Appellants' Brief
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
PENNY M. VENETIS, ESQ. RUTGERS CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION CLINIC* 123 Washington Street Newark, New Jersey 07102 Tel: (973) 353-5687 JOHN McGAHREN, ESQ. CAROLINE BARTLETT, ESQ. ROBERT P. ARTER, ESQ. PATTON BOGGS LLP The Legal Center One Riverfront Plaza, 6th Floor Newark, New Jersey 07102 Tel: (973) 848-5600 Fax: (973) 848-5601 Attorneys for Plaintiffs ASSEMBLYMAN REED GUSCIORA, SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY STEPHANIE HARRIS, COALITION APPELLATE DIVISION FOR PEACE ACTION, and NEW JERSEY PEACE ACTION, DOCKET NO.: A-005608-10T3 Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. On Appeal from: CHRISTOPHER J. CHRISTIE, LAW DIVISION: MERCER GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW COUNTY DOCKET NO.: JERSEY, (in his official MER-L-2691-04 capacity) and KIMBERLY Sat below: Linda R. GUADAGNO, SECRETARY OF STATE Feinberg, A.J.S.C. OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (in her official capacity), CIVIL ACTION Defendants/Respondents. BRIEF OF APPELLANTS * Counsel for Appellants acknowledge the work of Rutgers Law School Students Julia Casteleiro, Isabel Chou, Mark Heinzelmann, Erin Phalon and Jorge Sanchez in helping to prepare this brief. 114626 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ xvii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.......................................... 1 PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................. 4 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS........................................ 10 I. BACKGROUND.......................................... 10 II. APPELLANTS HAVE PROVEN THAT THE SEQUOIA ADVANTAGE 9.00H AND ITS WinEDS TABULATION SYSTEM CAN BE HACKED EASILY....................................... 17 A. There Is Overwhelming And Uncontested Evidence Showing That The Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H Is Unreliable.................. 17 1. The Sequoia Advantage 9.00H Is Unreliable Because A Legitimate ROM Chip On The Motherboard Can Be Easily Replaced With A Fraudulent ROM Chip That Makes The DRE Cheat....................... 17 2. The Sequoia Advantage 9.00H Is Unreliable Because Anyone With Moderate Computer Skills Can Devise Many Other Ways To Make It Steal Votes............... 22 3. The Sequoia 9.00H Is Unreliable Because Hundreds Of Thousands Of Individuals Possess The Skills To Create Fraudulent Vote-Stealing Firmware In The Form Of A Fake Z80 Chip On The Motherboard.......... 25 4. The Sequoia 9.00H Is Unreliable Because Fraudulent Firmware Can Easily Create Redundant, Identical Records Which All Agree, And Render Fraudulent Election Results Completely Unauditable............ 29 5. The Sequoia 9.00H Is Unreliable Because The Skills Needed To Create And Install Fraudulent Firmware On It Are Common...... 30 - i - 114626 6. The Sequoia Advantage 9.00H Daughterboard Is Particularly Unreliable................................ 33 a. The Daughterboard Is Another Computer Inside The DRE.............. 33 b. The Daughterboard’s Use of Flash Memory to Store Firmware is Extremely Insecure and Unreliable.... 33 c. Connecting WinEDS Computers To The Internet Multiplies The Danger Of Daughterboard Viruses................ 35 7. Even When Operated As Intended, The Sequoia AVC Advantage DRE Is Unreliable................................ 37 a. The Option Switch Bug Has Disenfranchised New Jersey Primary Voters............................... 37 b. County Clerks And Other Constitutional Officers Doubt The Reliability Of The Sequoia Advantage And The Validity Of The 2008 Presidential Primary............ 41 c. Protections Against The Option Switch Bug Have Not Been Adequately Addressed By The State Or Sequoia. ... 43 8. Many Other Bugs And Sloppy Software Practices Make The Sequoia Advantage 9.00H Unreliable.......................... 45 a. The Buffer Overrun Bug Can Shut Down The Advantage................... 45 b. Known Sloppy Practices And Bugs Make It More Likely That There Are More Bugs In The 9.00H............... 46 9. The Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H Is Unreliable Because It Falsely Tells Voters That Votes Are Recorded When They Are Not.............................. 48 - ii - 114626 10. The Sequoia 9.00H Is Unreliable Because Its Flawed User Interface Can Confuse Voters And Cause Lost Votes............... 50 11. The Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H Is Unreliable Because It Does Not Allow a Voter to Undo a Write-In Vote, Violating Federal Guidelines.............. 52 12. Prof. Appel Testified About Other Serious Flaws In The Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H DRE That Make It Unreliable................................ 53 B. The Sequoia Advantage WinEDS Vote Tabulating System Is Not Reliable......................... 54 1. The WinEDS System Is Unreliable Because It Cannot Ascertain Whether DREs Have Been Corrupted............................ 