Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

A Study on Reasons for the Collapse of the Pahlavi's Army in the Face of the 1979 Islamic Revolution of

Hosseinali Yarokhi Joshaghani 1, Shohreh Pirani 2, Marzieh Bogheiry 3

1PhD Student in Political Science - University of Tehran, Iran 2PhD Student in Political Science - University of Tehran, Iran 3PhD Student in Political Science - University of Tehran, Iran

Article Information Abstract Article history: The army at least until the Islamic Revolution was able to present itself as an Received: 27 June efficient and reliable power at the time of Pahlavi father and son. Especially after Received in revised form: 14 August the coup of 19 August 1953 the indisputable dominance of Mohammad Accepted: 3 September on the army caused the army to become his private property; But despite all the Available online: September attention of the Shah to army, the army failed to demonstrate any initiative during Keywords: the Islamic Revolution. In this paper, the authors discuss the question of why army Islamic Revolution of Iran takes such a stance and does not take any initiative in the face of the revolution. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi The authors in a descriptive-analytical study concluded that the most important Sultanistic Regime factor involved in this issue was the nature of the Pahlavi regime and the Army subsequent regulatory policies of the Shah to control the army, which resulted in Coup the depletion of independence from the army and its inability to take any initiative during the Revolution. Corresponding Author:

Hosseinali Yarokhi Joshaghani [email protected]

© 2015 Danish Journals All rights reserved To Cite This Article: Hosseinali Yarokhi Joshaghani, PhD Student in Political Science - University of Tehran, Iran Danish Journal of Sociology and political sciences, VOL. 2, 31 -39, 2015

Introduction Iran was a full-scale military dictatorship at the time of the Pahlavi father and son. The government did not permit any independent political activity; But Iran was not a military dictatorship because of one important reason: the position of the king. Both Pahlavi Shahs could dominate the army and create a monarchy system that was completely different from military dictatorships in practice and in ideology. Reza Shah was a colonel, but a colonel that put a crown on his head. Then he created for himself a superior position that took the form of a kingdom and Mohammad Reza Shah after initial doubts until 1953, could expand it further (Halliday, 1980, p. 61).The growing power of the army and the indisputable dominate of the Pahlavi Shahs on the army caused this institution to become an exceptional and particular organization separated from all the government organizations and this was why both Pahlavi Shahs often appeared in military uniforms and their presence in all military rituals was as the highest ranking commander. On the other hand, the slogan "God, Shah, Country" was advertised daily in various ways for all the military staff and personnel. Loyalty to the Shah and welding monarchy to the glory of ancient Iran was continually reminded to the military personnel (Farbod, 2004, pp. 340-341). Given the importance that the father and son attached to the army and the related duties, it could be said that the fate of the army and the monarchy, and especially the Shah himself were tied to each other so that in the Pahlavi era, the army became the most reliable power and organization to the Shah.

Army at the Time of Reza Shah The motivation for the army formation in different periods of Iranian history in general is bound to one of the two circumstances, in the sense that from the beginning of the creation of monarchy in Iran to the first years of the Qajarid era, i. e. about two thousand five hundred years, Iranian army formation has always been caused by the ideas of the kings and the governments of the time who embarked on the establishment and strengthening of the organization in order to maintain security in their territory or to expand borders; But since the early Qajarid era along with enhance the competitiveness of European governments in Iran, the competitions of the mentioned governments gradually affected the fate of the Iranian military and created the changes produced by the same competitions as a natural process (Alibabaei, 2003, p. 10).

31 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

Iran's armed forces during the Qajarid era comprised of four categories: - South police gunman - Kazakh group - Gendarmes group - Central brigade, provincial military, security, the police, etc. (Bahar, 1944, p. 47).

After the coup of 22 February 1921, the idea of the formation of a new army was fulfilled. Reza Khan who regarded achieving power and keeping it subject to the armed forces under his command, issued orders to form the new army organization about two months after the coup. After organizing a new army of Iran, he first began the disarmament and displacement of the nomads and tribes and the suppression of the turbulent who did not obey the government for many years, especially in the late Qajarid era (Nejati, 1992, vol. 1, p. 43). Reza Shah attached special importance to the army and military forces from the beginning. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in his book writes concerning the importance of the army for his father which was more than other institutions of the government: my father worked on internal reform with the full force. His first decision, which has long been favored and wished by him, was to bring all the dispersed and scattered parts of the country under a whole unit again and for this purpose a powerful army was needed. On the same day that he was appointed minister of war and commander in chief, he began to join together the Kazakh brigade, police of the south, gendarmerie and other elements of the military and police force to form a unitary army of all the Iranian forces (Pahlavi, n. d., pp. 58-59). With his coming to power, Reza Khan began amendments to the reorganization and the establishments of the army. Military costs increased dramatically and in 1922, about 47 percent of the total budget of the central government was spent on it. The Iranian division of Kazakh, the South Marine units, gendarmerie and other military units were allied to form one armed force (Lotfian, 2001, p. 81). Reza Khan was a hard-working, frank and cruel man, who had a very strong memory and had a high confidence. He had two opposing features which could rarely be found in one person: irritability and disingenuous to the point of indecency and sometimes shamelessness and on the other hand hiding personal ideas and plans and even vengeance (Katouzian, 1993, p. 127). The mentioned features effectively influenced the army, and many army officers demonstrated these characteristics. Despite improvements that Reza Shah created in the structure and organization of the army during two decades to a form modern and efficient army, it could not resist against the Allied forces during the Allied attack on august 24, 1941.

