policy elites in Delhi fiercely de- ’s Indo- bate key strategic choices in pur- Pacific Reckoning suit of the national interest. Stakes Dr. Titli Basu are high with trade, technology, 6 the fourth industrial revolution, and infrastructure all defining great power contestation in the strategic theatre of the Indo-Pa- cific. Disequilibrium in US-China- India Triangle

China frames its pursuit of power within the narrative of “great reju- venation of the Chinese nation,” anchored in an historical interpre- tation of the Middle Kingdom’s “century of humiliation” from the First Opium War through the Sino- Japanese War. Beijing’s path to primacy is anchored not only in military modernization and eco- nomic statecraft but also soft and

sharp power instruments to ad- vance grand strategic designs like S-China disorder presents a the Belt and Road Initiative. With defining moment in interna- China’s rise, the Chinese Com- U tional history. A fractured munist Party (CCP) seeks a rene- power structure and contestation gotiation of the asymmetry that ex- over the rules of the international ists between the distribution of system have been sharpened by power and the distribution benefits the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing’s in international society. Offering ascent in the international order Chinese solutions to international and the ensuing disequilibrium in problems, Beijing has challenged the balance of power between the the US-led liberal order with alter- and China at the native rules and norms, ideas, and global level, and China and India institutions. at the regional level, are making At the regional level, the growing Indo-Pacific Perspective │ 28

India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

power differential in India-China positioning India as a leading relations is manifesting beyond power in a multi-polar world. contested Himalayan borders. Chi- Delhi’s strategic quest for a multi- nese checkers in Pakistan, South polar world was shaped amid ap- , and the wider Indian Ocean prehension of US hegemony in the Region further complicate geopoli- post-Cold War years. India believes tics. In the last two decades, Bei- that a multipolar world should be jing’s defense spending has wit- anchored by a multipolar Asia at nessed around a seven-fold in- its core.5 But today, the prospect of crease, rising from $39.6 billion in a unipolar Asia has become more 1999 to $266.4 billion in 2019.1 The pronounced with President Xi reality of China’s economy being Jinping’s “China Dream.” While one-sixth larger than America’s (in India is seeking strategic equilib- purchasing power parity terms) is rium, China is relentless in its pur- upon us.2 It is imperative for India suit of engineering a hierarchical to adjust to the profound impact of Asian order, with Beijing at top,6 China’s rise in the immediate fueling its vision of a Chinese cen- neighborhood, and especially when tury as opposed to an Asian cen- it comes to addressing Chinese ag- tury.7 gression along its land border with Judging from key policy pro- India. In recent times, India has nouncements, India aspires to be a managed incidents like Doklam, stabilizing power bringing its ca- Chumar, and Depsang—but the pacities to bear on the interna- Galwan standoff was the definitive tional system for the purpose of moment when Beijing has “strate- promoting the global good.8 It 3 gically lost India.” In India, the wants to be a net-security provider debate over China is increasingly rather than a disruptionist power turning in favor of making the cost in the Indo-Pacific. India’s Foreign of unilaterally altering the status Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has 4 quo unsustainable for Beijing. deftly articulated that today’s Beijing’s Proposition of a multi-polar world reflects strong Unipolar Asia in a Chinese bipolar characteristics, with not all Century the poles being of the same size, and the United States and China The narrow prism of analyzing In- being relatively more influential dia as a mere “balancer” in great than other players.9 power game is flawed. Sharper Shaking off “hesitations of his- strategic articulation from Delhi is tory”10 and debunking the Indo-Pacific Perspective │29

