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1 THE NUCLEAR IMPASSE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME Dennis Florig The revelation that North Korea has been secretly enriching uranium for nuclear weapons in violation of its international commitments has thrown the Korean peninsula into crisis. The sunshine policy of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has been undermined, but the Bush administration’s hard-line expressed in the “axis of evil” speech has also come in for criti- cism. At the root of the current crisis is the failure of all sides to face up to the fundamental security issues. Hard-liners in the U.S. and the South should reconsider their desires for rapid regime change in the North in light of its catastrophic conse- quences. The interaction between reform in the North and eas- ing of its security situation needs to be more clearly recognized. Analysis of policy options to reverse the North’s nuclear pro- grams shows that use of military force is much too costly and damaging to regional security. And that isolation and sanctions alone will not stop the North from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the long run, the way to get the North to truly abandon its nuclear programs is not to isolate it further or try to buy it off only with economic aid, but to establish security cooperation in which all sides will have their security concerns addressed. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2002, pp. 1-24. Copyright © 2002 by KINU 2 The Nuclear Impasse on the Korean Peninsula Dennis Florig 3 The New Nuclear Crisis But in the past two years the bloom has come off the rose. The newly elected Bush administration, suspicious of the North Korean Not that long ago the Korean peninsula seemed on the verge of regime and unhappy with the concessions of the Clinton engagement fundamental transformation. The dramatic first ever summit between policy, suspended U.S. dialogue with the North while South-North South Korean President Kim Dae Jung and North Korean leader Kim talks have been off and on. Most of what was promised at the Jong Il raised expectations that finally the two Koreas were on a path to Pyongyang summit has not yet been implemented. A planned second reconciliation. The summit was the realization of a series of positive summit in Seoul has not come off. The peninsula remains divided and developments since the 1994 Agreed Framework. The Agreed Frame- highly militarized. Fears of conflict remain on both sides. North Korea work was negotiated in the first Korean nuclear crisis, when the North is apprehensive about U.S. military superiority while the South and the seemed on the verge of gaining nuclear weapons. The Agreed Frame- U.S. are suspicious of the large conventional forces of the North. Angry work promised to end North Korean development of nuclear weapons rhetoric, which had been toned down, especially in the afterglow of and regularize negotiations between North and South Korea in return the summit, has renewed. North Korea has accused the Bush adminis- for two new nuclear power plants that would be less suitable for tration of sabotaging relations while the Bush administration character- weapons development and normalization of diplomatic relations izes North Korea as part of its “axis of evil” and talks openly of regime between the U.S. and North Korea. In 1998 newly elected South Korean change. President Kim Dae Jung embarked a sustained “sunshine policy” In October 2002, at the first high level visit of the Bush administra- designed to end half a century of hostility between North and South. tion officials to Pyongyang, when confronted with hard evidence, Sunshine dovetailed well with the Clinton administration’s engage- North Korea admitted it has been pursuing a secret uranium enrich- ment policy, as outlined in the Perry Report. Although formal U.S.- ment program in a new effort to develop nuclear weapons. This shock- North Korean diplomatic relations did not begin as envisioned in the ing violation of the North Korea’s commitments under the Nuclear Agreed Framework, some of America’s Cold War economic and politi- Non-proliferation Treaty, the 1992 Declaration on a nuclear free Korean cal sanctions against the North were related and most of America’s key peninsula, and the Agreed Framework, the centerpiece of the engage- European allies did normalize relations with the North. Work on the ment and sunshine policies, put any U.S.-North Korean cooperation in KEDO project to provide alternative nuclear energy began, although severe jeopardy. In November a broadcast on official North Korean the project quickly fell behind schedule. While there were setbacks, radio suggested that North Korea actually already possesses some most importantly, the test firing of a North Korean medium range mis- nuclear bombs, although it was not stated whether they were made sile over Japan, hopes were high that a new era was dawning. A freeze from plutonium extracted before the Agreed Framework or from the on North Korean missile development was negotiated. The North- later uranium enrichment. Doubts were then raised about whether the South summit was followed by an unprecedented visit of North seeming revelation was actually just a misstatement of the broadcaster, Korea’s number two man Jo Ryong Mok to Washington to meet with since this important statement was not attributed to any North Korean President Clinton and a trip by U.S. Secretary of State Madeline official. Albright to Pyongyang. 4 The Nuclear Impasse on the Korean Peninsula Dennis Florig 5 Sunshine vs. Axis of Evil: Trilateral Coordination, project alive, while the U.S. is calling for suspension of KEDO and cur- Division of Labor, or Asymmetries of Interest? rently rejects negotiations until the North verifiably abandons its nuclear weapons programs. Events are moving quickly on the Korean peninsula. The Bush While many decry this lack of uniformity in policy, others have administration’s response to these revelations was swift and unam- compared the differing U.S. and South Korean approaches as a kind of biguous. All U.S. cooperation with the North has been severed until the “good cop, bad cop” routine where a tough U.S. threatens severe pun- uranium enrichment program is terminated. In addition, the United ishment while a sympathetic South Korea elicits cooperation through States has suspended oil shipments that it was providing as an alterna- dialogue promising benefits. Certainly, in the current crisis some divi- tive energy source under the Agreed Framework. U.S. demands for sion of labor can be useful. There is some merit in the U.S. position that inspection of all of North Korea’s nuclear facilities have intensified. The the North should not be “paid off” for violating a solemn agreement, South Korean reaction has been more nuanced. While the Kim Dae and therefore there is nothing to talk about until the North backs off its Jung government has also called for the end of all North Korean nuclear weapons programs. But the situation is too dangerous to rely nuclear weapons development, it has continued on-going talks with simply on external pressure. Thus, if the South keeps open channels of the North on inter-Korean issues. Japan, which was in the middle of communication, possible solutions can be explored. While the U.S. normalization talks with the North when the revelations came, agreed stands outside applying pressure, South Korea can serve as a messen- to another round of those talks, but has made suspension of North ger, a catalyst or even an honest broker in the search for equitable solu- Korean nuclear weapons development a precondition for diplomatic tions to the immediate crisis. As long as the U.S. South Korea, and recognition. Japan keep to a uniform message that the North will have to abandon By the time of publication, the immediate impasse over nuclear its nuclear weapons programs before progress on any other issues is weapons may have broken or the situation may have worsened con- possible, differences in how to best convey this message are tolerable, siderably. Nevertheless, it is worth examining the recent history of rela- and perhaps even more effective in getting the message through. tions between North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and the However, the differences in the approaches of the Bush and Kim other powers of Northeast Asia. Dae Jung administrations reflect a deeper asymmetry of perceptions In recent years the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have attempted to and interests. It is often commented upon that the U.S. sees Korea pri- harmonize their policies toward North Korea, holding regular trilateral marily in light of security issues, while South Korea is increasingly coordination meetings. Yet in the past two years there has been grow- focused on the task of political reconciliation between the North and ing distance between the Bush administration’s hard-line and Kim Dae South.1 Jung’s sunshine policy. While governments continue to call for greater But at a deeper level there is a growing difference in U.S. and South policy coordination, neither is willing to change its basic approach to Korean concerns about the North Korean regime.2 The U.S., South the North simply to achieve consensus. This difference became appar- ent once again in the new nuclear crisis. The Kim Dae Jung administra- 1 John Kotch, “Korea’s Multinational Diplomacy and US-Korea Relations,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs and Victor Cha, “Balance, Parallelism, and Asymmetry: United tion is keeping lines open to the North and trying to keep the KEDO States-Korea Relations,” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol.

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