A Survey of Security Issues in Hardware Virtualization
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Iocage Documentation Release 1.2
iocage Documentation Release 1.2 Brandon Schneider and Peter Toth Sep 26, 2019 Contents 1 Documentation: 3 1.1 Install iocage...............................................3 1.2 Basic Usage...............................................6 1.3 Plugins.................................................. 10 1.4 Networking................................................ 11 1.5 Jail Types................................................. 14 1.6 Best Practices............................................... 15 1.7 Advanced Usage............................................. 16 1.8 Using Templates............................................. 20 1.9 Create a Debian Squeeze Jail (GNU/kFreeBSD)............................ 21 1.10 Known Issues............................................... 22 1.11 FAQ.................................................... 23 1.12 Indices and tables............................................ 24 Index 25 i ii iocage Documentation, Release 1.2 iocage is a jail/container manager written in Python, combining some of the best features and technologies the FreeBSD operating system has to offer. It is geared for ease of use with a simplistic and easy to learn command syntax. FEATURES: • Templates, basejails, and normal jails • Easy to use • Rapid thin provisioning within seconds • Automatic package installation • Virtual networking stacks (vnet) • Shared IP based jails (non vnet) • Dedicated ZFS datasets inside jails • Transparent ZFS snapshot management • Binary updates • Export and import • And many more! Contents 1 iocage Documentation, -
Oracle Solaris: the Carrier-Grade Operating System Technical Brief
An Oracle White Paper February 2011 Oracle Solaris: The Carrier-Grade Operating System Oracle White Paper—Oracle Solaris: The Carrier-Grade OS Executive Summary.............................................................................1 ® Powering Communication—The Oracle Solaris Ecosystem..............3 Integrated and Optimized Stack ......................................................5 End-to-End Security ........................................................................5 Unparalleled Performance and Scalability.......................................6 Increased Reliability ........................................................................7 Unmatched Flexibility ......................................................................7 SCOPE Alliance ..............................................................................7 Security................................................................................................8 Security Hardening and Monitoring .................................................8 Process and User Rights Management...........................................9 Network Security and Encrypted Communications .......................10 Virtualization ......................................................................................13 Oracle VM Server for SPARC .......................................................13 Oracle Solaris Zones .....................................................................14 Virtualized Networking...................................................................15 -
Tampere University Research Portal
Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto. Julkaisu 800 Tampere University of Technology. Publication 800 Francis Tam Service Availability Standards for Carrier-Grade Platforms: Creation and Deployment in Mobile Networks Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Technology to be presented with due permission for public examination and criticism in Tietotalo Building, Auditorium TB222, at Tampere University of Technology, on the 15th of May 2009, at 12 noon. Tampereen teknillinen yliopisto - Tampere University of Technology Tampere 2009 ISBN 978-952-15-2134-8 (printed) ISBN 978-952-15-2158-4 (PDF) ISSN 1459-2045 Abstract The rapid development of the mobile network industry has raised considerably the expectations and requirements of the whole chain of stakeholders, from the end users through the mobile network operators and ultimately to the network equipment providers. A key expectation from an end user is service availability, which is a perception that services are continuously operational even