14Th September 2006
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14th September 2006 To: the Secretary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Re: ACF submission on the proposed China nuclear cooperation treaty The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) welcome opportunity to participate in this Inquiry by the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties into the proposed Nuclear Cooperation Treaty for uranium exports to China. ACF consider this presents a number of important challenges to Australia’s international responsibilities in nuclear issues. ACF submit a set of recommendations for consideration by the JSCT Inquiry on this proposed treaty. We consider adoption of these recommendations to be in Australia’s national interest and that they contribute toward required minimum changes to strengthen Australian government policy in remaining uranium exports. We provide a critical appraisal of the IAEA safeguards regime and of the Australian bilateral agreement safeguards regimes in a report prepared jointly with the Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia), (see Attachment 1): “An Illusion of Protection. The “Unavoidable Limitations” of Safeguards and the Export of Uranium to China.” Note: that this report is a formal submission on behalf of both the ACF and the MAPW. In our considered view the central claim of this treaty that Australian uranium can only be used for peaceful purposes in China is invalidated by serious shortcomings in both the IAEA safeguards and Australian bilateral agreement safeguards regimes. These shortcomings are amplified in the case of China where the government is an unaccountable authoritarian state. This fact strongly predicates against the required level of confidence and assurance in transparency, independent verification and due process for delivery by China of peaceful use treaty obligations now and in the future. The proposed bilateral agreement sanctions practices that could lead to Australian uranium exports contributing to an ongoing or future expanded nuclear weapons program in China. Including an indirect contribution through Australian supplied uranium freeing up China to use their limited supplies in their weapons program. Uranium conversion and enrichment facilities and reprocessing facilities are dual use facilities with capability for production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Australian should not allow reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel in any bilateral uranium exports agreement. This treaty proposes a programmatic approval to a 30 year reprocessing program for separation and stockpiling of weapons usable plutonium derived from the use of Australian uranium in China’s nuclear power program. The treaty further proposes to sanction the processing of Australian uranium in a uranium conversion facility outside of IAEA safeguards and inspection regime and the enrichment of Australian uranium in a Chinese facility under joint military control. These treaty proposals would facilitate potential diversion of Australian uranium in China. The treaty also fails to provide any material reason for confidence in nuclear safety or in nuclear waste management practices in China. Every gram of Australian uranium exported to China is destined to become long lived radioactive waste. The management of radioactive waste – and the unique security, human and environmental hazards it poses – remains an unresolved global issue. The potential for catastrophic accidents inherent in nuclear power and the increasing risks of nuclear terrorism are strong reasons for all countries to put public health and safety ahead of any proposed nuclear power expansion plans. Rather than furthering nuclear risks it is in Australia’s national interest to contribute to China’s development and deployment of clean safe energy technologies through the engagement of renewables, conservation and efficiency to met Chinese society’s energy requirements into a carbon constrained future. A legislative target has been set in China for 15% of national electricity production from renewables by 2020. Some three times the projected electricity contribution of China’s expanded nuclear power program that may increase from 2% toward 4-5% by 2020. This provides for a much larger financial and sustainable Australian exports market. China has an unacceptable track record in failure to comply with international norms and international treaties and conventions on a range of issues. ACF provide a second report to the JSCT Inquiry, “Nuclear Safeguards and Chinese Accountability” (see Attachment 2). The report sets out a range of examples of Chinese breaches of treaties and agreements, across international trade rules including the WTO and Intellectual Property Rights and across human rights, and a relevant pattern of failure of governance in China on industrial practices and pollution control. These breaches in China’s obligations are symptomatic of factors that strongly predicate against confidence in compliance with the proposed uranium exports treaty. China has a record of willingness to break its signed word in order to pursue other policy objectives. China’s capacity to implement its agreements is hampered by serious governance issues, including opacity and corruption. China has a practice of enabling breaches though a strategy identified by the United States Trade Representative as ”delay, partial implementation, and creation of new barriers” which prevents the international community from effectively holding China to account. Australia can not be confident in this or all future Chinese government’s compliance with key international non-proliferation norms on weapons of mass destruction and associated military technology given China’s track record in proliferation issues. China has proliferated nuclear weapons technology, materials and designs to Pakistan; stolen US nuclear weapons designs; proliferated WMD missile technology, weapons systems and components to countries including Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and North Korea; and has provided assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. In 1999 a US House of Representatives investigation, the “SELECT COMMITTEE ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY/COMMERCIAL CONCERNS WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA”, also called the Cox Report, found that: 2 (i) China had stolen design information on the US’s most advanced thermonuclear weapons (ii) China was responsible for repeated thefts of the most sophisticated US nuclear weapons technology and that this practice likely continued (iii) China had proliferated such military technology to a number of other countries, including regimes hostile to the US, and (iv) China’s actions posed a direct threat to the US and its friends and allies. The “Overview” to the Cox Report (p.xxxvi-xxxvii ) stated that: “The Peoples Republic of China is one of the leading proliferators of complete ballistic missile systems and missile components in the world. … The PRC has proliferated military technology to Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. In 1991, the PRC agreed to adhere to the April 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, but the PRC has not accepted the revisions to those guidelines issued in 1993. The 1993 MTCR guidelines increase the kinds of missile systems subject to controls and call for a “strong presumption to deny” both sales of complete missile systems and components that could be used in ballistic missiles. … Iran. The PRC has provided Iran with ballistic missile technology, including guidance components and the recent transfer of telemetry equipment. The PRC reportedly is providing Iran with solid-propellant missile technology. Additionally, the PRC provided Iran with the 95-mile range CSS-8 ballistic missile. Since the mid-1980s, the PRC has transferred C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. The PRC has also provided assistance to Iran’s nuclear programs. … Pakistan. The PRC has provided Pakistan with a wide range of assistance. The PRC reportedly supplied Pakistan with CSS-X-7/M-11 mobile missile launchers and reportedly has provided Pakistan with the facilities necessary to produce M- 11 missiles. The PRC provides Pakistan with assistance on uranium enrichment, ring magnets, and other technologies that could be used in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.” See: http://www.house.gov/coxreport/cont/gncont.html In ACF’s view this unacceptable proliferation record should invalidate China for consideration as a potential customer for exports of Australian uranium. In conclusion ACF find that the proposed nuclear cooperation treaty for uranium export to China is not in Australia’s national interest and recommend to the JSCT Inquiry that this treaty should not be ratified by the Australian Parliament. For any inquiries or clarifications on issues and recommendations raised in this submission please contact David Noonan, ACF Nuclear Free Campaigner available on Ph 0408 821 058 and 08-82322566, and e-mail: [email protected] ACF request the opportunity to appear before a public hearing of the JSCT Inquiry and look forward to discussion of these issues and recommendations with the Committee. Yours sincerely Denise Boyd Campaigns Director Australian Conservation Foundation 3 Index ACF Recommendations to the JSCT Inquiry 5 Recommendations on strengthening IAEA Safeguards 5 Recommendations on strengthening Australia’s Uranium Exports Policy 6 Recommendation on Accountability in China 9 Attachment 1: “An Illusion of Protection. The “Unavoidable Limitations” of Safeguards and the Export of Uranium to China.” Executive Summary Chapter 1 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Proliferation 1.1 The Nuclear Non