The Credit Rating Game: Evidence from a Strategic Game Model Ruoyan Huang, Hongtao Li∗ Preliminary draft, please do not cite or circulate. Abstract This paper empirically analyzes the effect of competition on rating quality under the "issuer- pay" compensation scheme. Using hand-collected data of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), we specify the competition among credit rating agencies with a discrete game framework and test its influence on the rating quality. We find that competition raised the probability of choos- ing lenient rating by 31% for Moody’s and 27% for S&P in the sample period of 2007-2008. We further demonstrate that the propensity for selecting lenient rating increases with the bar- gaining power of the underwriters and the complexity of the CDOs. Overall, we find evidence suggests that competition among CRAs reduces their rating quality under the "issuer-pay" scheme. ∗Huang is with the University of Hong Kong and Li is with Tulane University E-mail:
[email protected],
[email protected]. We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of Rochester. All remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the author. “Oh God, are you kidding? All the time. I mean, that’s routine. I mean, they would threaten you all of the time. ... It’s like, ‘Well, next time, we’re just going to go with Fitch and S&P. ’ ” — Gary Witt, a former Moody’s team managing director told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission when asked if the investment banks frequently threatened to withdraw their business if they did not get their desired rating1.