Army at the Time of Mohammad Reza Shah Mohammad Reza Shah faced with the difficult task of rebuilding the army due to the lack of broad political power base and destroyed army. It can be said that the Iranian army was revived after the war, when the international situation could provide wresting Azerbaijan from the separatists. The military victory in Azerbaijan, while mostly dependent on the international developments and the refusal of the Soviet Union to support the separatists, created a new reputation and dignity for the Iranian armed forces and provided its reinforcement and support it in the following years (Sullivan, 1982, p. 52). During the rule of Mosaddegh, situation was intolerable for Mohammad Reza Shah. Finally, on 19 August 1953, Shah co-operated with British and American intelligence agencies and attempted a coup against the government of Dr. Mosaddegh and the government of Dr. Mosaddegh was overthrown. With the fall of the government of Dr. Mosaddegh, a new era began in the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi who his new authority to the loyalty of the armed forces and the army. Gen. Hossein Fardoost thus describes the main points of the national security doctrine of Mohammad Reza Shah after the 1953 coup: Mohammad Reza Shah set the main base of his power on the army, just as his father had chosen the same procedure. Perhaps his most important job was his job as the commander in chief. No one, even the prime-minister had the right to interfere in the affairs of the army (Fardoost, 1999, pp. 483-484). On June 5, 1963 the army could break people's uprising. During the uprising, the Shah sent the army to suppress protests in Tehran and other cities, and the army suppressed the uprising. During the call to the army, the army once again changed the equation of power in favor of the Shah. From this time onward, the Shah gained an undisputed power and in fact the absolute power of the Shah begins from this date onward. The Shah established his dominance over the armed forces after this decade and monopolized all sensitive positions (Parsons, 1984, p. 60). The Shah regarded the fate and the future of the monarchy and the country in the presence and power of the armed forces. In an interview with one of the professors in the United States he said: I am not like Louis XIV of who said: I am the government. I say: I am the army (Nejati, 1992, vol. 1, pp. 488-489). Shah's dependence on the army was so that he spoke with confidence of the function of the army in support of the survival of the regime and himself; in an interview with , he said: I and 700 thousand soldiers and military officers will not let the dissidents to make Iran their plaything (Azizi, 2007, p. 26). In addition to personal ambitions of the Shah, the doctrine of Nixon-Kissinger provided the opportunity for him to assume the role of the gendarmerie in the Persian Gulf zone; and assuming this role required military power (Azghandi, 1997, p. 55). Now, based on what was discussed, the real question is why, despite the special

32 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

attention from the Shah to the army presence, when the Shah was forced to leave the country, the huge armed forces is pushed to the verge of collapse and becomes unable to show any initiative in dealing with the Islamic Revolution? The authors are of the opinion that what caused the army of Pahlavi regime to lie in such a situation and be deprived of such initiative was the result of the nature of the regime which was a sultanistic regime and subsequently it was the policies that Shah applied to control the army.

The Sultanistic Regime Linz & Stepan's typology of political regimes based on four values of pluralism, ideology, mobilization and leadership that distinguish five political regimes, i.e. one democratic type and four non-democratic types (authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian and Sultanism) (Linz & Stepan, 1996, pp. 38-54). Linz and Stepan (1996) believe that in the sultanistic regimes we face with high affinity of the Sultan to combine public and private areas. In the sultanistic regimes, political sphere is the Sultan's personal property. There is no rule of law in this area and institutionalization is much lower and institutions are often formal. In sultanistic regimes there may be broad economic and social diversity, but there is no political pluralism, because political power is directly linked to the ruler. In the view of Chehabi and Linz, sultanistic regime is based on the rule of person, but the motive of loyalty to the ruler does not appear due to the ideology embodied in him or represented by him, nor is it created by one unique mission nor any charismatic character, but a mixture of fears and rewards given to the collaborators raises their loyalty. The sovereign exercises his power unhindered as he wishes and above all without rules or any commitment to an ideology or value system hindering him. Administrative staff of such rule are not constituted by systems including specified job categories, like an army or a bureaucratic administrative system employed based on more or less general criteria, but it consists mainly of people who are directly elected by the ruler. Among them we often find family members, friends, associates, or the people who are directly involved in the use of violence to maintain the system (Chehabi & Linz, 2001, pp. 21-22). Snyder (2001) believes that in the sultanistic regimes, in the field of the ruler relationship with public institutions (especially the army), there is often an ongoing conflict between the dictator, who tries to take autonomy of public institutions of the country, and official institutions, who try to maintain their independence and freedom of action. In these regimes, the extent to which the independence of the armed forces is undermined by the sovereign support is an important variable that distinguishes the sultanistic regime transition cases in which political change motivation comes from high and from within the ruling system, from cases where the motivation comes from the bottom and encompassing social actors out of the system. When parts of the armed forces are not completely divided and not gathered under the dictator's supporters and are able to practically taking an independent action against him, a military coup, supported by or without the people may dismiss the dictator; But when the army does not have enough autonomy to operate independently of the ruler, the possibility of political change by the army is ruled out. In sultanistic regimes strict action is taken to undermine the independence of the army for fear of military coup against the dictator. To assess the independence of the military, you can check out: If armed forces have control of supplying their requirements, the ability of officers to predict their career paths and express discontent, how much the officers are divided on the basis of ethnic or regional factors, the ability of the dictator to eliminate the armed forces that he doubts their loyalty, and the force that acts as a balance against the regular army with members who infiltrate in the army and spy on them (Snyder, 2001, p. 125).

