Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union of African States in the 21st Century

Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union of African States in the 21st Century

By

E. Ike Udogu

Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union of African States in the 21st Century, by E. Ike Udogu

This book first published 2010

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2010 by E. Ike Udogu

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-1978-6, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-1978-7

This work is dedicated to past and current political and academic sages in Africa and the Diaspora that have fought—and are still struggling— for the creation of a Union of African States.

CONTENTS

Foreword ...... ix Professor George K. Kieh, Jr.

Preface...... xi

Acknowledgements ...... xv

Acronyms ...... xvii

Chapter One...... 1 General Introduction and a Synoptic Overview of the Study

Chapter Two...... 27 Political Leadership and the Way Forward

Chapter Three...... 59 Pan-Africanism and the Long March toward African Unification in the Millennium

Chapter Four...... 97 The Issue of Democracy and Good Governance in the Union Discourse

Chapter Five ...... 129 Political Parties, Elections and Political Legitimation

Chapter Six...... 167 Conclusion: Federalism as a Possible Model for the Continental Union

Selected Bibliography ...... 203

About the Author...... 239 viii Contents

Appendix A ...... 241 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

Appendix B...... 261 Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament

Appendix C...... 275 Member States of the African Union

Index...... 277

FOREWORD

The contemporary global system has been brought much closer as a result of modern technology and international trade and commerce. The need to establish strong economic blocs in order to augment regional clout has found expression in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union/European Economic Union, for example. Moreover, the need to address the structural and institutional weaknesses in the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe induced these societies to seek membership in the European Union within the context of the impact of the “New Globalization.” Africa cannot, and should not, be left out of this global phenomenon lest it could become irrelevant in global affairs. In the book, Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union African States in the 21st Century, Professor E. Ike Udogu, a student of African Studies, brought his expertise and discourses to bear on a fundamental issue that has taxed the intellectual wits as such sages as William E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and others of the pan-Africanist hue. The centrality of the suppositions and argumentations in this volume is that “Africa must Unite” in the 21st century, against the backdrop of the reality of the continent’s marginalization in the international economic system and division of labor. While his postulations might seem farfetched to Afro-pessimists, Udogu is convinced that Africa will rise up in this century, using her abundant untapped natural resources and human capital to develop so that it could compete effectively vis-à-vis other regions of the world. As a consequence of such a development, Africa will be able to play a major role in global political and economic affairs. In truth, this book falls within the context of the urgent, tough and “current” epistemological approach in African scholarship that calls upon academics to design more theories and modalities for possible short and long term solutions to the current situation of underdevelopment. In this way, the continent would rapidly be catapulted to its zenith developmentally. This book is exciting, motivating and provides possible solutions to Africa’s perennial quest for unity. It is a must read by policy makers, students of African history and Politics.

—Professor George K. Kieh, Jr., Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, University of West Georgia