Basu narrative of India as a reluctant Delhi to make tough policy choices power, Delhi aims to be a rules- and shape global conversations set- shaper and not an abstainer – rec- ting standards on pertinent issues, ognizing that “rule of force” under- for instance, global trade rules, writes the “rule of law.” At the tech rules and digital governance. Shangri-La Dialogue, India has ar- Dividends of India’s Doctrine gued that the Indo-Pacific should be anchored in rules and norms India’s search for solutions in man- based on the consent of all and not aging differences and protecting the power of a few. Strategic con- strategic equities has renewed the versations have urged for a New debate on strategic autonomy ver- Delhi Consensus, characterized by sus alliances. The strategic assess- a call for a more inclusive, equita- ment in Delhi is that “the more In- ble, and participatory world or- dia rises, the more it must expect der.11 The experience of the liberal Chinese opposition.”13 With the rules-based order was “neither lib- Galwan misadventure, Beijing has eral, nor particularly orderly”12 for incentivized Delhi’s pivot to Wash- all. History shows that great pow- ington, but the current border cri- ers have often customized rules of sis might not fundamentally reori- the international system and have ent Indian policy towards alliance, taken an a la carte approach in but it may rebalance some of its pursuit of their national interest priorities.14 and strategic ambitions. Rules- Sieving the conversation in Delhi based order has at times been over- shows that, while alliance contin- ridden by power-based order. ues to remain the “wrong answer” The rules of the international sys- for India, greater “realism” is per- tem need to be overhauled and In- meating policymaking. Political dia cannot afford to be a passive discourse suggests that while India player. India largely has a rule- cannot give any other country a taker instinct. For instance, unlike veto over its policy options, there is Beijing’s disregard for the PCA’s a need to look beyond dogma and ruling in favor of the Philippines, enter the real world of conver- Delhi respected the ruling by a gences.15 Today, military alliances PCA-established tribunal in favor are neither being offered to nor of in the Bay of Bengal sought by Delhi. The very dis- Boundary Arbitration. But India’s course in India has pivoted to en- rising political capital as a rule- compassing issue-based multi- shaper makes it imminent for alignments and coalitions in

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India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning

pursuit of shared strategic inter- geography extends from the ests and leveraging partnerships to “shores of to that of the further India’s national interests. Americas,” the India Ocean re- Indeed, this new discourse has ech- mains the primary theater for oes in India’s history of trysts with Delhi. Despite the natural geo- various shapes and forms of alli- graphic advantages in the littoral, ances, all of which were influenced India’s policy elites have long had by the evolving nature of interna- a continental orientation. But tional threats.16 China’s strategic ambition in the While the Trump administration Indian Ocean, manifested in its ex- has treated Delhi relatively more panding military footprint and the st gently than Beijing and even some 21 Century Maritime Silk Road of its formal allies,17 India is projects, has compelled Delhi to re- keenly aware that the United orient its focus. As such, island na- States has fed the rise of China tions and smaller littoral states sit- and that a US-China “grand bar- uated in the strategic geography gain” at some point is not impossi- across Indian Ocean, Pacific ble. To date, India’s strategy of en- Ocean, and even the Caribbean are gagement-with-all without having gaining more attention in New 18 to choose between rival great pow- Delhi’s strategic thinking. ers paid rich dividends in terms of Securing a stable maritime order - sourcing capital and technology. and the rule of law at sea - has “Balance of interest” has remained driven Indian maritime diplomacy. the guiding principle of Indian for- To uphold rule of law and freedom eign policy. of seas, Delhi is weaving a deeper Between National Interests and security-cooperation network among Indo-Pacific stakeholders. International Responsibilities This is taking the form of a grow- India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while ing number of logistics agree- being a critical component of ments, intelligence sharing ar- Delhi’s China policy, also enumer- rangements, advancing maritime ates an open, inclusive, and cooper- capacity building, maritime do- ative construct to maximize geopo- main awareness, and strengthen- litical advantages and geo-eco- ing interoperability between navies nomic guarantees in advancing In- through joint drills like the Mala- dia’s global influence. bar exercise in key theatres. India has conceived the Indo-Pacific Maritime security is at the heart of Ocean Initiative (IPOI), building Indo-Pacific construct. While the Indo-Pacific Perspective │31