Shah and the Control of the Army Army dependence on Mohammad Reza Shah along with his affiliation and interest in the army created conditions in the military structure that Shah nearly worshiped army. It may not be an exaggeration if it is said that Shah had no similar attachment to the other pillars of his regime. So that it can be said that the most important issues of demand by Shah were modifying the affairs of the army. Shah, in accordance with article 50 of the conditional constitution, was the supreme commander of the armed forces (Anonymous, 2008, pp. 56-57). Shah considered the army and issues related to it as personal territory and property with no one being his partner and any violence and abuse to it received overwhelming response. According to the authors, the most important feature of the army at the time of Mohammad Reza Shah was its lack of independence and full compliance with the orders and instructions of his Imperial Majesty. In order to create such a structure in the armed forces, he had created various policies on the supervision and control over the army. Along with the development of the armed forces and their increasing power, surveillance policies of Shah on the army became stricter and more diverse. By refining the nationalist officers and the discovery of military network of the Tudeh party of Iran, organized parties against the Shah in the army disappeared. However, the possibility of case military disobedience and trying to establish independent groups was still expected. The formation of intelligence and counter-intelligence units within the army, the formation of pillar 2 in the great headquarters of the Arteshtaran (commanders of military forces), the formation of specific information office, separation of the

33 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

tripartite forces from each other and their direct relationship with the great headquarter of the Arteshtaran, creating split and false administrative competitions and refining the old army, constituted a variety of tools and methods that were applied to control and neutralize possible threats in the army. The simplest means of controlling the army and the discovery of the conspiracy and disobedience was the pillar 2 in the army. Pillar 2 was the eyes and ears of the Shah in the army (Sinaei, 2005, p. 519). In the clean-up after the 1953 coup, several hundred officers and supporters of Dr. Mosaddegh were arrested on charges of membership in the Tudeh party. Nearly 20 people were sentenced to death to show people that the Shah is in the lead (Lotfian, 2001, p. 114). The counterintelligence office of the great headquarters of Arteshtaran was among the units that performed information duties within the armed forces. It was first part of the pillar 2 of the army headquarter, but then moved to the great headquarters of Arteshtaran. According to the report by the Intelligence Committee of the US military, the intelligence department was a relatively small organization, but it enjoyed high ability, mobility, order, and performance. The most important task of this department, which had considerable autonomy, was to secure and ensure loyalty of the armed forces to the Shah. The administration was responsible for cleaning and refining the military personnel, supervision of the activities of foreign intelligence in relation to military installations in Iran and protection of the documents in the armed forces. Counterintelligence could arrest the military personnel and the common people (Sinaei, 2005, p. 521). Shah always showed sensitivity to those army officers who were trying to establish their independent status. Long and faithful service to the Shah was not always an assured way to achieve security. To distinguish between personal ambitions and professional errors for the Shah to dismiss a special officer was never simple (Anonymous, 1987, p. 88). The most stable officers were those who had shown their loyalty to the Shah over the years (Halliday, 1980, p. 65). Army was not controlled only by the intelligence agencies inside and outside. Decentralized organization of the tripartite forces was another action that was taken by the Shah to indirectly control the army. The headquarter formed by each of the three forces in 1955 and their independence from one another was aimed to prevent the concentration of power in the army and to exercise greater control over them by the Shah. With the formation of the great headquarter of Arteshtaran, the powers and role of the ministry of war was overshadowed. Shah kept the officers under his direct close supervision. On the other hand he encouraged a sense of loyalty to his person and all the Sultanistic institutions. No military rank higher than major was confirmed without his own careful review and direct investigation. Shah personally studied the dossier of such officers to determine the interest and the need for upgrading them. He prohibited all generals and his high ranking commanders to come to the capital or meet with other commanders without his personal permission for each case (Zonis, 2008, pp. 200-201). All decisions in the army were adopted by the Shah. General Huyser believes that even decisions in most military organizations adopted by such ranks as colonel or lieutenant colonel were adopted by the Shah in Iran. Huyser seeks one of the reasons for this in the Iranian officers features who were accustomed to be given orders to them. Huyser believes the Iranian army had a general undeniable weakness: the army was not trained to solve problems in itself. Army relied on the power of the leadership who was limited to the Shah and the America. Gharehbaghi in meeting with Huyser Confesses that military commanders have little experience in planning, because the Shah had always formulated plans in person and they were accustomed to only perform the orders (Huyser, 1986, pp. 23-63). Gharehbaghi in his memoirs about the Thursday meeting on the subject to allow or disallow to organize opposition protests on the eve of Ashura and Tasua held on December 7, 1987 writes that the meeting was held to decide on whether to allow religious groups and the opposition to march on Ashura and Tasua or not? They could not decide on the subject and when General Azhari could not decide he said: I will meet his Majesty today. I will report this issue and will act according to his orders (Gharehbaghi, 1987, p. 71). Shah had trained the Arteshtaran in a way that when it came to deciding on issues related to the army, they lacked the will and independence. Troop commanders were ordered directly by the Shah. Gharehbaghi in this regard writes: In the days of the attendance of his Majesty in the country, it was common for the commanders of the armed forces to be directly granted orders on the issues related to the forces. Thus, the responsibility of the forces was assigned on their commanders and chief of the great headquarters of the Arteshtaran had no power on the tripartite forces. Of course, the current method was based on notifying the orders of his Majesty to the forces through the chief of the headquarter, but the commanders of the three forces of land, air and naval reported the important issues directly to his Majesty and received necessary orders and in turn informed the result to the headquarter so that they could take actions and arrange necessary coordination on the implementation of the orders of the commander (Gharehbaghi, 1987, pp. 157-156). According to Gen. F. Jam Shah directly involved in the most trivial decisions of the army and the greater and more important the subject, it was finally transferred to the great headquarter of Arteshtaran to be offered to Shah and be approved by his Majesty. Purchasing military equipment for the army as general Jam said depended just on the decision of the Shah. He personally selected and ordered Toufanian to go and buy; neither the ministry of war had any control on neither these purchases, nor the great headquarter of the Arteshtaran. It