PREFACE

As is the wont with many scholars who wish to embark on a major research effort, they first debate the topic—particularly the merits and demerits of the proposal—with colleagues. In some cases, one’s peers are likely to throw their weight in support of such a project because of its relevance, practicality and possibility of substantially augmenting the existing literature on the subject matter. On the other hand, some critics might express reservation on such a project arguing that the attempt may lead nowhere. In the case of this study, however, the opinions of my associates in support of writing this important book were spectacularly encouraging. The significance of Africa’s unification in the face of the enormous challenges the region faces politically and economically in this era of the new globalization, and more importantly the possibilities that a success at uniting could advance the development enterprise for the benefit of future generations of Africans, call for such an amalgamation. Be that as it may, in contemporary discourses on African development, there are two major schools of thought, viz. Afro-pessimists and Afro- optimists. Some Afro-pessimists postulate that Africa’s governing elite and wealthy oligarchs are too divided, unpatriotic and selfish in the pursuit of their insular interests vis-à-vis those of the majority ordinary citizens in a nation-state. Moreover, many are so corrupt to seriously and sincerely consider the economic, political and social benefits that may accrue from an agglutination of the current weak state-system in much of the continent. Besides, they argue, the power base from which these economic and political plutocrats had dominated their polity could be greatly curtailed and their ability to control the national coffers would be profoundly and painfully limited in a broader and all-inclusive Union of African States. On the other hand, many Afro-optimists see Africa and the current debate on unification positively. They argue, among other factors, that the impressive developments in a number of African countries can provide important models for catapulting the continent to greater heights. Africa, they further contend, has abundant raw materials—gold, diamond, crude oil, uranium, copper, iron et cetera and of recent substantial human capital— with which to move the area forward in the 21st century. By pulling together these plentiful resources a united Africa can develop substantially. Indeed, some posit in a popular cliché that “Rome was not built in a day” with the xii Preface view to boosting general optimism in the pan-Africanist credo of Africa’s unification and the growth project. Two popular names (among others) have been invented in the literature for a politically amalgamated Africa. These are the Union of African States (UAS) and United States of Africa (USA). Regardless of the nomenclature to be applied to this formation, they both capture the true essence and vision of African integration in this century. Accordingly, let it suffice to say that I used both the Union of African States and United States of Africa interchangeably in this text. Incontrovertibly, this undertaking is audacious and challenging against the backdrop of a measured approach of political actors to political development in Africa. All the same, my conceptual, analytical and theoretical argumentations in this volume call for a logical reexamination of the character of Africa’s current oligarchic state that serve the narrow interests of a few political and economic entrepreneurs in the continent. In other words, Africa’s current nation-state system may have to be “born again” in such a way as to be able to meet the needs of citizens and thereby command and advance political legitimacy from a majority in the polity. An enactment of such a policy strategy could make the state attractive for the region’s eventual amalgamation. Africa, as I argue in this text, has limited choices against the backdrop of its politico-economic marginalization in the contemporary globalization phenomenon. Thus, is reassuring that a resolve for the continent’s revival and eventual political assimilation is demonstrated in the spirit of the African Union and its various organs and agencies. These developments are not only promising but also critical to providing Africa with fiscal and political clout in global affairs. Even so, any aspiration to move the continent forward toward the creation of a Union of African States must be pursued collaboratively. In short, a drive for unification may rest, in part, on the works of Africanist scholars who, in the tradition of great sages of the past, must provide appropriate modalities and instrumentalities for its actualization; political actors, whose task will be to develop adequate infrastructures and implement the frameworks constructed by academics; the oligarchs, who will supply entrepreneurial and industrial base to boost relevant development schemes; civil society, that will monitor good governance performance, economic growth indicators, and other worthwhile programs in order to ensure their efficacy; and the grassroots, who would offer their labor and other necessities to sustain the union. Within the context of the foregoing suppositions, I examined a potpourri of issues that are important in the process of amalgamating the continent under the following rubrics: a general introduction with a concise summary

Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation xiii of a Union of African States of chapters in the text; the issue of leadership; a history of the pan-African movement that enlightens the reader as to the attempts made so far toward unity; the issue of democracy and good governance; the role that political parties and effective elections can play in promoting the vision of a united continent; and concluded with a suggestion that a federal structure could be useful in a potential Union of African State. In all, this book is probing, incisive and visionary; it is a significant contribution to the literature.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It would be perverse to assume that this volume was put together without assistance and support from many who have crossed my academic, professional and social paths. To this end, I would like to thank the Chair and faculty of the Department of Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian State University, for granting me off-campus scholarly assignment or sabbatical leave in spring 2009. This leave of absence provided me an opportunity to complete this work and a co-edited volume, African Mosaic: Political, Social, Economic and Technological Development in the Millennium, published in 2009. Professionally, my thanks are extended to members of the Association of Third World Studies (ATWS), the oldest and largest multidisciplinary Third World Association in the world. In addition to maintaining a life membership in this prestigious association, it was a real privilege to have served as its president in early 2000s. The lessons learned, and experience gained, from my tenure as chief of this organization helped sharpen my analysis in this work. It was also within the context of my relationship with members of this organization and African Studies and Research Forum (ASRF) that I have augmented my scholarly works. For example, I met and worked with such erudite Africanists as professors Julius O. Ihonvbere, John Mukum Mbaku, George Klay Kieh, Jr., Pita Ogaba Agbese, Toyin Falola, A.B. Assensoh and Philip Aka whose impressive works and publications in African studies added so much to the “flavor” and wholesomeness of this study, my other texts, and scholarly articles. Moreover, as an African adage goes, “a tree can’t stand solidly without firm roots to support it.” Accordingly, other scholars who have collaborated with me and whose works continue to inform my scholarship and epistemology are professors Alfred B. Zack-Williams, Joseph Takougang, Mojubaolu O. Okome, F. Wafula Okumu, Olufemi Vaughan, Peyi Soyinka-Airewele, Bennett A. Odunsi, Kelechi A. Kalu, John B. Ejobowah, Abdul K. Bangura, Ufo O. Uzodike, Julius E. Nyang’oro, Paul T. Zeleza, Kidane Mengisteab, Mobolaji Aluko, and the late Nwafejoku O. Uwadibie. In the same spirit, I would like to extend special thanks to those academics whose works I cited in this project. Educationally, socially and emotionally, I would like to thank my family and friends in Africa, the United States and Europe. They have xvi Acknowledgements stood by me through thick and thing during my educational and professional career. Also, my special appreciation is extended to Miss Elizabeth Wilson, Dr. Herbert Wey, Dr. William Hardenberg, Dr. Vaughn Christian, Dr. Jawad Barghothi, Dr. Ruth Ann Strickland (for an invaluable editorial assistance), Dr. Onyile B. Onyile (for formatting and indexing this work), my professors, Permanent Secretary P. C. Chukwujekwe, Carol Koulikourdi, Amanda Millar and staff members at CSP who worked on this project. I, however, take full responsibility for the content of this book.