54 2. The Sequoia Advantage WinEDS System Is Unreliable Because A Bug In WinEDS Causes The Advantage 9.00H DRE To Fail To Report Candidate Vote Totals........... 56 III. APPELLANTS HAVE PROVEN THAT THE SEQUOIA ADVANTAGE DREs AND THE WinEDS SYSTEM ARE INSECURE AND READILY ACCESSIBLE TO HACKERS....................... 57 A. DREs Can Be Hacked At Polling Places And Warehouses By Insiders, Contract Workers, And The General Public. ............................ 57 1. The General Public Can Easily Access DREs At Polling Places And Hack The DREs...................................... 58 2. Warehouses Storing DREs Are Insecure...... 61 3. “Insiders” Pose The Greatest Risk To Tampering With The State’s Election Equipment................................. 64 4. DREs Can Be Hacked By Third Party Contractors............................... 67 5. New Jersey Has No Protections In Place For Its Voting Machines................... 69 - iii - 114626 B. DREs Can Be Purchased From The Internet........ 71 C. Once An Attacker Gains Access To The ROM Chip, The Attacked Can Reverse Engineer It To Create Vote-Stealing Software............... 72 D. WinEDS Is Insecure And Can Be Manipulated To Change Election Results........................ 74 1. Vote-Stealing Viruses From The Internet Can Infect Computers Running The WinEDs Election Tabulation Software And Can Propagate Through County Computers And Networks Used For Vote Tabulation......... 74 a. AmpX Was Downloaded From The Internet Causing Severe Vulnerabilities...................... 79 b. WinEDS Computers Can Be Connected To The Internet...................... 80 c. Any Computer Connected To Both The Internet And Internal Network Can Corrupt The Whole Network............ 82 d. Should Any WinEDS Computers Become Corrupted, The Integrity Of The Results Cartridge Becomes Suspect.... 84 e. Viral Propagation Can Infect The Daughterboard Of The AVC Advantage............................ 87 f. Appellees’ Witnesses Agree With Prof. Appel That Any Connection To The Internet Raises Serious Security Concerns.................... 89 IV. THE LACK OF STATE OVERSIGHT OF ELECTIONS OR STATE-WIDE PROCEDURES FOR POLL WORKERS MAKES MANIPULATING ELECTION RESULTS EASY.................. 92 A. New Jersey Does Not Have Uniform Procedures For Running Elections.......................... 92 1. Paper Results Reports Printed At The Close Of Polls Are The Superior Form Of Vote Tabulation........................... 93 - iv - 114626 B. It Is Easy For A Dishonest Poll Worker Or Election Staffer To Print Fraudulent Results Reports From Results Cartridges................ 95 C. Counties Rely On Results Cartridges For Official Election Results, And Do Not Use The Printed Results Report That Is Signed By Witnesses When The Polls Close................. 96 D. The State Relies On Results Cartridges For Election Results Even Though There Are Many Opportunities To Manipulate Results Cartridges.................................... 100 E. Results Cartridges Can Easily Be Acquired And Be Converted, Falsified, Or Altered To Manipulate Election Results................... 102 F. The State Does Not Require That Signed, Printed Result Reports Be Compared Against Results Cartridge Results..................... 108 V. THE STATE’S HAPHAZARD ATTEMPT TO DEVISE “SECURITY MEASURES” FOR USE ON DREs ONLY DEMONSTRATED THE STATE’S INCOMPETENCE............................... 110 A. Security Seals And Measures Proposed For Use By The State Were All Readily Defeated By Appellants’ Experts........................... 110 B. The State’s Haphazard Approach To Physical Security Does Not Protect DREs................ 111 1. Dr. Johnston Concluded That New Jersey Does Not Have An Effective Security Protocol in Place........................ 112 2. The State Took the Advice of Vendors on What Seals to Use........................ 115 3. Mr. Giles’ Lack Of Understanding Of Security Issues Exacerbates The Vulnerabilities Of New Jersey’s DREs..... 116 C. Retroactively Adding Security Products To An Insecurely Designed System Does Not Work; In Such Instances, Dr. Johnston And His Team - v - 114626 Recommend Exploring Different Security Approaches.................................... 118 VI. APPELLANTS’ EXPERTS’ ARE BETTER QUALIFIED TO ASSESS THE RELIABILITY AND ACCURACY OF THE SEQUOIA ADVANTAGE 9.00H. ................................... 119 A. Appellants’ Experts Are Better Qualified...... 120 1. Prof. Andrew Appel:...................... 120 2. Dr. Roger Johnston:...................... 123 3. Prof. Wayne Wolf:........................ 126 B. Appellees’ Experts Are Not Qualified To Issue Opinions Concerning New Jersey’s DREs... 128 C. Appellants’ Experts Examined The DREs And Security Seals................................ 132 D. APPELLANTS’ EXPERTS’ OPINIONS AND BELIEFS ARE SHARED BY MEMBERS OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY, WHILE APPELLEES’ EXPERTS’ OPINIONS ARE NOT.............................. 136 VII. FACTS RELATED