34 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

was just his Majesty, the Central Bank, Toufanian and the US Embassy, while army did not know anything (Baghi, 1994, pp. 245-248). The Shah not only supervised arms imports and promotion of senior military officers, but he also monitored and supervised issues such as welfare needs of the officers, their educational programs, participation in military exercises, paying massive bonuses, various job benefits including foreign travel, advanced medical facilities, homes for the affluent and low-priced stores. Another policy of the Shah on surveillance and control over the army was the known policy of divide and rule. This policy was exercised not only in the army, but it was also applied as an efficient tool on the one hand to create competition and balance and on the other hand it was stemmed in Shah's pessimism and lack of trust.1 The army was just one of the clear examples of the application of this policy to avoid the conflict of the power of commanders of the country with the power of Iran's most important person. Huyser in his memoirs writes that the Shah expressed happiness to see he was able to gather heads of the army in the days that nothing could be done by the Shah because he had never done such a thing himself. Huyser was strongly surprised that even in those fateful days Shah would meet separately with the army commanders (Huyser, 1986, p. 81). To protect his power and prevent any military move out of his control, Shah had developed disputes and rivalries between his generals which made the coordination and unity of action between them difficult. This disagreement and mistrust between military commanders during the revolution and after the departure of the Shah of Iran prevented their coordination to face the revolution and finally led to the disintegration of the armed forces (Tolooei, 1997, p. 582). Although having many officers around him, and these being more loyal than others, Shah always feared the military coup against him somewhere. He had forced all senior officers to spy and constantly send reports on others. Mohammad Reza Shah played with officers like chess, and kept moving them to left and right to prevent their stay in one position for long to gain an independent power (Kia, 1997, p. 103). Pessimism of the Shah to his officers went so far that general Jam, the chief of the great headquarter of Arteshtaran was removed from office without any justified reason. General Jam explained the cause of his dismissal to Parviz Raji saying that the US military advisors always said good words for me in their discussions with the Shah, but one day general Zayts - commander of US advisors in Iran- told me with a smile that today I sent you a kiss of death and when I asked him the meaning of this sentence, he answered that in a meeting with the Shah, I told him that Jam is the best general in the army of Iran. Jam went on to say that from that day on, things changed and if I was to do anything I reached an impasse. Until one day when speaking at a gathering of military commanders about the dissatisfaction of Shah with some army units, I told them that the displeasure of Shah of such problems both professionally and emotionally is distressful for me, because I not only know Shah as my commander, but also I love him as a brother. Saying that changed the fate of General Jam. Therefore, Assadollah Alam in a short meeting with him had told Jam that Shah is unhappy about his carelessness and that he regarded Shah as his brother. He pointed out that if he had the intention to resign, the Shah would agree to the request (Raji, 1986, pp. 110-111). One other result of the policies of Shah was neutralizing the role of the Joint headquarters of the army and the ministry of war. According to Sullivan, Iran's armed forces had one chief for joint headquarters who had regular meetings with the chiefs of headquarters of different forces, but Iran's Joint headquarters of the armed forces and its chief lacked the power and authority of the usual military organizations and similar authorities in other countries and mostly served as a plan and coordination office (Sullivan, 1984, p. 53). General Gharehbaghi wrote about the relations between the joint headquarters and the ministry of war: the relations of the headquarters of Arteshtaran with the ministry of war at the time of the presence of his Majesty was according to the orders of the Shah and the common procedure in the royal army was that the chief of the great headquarters of Arteshtaran and the commanders of the tripartite forces were under direct supervision of the Shah who was the commander in chief, and the chief of the great headquarters of Arteshtaran and the commanders brought the reports directly to Shah and received orders and instructions. Only matters of budget and financial issues, and army laws were given to the government and the legislators through the ministry of war. Therefore, the minister of war and the troops did not intervene in the affairs of the army headquarters and the forces (Gharehbaghi, 1987, p. 160). The nature of the army with 5 decades of spent time and money on its organizing and equipping is now well realized. According to the authors with such a relationship between the military and the Shah, loyal officers could not realize the integrity of the army without his presence. This was due to the nature of the regime. From this perspective, the adoption of such arrangements for the control of the army, created military situations that annihilated any initiative in dealing with the revolution and the army had no choice but to declare neutrality. The following are more detailed evaluation of the military situation during the revolution and its performance.