—E. Ike Udogu, Faculty Fellow and Professor of African, Comparative and International Politics Anne Belk Hall Department of Government and Justice Studies Appalachian State University Boone, N C, USA

ACRONYMS

AAPO All African Peoples Organization AG Action Group AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ANC African National Congress AU African Union DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EMB Electoral Management Bodies FLN National Liberation Front HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus ICES International Center for Ethnic Studies IMF International Monetary Fund KADU Kenya African Democratic Union KANU Kenya African National Union NCNC National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons/National Council of Nigerian Citizens NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NFD Northern Frontier District NPC Northern People’s Congress OAU Organization of African Unity ODM Orange Democratic Movement PR Proportional Representation SADC Southern African Development Community SMD Single-Member District UN United Nations UNR-UDR Union for a New Republic-Democratic Union for the Republic WWI World War One WWII World War Two ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND A SYNOPTIC OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Without suggesting that the achievements of the ancient Africans were “the same” as those of the Greeks, it may be reasonable to think that they were in one great aspect superior. They really did evolve much out of little or out of nothing at all. If one should praise “the Greek spirit” as splendidly creative and inventive, one may perhaps express some admiration for an “African spirit” which was far less favorably placed for the elaboration of the arts of life, but nonetheless made this continent supply the needs of man. Where, after all, lay the precedent for the social and ideological structures built by the Africans, so variously resilient, so intricately held together, so much a skilful interweaving of the possible and the desirable? Where did these systems draw their sap and vigor except from populations who evolved them out of their own creativeness? Even allowing for the distant precedents of Egypt, the peoples who settled Africa had surely less to go upon than the ancestors of Pericles. The balance needs adjusting here.1 —Basil Davidson

A major rationale for writing this provocative book, Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union of African States in the 21st Century, flows from the notion that in almost all polities, in all regions of the world, there comes an epochal moment when groups would examine their political, social and economic formation. The purpose of such a re-examination is to restructure the community so that it could become more relevant to the character of the zeitgeist. After the Berlin Conference of 1884/5 in which parts of the continent were ceded to various colonial hegemonies, and the wobbly political systems in post- independence, that critical moment of transformation is now—in the 21st century.

1 Basil Davison, The African Genius: An Introduction to African Social and Cultural History (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 37. 2 Chapter One

That Africans have from time immemorial had the propensity for making progressive and creative adjustments to their situation is a given as noted in Davidson’s preceding excerpt. Long ago, in the European context, Thomas Hobbes 1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704), among others, in their treaties on the problematic character of society in the state-of- nature were for the most part in sync as to how to bring about stability. In this regard, their argument for the development of a social contract of sorts between the rulers and governed as a strategy intended to move a population in a community from its “brutish” disposition in a state-of- nature to a civil society is instructive. Historically, “atrocious” and sometimes “practical” methods for deconstructing the character of a polity and reconstituting it so that society could serve the interest of the greater population as defined by the elite have been applied. For example, the beheading of King Charles I of England;2 the French Revolution of 1789;3 the American Civil War of the 1860s;4 the Russian first revolution (1917)5 and second revolution of 1989-1990, and South Africa’s all-race elections of 19946 (that struck a blow at the heart of apartheid) are some cases in point. In almost all of these social and political upheavals members of the well-informed public (scholars and politicians) of different hue have ruminated, debated and written essays intended to improve the socio-political and economic conditions in a community for the purpose of advancing harmony and peaceful coexistence. Thus from Plato to Marx in the Occident and from William E. B. Du Bois to Claude Ake in the African political theater theories and suppositions have been proposed as to how best to construct

