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The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902

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The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 ( 297 ) CHAPTEE IX THE BRANDWATER BASIN I The battle of Diamond Hill, which removed the immediate menace of Botha's army on Pretoria, coincided with the entry of General Buller's army into the Transvaal from Natal, and Roberts's with the occupation of Kustenbnrg and Potchefstroom by ^°amond Generals Baden-Powell and Hunter from the west. By the Hill, middle of June therefore the colonies of N'atal and of the Cape had been almost entirely freed from rebellion or in- vasion. The Free State had been traversed from end to end and annexed to the British dominions, and in the Transvaal the capital and several of the principal towns were already in Lord Eoberts's hands. The only portion of the five English or Dutch states in South Africa which Lord Eoberts's armies had not touched were the country to the north and east of Pretoria in the Transvaal, and the north-eastern corner of the Free State.* But the very rapidity and magnitude of Lord Eoberts's success rendered his position for the moment more precarious, and the same map which measures his victory indicates also his Weak points weakness. The English at this time had over 200,000 soldiers in the field, the Boers possibly 20,000. But against this numerical superiority of the English must be set the following facts. In the first place, Eoberts's main army had only one line of communication with its sea-base, and that a line over 1,000 miles in length. Secondly, in the invaded territories obedience could not be enforced nor protection afforded to neutrals except within the very restricted areas actually * The extent of Lord Roberts's success may be measured by the map facing p. 268, which shows the respective positions of the British and Boer armies at the end of June. 298 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA occupied by British troops, with the result that about three- quarters of Lord Koberts's army was immobile, beiug required to ^hold the railway or strategical posts in the conquered territory. Lastly, Lord Eoberts had no immediate means of increasing his numbers. On the other hand, the Boers, besides their force actually in the field, could always reckon on another fully as large dispersed on the farms, but ready on occasion to take their turn at fighting also ; they could rely on a friendly population for supplies. Moreover, the Tree Staters had nothing to tie them down, being free to disperse and gather again for any enterprise. In the Trans- vaal the presence of President Kruger and the Government on the Delagoa Bay line kept Botha's army within a more restricted area, but having only one fixed point to defend, it still had considerable scope for activity. No great Lord Eoberts would no doubt still have been vulnerable, reduction of as long as he had only one line of supply, even if a very the Boer forces since limited number of irregular bands of Boers had been able to Paardeberg. roam about the country. In fact, however, since Paardeberg no defeat had been inflicted on the Boers serious enough to cause a permanent diminution of their fighting forces. Nor was this surprising, for since leaving Bloemfontein Lord Eoberts had aimed at little more than advancing as fast as possible, counting on the moral effect of his progress rather than on real defeats. Surrenders indeed had been numerous after every important stage in the advance of a column, but they were surrenders either of men who had never fought with much alacrity, or of those ready to take up arms again as soon as a returning commando offered them an excuse. The Boer organized forces, therefore, as far as they ever were organized, were still unimpaired. Lord Eoberts's first task now was to effect a permanent reduction of them. Eoberts's His experience during the first week at Pretoria, when he determina- found himself cut off from all supplies, had convinced him of tion to conquer his insecurity as long as the Free State commandos in the Boers in N.E, ' north-east of the colony were still uncrushed. Even Free State. new before the battle of Diamond Hill he had begun making plans for their defeat, and, as soon as that battle had given him a temporary respite, and Lord Kitchener had re-opened railway TEE BRANDWATER BASIN 299 communication with the south, he set in motion the columns which were to carry out his scheme. The positions of the Boer forces in this part had now Distribution their been determined, although numbers were probably fgrcesT under-estimated at headquarters. Tor some time after the first capture of Lindley, Steyn and the Free State Govern- ment had been established between Frankfort and Heilbron