in the presence of failures in the mobile network. Network equipment providers have been using carrier-grade platforms to provide various support functions including high availability as reusable assets for products creation. The term carrier-grade refers to a class of systems used in public telecommunications network that deliver up to five nines or six nines (99.999% or 99.9999%) availability. The convergence of communications and information technology in the industry has led to more competition and pressure to reduce development efforts. By creating a service availability standard, Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software can be bought and integrated into a carrier-grade platform, enabling a company to focus on the core business and concentrate the resource investment onto new innovations. -
Freebsd's Jail(2) Facility
Lousy virtualization, Happy users: FreeBSD's jail(2) facility Poul-Henning Kamp [email protected] CHROOT(2) FreeBSD System Calls Manual CHROOT(2) NAME chroot -- change root directory LIBRARY Standard C Library (libc, -lc) SYNOPSIS #include <unistd.h> int chroot(const char *dirname); Calling chroot(2) in ftpd(1) implemented ”anonymous FTP” without the hazzle of file/pathname parsing and editing. ”anonymous FTP” became used as a tool to enhance network security. By inference, chroot(2) became seen as a security enhancing feature. ...The source were not strong in those. Exercise 1: List at least four ways to escape chroot(2). Then the Internet happened, ...and web-servers, ...and web-hosting Virtual hosts in Apache User get their own ”virtual apache” but do do not get your own machine. Also shared: Databases mailprograms PHP/Perl etc. Upgrading tools (PHP, mySQL etc) on virtual hosting machines is a nightmare. A really bad nightmare: Cust#1 needs mySQL version > N Cust#2 cannot use mySQL version <M (unless PHP version > K) Cust#3 does not answer telephone Cust#4 has new sysadmin Cust#5 is just about ready with new version Wanted: Lightweight virtualization Same kernel, but virtual filesystem and network address plus root limitations. Just like chroot(2) with IP numbers on top. Will pay cash. Close holes in chroot(2) Introduce ”jail” syscall + kernel struct Block jailed root in most suser(9) calls. Check ”if jail, same jail ?” in strategic places. Fiddle socket syscall arguments: INADDR_ANY -> jail.ip INADDR_LOOPBACK -> jail.ip Not part of jail(2): Resource restriction Hardware virtualization Covert channel prevention (the hard stuff) Total implementation: 350 changed source lines 400 new lines of code FreeBSD without jail usr Resources of various sorts / home var process process process process process process Kernel FreeBSD with jail usr Resources of various sorts / home var process process process process* process process Kernel error = priv_check_cred( cred, PRIV_VFS_LINK, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL); if (error) return (error); The unjailed part One jailed part of the system. -
Sandboxing 2 Change Root: Chroot()
Sandboxing 2 Change Root: chroot() Oldest Unix isolation mechanism Make a process believe that some subtree is the entire file system File outside of this subtree simply don’t exist Sounds good, but. Sandboxing 2 2 / 47 Chroot Sandboxing 2 3 / 47 Limitations of Chroot Only root can invoke it. (Why?) Setting up minimum necessary environment can be painful The program to execute generally needs to live within the subtree, where it’s exposed Still vulnerable to root compromise Doesn’t protect network identity Sandboxing 2 4 / 47 Root versus Chroot Suppose an ordinary user could use chroot() Create a link to the sudo command Create /etc and /etc/passwd with a known root password Create links to any files you want to read or write Besides, root can escape from chroot() Sandboxing 2 5 / 47 Escaping Chroot What is the current directory? If it’s not under the chroot() tree, try chdir("../../..") Better escape: create device files On Unix, all (non-network) devices have filenames Even physical memory has a filename Create a physical memory device, open it, and change the kernel data structures to remove the restriction Create a disk device, and mount a file system on it. Then chroot() to the real root (On Unix systems, disks other than the root file system are “mounted” as a subtree somewhere) Sandboxing 2 6 / 47 Trying Chroot # mkdir /usr/sandbox /usr/sandbox/bin # cp /bin/sh /usr/sandbox/bin/sh # chroot /usr/sandbox /bin/sh chroot: /bin/sh: Exec format error # mkdir /usr/sandbox/libexec # cp /libexec/ld.elf_so /usr/sandbox/libexec # chroot /usr/sandbox -