2 C. V. Wedgwood, Mary Coate, M. A. Thomson & David Piper, King Charles I 1649-1949 (London: George Philip & Son, Ltd, 1949),18-19. 3 Simon Schama, “The Fall of the Bastille,” in Don Nardo (ed.), The French Revolution (San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, Inc., 1999), 70-75; Norah Lofts and Margery Weiner, “The King’s Fall from Power, Trial, and Execution,” in Don Nardo (ed.), The French Revolution (San Diego, CA: Greenhave Press, Inc., 1999), 90-96. 4 Austin Ranney, Governing: An Introduction to Political Science 4th Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 18-19, 349, 377, 396. 5 Rex A. Wade, The Russian Revolution, 1917 (Cambridge, EN: Cambridge University Press), 232-254. 6 Richard Calland, “Democratic Government, South African Style 1994-1999,” in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), Election ’99 South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 1-15. General Introduction and a Synoptic Overview of the Study 3 societies that could strengthen the state and offer hope to every citizen.7 Indeed, the strategies for deconstructing the quality of a less efficacious social and political society, and the reconstitution of the polity so that it could become more stable and create an enabling environment in which most citizens could see themselves as stakeholders in the system continues to tax the intellectual wits of scholars.8 In truth, one of the central theoretical questions in the discourse on how to construct a viable Union of African States or United States of Africa that could meet the needs of most citizens might always be that of the peculiar character of human nature. Philosophically, it is arguably this complex temperament inherent in the governor and governed in a social and political system that may determine the nature of a constructed society in which people live and interact. Accordingly, in a general discussion on epistemology— particularly on how the acquisition and utilization of knowledge is to be applied to promote a community’s wellbeing—it might be useful to briefly allude to the crux of the viewpoints of some of the sages who confronted a somewhat similar phenomenon at their historical moment. In this regard, I refer to the ideas on human nature and society. All the same, as noted in my earlier supposition, the character of human beings that is often framed by his or her milieu cannot be taken lightly in the way, as leaders and followers, a society is structured and governed politically, socially, economically and religiously. In regards to explaining the foregoing assumptions, the opinions of some past philosophers on human nature9 (for the purpose of later making some general references to the African situation and circumstances) are edifying and instructive.

• For Plato all things can and must be judged as good or bad, whether a desk, a person, or a political regime, depending on how well each fulfills its nature or essence. The form of good is the basis for such

7 E. Ike Udogu, African Renaissance in the Millennium: The Political, Social, and Economic Discourses on the Way Forward (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 121-122. 8 J. D. Mabbott, “Is Plato’s Republic Utilitarian? in Gregory Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), 57-65; Glen R. Morrow, “Plato and the Rule of Law,” in Gregory Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), 144-165; Ronaldo Munck, Marxism @ 2000: Late Marxist Perspectives (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 60-76. 9 See Donald G. Tannenbaum and David Schultz, Inventors of Ideas: An Introduction to Western Political Philosophy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). 4 Chapter One

judgments. But it is also political, because it can serve as the solid foundation for the government (or state) established according to true human nature. Only by fully serving people’s true natures can any state be judged as good. Thus, realizing the good in the state and its citizens is the foundation of justice.10

• Drawing from his classic book, Leviathan, Hobbes discusses the character of human nature from the standpoint of the individual whose raison d’être is the acquisition of force [or power]. He affirmed: I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceases only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with the moderate power, but because he cannot assure that power and means to live well which he has… without the acquisition of more.11

In the African context, many intellectual activists have written copiously on the issue of the interlacement between human nature and the quality of the state. Particular attention was and is paid to the disposition of the state that should be invented in post-colonial Africa. Other academics, too, have expressed concern on the character of leadership in which the chiefs were and are still hell bent in Hobbesian foregoing caricature on acquiring more power as a strategy for maintaining their position of privilege. But the kind of society envisaged by most scholars is that which encourages the genre of captainship that would advance a state’s constitutional principle of equality of opportunity for all. In this respect the views of two philosophers and theorists in post-independent Africa on human nature and the personality of the state are enlightening and should suffice for the purpose of illustration.

