Third Quarterly Progress Report, April 1 – June 30, 2020

People at Peace (Lafia) Third Quarterly Progress Report, April 1 – June 30, 2020

Program Information Grantee: Mercy Corps Project Title: People at Peace (Lafia) Grant Number: 720-688-20-CA-00001 Country: Mali Funding Amount: $1,499,526 Grant Dates: 10/16/2019 – 09/30/2021 Quarter (Dates) being discussed: 04/01/2020 – 06/30/2020 Date Progress Report is submitted: 30 July 2020

Program’s Scope of Work: As instability has wrecked northern and central Mali since 2012, Mali’s south and west have remained relatively stable. However, multiple tensions now threaten that fragile peace. In both urban and rural areas, male and female youth are frustrated at perceived injustices, lack of economic opportunities and the absence of functioning government services. In rural areas, competition for land and water between Fulani pastoralists and Bambara and Soninke farmers may trigger the further spread of violence if left unmanaged. At the political level, resentment against a perceived lack of engagement of the south in national peace processes coupled with the flow of resources to northern and central Mali is considered a further risk to southern stability.

In response to these trends, Mercy Corps and Think Peace are implementing “Lafia,” meaning “People at Peace” in Bambara, a two-year, $1,499,526 program that aims to support urban and rural communities in southern and western Mali to increase resilience to conflict and violent extremism. Through a people- to-people approach bringing together political and religious leaders and young men and women from different ethnic groups, Lafia will increase local capacities to counter drivers of conflict and extremism through three interlinked objectives: 1) Youth reduce their vulnerability to participating in conflict and violent extremism; 2) Traditional, religious and female leaders, and government officials resolve inter- group conflicts peacefully and reduce conflict drivers; and 3) Local communities actively engage with relevant government authorities and civil society actors in the implementation of national policies that prevent violent extremism and promote reconciliation.

Acronyms CMM Conflict Management and Mitigation CSA Peace Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de Suivi de l’Accord de paix) CVE Countering Violent Extremism COFO Commission Fonciere (Land commission) DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration EWER Early Warning Early Response FAMA Malian Armed Forces M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali MOU Memorandum of Understanding OCI Organizational Capacity Index RECOTRAD Network of Traditional Communicators TOC Theory of Change UNPBF United Nations Peacebuilding Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development VEO Violent Extremist Organization VRAI Vulnerabilities and Resilience Assessment Initiative VRAI-CVE Vulnerabilities and Resilience Assessment Initiative to Counter Violent Extremism

2 Executive summary From 1 March to 30 June 2020, Lafia program carried out activities related to all the three objectives. Thus, the program held two workshops to share the VRAI mapping preliminary results, started the training for community leaders and sport for change activities. Adding to this, Lafia initiated a series of awareness-raising activities reduce violence in Kayes in response to mounting unrest.  New activity: Awareness-raising initiatives to prevent violence following the events of 11 May 2020 in Kayes

 Objective 1: Youth reduce their vulnerability to participating in conflict and violent extremism o Activity 1.1. Youth associations conduct a mapping exercise of vulnerability to violence and sources of resilience. Work completed under this activity include: . Finalization of the main conclusions section of the assessment . Workshops: VRAI Results and Targeting

o Activity 1.2. 80 Sport for Change Clubs set-up to involve 2000 youth at risk of participation in conflict in identification and resolution of conflict in collaboration with youth leaders. Work completed under this activity include: . Sport for Change training . Establishment of 54 sports clubs . Training session - coaches from Faleme and Koussane communes

 Objective 2: Traditional, religious, and female leaders and government officials resolve inter- group conflicts peacefully and reduce conflict drivers o Activity 2.1. Traditional, religious, women, and government leaders increase their capacity in dispute resolution. Work completed under this activity include: . A training session for community leaders from the commune of Koussane

o Activity 2.2. Trained leaders participate in 12 conflict resolution forums to share lessons and develop/adapt EWER systems to needs of zones of intervention. Work completed under this activity include: . 29 monitors identified . Training and set up of the EWER system in the commune of Koussane The program faced two major challenges this quarter. The first related to the surge in socio-political tensions in Bamako, which is the epicenter of the demonstrations and the resulting violence. This situation forced the Lafia program to suspend activities in Bamako for most of June. The program instead focused on activities in the Kayes region until the situation in Bamako is conducive to the resumption of activities. The second major challenge relates to the ongoing conflict situation in Konsiga, one of the target communes in the Yelimane cercle. Due to the conflict, program activities have been paused in Konsiga, and Lafia is coordinating a joint-decision making process involving key stakeholders that will inform next steps.