Basu on the Security and Growth for All vulnerabilities in key sectors like in the Region (SAGAR) doctrine, in pharmaceuticals, medical devices, its quest for securing maritime semiconductors, automotives, and global commons and present gov- chemicals. India’s recent involve- ernance solutions to shared mari- ment along with in the Five time challenges. In designing a Eyes intelligence-sharing frame- rules-based regional architecture, work is designed to navigate ten- India’s IPOI rests upon the seven sions between law enforcement pillars of maritime security, mari- and the encryption policies of tech time ecology, maritime resources, companies – another demonstra- capacity building and resource tion of Delhi’s rising interest in sharing, disaster risk reduction forming global coalitions. and management, science, technol- India accords primacy to advancing ogy and academic cooperation, and regional connectivity and infra- trade connectivity and maritime structure across the Indo-Pacific. 19 transport. This has gained trac- Doing so not only connects the eco- tion with other maritime democra- nomic growth poles and advances cies like Japan and , and regional economic linkages, pro- also features in the India-ASEAN duction networks and value chains, Plan of Action (2021-2025). but also acts as strategic leverage Strategic pursuit of a free, open, in the great power game. As host and inclusive Indo-Pacific is shap- nations today have several financ- ing India’s issue-based alignments ing options, including BRI, India with various Indo-Pacific stake- advocates infrastructure projects holders, especially the United underpinned by consultative prac- States, Japan, Australia, and tices involving local stakeholders. in addition to ASEAN and India’s infrastructure outreach is the European Union in bilateral, driven by compliance with global trilateral, quadrilateral and “Quad governance standards, including plus” strategic geometries. While respect for sovereignty, responsible the Quadrilateral Security dia- debt financing practices, and eco- logue (“Quad”) is anchored by a de- logical sustainability. As such, In- sire to keep maritime highways dia has steered a Coalition for Dis- free and open, coordination under aster Resilient Infrastructure and the India-Japan-Australia Supply International Solar Alliance. Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) Infrastructure financing is a vital is driven by the need to map and geo-economic instrument of state- manage supply-chain craft and India is catching up by Indo-Pacific Perspective │32

India’s Indo-Pacific Reckoning tapping into the joint capacities of strategic metals and minerals. strategic partners like Japan and Revisiting the global economic or- the United States to deliver on the der became apparent following shared responsibility of addressing Covid-19. The pandemic unleashed the infrastructure gap. The Indo- severe economic contraction across Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral the world, and tentatively dialed Forum aims to channel the assets down India’s growth story. The dis- and resources of the India-Japan- ruption has made Delhi devise the United States private sectors to ad- Atmanirbhar Bharat strategy dress the infrastructure gap. More- which has sparked a fierce debate over, India is inching towards join- on globalization versus economic ing forces with the US-Japan-Aus- autarky. To be clear, Prime Minis- tralia-led Blue Dot Network ter Modi’s self-reliance policy is not (BDN), seeking to advance high about being self-contained or being quality infrastructure. Japan has closed to the world but is driven by emerged as India’s preferred part- India’s determination to enhance ner in third country co-operation its economic contribution to the with a few success stories to boast global economy. India’s exit from in the Bay of Bengal. the Regional Comprehensive Eco- Beyond hard infrastructure, strate- nomic Partnership (RCEP) pact, gic competition also centers on which took place even before the technology and data. Given the vi- COVID-19 pandemic struck, un- tality of digital connectivity and se- derscores the domestic compul- cured networks, India is coordinat- sions and urgent need to accelerate ing with like-minded partners at structural reforms and enhance the D-10 on strategic vulnerabili- competitiveness. ties and national-security chal- India’s ability to economically en- lenges posed by critical technolo- gage with the region remains im- gies including 5G. The Open Radio perative since economic isolation is Access Network (O-RAN) is driving not an option. But the RCEP nego- the discourse and an O-RAN Policy tiations proved that the world is Coalition is formed to advance perhaps unwilling to accommodate open and interoperable solutions India’s interest despite the size of aimed at enabling innovation. Mu- its market. India’s target of becom- tual interests could drive momen- ing a US$5 trillion economy is con- tum on key verticals including arti- tingent on becoming able to with- ficial intelligence, quantum tech- stand global competition and seize nologies, space technologies and in benefits from export opportunities Indo-Pacific Perspective │33