• For Claude Ake the quality of the post-colonial state did not change significantly at independence [and after] since with few exceptions, the colonial state was inherited rather than transformed. Like the colonizer before them most of the national leaders regarded the state as the instrument of their will. They privatized, and exploited it for

10 Ibid., 36. 11 See H. W. Schneider, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Publishers, 1958), Ch. 11; Arnold W. Green, Hobbes and Human Nature (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993); Tannenbaum and Schultz, op. cit., 153. General Introduction and a Synoptic Overview of the Study 5

economic gain and used it oppressively to absolutize their power. Even after independence, the state in Africa has not become a reassuring presence but remains a formidable threat to everybody except the few [political and economic oligarchs] who controlled it.12

• Insofar as Arthur W. Lewis was concerned no politician will admit that he suppresses his political opponent primarily because he wants to stay in power [e.g., Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Biya of Cameroon, Mubarak of Egypt, etc.]; he will more usually say that their [politics], policy and tactics endanger the country. … But it would also be mistaken to forget that much of what is going on in some of these countries is fully explained in terms of the normal lust of human beings for power and wealth [with negligent attention paid to the legitimacy and effectual character of the state]…13

In fact because of Africa’s colonial antecedent, and the weak state system passed on from the colonial administrators to African nationalists during the middle of the 20th century, much of the continent underwent political instability that has its roots in the hunger for power, accumulation of wealth and prestige. Having gone through 50 or so years of political malaise, not unlike the situation in Europe immediately following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Africa, by many accounts, is eager to make a clean break from the vices that have been responsible for the area’s political instability. Incontestably, peaceful coexistence, argue most members of the informed public, will promote development as the continent positions itself to claim the 21st century with its vast untapped natural resources.14 The end of the Cold War between Washington and Moscow mainly, in which many African states were the proxies and pawns in the East-West conflict, was not only welcomed by scholars concerned about Africa but also ushered in a period that necessitated a “new thinking” on the role of Africa in the “international world order.” Additionally, the consequences of the juggernaut of the new globalization phenomenon, that have been fundamentally advanced by the information communication technologies,

12 Claude Ake, Democratization of Displacement in Africa (Port Harcourt, Nigeria: CASS Occasional Monograph No. 1, 1994), 7. 13 Arthur W. Lewis, Politics in West Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 30-32. 14 Udogu, African Renaissance in the Millennium: The Political, Social and Economic Discourses on the Way Forward, 1. 6 Chapter One has left many students of development scrambling, as it were, for paradigms, theories and models to help Africa adjust to it and thus make the region a relevant and key participant in the progress.15 One of these strategies is the African Renaissance program that is intended, within the comprehensive New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), to transform and revitalize the continent politically, socially and economically in the millennium.16 This volume, in essence, is an important contribution to the literature on how Africa might move forward on the way towards its cherished objective of amalgamation. However, the analytic emphasis on the pathway to attaining this objective, in Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union of African States in the 21st Century, is political. Moreover, if the dream of uniting African states is possible, I argue for the “deconstruction” of the contemporary “oligarchic state.” By oligarchic state, I suggest that African states as currently constituted are governed by a few, wealthy individuals in a “corporatist” manner with a majority of the populations left to sink or swim, in a manner of expression. Indeed, in the words of Alexis de Tocqueville “the wealthy have little desire to govern the working people; they simply want to use them [economically and politically].”17 But if the continent is to rise from its “self-imposed” level of underdevelopment, given the area’s enormous natural resources, this volume contends that disenfranchised and marginalized citizens should be encouraged to become social, political and economic stakeholders through enlightened and inclusive government policies. The above postulation may be promoted within the concept and political philosophy of Robert Dahl’s polyarchic democracy—i.e. a government in which many, and not a few, rule.18 These measures are useful in preparing Africa for its unification in this century. The power and proclivity of a few corporate executives, the wealthy, politically wellborn and well-connected to control the political landscape in virtually all political systems is obvious to political observers and most

