Civil Appeal No 144 of 2010 v Attorney-General

4 April 2011

Summary of the judgment of CJ

1 This is a summary of my decision on the issues raised in this appeal. The detailed analysis of the law and my reasoning are set out in my written judgment.

Factual background

2 The events leading to this appeal are well-known to the public as they have been extensively reported in the media. On 14 November 2008, the Appellant, Yong Vui Kong, was convicted of trafficking in 47.27g of diamorphine, and was sentenced to death. On 27 November 2008, he filed an appeal against his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, he indicated through his then counsel’s letter dated 23 April 2009 that he wished to withdraw his appeal. When the appeal came on for hearing on 29 April 2009, the Appellant’s then counsel confirmed the Appellant’s wishes, and, consequently, the Court of Appeal formally dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.

3 Subsequently, on 11 August 2009, the Appellant petitioned the President for clemency under Art 22P of the Constitution.1 On 20 November 2009, the President decided not to grant clemency to the Appellant. On 30 November 2009, four days before his death sentence was due to be carried out, the Appellant (through his current counsel, Mr Ravi) filed a criminal motion for leave to pursue his appeal to the Court of Appeal notwithstanding that he had earlier withdrawn it. One of the grounds relied on by the Appellant for seeking leave to revive his appeal was that the mandatory death penalty prescribed for the offence of trafficking in more than 15g of diamorphine was unconstitutional.

4 At the hearing of the criminal motion on 8 December 2009, the Court of Appeal granted the application and restored the Appellant’s appeal. The appeal was heard on

1 Viz, the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint). 15 March 2010. On 14 May 2010, the Court of Appeal delivered its reserved judgment dismissing the appeal.

5 On 10 May 2010, shortly before the Court of Appeal’s judgment on the Appellant’s appeal was delivered, Mr K Shanmugam, the Minister for Law and the then Second Minister for Home Affairs (ie, “the Law Minister” referred to in my written judgment), was reported in the TODAY newspaper as having made, at a community event the previous day, certain comments on the Government’s policy of imposing the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking offences. The Law Minister made those comments in response to a query as to whether there would be any changes to the Government’s policy in view of the Appellant’s case. The material parts of the Law Minister’s statements, as reported in the 10 May 2010 edition of TODAY, were as follows:2

… Mr Shanmugam said “thousands of lives have been ruined due to the free availability of drugs” in cities such as Sydney and New York. It also contributes to soaring crime rates, he added. “People assume you can have this safety and security without this framework of the law; that you can change it, and yet your safety and security will not be affected,” he said. “But there are always trade-offs. The difficulty the Government has sometimes in explaining this is that the trade-offs are not apparent. The damage to a large number of others is not obvious. “You save one life here, but 10 other lives will be gone. What will your choice be?” If [the Appellant] escapes the death penalty, drug barons will think the signal is that young and vulnerable traffickers will be spared and can be used as drug mules, argued Mr Shanmugam. “Then you’ll get 10 more. There’ll be an unstoppable stream of such people coming through as long as we say we won’t enforce our laws,” he said during his ministerial community visit to Joo Chiat.

6 On 15 May 2010, the TODAY newspaper carried a report that Mr Ravi had said that the Law Minister’s statements had caused the Appellant’s fate to be “‘poisoned’ with ‘biasedness’”.3 The report also elaborated on the Law Minister’s statements as follows:4

… [The Appellant]’s lawyer, Mr M Ravi, told reporters he plans to file for a judicial review before the Court of Appeal over Law Minister K Shanmugam’s remarks relating to his client’s case during a residents’ dialogue session last Sunday in Joo Chiat.

2 See the Appellant’s Core Bundle (“ACB”) at vol 2, Tab 5. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

2 The resident had asked if [the Appellant]’s case would affect Singapore’s laws on the mandatory death penalty. Mr Shanmugam replied: “[The Appellant] (who was sentenced to hang for trafficking in 47g of heroin) is young. But if we say, ‘We let you go’, what’s the signal we’re sending?

“We’re sending a signal to all drug barons out there: Just make sure you choose a victim who’s young or a mother of a young child and use them as the people to carry drugs into Singapore.” With the sympathy generated after these people are caught, he added, there will be “a whole unstoppable stream of people coming through as long as we say we won’t enforce our laws”. As [the Appellant]’s case was subjudice, or still under judgment, Mr Ravi said his client’s fate had been “poisoned” with “biasedness”.