1 For Study the Character of the Shah, see Zonis, M. (1991). Majestic Failure:The Fall of the Shah. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

35 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

The Army and the Exit of the Shah After making a decision by for the exit of Shah from the country and the formation of government by him, the US sent General Robert Huyser to Iran in the first place to maintain consistency and stability of the military and secondly to prevent its disintegration after the withdrawal of the Shah. The American four-star general sent by the United States of America shows that even Americans were aware of the Iranian army helplessness and lack of initiative in the absence of the Shah. US authorities had considered two missions for General Heyser. First, they maintain consistency in the army forcing them to support the government of Bakhtiar, so the government could organize the affairs of the country and succeed and secondly, if the government of Bakhtiar failed in its mission and lost control of the situation, military action be launched to settle the situation in the country and take the initiative (Huyser, 1986, pp. 51-52). But as we saw, the Pahlavi army with regard to education and training during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had an undeniable weakness: to take any initiative, the army and the military forces needed a strong leadership formulating instructions from above, and they only implemented the directives and orders. The leadership was limited to the Shah and the US. Now that the Shah was to leave the country, the United States had to take on the role of the military leadership. According to Michael Ledeen, if any initiative was to be taken place to save the Shah and the monarchy, this could only be done by Washington. Many of the generals, who had dedicated their lives to protect the United States, were confident that eventually one American will ask them to take action (Ledeen & Lewis, 1983, p. 72). But the Shah was surprised by the presence of General Huyser (Pahlavi, 1992, p. 364). General Huyser arrived in Tehran on Thursday January 4, 1979. Iran's military leaders were the key players of the mission of General Huyser. During his stay in Iran, he met with four top military commanders of the Iranian army: General Gharehbaghi, the chief of Arteshtaran headquarters; Amir Hossein Rabii, air force commander; Admiral Habibollahi, the Commander of the Navy; and General Toufanian, the deputy secretary of war. Huyser's mission in contact and talks with the four commanders in the first place was to ask them to seriously support Bakhtiar's government as long as it worked. This was doubly important especially with the Shah's departure; But when it comes to the issue of the departure of Iran's Shah, investigating the performances of top military commanders clearly show that with the introduction of the option of the departure of Iran's Shah, top military commanders feared greatly. About the causes and circumstances that led to the forced departure of the shah of Iran, it should be noted that all political observers were unanimous that solving the Iranian crisis was not possible with the continued presence of the Shah, and Imam Khomeini, the leader of the revolution would not tolerate the presence of the Shah and the monarchy. Shah himself was aware of this issue (Nejati, 1992, vol. 2, p. 312). With the introduction of the option of the departure of the Shah, military commanders were concerned about the absence of the Shah. The military commanders were trying to dissuade the Shah from leaving the country and persuade him to stay in the country. Gharehbaghi writes: when the issue of the Shah's travel abroad was raised, at every opportunity possible I tried to persuade him not to travel. In one of those first days when I met him, I described the problems that the armed forces of the country would be faced with as a result of his departure from Iran and then I said to him: It is said that this trip will not be a return trip. Then reminding the impact of this news on the morale and discipline of the armed forces, I added that not only the number of noncommissioned officers and soldiers will increase, but also the number of escapees staff and the absentee in the fixed staff will increase daily (Gharehbaghi, 1987, pp. 154-155). With the certainty of Shah's travel, concerns of military commanders were added. They worried about their political and military future after the departure of the Shah of Iran. The least-cost way that seemed to them was to leave the country with the Shah to save themselves. This conclusion is well reflected in the conversations of top military commanders in talks with General Huyser in the meeting during his stay in Tehran: Toufanian was clearly worried about his security. He said that if the Shah left, he would leave too, otherwise he would be killed. He (Toufanian) feared that the Shah would not return at the end of his leave. I said the army should take the responsibility of keeping the country for the Shah. Army is the only power in the country and shall take powerful steps in order to revive the monarchy. Toufanian said: the Shah is not just a man, he is a country. We (Huyser and Rabii) heard the sound of the phone ringing and our talk was cut off. It was a direct-line call. The conversation was in Farsi and I had no doubt that the person on the phone was the Shah. The conversation was brief, but every minute that passed Rabii sounded louder and more excited, it seemed what he heard was disturbing. When he hung up the phone, with shaky voice he said: his Majesty ordered me to prepare a plan for his departure. Rabii was worried. He strongly insisted that he should go too; otherwise his life was in danger. Admiral (Habibollahi) was sad of the Shah's departure like two other generals. Habibollahi said that if his Majesty went on the travel, the army would fall apart. All army officers, including him, had to leave Iran, because their lives were in danger without the support of the Shah. Finally, the fire under the ashes flamed. Gharehbaghi as I predicted had the last word: If his majesty decides to go, I would go with him. Gharehbaghi said: our records determine our capabilities more than what you can imagine. It is not our education that