Wireless Network Virtualization: Ensuring Carrier Grade Availability
™ AN INTEL COMPANY Wireless Network Virtualization: Ensuring Carrier Grade Availability WHEN IT MATTERS, IT RUNS ON WIND RIVER WIRELESS NETWORK VIRTUALIZATION: ENSURING CARRIER GRADE AVAILABILITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The wireless industry’s battle to acquire new subscribers and retain existing ones is accelerating the need for new services. Profit margins are under pressure from the increased infrastructure and operations costs required to satisfy the growing demand. Network functions virtualization (NFV), a rapidly growing initiative in telecom networks, promises to revolutionize how networks are architected and managed. It allows communications service providers (CSPs) to virtualize network functions and consolidate them on standard off-the-shelf servers. Although 4G LTE is effective at meeting the increasing bandwidth demands at lower costs than its predecessors, its mobile base station, E-UTRAN Node B (eNB), located at the edge of the radio access network (RAN), is underutilized at certain times of the day and has grown in complexity, resulting in higher downtime and field maintenance costs. As a result, the eNB is a good candidate for NFV. Cloud-RAN (C-RAN) is the virtualization of the eNB’s control plane and data plane functions, consolidating it in one or more data centers. The result is significantly higher equipment utilization, cost-efficient redundancy to achieve high availability, and lower operations and maintenance costs. However, to realize these benefits, the foundation for virtualized eNBs must be a robust, carrier grade NFV platform that incorporates advanced fault management features. Poor implementation results in lower quality execution with excessive outage and maintenance costs. Wind River® Titanium Cloud is the industry’s first NFV-ready solution that incorporates advanced carrier grade fault, security, performance, and network management features. -
Carrier Grade Virtualization
Carrier Grade Virtualization Leveraging virtualization in Carrier Grade Systems Abstract Network Equipment Providers (NEPs) have been building networking infrastructure equipment able to deliver “carrier grade” services, typically mission-critical services such as voice telephony. In decades past, NEPs have achieved high degrees of availability through purpose-built hardware and software implementations. Today they increasingly build on COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) hardware and Open Source Software (OSS), freeing their engineering resources to focus on core telephony competencies. The move to COTS and OSS requires that these hardware and software components be available from an ecosystem of suppliers, and that they interoperate seamlessly. Bodies such as The Linux Foundation (LF), the Service Availability Forum (SA Forum) and PICMG have defined standards and specifications such as carrier grade OSes (CGLinux), Service Availability Forum APIs and AdvancedTCA hardware to target carrier grade applications. Recent advances have made virtualization appealing for carrier class equipment by permitting significant cost reduction through consolidation of workloads and of physical hardware. Virtualization also transparently lets NEPs and other OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) leverage multi-core processors to run legacy software designed for uniprocessor hardware. However, virtualization needs to meet specific requirements to enable network equipment deploying this technology to meet industry expectations for carrier grade systems. This -
Energy Efficiency in Office Computing Environments