Contextual Information The last quarter was generally marked by socio-political tensions, which were often related to the COVID-19 restrictions and prevention measures. Following the confirmation of the first positive case of COVID-19 in Mali on 25 March, the number of cases has increased significantly. In May and June, we saw a significant increase, reaching 80 cases in one day. However, the situation appeared to be improving in Bamako, the area with the largest number of cases. During May, the month of Ramadan, the imposed curfew was not readily accepted or followed, and was deemed to be ineffective in the fight against the virus. In several localities, populations dismissed the curfew, and about 30 youth group demonstrations were recorded in one week. Police intervention and the use of tear gas contributed to fueling the socio-political tensions arising from this spring’s legislative elections, reinforcing the division between the population and the government.

3 The final results of recent legislative elections in Mali were announced in April, triggering localized protests denouncing the election process and decision by the Constitutional Court to uphold contested results. The largest demonstration took place in Sikasso on 7 May, and police responded forcefully, resulting in the death of one protester and injuries to at least four others. Calls for calm, as well as the suspension of the curfew on 9 May, temporarily diffused the situation. In response to the frustrations with election and COVID-19 response, political and religious movements gathered to protest against the government. The “Coordination des mouvements, Associations et Sympathisants de l’Imam Mahmoud Dicko (CMAS), the Front pour la Sauvegarde de la Démocratie (FSD) and the Mouvement Espoir Mali Koura (EMK) organized a demonstration in Bamako on 5 June, bringing together more than 5,000 people. Now grouped within the Mouvement du 5 juin (M5), the protesters demonstrated again on 19 June. Their main demand was for the resignation of the President of the Republic. Weak governance and perceived corruption remain at the heart of widespread frustrations, but other longstanding economic, social and security issues are adding to the discontent. Demonstrations have also been organized in other regions, particularly in the Kayes region. There have been various responses at the national and international levels, including mediations led by an initial ECOWAS delegation and a subsequent delegation of regional leaders, but little ground has been made thus far.

Awareness-raising initiatives to prevent violence following the events of 11 May 2020 in Kayes In the month of May, in the Kayes region, a 17-year-old boy was shot and killed by a police officer while on his motorcycle. There was an immediate outcry, and demonstrators went to the 2nd district police station in Kayes to set it on fire. The confrontation between the population and the police resumed on Tuesday, May 12, 2020, with violence that resulted in three deaths and injuries. Following this tragic event and in response to the risks of escalating violence, Lafia initiated awareness raising actions to ease tensions between the Security Forces and the population in Kayes in collaboration with key influential actors (youth, women, RECOTRAD, religious, security forces, etc.). This consisted of identifying key actors, organizing awareness-raising meetings, producing awareness videos that were broadcast on the local media and organizing three round tables that engaged the local president of the nation council of youth, a representative of traditional communicators, the communal council, regional director of youth, the permanent secretariat for combating proliferation of small arms, and the citizen committee. This response also resulted in the involvement of the Permanent Secretariat for Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms, which has set up a commission to recover the weapons taken when the police station was attacked, in collaboration with the Governor and the Regional Police Directorate. Short videos and audio have been produced and broadcast on social networks and local radio stations. Key actors, such as the brother of the young man who was killed and the leaders of the youth demonstrators, shared peaceful messages with the population through these videos.

These various actions have contributed considerably to restoring calm. The response has also generated a surge of civic mindedness among young people, who mobilized to clean up the premises of the police station that had been ransacked during the events.

“These initiatives are timely. It is important that the various influential actors in the community intervene so that we can find solutions to this current crisis and avoid further violence. I particularly welcome this initiative by Think Peace, Mercy Corps, and partners to produce and disseminate messages of healing so that we can meet as brothers and sisters to resolve this crisis and preserve social dialogue and understanding between the security services and the population.” - Conseillere de Kayes

“I am happy that we have been able to agree on how to end this tension between our defense and security forces and the population. The communal council has undertaken initiatives to calm the situation. We have organized a collective breaking of the fast at Mosque to offer prayers in memory of the victims and for the return of peace. We were

4 able to bring together the young people to clean the premises of the police station that had been ransacked during the events. Our partners Think Peace and Mercy Corps accompanied us in this crisis and have the merit of this agreement because they allowed us to settle something that seemed difficult to us, through the production and distribution of video messages of appeasement.” - President du Conseil Communal des jeunes de Kayes

Progress of Program Objectives Following the preparation and set-up of previous quarter, this quarter saw the start of activities under all three objectives of Lafia.

Objective 1: Youth reduce their vulnerability to participating in conflict and violent extremism. Activities under this objective are led by the national partner Think Peace. With Mercy Corps technical support, these activities aim to involve youth in reflection and actions keeping them far from conflict and violent extremism.