36 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

determines our performance, but something deeper than the training which is our Iranian tradition. He said: You do not understand our traditions. It is this tradition that makes us go with the Shah of Iran. Because our strong priorities are: God, Shah and the country (Huyser, 1986, pp. 23-46). Huyser describes the moment when the plane was flying the Shah out of the country and the feelings of top military commanders at those moments: some of them still could not believe it; especially Rabii, Badarei and Gharehbaghi. I (Huyzer) think Toufanian was realistic enough no to doubt about what had happened. Habibollahi had accepted Shah's departure as a pre-condition to calm the situation. I knew how sensitive they were and how quickly they changed their mind, I would not be surprised if they said goodbye to me and left the country with their Master. I heard the sound of their heartbeats in the room. I sympathized with them, because I perceived the depth of their feelings very well. I was also aware of the uncertainty and fear that should have been ruling them (Huyser, 1986, pp. 132-134). Almost immediately after the departure of the Shah, some military units in several cities began looting and shooting at the demonstrators and some of them joined the revolutionary crowd. Thousands of soldiers fled and went to their homes. Brzezinski on the effects of this departure is of the opinion that the problem became more difficult in the next stages, when the army was intensely involved and lost its morale, especially when the Shah left and the army faced massive crowd and crippling strikes. Undoubtedly, with each passing week problems and casualties resulting from any military action increased. I cannot say categorically that the army could still overcome the situation (Brzezinski, 2000, p. 524). General Fardoost on the impact of the Shah's departure from Iran says that when Mohammad Reza Shah left, the military that he was its commander in chief and its symbol lost its spirit and its body was absorbed in the revolution and its leaders were drowned in complete confusion (Fardoost, 1999, p. 571).

The Army and Bakhtiar Shapour Bakhtiar was a member of the of Iran during the time of Mohammad Mossadeq. After the 1953 coup Bakhtiar was an active member of the National Resistance Front. After the fall of Azhari's government in a condition that the revolution was close to the days of its victory, Bakhtiar accepted Shah's suggestion for the Prime Minister's office under conditions, and on January 6, 1979 he announced his cabinet to the Shah (Abdollahpour, 1990, p. 307). After the parliamentary vote of confidence to Bakhtiar, Shapour Bakhtiar was introduced prime minister of the country. Bakhtiar promised to dissolve SAVAK, and suspend the Articles 5 and 8 of the law on the media regarding and declared that the press was free based on the constitution (Dehmardeh, 2004, p. 156). Bakhtiar arriving at the prime minister's office took actions to satisfy the opposition. He appeared on television with an image of the doctor Mosaddegh behind him, promising to revoke martial law. He later cancelled several military contracts worth $ 7 billion, stopped oil sales to South Africa and Israel, and announced that Iran is out of CENTO and will not be the Persian Gulf gendarme (Abrahamian, 2003, p. 647). With the appointment of Bakhtiar to the post of prime minister, the Shah left the country on 16 . When Shah left, the most important issue that Bakhtiar faced was the army control. Bakhtiar was well aware that the army only obeyed the Shah and if he could not ensure the support of the army he would not be able to succeed in this position. So from the very beginning, he tried to be supported by the army through the Shah. Bakhtiar writes in his book for happening this: the first meeting of the on January 13, was held in the presence of the Shah. At the end of the meeting I said to the Shah: I have a request from your majesty and that is to invite the commanders of the armed forces and they emphasize in my presence that they are under state control and because his majesty has appointed me, they obey my commands. The meeting was held in the evening. The Shah had summoned the chief of headquarter, the commanders of the land, air and naval forces and the head of the military industries who was a four-star general and he said: Bakhtiar accepted to form a cabinet in conditions that everyone knows is difficult. Because I decided to do a trip abroad you should know that you are under his supervision. If you come to solve the problem in my jurisdiction, he can consult with members of the regency council and share it with me and tell you the result, but regarding the questions about the government, Bakhtiar decides personally (Bakhtiar, 2006, p. 105).

The Army and Coup What is certain is that when the Shah of Iran decided to leave the country, there were various rumors about the military coup, but the main question raised is that whether the army had the ability to do so or not? Khosrowdad, a military commander had announced that his majesty at the moment did not even intend to leave the country for the holidays, because if he left, the communists would takeover of the country and the army would not accept this situation. If Shapour Bakhtiar failed to prevent the departure of his majesty, he would dig his grave with his own hand (Yazdi, 1989, p. 101). Despite this fear, as we saw, General Huyser enters Iran to ensure the support of the army from Bakhtiar government. Huyser writes in his memoirs: During talks with the advisory office and the embassy, I heard strong rumors about a group of the Iranian officers working on a plan for the coup.