15 Emmanuel Nnadozie, “Africa at the Crossroads of Globalization,” in John Mukum Mbaku and Suresh Chandra Saxena (eds.), Africa at the Crossroads (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 21-47. 16 The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (2001) http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Conference_Reports_and_oth; (retrieved 12/10/ 2008); see, Fantu Cheru, African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2002). 17 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. 2 (New York: Vintage Book, 1945), 171. 18 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 17-32. General Introduction and a Synoptic Overview of the Study 7 social scientists. This was an opinion that Bill Moyer, in the American case, highlighted in his book on Democracy in America.19 In Africa, the situation noted above is no different except, of course, that the region’s productive capacities are not close to that of America. In any case, to illustrate Africa’s dilemma on this matter, take for instance, the political shenanigans in the 2007 problematic national elections in Kenya and its aftermath as the elites in society promoted their self- and group- interests at the expense of the masses of Kenyans. First the constitution was amended to allow for the position of a Prime Minister. This constitutional engineering was accompanied by a description of the power-structure of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis those of the President all in attempts to mollify the invested interest of the powerful political and business forces in the polity. But even more spectacular in the manner in which the oligarchs played the political game was in the distribution of cabinet posts to party stalwarts in order to assuage the selfish demands of the leaders of the conflicting parties with the country’s largesse. James Anyanzwa and James Ratemo explained dispiritedly the role played by the governing elite following the power sharing scheme in that republic thus:

It is now official—Kenya will have to dig deeper into their pockets to maintain a bloated Cabinet. The proposed 40-member Cabinet agreed between President Kibaki and Prime Minister-designate Mr. Raila Odinga, will cost the taxpayer at least sh352 billion a year. And analysts have warned that the already battered economy, due to the recent post-election skirmishes, could compromise recovery and reconstruction efforts. The consequences of the huge numbers could lead to higher taxation and an even higher cost of living …For instance, a minister earns sh887,500 salary and sh200,000 in allowances. This adds up to sh1.087 million a month. An assistant minister earns sh887,500 and sh100,000 in allowances, translating to about sh987,500 a month. Forty Cabinet ministers will, therefore, cost the exchequer sh43.5 million a month, and 40 assistant ministers sh35.5 million.20

According to Jere Longman the political violence that brought about the decision to appease the governing moguls at the expense of the nation- state claimed about 1,200 lives—not to mention the misery that

19 Bill Moyers, Moyers on American Democracy (New York: Random House, Inc., 2008); see Interview with Bill Moyer, National Public Radio (Monday, May 12, 2008) 20 James Anyanzwa and James Rateno, “Cabinet: What it will cost the taxpayer,” Published on April 4, 2008; see also USA Africa Dialogue Series: Naming 40 cabinet ministers will come at a heavy price to Kenyan taxpayers. [email protected] (retrieved 4/10/2008). 8 Chapter One accompanied several thousands who fled their homes during the political mayhem.21 A further issue as it relates to cabinet members is the role they must play in order to retain their positions as ministers and cabinet members. They are “required” to offer lucrative contracts to their financial backers and tycoons either on behalf of themselves or their political party. These entrepreneurs who may have contributed to their election efforts must recoup their investments often at the cost of national development and insensitivity toward the economic and social plight of a majority of the population. In Nigeria, this sort of politics is sometimes referred to as the “godfather” politics and patron-client politics in Latin America and elsewhere. Kenya is not an exception to the sketch of the preceding political imbroglio. This political and social maneuvering for advantage by the plutocrats is continental. Little wonder, then, that Julius O. Ihonvbere noted that: “Like most of the petite-bourgeois leaders of the independence struggle [many of the contemporary leaders] are for the most part self- centered seekers of political power and material benefits. Their main preoccupation is to position themselves for political office [in order to be able to exploit the state’s coffers]… This hunger for power has encouraged political prostitution, grand-standing, corruption, intolerance, and strange alliances [with opposition parties and influential oligarchs for the sole purpose of exploiting the national treasury].22 Some flaunt their wealth while others are audacious enough to boast in public, without fear of repercussion, about how they looted funds from the national resources and treasury. In the same vein, too, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja argued that the incongruities in the forms of relationship within the nation-state issues from the class structure in the continent. The antinomy and crisis are linked to the very nature of the post-colonial state in Africa with its authoritarian structure of control serving the parochial interests of the governing oligarchs and their external lackeys.23