within reach of the Transvaal, on which they still depended for their supplies of ammunition ; Vrede was also useful to them for the same reason, as Lord Eoberts had recog- nised when he tried to induce Buller to go there. But by the end of June Steyn had come down to Bethlehem, the only other place of any importance besides Harrismith still held by his Government. Eound Bethlehem and Lindley the most active part of the Free State forces, including the Bethle- hem, Heilbron, and Kroonstad commandos and Theron's and Scheeper's scouts were assembled imder de Wet himself. The Harrismith and Vrede commandos were still guarding Van Eeenen's Pass, the Ficksburg, Ladybrand, and Senekal commandos were holding Zuringkranz and the Wittebergen, the Winburg commando was in the Doornberg, and a small por- tion of the Heilbron commando were in their own district. Lord Eoberts's first scheme for dealing with these forces Roberts's ^cbeme to was made known on June 14 in a circular telegram to his o deal with generals in the Free State. Besides Heidelberg in the Trans- them, vaal, Frankfort, Heilbron, Lindley, Senekal and Winburg were to be held with garrisons ; Bundle, without losing control of his present line from Ficksburg to Senekal, was to move up to Bethlehem and Vrede, while Buller, at Standerton, blocked retreat into the Transvaal ; and four flying columns, one from the Transvaal, MacDonald's from Heilbron, Clements's from Senekal, and Methuen's from the railway, operating in the area thus enclosed, were to drive all the Boers still left in arms to submission. The column chosen to co-operate from the Transvaal was Ian Hamilton's.* On the 16th June it was recalled to Pretoria from Eland's Eiver Station, whither it had proceeded in the vain attempt to pursue the Boers * Broadwood's and Gordon's cavalry brigades, Ridley's M.I. brigade, Bruce Hamilton's infantry brigade. 800 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA after Diamond Hill ; three days later it started off towards Heidelberg, which was captured after a small fight on June 23. On this day Ian Hamilton imfortunately broke his collar-bone as a consequence of a fall from his horse. Luckily, however, General Hunter had just arrived from the Western Transvaal, and Lord Koberts transferred the com- mand to him. The original plan was subsequently modified in other small details also, though in its main outline it remained unchanged. Eundle urged that the country towards Vrede was so difficult that he would require most of his force to enable him to reach it, and would thus have to leave the line he now occupying dangerously exposed finally was ; he was told to remain where he was with the additional duties of garrisoning Senekal, in order to set Clements free, and of forming a second line, with headquarters at Trommel, in order to keep up the connection between Ficks- burg and Winburg ; he was also to detach 700 of the Colonial Division as a mounted force for Clements. To Clements was assigned the capture of Bethlehem, and Paget was ordered to join forces with him in that undertaking ; Methuen was to hold Heilbron and patrol the country north of it and south as far as Lindley, thus setting free MacDonald. The idea of the operations which now took place was entirely Lord Eoberts's, and though in the development of the scheme Hunter was put in immediate command of all the columns in the north-eastern Free State, Eoberts himself kept a guiding hand on everything, and throughout received reports and issued occasional directions from Pretoria. June 26- It will be noticed that the only force of Free Staters who peditkins^o' were now outside the area contemplated for this first big the Doom- " drive "in the war was the Winburg commando in the Doorn- berg, under the command of General Eoux and Commandant Haasbroek. They were a menace not only to the railway but also to Clements's and Eundle's convoys marching to and from Winburg. Thus, on June 23, when Clements was going from Senekal to Winburg with a convoy of sick, he was attacked half-way by Eoux, and, though he succeeded in driving off his assailants, he inflicted no serious damage upon them. On his return journey, therefore, he made an attempt — THE BRAND WATER BASIN 301 to deal with them. Expecting attack at the same place on June 26, he ordered Colonel Grenfell, in command of the mounted detachment lent to him by Eundle, to go from Senekal along the ICroonstad road to Leliefontein and fall upon the Boer rear while they were engaged in attacking his convoy on the Winburg-Senekal road further south. Grenfell * started on the night of the 25th, but at dawn next morning, instead of being in a position to attack, was surprised by a force of Boers who, unknown to him, had camped three miles south of his bivouac.
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