Digital Commons @ Georgia Law Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 3-1-2016 Attorney’s Fees, Nominal Damages, and Section 1983 Litigation Thomas A. Eaton University of Georgia School of Law,
[email protected] Michael Wells University of Georgia School of Law,
[email protected] Repository Citation Thomas A. Eaton and Michael Wells, Attorney’s Fees, Nominal Damages, and Section 1983 Litigation , 24 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 89 (2016), Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1066 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please contact
[email protected]. ATTORNEY'S FEES, NOMINAL DAMAGES, AND SECTION 1983 LITIGATION Thomas A. Eaton and Michael L. Wells Can plaintiffs recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when they establish constitutional violations but recover only nominal damages or low compensatory damages? Some federal appellate courts have concluded that no fee, or a severely re- duced fee, should be awarded in such circumstances. This position, which we call the "low award, low fee" approach, rests primarily on the Supreme Court's 1992 opinion in Farrarv. Hobby. We argue that a "low award, low fee" approach is misguided for two main reasons. First, the majority opinion in Farraris fragmented, and the factual record is opaque regarding what and how the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated. These com- plexities render Farrara poor case upon which to frame a rule regarding the relation- ship between damage awards and the proper calculation of attorney's fees.