Basu

that external markets offer. Multi- initial reluctance and is ready to lateral agreements create such ex- step up to the challenge. Structural panded opportunity.20 organization in the Indian foreign Walking the Talk ministry (the creation in 2019 of an Indo-Pacific division) and institu- While the Indo-Pacific is dominat- tion of key 2+2 dialogues with ma- ing the political lexicon and strate- jor Indo-Pacific powers like the US, gic thinking in Delhi, the biggest Japan, and Australia; elevating the challenge will be matching political Quad’s profile; and the rise of Indo- intent with material and national Pacific trilaterals with India-Ja- capacity. The conversation on the pan-US, India-Japan-Australia, In- Indo-Pacific gained traction with dia-Australia-France, and India- Japanese Prime Minister Abe -Australia – all of these Shinzo’s landmark speech in the developments demonstrate Delhi’s Indian Parliament – “Confluence of quest to engage in a collaborative the Two Seas” - capturing the dy- and cooperative framework to de- namic coupling of the Indian and sign a free and open Indo-Pacific. Pacific Oceans as seas of freedom Without doubt, India is now walk- and prosperity. India’s “Look East ing the walk when it comes to Policy,” meanwhile, pivoted to “Act Indo-Pacific order. ■ East” and subsequently the idea of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” If Dr. Titli Basu geopolitical churning in the major capitals of the world have posi- Dr. Basu is an associate fellow at tioned India at the heart of their the Manohar Parrikar Institute for respective Indo-Pacific strategy, Defence Studies and Analyses. India has, for its part, shed its

Notes Syndicate, August 21, 2020, https://www.project-syn- dicate.org/. 1 “What Does China Really Spend on its Military?,” 5 “Multipolar World Should Include Multipolar Asia: CSIS China Power, September 15, 2020, Jaishankar,” The Hindu, September 19, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/. https://www.thehindu.com/. 2 Graham Allison, “China Is Now the World’s Largest 6 S D Muni, “While seeking equilibrium with China, Economy. We Shouldn’t Be Shocked,” National Inter- diplomatic adjustments through give-and-take must est, October 15, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/. be explored,” Indian Express, August 25, 2020, 3 Ananth Krishnan, “For Minor Tactical Gains on the https://indianexpress.com/. Ground, China has Strategically Lost India, Says 7 Raja Mohan, “China’s hegemonic ambitions mean Former Indian Ambassador to China,” The Hindu, that Beijing’s focus is now on building Chinese cen- June 21, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/. tury,” Indian Express, July 7, 2020, https://indianex- 4 Brahma Chellaney, “China Alone,” Project press.com/. Indo-Pacific Perspective │34

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relations,” Indian Express, October 6, 2020, 8 Ministry of External Affairs, “External Affairs Min- https://indianexpress.com/. ister in Conversation at Raisina Dialogue 2020: The 17 Suhashini Haidar, “More ups than down, and India Way,” January 16, 2020, many surprise turns in Trump’s foreign policy for In- https://www.mea.gov.in/. dia,” The Hindu, November 1, 2020, https://www.the- 9 Ministry of External Affairs, “Geopolitics of Oppor- hindu.com/. tunity: As World Rebalances, How should India Capi- 18 Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: talise?,” YouTube, July 20, 2020, ’s Theater of Opportunity,” Carnegie Work- https://www.youtube.com/ . ing Paper, June 2020, https://carnegieendow- 10 Ministry of External Affairs, “External Affairs ment.org/. Minister's speech at the 4th Ramnath Goenka Lec- 19 Harsh Vardhan Shringla, “More and more coun- ture, 2019,” November 14, 2019, https://mea.gov.in/. tries now share India’s vision for the region,” Indian 11 and Samir Saran, “The New Express, November 7, 2020, https://indianex- World Disorder and The Indian Imperative - an ex- press.com/. tract,” World Economic Forum, January 22, 2020, 20 Pradeep S. Mehta and Amol Kulkarni, “Why India https://www.weforum.org/. Shouldn’t View its Refusal to Join RCEP as a Vic- 12 Shivshankar Menon, “China-US Contention Has tory,” The Wire, November 6, 2019, Opened Up Space for Other Powers, Including India,” https://thewire.in/. The Wire, December 24, 2018, https://thewire.in/. 13 Shinvshankar Menon, “India’s Foreign Affairs Strategy,” Impact Series, Brookings Institution, May Disclaimer 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/. The views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA 14 Arzan Tarapore, “India does not need a Cold War are those of the authors and should not be construed alliance,” East Asia Forum, July 27, 2020, as carrying the official sanction of the Department of https://www.eastasiaforum.org/. Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Com- 15 Ministry of External Affairs, “EAM's interaction at mand, Air University, or other agencies or depart- USIBC India Idea Summit,” July 22, 2020, ments of the US government or their international https://www.mea.gov.in/. equivalents. 16 C. Raja Mohan, “Confusion reigns on what the Quad is and its future in India’s international

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