7 Subsequently, on 21 July 2010, the Appellant filed an application under O 53 of the Rules of Court for leave to apply for judicial review on certain issues relating to the clemency power set out in Art 22P of the Singapore Constitution. His arguments on those issues were as follows:

(a) Under Art 22P, it is the President, and not the Cabinet, who has the power to decide whether or not to grant any fresh clemency petition which the Appellant might file.

(b) The President’s wrongful abdication of his clemency power to the Cabinet and the Cabinet’s wrongful pre-emption and usurpation of the President’s clemency power had jeopardised a fair and just determination of the Appellant’s intended clemency petition.

(c) The Law Minister’s statements had created a reasonable apprehension that the views expressed therein represented those of the Cabinet, and that, as a result, any advice which the Cabinet might give to the President as to whether or not the Appellant should be granted clemency had been predetermined even before the receipt of the Appellant’s intended clemency petition, and even before the reports referred to in Art 22P(2) had been transmitted to the Cabinet for its consideration.

(d) Accordingly, the Cabinet was disqualified from taking further part in the clemency process vis-à-vis the Appellant.

3 (e) The Appellant had been deprived of the possibility of a fair determination of his intended clemency petition and was entitled not to be deprived of his life on that account.

(f) The Law Minister’s conduct had irreversibly tainted the clemency process in respect of the Appellant with apparent bias, and the Appellant was entitled to be pardoned on account thereof or was, alternatively, entitled not to be deprived of his life.

(g) The Appellant was entitled to see all the Art 22P(2) materials that would be placed before the Cabinet in connection with his intended clemency petition, including, in particular, the trial judge’s report, the Chief Justice’s report and the Attorney-General’s opinion on those reports, so as to afford him an opportunity to make written representations before any decision on whether or not he should be granted clemency was reached.

(h) The Appellant had suffered grave injustice as a result of the actions of the President and the Cabinet, and was entitled not to be deprived of his life on account thereof.

8 In the statement filed by the Appellant as required by O 53 of the Rules of Court, the Appellant sought the following reliefs:5

(a) a declaratory order that under Art 22P of the Singapore Constitution, the clemency power was exercisable by the President acting in his discretion, and not in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet;

(b) a prohibitory order enjoining the President from delegating to the Cabinet his discretion to grant clemency;

(c) an indefinite stay of execution of the death sentence imposed on him ;

(d) a declaratory order that clemency should be granted to him for the reasons set out in his statement; and

5 See ACB at vol 2, Tab 4.

4 (e) a declaratory order that he was entitled to disclosure of the materials required to be sent to the Cabinet under Art 22P(2) in connection with his case

9 The hearing of the Appellant’s application took place before J, who dismissed it for the following reasons (and, here, I quote from [85] of Chong J’s judgment):6

85 … [T]he clemency process is not justiciable on the grounds pursued by [the Appellant], because: (a) the power to grant pardons under Article 22P is exercised by the Cabinet, and not the President, who has no discretion in the matter; (b) apparent bias is not an available ground on which to review the clemency process; (c) there is no evidence of a pre-determination of [the Appellant]’s imminent [clemency] petition; and (d) there is no basis for a substantive right to the materials which will be before the Cabinet when it advises the President on the clemency petition.

10 The Appellant appealed to this court. The Appellant was represented by Mr Ravi at the hearing of the appeal, and the Attorney-General, by Mr Aedit Abdullah. The issues raised in the parties’ arguments are all issues of law, and may be crystallised into the following six issues:

(a) “the Discretion Issue” – viz, whether the clemency power under Art 22P of the Singapore Constitution is exercised by the President acting in his discretion or whether the President is bound by the advice of the Cabinet;

(b) “the Justiciability Issue” – viz, whether the clemency power under Art 22P is subject to judicial review;

(c) “the Natural Justice Issue” – viz, if the Justiciability Issue is answered in the affirmative, whether breach of natural justice is an applicable ground for reviewing the clemency process, and, if it is, whether the clemency process vis-à-vis the Appellant has been tainted by apparent bias as a result of the Law Minister’s statements;

6 Viz, Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 1 SLR 1.

5 (d) “the Disclosure Issue” – viz, whether the Appellant is entitled to disclosure of all the Art 22P(2) materials to be placed before the Cabinet in relation to his case so as to afford him an opportunity to make written representations before any decision on whether or not he should be granted clemency is reached.

