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Ukraine: What’S a Language For? Natalia Kudriavtseva

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Ukraine: What’S a Language For? Natalia Kudriavtseva KENNAN CABLE No. 15 l March 2016 The inscription on the billboard reads “There is language, there are Ukrainians, there is a state—there is a future.” Adapted from http:// language-policy.info/2015/11/u-kyjevi-z-yavylasya-sotsialna-reklama-pro-ukrajinsku-movu/. Ukraine: What’s a Language For? Natalia Kudriavtseva Introduction signed nor been vetoed by the president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko. In the current conflict in Ukraine, one of Russia’s most effective propaganda weapons is its ability to Meanwhile, a newly established advisory board fuel the fear in Ukraine’s eastern regions that the has been tasked with strengthening Ukrainian as new government in Kyiv will enact laws against use the state language. The Board for National Unity, of the Russian language and repress speakers of which came into existence by a December 2015 Russian. In 2014, in the aftermath of Euromaidan, decree of President Poroshenko, has the mandate the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, to promote the consolidation of Ukrainian society on actually passed a law to repeal the “language law” the basis of national values and cultural traditions. of 2012,1 which had enabled the expansion of The board also seeks to craft appropriate measures Russian at the regional level. Since then, the 2014 to reinforce national unity and develop the Ukrainian repeal has been in limbo, as it has neither been national identity. With these intertwined linguistic KENNAN CABLE No. 15 l March 2016 and cultural goals, Ukrainian as the state language Ukrainian and 45 percent speak Russian. The overall should function as the uniting and consolidating trend since 2004 has been toward an increase in power enhancing the state unity of Ukraine. As the number of people who switch into Ukrainian for such, language is held out as a means of unifying everyday communication. The discrepancy stems people through instilling common values, culture, from the ambiguity of the census, which asked and thought. about “mother tongue” without stipulating whether the term should be understood as the respondent’s Language Situation and Current ethnic language, the language most often spoken Linguistic Trends by the respondent, or the language the respondent remembered his or her parents speaking. Two Like most countries, Ukraine is multilingual. More surveys conducted in 2006 showed that Ukrainian than eleven languages are spoken in Ukraine as traditionally dominates in western Ukraine (93.55 2 3 native languages. The 2001 census (see figure1) percent), in the central and northeastern regions identified Ukrainian as the native language of 67.5 (83.58 percent), and to a lesser extent in the percent of Ukrainian citizens and Russian as the southern and southeastern regions (61.29 percent). native language of 29.6 percent. However, some Only the regions of Crimea and Donbas preferred 4 more recent sociological surveys have shown that Russian (76.88 percent).5 approximately 53 percent of the population speaks Figure 1. Most common native languages in the 2001 census, % KENNAN CABLE No. 15 l March 2016 Even though people in Ukraine have been similarly unequal distribution, with 41 percent in multilingual by virtue of using a number of different favor of the CIS and 28 percent preferring Western languages, the language debate in Ukraine has Europe. The percentage of those choosing both come into sharp focus with the controversy over orientations is almost identical across categories: Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism. The latest arguments 34 percent of Ukrainian speakers, 32 percent of about it have invariably been marked by the view Russian speakers, and 31 percent of bilingual that there are specific ways of thinking related to respondents. Ukrainian and Russian. Not only does the choice A February 2015 survey by the Kyiv International between these languages enable one to identify Institute of Sociology (КМІС), of 2,013 respondents with Ukrainians or not, it also subjects speakers to drawn from all over Ukraine (including Donetsk and the influence of certain political and social “senses,” Luhansk regions) measured the effectiveness of or persuasions and motivates their preferences for Russian propaganda on Ukraine, as represented heroes and motherland.6 An even more severe, by the following narrative (which more than 80 almost surreal position on the bilingualism issue percent of the Russian populace believes): holds that since Ukrainian and Russian each impose The a different worldview, people who speak both Euromaidan was organized by Americans together result, Ukrainian languages eventually end up with a kind of split with Ukrainian nationalists → As a nationalists gained power and now threaten the identity amounting to a “linguistic schizophrenia.”7 Russian-speaking population of Ukraine Crimea While Ukrainian promotes national identity, → and the East of Ukraine have been exposed to patriotism, and pro-Western foreign policy, Russian danger Crimea has been saved by its inclusion