 Activity 1.1. Youth associations conduct a mapping exercise of vulnerability to violence and sources of resilience.

This mapping was conducted following the Vulnerabilities and Resilience Assessment Initiative (VRAI) approach and methodology developed and implemented by Mercy Corps in Niger. The Lafia program team supported Think Peace in the development of the terms of reference, the methodology, and the review of the data collection tools. The main objective of the VRAI process is to understand vulnerability to violence and sources of resilience in Kayes region and Bamako District. Specific objectives include: - Understand social, economic and cultural dynamics of the targeted areas; - Identify perceptions of households and different groups on the factors of vulnerability and resilience of communities to violent extremism; - Collect views and opinions of the authorities on the security situation and the community resilience; - Inform the selection of the communes of intervention.

Geographic scope of the study The mapping was carried out in 18 communes. While Lafia will be implemented in 10 communes, the eight other communes will be used for comparison during the final evaluation in order to better capture the impact of the program in targeted areas – in other words, acting as “control” communities.

Methodology The methodological approach utilized both quantitative and qualitative methods, combining household survey with semi-structured interviews with local authorities and focus groups discussion with both community leaders, youth and women.

Socio-demographic statistics of respondents In total, the study interviewed 508 people, including 152 women (approximately 30% of total respondents). 68% of the respondents were in the Kayes region and about 32% were in Bamako.

Table 1 : Socio-demographic distribution of respondents

Age et sexe Bamako Kayes Total Female 38 114 152 15-17 1 1 2 20-24 1 8 9

5 25-35 15 37 52 36-93 21 68 89 Male 125 231 356 20-24 4 6 10 25-35 38 40 78 36-93 83 185 268 Total 163 345 508

Main conclusions

Level of satisfaction of public services In terms of public services, the study looked at access and appreciation of services in the areas of health, education and water. In general, we noted an overall satisfaction of the communities in Kayes region with regard to public services (84% of the respondents indicated they are at least satisfied – total of “bien” and “tres bien” in the graph below). On the other hand, only 16% of respondents said they were at least satisfied in Bamako. This level of dissatisfaction in Bamako could be explained by the high demand for available public services. The other hypothesis may relate to the state's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, given that the surveys took place in the context of a general psychosis that this pandemic caused among the population. Figure 1: Level of satisfaction with public services

Level of satisfaction about public services 1.2 100% 1 84% 0.8 72% 58% 0.6

0.4 26% 28% 15% 16% 0.2 1% 0 Bamako Kayes Total général

Bien Très bien Total général

Security perceptions and evolution over the next three years Most respondents do not have a positive view of the security situation. In Kayes, 43% of respondents feel that the security situation is not good, and in Bamako, half of the respondents (50%) responded as such. Disaggregation allows us to see that more than two thirds of respondents in some of the Kayes localities feel that the security situation is not good, specifically 74% in Fanga, 71% in Guidimé and 67% in Koussané. This perception of the security situation can be explained by the resurgence of tensions and conflicts between communities in the Yelimane cercle, related to land issues and the practice of slavery by social caste. The most frequently cited factors to explain the deterioration of the security situation are the failure of the security forces and the increase in acts of banditry. In addition, when asked about the respondents' perception of the evolution of the security situation over the next three years, overall pessimism was noted. More than half of the respondents (52%) believe that the security situation will further deteriorate (53% of respondents in Kayes and 50% in Bamako)

Figure 2: Perceptions of social cohesion/social relations

6 80% Perceptions of social cohesion 67% 65% 61% 60%

39% 40% 33% 35%

20%

0% Bamako Kayes % des répondants qui pensent qu’ils partagent les mêmes valeurs et mode de vie avec les gens de leur communauté % des répondants qui déclarent qu’ils sont d'accord de se marier ou qu'un autre membre de leur famille se marie avec une personne d'un autre groupe ethnique

Figure 2: legend – English: Green: % of respondents who think they share the same values and way of life with people in their community Blue: % of respondents who say they agree to marry or have another family member marry someone from another ethnic group Yellow: % of respondents who say they have friends or people they have socialized with who are from other ethnic groups In order to collect respondents' perceptions of social cohesion and social relations, the questions focused on three factors: 1) sharing the same values and lifestyles, 2) inter-ethnic marriage and 3) social relations with other ethnic groups. As shown in the graph above, the primary factor in Bamako is interethnic marriage (39%) while in the Kayes region, it is rather the sharing of cultural values and lifestyle that is cited by 67% of respondents. These results can be explained by the geographical location of Kayes, whose region borders Senegal and Mauritania, where people have long-standing relationships across the borders.