(e) “the Declaratory Relief Issue” – viz, whether declaratory relief can be granted in proceedings commenced under O 53 of the Rules of Court; and

(f) “the Legitimate Expectation Issue” – viz, whether the Appellant has a legitimate expectation that the President will act in his discretion, as opposed to on the Cabinet’s advice, in deciding whether or not the Appellant should be granted clemency.

11 I have, in my written judgment, provided a detailed analysis of the parties’ submissions on four of the six issues listed above, namely, the Justiciability Issue, the Natural Justice Issue, the Disclosure Issue and the Declaratory Relief Issue. With respect to the Discretion Issue and the Legitimate Expectation Issue, I have read the joint judgment of Boon Leong and V K Rajah JJA, which will shortly be released to the parties, holding that Mr Ravi’s arguments on these two issues are devoid of merit. I agree entirely with their decision on these two issues.

12 I will now summarise my decisions on the four issues which I dealt with in detail in my judgment.

The Justiciability Issue

13 In the court below, Chong J held that the clemency power in Art 22P was not justiciable (that is to say, not reviewable by the courts) on the grounds relied on by Mr Ravi. Before this court, Mr Ravi argued that the clemency power is subject to the legality principle approved by this court in Chng Suan Tze.7 Mr Abdullah, on the other hand, argued that the clemency power is not justiciable.

7 Viz, Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs and others and other appeals [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525.

6 14 In my view, given the legality principle laid down in Chng Suan Tze as elaborated on in Phyllis Tan,8 the clemency power is justiciable if it has been exercised in a manner which is unconstitutional or which amounts to an abuse of the power. However, it is common ground that the merits of any clemency decision are not reviewable by any court of law.

The Natural Justice Issue

15 Chong J decided that apparent bias was not an available ground on which to review the clemency process. Mr Abdullah supported Chong J’s decision and also argued that an offender has no right to be heard during the clemency process, whereas Mr Ravi argued that the rules of natural justice in the administrative law context are applicable to the clemency process.

16 The rules of natural justice in the administrative law context comprise two rules, namely: (a) the rule that no one shall be a judge in his own cause, commonly known as “the rule against bias”; and (b) the rule providing for a right of hearing, which is referred to as “the hearing rule” in my written judgment. In my view, the rule against bias applies to the clemency process, but the hearing rule does not as, historically, it has never been part of the clemency process in Singapore. This is reflected by the terms of Art 22P itself, which does not provide an offender with any right of hearing during the clemency process.

17 With respect to the Law Minister’s statements, Chong J held that they did not constitute apparent bias (amounting to predetermination) with respect to the Appellant’s intended clemency petition. I agree with this finding. In my view, the Law Minister’s statements in relation to the youthfulness of an offender merely reflects the legislative policy that the mandatory death penalty for serious drug trafficking offences can be imposed on any offender so long as he is aged 18 or above at the time of the offence, and that youthfulness is therefore not in itself a ground for granting clemency.

The Disclosure Issue

18 Chong J decided that in the context of our clemency regime, an offender seeking clemency had no right to see the Art 22P(2) materials which the Cabinet has to consider in

8 Viz, v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239.

7 connection with its constitutional duty to advise the President on the exercise of the clemency power. These materials consist of: (a) the report of the judge who tried the case, (b) the report of the Chief Justice or other presiding judge of the appellate court (if there is an appeal); and (c) the opinion of the Attorney-General on the judges’ reports. Mr Ravi argued that the Appellant had a right to full disclosure of the Art 22P(2) materials relating to his case in view of the majority decision of the Privy Council in Lewis.9

19 I agree with Chong J’s decision on the Disclosure Issue. The case of Lewis is not relevant in our legal context. That was a majority judgment based on Art 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, which gives an offender in a death sentence case a right to petition for clemency, and which was held (in Lewis) to be applicable to the clemency process under the Jamaican Constitution. There is no such or similar convention which applies in Singapore; nor does the Singapore Constitution provide an offender in a death sentence case with any right to a hearing. The grant of clemency in this jurisdiction is a matter of executive grace, although the need to consider whether or not clemency should be granted is a matter of law.

The Declaratory Relief Issue

20 Chong J decided that the Appellant was not entitled to the declaratory relief sought on the ground that our courts have consistently held that they have no power to grant declaratory relief in proceedings brought under O 53 of the Rules of Court because that Order does not provide for the grant of such relief. I agree with Chong J’s decision on this point.

Conclusion

21 For the above reasons, I agree with Chong J’s ruling that the Appellant’s application has no merit, and I would dismiss the appeal.

9 Viz, Neville Lewis v Attorney General of Jamaica and another [2001] 2 AC 50.

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