21 Jere Longman, “In Kenya, Violence Shakes Running Community,” New York Times, May 13, 2008; see also [email protected] (retrieved 5/15/2008). 22 Julius O. Ihonvbere, “Where is the Third Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa’s Non-Transition to Democracy,” Africa Today, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1996): 353- 354. 23 Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Africa: Essays in Contemporary African Politics (London: Zed Books, 1987); see Udogu, African Renaissance in the Millennium: The Political, Social, and Economic Discourses on the Way Forward, 43. General Introduction and a Synoptic Overview of the Study 9

Indeed, from Egypt to South Africa and from Kenya to Gabon, the oligarchs see the state as an instrument through which they accumulate inordinate wealth for themselves with insufficient attention paid to the despair and interests of the majority of citizens. In other words, very little of their colossal and hoarded wealth goes for improving the wellbeing of the populace—as for example, the provision of adequate public infrastructures—good roads, hospitals, schools et cetera—needed for important development of society. It is the character of the plutocratic state in which the rich gets richer and the poor gets poorer that must be changed and reinvented in such a way that it reflects a liberal dogma—the promotion of equality of opportunity for all. Such a principle could further political stability and peaceful coexistence needed for uniting any polity, and should serve as a model for the unification of the region in the 21st century. The above objective could be attained if a majority of the population are constantly reminded that they are part of the system, and more significantly that their voices and input in the development project will be taken seriously. And, unlike political systems in the Occident where the social and economic needs of the poor are commonly addressed by the governing class, the African political and economic elites at this moment in the continent’s history tend to overlook the economic woes of the masses. This attitude toward the destitute in society must change through the efforts of enlightened leaders and policies aimed at providing citizens with adequate access to resources for personal and group development at all levels. In this way, a majority of the population may see the value of transferring loyalty from their ethnic cleavage to that of the nation-state and eventually to that of a Union of African States. Moreover, is worth noting that in a recomposed society with the interest of the general public foremost citizens are likely to embrace greater African unity and continental citizenship—which is the aim of most pan-Africanists. It is within the framework of the preceding concise discourses on theories and argumentations on the character of human nature, human being and the leader of the state that I suggest the need for collaborative effort between all stakeholders (e.g. oligarchs, civil society and the intelligentsia). Together they could construct an enabling environment that should advance the objective of creating a Union of African states. This viewpoint and vision is borne out by a profound and insightful conviction that such a unity could turn Africa into a political and an economic power- house. In fact, I contend that African leaders have limited, if any, options in this competitive global system. Consequently, I hereby hypothesize and argue that Africans and their global well-wishers elsewhere will elevate 10 Chapter One this continent, using her abundant resources, out of her current level of under/development and reposition the region for a spectacular growth before the end of this millennium. This idea, in part, is the motivation that led to the production of this volume. It is against the backdrop of the above postulations and analyses that attempts are made to provide a synoptic overview of the structure on which this text rests chapter by chapter. In this way, the reader might be able to appreciate the arguments being posited in the confrontation of the challenges and prospects in advancing the area’s vision of creating a Union of African States. Consequently, in chapter two, Political Leadership and the Way Forward, I endeavored, besides my discourses around the issue of inadequate leadership, to bring to the fore some of the reasons why Africa since independence has not been catapulted to the zenith of development. This problem has persisted despite its abundant natural resources and adequate human capital with which good leaders could have moved the continent forward. Contextually, it was a desire to grab the region’s wealth that in part led to the scramble for Africa, and the Berlin Conference of 1884/5, in which European powers divided up the continent in a zigzag manner into their spheres of influence. For example, King Leopold of Belgium singularly ruled the former Congo and successfully made use of the area’s resources for his aggrandizement and the development of Belgium. Paradoxically, the late President Mobutu Sese Seko, as the leader Zaire, mimicked King Leopold, and surpassed the monarch in the wanton exploitation of Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo) and its wealth leaving in its wake poor and inadequate infrastructures. Despite a consciousness of leadership quagmire in African history since independence, a general opinion is that if only African leaders within their areas of jurisdiction could govern effectively Africa, overall, would not lag behind other continents in political and economic development. Historically, however, many observers of African politics argue that the period of political emancipation from Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium mainly has been relatively short and that it would be perverse to assume that the continent could develop rapidly within such a short time. After all, the industrial revolution occurred around the middle of the 18th century and it has taken the Occident centuries to arrive at this impressive stage of social, political and technological advancement. Critics of Africa’s slow pace of development, nevertheless, contend that it does not have to take Africa as long as it took Europe to develop. Undeniably, much can be learned from European and North American development experience and these lessons could help launch Africa’s General Introduction and a Synoptic Overview of the Study 11