37 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

No one outside this group knew who the members were and what their plan was, but it is said that they will act on two conditions. First, if the Shah travels like 1953 and secondly, if he completely loses power (Huyser, 1986, p. 24). Huyser investigates about such a plan to ensure the existence of it at the first meeting of senior military commanders, Toufanian, Rabii, Habibollahi and Gharehbaghi. But such a plan needed planning and initiative, and senior officers needed to be able to make it practical. But the point is that, as we have seen, these Arteshtaran were not mainly trained to independently think and act. They had done everything with the orders of the Shah always dictated to them from up and the first person of the country. Therefore, the commanders of such a hierarchical system lacked independence, authority and ability to take independent decisions. Military commanders of the army had little political experience. They entered into politics by the command of his majesty and withdrew by his order. General Azhari states among military commanders at the meeting of July 15, 1987 that we have limited vision and we cannot see the problem from the angle that the Shah looks at things. Why open political atmosphere was declared is something that the Shah knows alone. So, certainly the shah does not want the situation to be so, but because of his high visibility of the issue and his dominance on politics, he knows where to stop these events. Some issues are related to the oil and we do not enter into them because we do not know about it and it is better for us not to enter into them (Anonymous, 1997, pp. 40-41). General Toufanian believed: we have not seen political struggle for a lifetime. Now, I cannot and I do not know. Gharehbaghi also confirmed his words, he said: as general said we have never been in the politics (Anonymous, 1986, p. 244).Toufanian clearly states that we called the Shah, the commander in chief, and we even had to report the leave the officers, the appointments and everything to him; everything. The officers were accustomed to a certain system and when a person who was at the head of the system left, I believe that the collapse was almost certain (Katouzian, 2001, p. 396). On the other hand, other factors that could be called psychological war of the army opposition caused the remains of the military morale to be worn out. The behavior of demonstrators in the streets with the arms forces, demonstrators' chanted slogans and messages that Imam Khomeini sent to troops, were factors that acted as the last blows to the headless body of the army. Badarei warned that I think we should not even allow a soldier think about even take the flower from the hand of the public. Since it starts with the same flower, and this is when the risk of soldier between the army and the people will threaten us that (Anonymous, 1986, p. 59). Slogans like "army is our brother", or "brother of the army, why fratricide", were slogans that undermined the morale of troops in dealing with the demonstrators. Imam Khomeini in messages sent to the army regarded the army as the people and said that the Iranian nation has the duty to respect noncommissioned officers and noble officers. He said some cruel people in the army are specified number and we shall separate them of the Iranian army. The army is of the nation and the people are from the army (Yazdi, 1989, p. 116). Therefore, with such conditions that the army was devoid of independence and initiative and its military commanders were incapable of decision-making, a coup by military leaders was meaningless. Finally, at a meeting of the High Council of Commanders, the army neutrality was announced on February 11, 1979.

Conclusion Pahlavi regime was an ideal example of sultanistic regime that enjoyed all the features of this type of regime. It was a regime based on the military power on the Shah's personal rule that was applied without any hindrance. As we saw in sultanistic regime the ruler tries to undermine the freedom and independence of state institutions. Among state institutions, the army because of the potential for action against the ruler is under special attention. Because of the increasing power of the army and the undisputed dominance of the Pahlavi father and son, the institution became a special and particular one, distinct from all the organs and organization of the government. The dependence of the army on Mohammad Reza Shah along with the interest and dependence of Shah on the army created conditions in the army that the Shah nearly worshipped the army. It may not be an exaggeration to say that if the Shah had no similar attachment to any of the pillars of his regime as the army. So that the army of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi turned into his personal property so that he did not allow anyone to interfere in its affairs. But the most important feature in the Shah's army was that it was devoid of independence and its full compliance with the orders and instructions of his Majesty. In other words, it could be said that the army was embodied in the person of Mohammad Reza Shah. In order to create such a structure in the armed forces, the Shah created various policies to control the army. Parallel to the development of the armed forces and their increased power, monitoring methods of the Shah on the army became stricter and more diverse. Forming intelligence and counter-intelligence units within the army, composing the pillar 2 in the great headquarter of the Arteshtaran, forming a special information office, the separation of the tripartite forces and their direct relationship with the great headquarter of the Arteshtaran, creating disagreement, split and false administrative competitions and refining old military members, were various tools and techniques that were used to control the army and neutralize possible threats. Such monitoring caused the army feel severe need to a commanding center in order to act and take initiative, so that it could not do anything. Result of such policies led military force to become yes man who needed his royal command for each small action. The authors are of the opinion that the

38 Danish Journal of Sociology and Political Sciences, September, 2015, Pages: 31-39

adoption of such arrangements in the organization and supervision of the army, provided conditions for the army that it failed to take any initiative in dealing with the revolution, and walked in the way that there was no choice but to declare neutrality.

