negative judgement. I quite similar to the Pragmatic Approach Pears rejects because it fails to would close, then, with a very condensed suggestion as to what Russell's agree with his assumptions. actual approach was. Doing this will also provide an example of a logical atomist position that need not assert either correspondence realism or the existence of actual simples.
THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO LOGICAL ATOMISM
As it happens, the paragraph from which Pears takes the last-mentioned quotation is instrumental in giving a positive understanding of Russell's approach.6 The picture of logical analysis Russell draws in the passage is one in which what is currently considered to be simple could later turn out to be complex and, thus, further analysable. The current position, there fore, is only a step in a ladder which, at its top end, hangs off our sensa and whose full length of descent is unknown to us. Russell pictures an analytical descent which, at each step, is self-consistent, so long as all simple symbols refer to objects of one type:
A logical language will not lead to error if its simple symbols (i.e. those not having any pam that are symbols, or any significant structure) all stand for objects ofsome one type, even if these objects are not simple. (P. 173; Papers 9; 173)
The value in continuing our descent into the unknown comes in our being able to examine what we already have seen in greater detail:
The only drawback to such a language is that it is incapable of dealing with anything simpler than the objects which it represents by simple symbols. (P. 173)
6 I.e., p. '73; Papers9: 173-