introduces the russkiy mir (the Russian world), → authoritarian attitudes, and pro-Russian imperial into Russia, and the East rose in rebellion and longs But the Ukrainian ideals dating back to USSR or even tsarist times. for autonomy and security → nationalists, who illegally seized power, are now Within such a split-identity framework, language waging war upon their own people.9 is ascribed a unique power either to unify or to divide Ukrainian people, as the choice of Ukrainian The КМІС created an index measuring the or Russian entails choosing between opposing effectiveness of Russian propaganda while opinions, identities, and views. isolating factors such as gender, age, education, and region of residence. Of these factors, only the Some surveys8 indicate that when language data respondent’s region correlated with agreement with are cross-tabulated with responses to questions the Russian narrative. The lowest level of influence regarding views on the CIS and Western Europe, of information from Russia occurred in the western an association between language and outlook is (score = 12) and central (score = 19) regions, while apparent: up to 43 percent of Ukrainian speakers it was far higher in the south (score = 32). In the think their country’s future lies with Western east, the score was four times as high as in the Europe, while only 23 percent think Ukraine’s west (score = 48) (figure 2). The respondents’ future is with the CIS. Among Russian speakers, 52 native language was not directly measured by percent prefer the CIS and only 16 percent choose the question, although the language in which the Western Europe. The bilingual category shows a KENNAN CABLE No. 15 l March 2016 respondent replied to the survey was captured. agreement (score = 38). Responses that included a Ukrainian speakers were found to be least affected mix of Ukrainian and Russian fell almost exactly in by the Russian propaganda narrative (score = 15), the middle (score = 27). while Russian speakers demonstrated the most Index of Russian propaganda influence on Figure 2. Index of Russian propagandaUkraine's influence macro-regions on Ukraine’s macro-regions 48 50 45 40 32 35 30 25 19 20 12 15 10 5 0 Western Central Southern Eastern (including Donbass) While the authors of the survey readily admit some to learn Russian in schools, and several that their data on the effectiveness of Russian other actions constraining the use of the Russian propaganda are not definitive, the data do language. For example, a court judgment in generally confirm the common impression that Lviv forced the State Migration Service to issue language influences a speaker’s ideals and political a national passport without duplicating the orientation. information in Russian. Another decision required the Ministry of the Interior to translate all speeches Other important linguistic trends in 2015 included by its Russian-speaking minister, Arsen Avakov, into a growing number of people willing to attend free Ukrainian. The Kyiv City Council adopted a regulation Ukrainian language courses, an increase in the promoting the Ukrainian language, culture, and number of those who voluntarily switched over historical memory among the inhabitants of the to speaking Ukrainian, the persistent refusal by KENNAN CABLE No. 15 l March 2016 capital during the years 2015–2020. A new version on foreign policy preferences, and regional origin of the law on the Ukrainian civil service10 that is obviously independent of identity or linguistic requires the use of the Ukrainian language has habits. motivated more and more state employees to enroll Neil Munro, a senior research fellow at the Center in Ukrainian language courses. for the Study of Public Policy, the University of Language and Thought: What Aberdeen, Scotland, interprets the regional effects linguistic science tells us as indicative of historical ties that bind each of the macro-regions to neighboring states in a Apart from being a national symbol, language is way that is not characteristic of the country as a first and foremost a means of communication. We whole.12 Therefore, identity and language are not use it to express our ideas, desires, and needs, the major influences; at least as far as foreign and to make them accessible to others. We learn policy preferences are concerned. The historical foreign languages to be able to communicate with explanation reveals that the correlation between other people and to understand them ourselves. language and political worldview is by no means If we dig a bit deeper, we see that language a cause-and-effect relationship; instead, both serves to label the world and present it to us in a language and attitudes are the consequences of the neat classification that reflects the way we see it. earlier histories of Ukraine’s different regions within Not only does language show whether we care the boundaries of other states. about different shades of blue, it also captures In addition to sociological studies, voluminous our habits of behavior and thought, and helps us psycholinguistic research has recently been identify ourselves with a particular community and conducted worldwide on the very problem of the culture.
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