References 1. Abrahamian, E. (2003). Iran Between Two Revolutions (A. Gholmohamadi & M. E. Fatahi Valilaei, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Nashr-e nei. 2. Azghandi, A. (1997). Ravabet-e Khareji-e Iran 1320-1357 [Iran's Foreign Relations 1941-1979]. Tehran, Iran: Ghomes. 3. Abdaollahpour, A. (1990). Nokhostvaziran-e Iran [Prime Ministers of Iran]. Tehran, Iran: Elmi. 4. Alibabaei, Gh. R. (2001). Tarikh-e Artesh-e Iran [Iran's Army history]. Tehran, Iran: Ashian. 5. Azizi, H. (2007). Tarikh Shafahi-e Artesh Dar Enghelab-e Eslami [Army Oral History in Islamic Revolution]. Tehran, Iran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Eslami. 6. Anonymous. (1987). Az Zohoor Ta Soghoot [The Rise and Fall]. Tehran, Iran: Markaz-e Nashr-e Asnad-e Lane-e Jasosi-e Amrica. 7. Anonymous. (1997). Ma Gereftar-e Yek Jang-e Ravani-e Vaghei Shodeim [We've caught a real psychological war].Tehran, Iran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Eslami. 8. Anonymous. (1997). Mesle Barf Ab Khahim Shod [We will melt like snow]. Tehran, Iran: Nashr-e nei. 9. Anonymous. (2008). Ghanon-e Asasi az Farman-e Mashrotiat ta Emroz [Constitution of the Constitutional order to today]. Tehran, Iran: Derak. 10. Brzezinski, Z. (2000). Power and principle (M. Saghian, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Daftar-e Motaleate-e Siasi va Beinolmelali. 11. Bahar, M. T. (1944). Tarikh-e Ahzabe-e Siasi-e Iran [The History of Political Parties in Iran] (Vol. 1). Tehran, Iran: Rangin. 12. Bakhtiar, Sh. (2006). Ma fidelite (M. Amir shahi, Trans.). , France: Albin Michel. 13. Baghi, E. (Ed.). (1994). Tahrir-e Tarikh-e Shafahi-e Enghelab-e Eslami-e Iran [Write Oral History of the Islamic Revolution Iran]. Tehran, Iran: Tafakor. 14. Dehmardeh, B. (2004). Dowlat-e Bakhtiar va Tahavolat-e Enghelab-e Eslami [Bakhtiar Government and the Developments of Islamic Revolution]. Tehran, Iran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Eslami. 15. Farbod, N. (2004). Naghsh-e Artesh Dar Tahavolat-e Tarikhi-e Iran [Iran's Army role in the historical developments]. Tehran, Iran: Komesh. 16. Fardoost, H. (1999). Zohoor va Soghoot-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi [The Rise and Fall of the ]( Vol. 1). Tehran, Iran: Moasese-e Motaleat va Pazhoheshhai-ye Siasi. 17. Gharehbaghi, A. (1987). Eterafat-e Zheneral [General Confessions]. Tehran, Iran: Nashr-e nei. 18. Halliday, F. (1980). Iran: Dictatorship and Development( M. Yelfani, & A, Toloei, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Elmi. 19. Huyser, R. (1986). Mission to Tehran (A. Rashidi, Trans.).Tehran, Iran: Etelaat. 20. Katouzian, H. (1993). The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-modernism, 1926-79 (M. R. Nafisi & K. Azizi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Nashr-e Markaz. 21. Katouzian, H. (2001). Pahlavi regime in Iran (M. Saboori, Trans.). In H. Chehabi & J. Linz (Eds.), Sultanistic Regimes (pp. 369-412). Tehran, Iran: Shirazeh. 22. Kia, B. (1997). Artesh-e Tariki [Army of Darkness]. Tehran, Iran: Markaz-e Tarjomeh va Nashr-e Ketab. 23. Ledeen, M., & Lewis, W. (1983). Debacle: The American Failure in Iran (N, Irani, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Amir Kabir. 24. Linz, J,. & Stepan, A. (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johans Hopkins University Press. 25. Lotfian, S. (2001). Artesh va Enghelab-e Eslami [Army and the Islamic Revolution]. Tehran, Iran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enghelab-e Eslami. 26. Nejati, G. R. (1992). Tarikh-e Bist-o Panj Sal-e Iran [Twenty-five years of political history of Iran] (Vols. 1-2). Tehran, Iran: Rasa. 27. Pahlavi, M. R. (n.d.). Mamoriat Baray-e Vatanam [Mission for My Fatherland]. Tehran, Iran: Chapkhane-e Sazman-e Samei va Basari Honarhai-ye Zibay-e Keshvar. 28. Pahlavi, M. R. (1992). Answer to History (H. Abootorabian, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: n.p. 29. Parsons, A. (1984). The Pride and the Fall: Iran 1974–1979 (M. Rastin, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Hafteh. 30. Raji, p. (1986). In the Service of the Peacock Throne (H. A. Mehran, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Etelaat. 31. Sinaei, V. (2005). Dowlat-e Motlaghe, Nezamian va Siasat Dar Iran [Absolutist State, the Military and Politics in Iran]. Tehran, Iran: Kavir. 32. Chehabi, H., & Linz, J. (Eds.). (2001). Sultanistic Regimes (M. Saboori, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Shirazeh. 33. Sullivan, W. (1982). Mission to Iran (M. Mashreghi, Trans.). Tehran, Iran :Hafteh. 34. Snyder, R. (2001). Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes, Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives (M. Saboori, Trans.). In H. Chehabi & J. Linz (Eds.), Sultanistic Regimes (pp. 111-181). Tehran, Iran: Shirazeh. 35. Tolooei, M. (1997). Dastan-e Enghelab [Story of Revolution]. Tehran, Iran: Markaz-e Tarjom-e va Nashr-e Ketab. 36. Zonis, M. (2008). Political Elite of Iran (P. Salehi & S. Aminzade & Z. Lobadi Trans.). Tehran, Iran: Chpakhsh. 37. Yazdi, E. (1989). Akharin Talashha Dar Akharin Roozha [Last Attempts in Last Days]. Tehran, Iran: Ghalam.

39