Fakulät für Informatik und Mathematik Universität Passau, Germany Energy Efficiency in Office Computing Environments Andreas Berl Supervisor: Hermann de Meer A thesis submitted for Doctoral Degree March 2011 1. Reviewer: Prof. Hermann de Meer Professor of Computer Networks and Communications University of Passau Innstr. 43 94032 Passau, Germany Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.net.fim.uni-passau.de 2. Reviewer: Prof. David Hutchison Director of InfoLab21 and Professor of Computing Lancaster University LA1 4WA Lancaster, UK Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.infolab21.lancs.ac.uk Abstract The increasing cost of energy and the worldwide desire to reduce CO2 emissions has raised concern about the energy efficiency of information and communica- tion technology. Whilst research has focused on data centres recently, this thesis identifies office computing environments as significant consumers of energy. Office computing environments offer great potential for energy savings: On one hand, such environments consist of a large number of hosts. On the other hand, these hosts often remain turned on 24 hours per day while being underutilised or even idle. This thesis analyzes the energy consumption within office computing environments and suggests an energy-efficient virtualized office environment. The office environment is virtualized to achieve flexible virtualized office resources that enable an energy-based resource management. This resource management stops idle services and idle hosts from consuming resources within the office and consolidates utilised office services on office hosts. This increases the utilisation of some hosts while other hosts are turned off to save energy. The suggested architecture is based on a decentralized approach that can be applied to all kinds of office computing environments, even if no centralized data centre infrastructure is available. -
Carrier Grade Linux Requirements Definition
Carrier Grade Linux Requirements Definition The Linux Foundation Version 5.0 1796 18th Street S u i t e C Prepared by the Carrier Grade Linux Working Group San Francisco CA 94107, USA Copyright (c) 2005, 2006, 2007, 2011 by The Linux +1 (415) 723 - 9 7 0 9 Foundation. This material may be distributed only subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Open Publication License, v1.0 or later (the latest version is available at http://www.opencontent.org/opl.shtml/). Distribution of substantively modified versions of this document is prohibited without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. Linux is a Registered Trademark of Linus Torvalds. Other company, product, or service names may be the trademarks of others. CONTRIBUTORS TO THE CGL 5.0 REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION INCLUDE (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER): Last Name First Name Company Anderson Matt HP Anderson Tim MontaVista Software Awad Majid Intel Aziz Khalid HP Badovinatz Peter IBM Bozarth Brad Cisco Cauchy Dan MontaVista Software Chacron Eric Alcatel Chen Terence Intel Cherry John OSDL Christopher Johnson Sun Microsystems Cihula Jospeh Intel Cress Andrew Intel Dague Sean IBM Dake Steven MontaVista Software Flaxa Ralf Novell Fleischer Julie Intel Fleischer Julie OSDL Fox Kevin Sun Microsystems Gross Mark Intel Haddad Ibrahim Ericsson Heber Troy HP Howell David P. Intel Hu Michael Radisys Ikebe Takashi NTT Ishitsuka Seiichi NEC Jagana Venkata IBM Johnson Christopher P. Sun Microsystems Kevin Fox Sun Microsystems Kimura Masato NTT Comware Krauska Joel Cisco Kukkonen Mika Nokia La Monte.H.P Yarrol Timesys Lavonius Ville Nokia Liu Bing Wei Intel Lynch Rusty Intel * MacDonald Joe Wind River Systems Manas Saksena Timesys Nakayama Mitsuo NEC Peter-Gonzalez Inaky Intel Pourzandi Makan Ericsson Rossi Frederic Eicsson Saksena Manas Timesys Sakuma Junichi OSDL Saskena Manas Timesys Seiler Glenn Wind River Systems Smarduch Mario Motorola Takamiya Noriaki NTT Software Weijers Gé Witham Timothy D. -
April 2006 Volume 31 Number 2
APRIL 2006 VOLUME 31 NUMBER 2 THE USENIX MAGAZINE OPINION Musings RIK FARROW OpenSolaris:The Model TOM HAYNES PROGRAMMING Code Testing and Its Role in Teaching BRIAN KERNIGHAN Modular System Programming in MINIX 3 JORRIT N. HERDER, HERBERT BOS, BEN GRAS, PHILIP HOMBURG, AND ANDREW S. TANENBAUM Some Types of Memory Are More Equal Than Others DIOMEDIS SPINELLIS Simple Software Flow Analysis Using GNU Cflow CHAOS GOLUBITSKY Why You Should Use Ruby LU KE KANIES SYSADMIN Unwanted HTTP:Who Has the Time? DAVI D MALONE Auditing Superuser Usage RANDOLPH LANGLEY C OLUMNS Practical Perl Tools:Programming, Ho Hum DAVID BLANK-EDELMAN VoIP Watch HEISON CHAK /dev/random ROBERT G. FERRELL STANDARDS USENIX Standards Activities NICHOLAS M. STOUGHTON B O OK REVIEWS Book Reviews ELIZABETH ZWICKY, WITH SAM STOVER AND RI K FARROW USENIX NOTES Letter to the Editor TED DOLOTTA Fund to Establish the John Lions Chair C ONFERENCES