“Great-Leap-Forward.” It only takes good leadership to set in motion a machinery to uplift the continent to a higher apex. Already Africa has produced a high level of human capital and is endowed with substantial raw materials with which to move the continent forward. So, an important question is: why the glacial pace of development in the region? Put in another way, has the implementation of development projects often enunciated in splendid blueprints been hampered by poor quality of leadership? To be sure, confusion always arises from attempts to examine the region as though it is one country with a monolithic approach to political and economic development instead of a plethora of “unequal” states endowed with unequal amount of resources as a result of its colonial legacy. Nonetheless, I have in this study visualized the continent within the context of a pan-Africanist lens, credo and inspiring slogan that “Africa must unite” in part because its peoples share a common hope and destiny in the quest for economic and political progress. In short, the passion to unite politically and economically is arguably urgent and reflects the zeitgeist—especially in this challenging age of the new globalization when other regions of the world with a similar colonial history are progressing astonishingly. In terms of leadership genus, Ali Mazrui’s typology in Africa is quite instructive. His typologies suggest that the leadership issue has been of concern to many scholars. More importantly, my allusion to his conjectures on this matter will augment the analysis on leadership quandary in this chapter. Mazrui identified eight types of leadership including but not limited to: 1. charismatic; 2. mobilization; 3. reconciliation; 4. housekeeping; 5. disciplinarian; 6. patriarchal; 7. technocratic; and 8. personal(istic). To this list one must add monarchical and warrior.24 The relevance of these genres of leadership displayed by different rulers from Kwame Nkrumah (charismatic) of Ghana to Robert Mugabe (warrior) of Zimbabwe have not generally produced the kind of state necessary for advancing the interest of a majority of citizens which is essential for moving their societies and the continent forward. What this development implies, overall, is that leaders in Africa invent and practice a style of leadership mainly designed to protect their interests and survival rather than those of their citizens. In truth, scholars have been lucid in

24Ali Mazrui, “Pan-Africanism, Democracy and Leadership in Africa: The Continuing Legacy for the New Millennium.” http://igcs.binghamton.edu/igcs_site/dirton6.html; (retrieved 1/6/2009); see also Ali Mazrui, The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill 1977). 12 Chapter One describing some of the peculiar methods adopted by various leaders for acquiring and retaining their position of power that are not always conducive to the general welfare of society. For instance, Francois Ngolet noted cogently that:

…a large number of African leaders have appropriated elements of the super-natural or attempted to control the symbolic sphere in order to establish power over society. …Strategies [for example, have been] adopted by [the late] Bongo [of Gabon] to strengthen his authority through control of traditional secret societies, the Christian church (both the Catholic and Protestant Church), and secular ideologies. [He co-opted] the entire political elite, composed of members of the government and other high ranking officials… [He] captured the Gabonese Freemason sects such as Dialogue and Rite Equatorial, which were directly or indirectly headed by Bongo himself. After achieving this process of “totalization” (control of all spheres of ideological production) Bongo became an ideological producer; and the only agent to propose a discourse that came to be regarded by the people as a “regime of truth.”25

Strategies applied in the process of capturing power by political oligarchs may be further consolidated by an administration of an oath intended to help solidify the leadership and his cadre in power, come hell or high water. In return the ruling or governing class—otherwise known as the plutocrats—will be let loose by the leader to freely exploit the state for their benefit and those of their close associates. The equation within this political space is a simple one for the trustees of the government who are generally politicians, business entrepreneurs and major stakeholders, to list a few. As the argument goes, if a boss is displaced in an electoral process by the opposition party, every member of the governing class could be sacked by an incoming regime; therefore, the political captain on whose watch they had acquired so much wealth and control of the state must be kept in power at all cost even at the detriment of society’s wellbeing. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in the 2008 elections is a case in point. As a matter of fact, following evidence that his ZANU-PF party was defeated by the opposition, the oligarchs who had benefited from his many years in power were adamant and resolute in their desire to keep him in power in order to protect their insular interest. Scott Johnson and John Barry noted that: “they [political plutocrats] definitely know that if Mugabe gets a golden parachute they’re not going to get one, and they are

25 Francois Ngolet, “Ideological Manipulations and Political Longevity: The Power of Omar Bongo in Gabon since 1967,” African Studies Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2000): 56-57.