LISA ’05:The 19th Large Installation System Administration Conference WORLDS ’05: Second Workshop on Real, Large Distributed Systems FAST ’05: 4th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies The Advanced Computing Systems Association Upcoming Events 3RD SYMPOSIUM ON NETWORKED SYSTEMS 2ND STEPS TO REDUCING UNWANTED TRAFFIC ON DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (NSDI ’06) THE INTERNET WORKSHOP (SRUTI ’06) Sponsored by USENIX, in cooperation with ACM SIGCOMM JULY 6–7, 2006, SAN JOSE, CA, USA and ACM SIGOPS http://www.usenix.org/sruti06 MAY 8–10, 2006, SAN JOSE, CA, USA Paper submissions due: April 20, 2006 http://www.usenix.org/nsdi06 2006 -
In PDF Format
Arranging Your Virtual Network on FreeBSD Michael Gmelin ([email protected]) January 2020 1 CONTENTS CONTENTS Contents Introduction 3 Document Conventions . .3 License . .3 Plain Jails 4 Plain Jails Using Inherited IP Configuration . .4 Plain Jails Using a Dedicated IP Address . .5 Plain Jails Using a VLAN IP Address . .6 Plain Jails Using a Loopback IP Address . .7 Adding Outbound NAT for Public Traffic . .7 Running a Service and Redirecting Traffic to It . .9 VNET Jails and bhyve VMs 10 VNET Jails Using sysutils/pot ............................. 10 VNET Jails Using sysutils/iocage ............................ 13 Managing Bridges . 13 Adding bhyve VMs and DHCP to the Mix . 16 Preventing Traffic Between VNET Jails/VMs . 17 Firewalling Inside VNET Jails/VMs . 20 VXLAN 22 VXLAN Example Overview . 22 Gateway Configuration . 24 Jailhost-a . 25 Network Configuration (jailhost-a) . 25 VM Configuration (jailhost-a) . 26 Jail Configuration (jailhost-a) . 27 Jailhost-b . 27 Network Configuration (jailhost-b) . 27 Plain Jail Configuration (jailhost-b) . 28 Network Switch Setup (jailhost-b) . 29 VNET Jail Configuration (jailhost-b) . 30 VM Configuration (jailhost-b) . 30 VXLAN Multicast Troubleshooting . 31 Conclusion and Further Reading 33 2020-01-08 (final) 2 CC BY 4.0 INTRODUCTION Introduction Modern FreeBSD offers a range of virtualization options, from the traditional jail environment sharing the network stack with the host operating system, over vnet jails, which allow each jail to have its own network stack, to bhyve virtual machines running their own kernels/operating systems. Depending on individual requirements, there are different ways to configure the virtual network. Jail and VM management tools can ease the process by abstracting away (at least some of) the underlying complexities. -
Running Untrusted Application Code: Sandboxing Running Untrusted Code
Running Untrusted Application Code: Sandboxing Running untrusted code We often need to run buggy/unstrusted code: programs from untrusted Internet sites: toolbars, viewers, codecs for media player old or insecure applications: ghostview, outlook legacy daemons: sendmail, bind honeypots Goal : if application “misbehaves,” kill it Approach: confinement Confinement : ensure application does not deviate from pre-approved behavior Can be implemented at many levels: Hardware : run application on isolated hw (air gap) difficult to manage Virtual machines : isolate OS’s on single hardware System call interposition : Isolates a process in a single operating system Isolating threads sharing same address space: Software Fault Isolation (SFI) Application specific: e.g. browser-based confinement Implementing confinement Key component: reference monitor Mediates requests from applications Implements protection policy Enforces isolation and confinement Must always be invoked: Every application request must be mediated Tamperproof : Reference monitor cannot be killed … or if killed, then monitored process is killed too Small enough to be analyzed and validated A simple example: chroot Often used for “guest” accounts on ftp sites To use do: (must be root) chroot /tmp/guest root dir “/” is now “/tmp/guest” su guest EUID set to “guest” Now “/tmp/guest” is added to file system accesses for applications in jail open(“/etc/passwd”, “r”) ⇒⇒⇒ open(“/tmp/guest/etc/passwd”, “r”) ⇒ application cannot access files outside of jail Jailkit Problem: all utility progs (ls, ps, vi) must live inside jail • jailkit project: auto builds files, libs, and dirs needed in jail environment • jk_init : creates jail environment • jk_check: checks jail env for security problems • checks for any modified programs, • checks for world writable directories, etc.