Factors of vulnerability to violence

1. Psychological factors

Personal conviction, assertiveness, naivety, desire for “gain facile” (translates as “easy gain” and represents the concept of trying to make money easily or with little effort) and despair are the psychological reasons most frequently cited by individual respondents for adult and young men to join radicalism and/or extremist groups whose modus operandi is violence.

Figure 3: Psychological reasons for participating in radicalism/violence

7 Psychological reasons that can push men, including young boys, to join radicalism/violence

Désespoir Facilite de gain Naïveté Affirmation de la personnalité Conviction personnelle Vengeance Peur Assurance Protection Autre précisez

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Kayes Bamako

Indeed, 64% of respondents in Kayes region and the District of Bamako think that despair is a reason for radicalism. This despair can have several sources, including the misery caused by the lack of income generating activities and livelihoods and/or poor treatment of a person or a group of people that deprives them of the possibility of asserting themselves in the community. 63% of all the people interviewed in Kayes and Bamako think that easy gain is one of the psychological reasons for radicalism. This perception is even more pronounced in the Kayes region, where 68% of the interviewees think the same, compared to 55% in Bamako.

In the focus group discussions with communities, some leaders, particularly in Commune IV of the Bamako district, stated that people who join radical groups or who engage in violence are not very intelligent and are easily manipulated. This justifies naivety as a reason for radicalism by 33% of those interviewed in Kayes and Bamako. This perception is stronger in Kayes, with 40% of the interviewees indicating this perception. The search for personal affirmation is an increasingly important reason that men and young men may engage in radicalism and/or violence. Indeed, it is a primordial element of the psychological fragility leading to violent radicalism. Analysis of the evaluation results shows that 27% of the people interviewed in Kayes and Bamako mention the search for assertiveness as a psychological reason leading to radicalism. In the much more conservative region of Kayes, 31% of respondents indicate this reason. Analyzing on a psychological level, it is clear that a person in search of assertiveness and meaning will inevitably try to fulfill this desire, and radicalism/violence may be one of those paths.

2. Education/training factors

Figure 4: Education-related reasons for participating in radicalism/violence

8 Educational/training reasons that may lead men, including young boys, to join radicalism/violence

Dégradation des valeurs éducatives traditionnelles

Mauvaise qualité de l'éducation dans les centres…

Inadéquation des valeurs transmises avec les…

Inadéquation entre les formations reçues et le…

Insuffisance d'infrastructures et mesures…

Aucune

Autre précisez

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Kayes Bamako

Figure 4: reasons – English:  Degradation of traditional educational values  Poor quality of education in the education system  Inadequacy of values transmitted with structures of the society  Inadequacy between training received and the employment market  Insufficient infrastructure and measures to continue the school cycle  None  Other

Respondents' perceptions of the reasons related to education and training that have or may lead men and boys to join radicalism or violence vary. However, the degradation of traditional educational values is one of the most important causes according to 78% of respondents overall. Based on focus group discussions, the role of the family in educating children has weakened. In the focus group discussions, it emerged that if children adopt non-compliant behaviors, it is because more often than not, parents or elders are no longer acting as effective role models. 64% of the interviewees think that the poor quality of formal education is a reason for radicalization. Linking the low level of education to the analytical capacity of young people leads to the conclusion that it can be challenging for young people to escape the manipulation of violent actors.

3. Ideological factors

Figure 5: Ideological reasons for participating in radicalism/violence

9 Ideological reasons that can push men, including young boys, to join radicalism/violence

Sensibilité à la défense d'une religion ou une…

Diversité d'interprétation des préceptes religieux

Idéologie Ethenique

Autre précisez

Aucune

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Kayes Bamako

Figure 5: reasons – English:

 Sensitivity to the defense of a religion or ideology  Diversity of interpretation of religious principles  Ethnic ideology  Other  None Analysis shows that 67% of the people interviewed in the Kayes region and the district of Bamako believe that sensitivity to defending a religion or ideology is a reason that drives adult and young men to join radicalism and violence. This perception is more pronounced in the Kayes region (74%) than in Bamako (53%), with respondents indicating that defending a religion or ideology can push young people in particular to become radicalized. This manifests in not only ideological but also political opposition between radicalized religious or ideological groups and their own societies. Usually these groups use religious texts and use a decontextualized and erroneous interpretation to convey messages inciting violence and radicalism. This could also explain the fact that 53% of the interviewees in the Kayes and Bamako region think that different interpretations and understandings of religious precepts are a reason for radicalism, against 23% who believe that sensitivity to the defense of an ethnic ideology can be a reason for adhering to radicalism tending towards violence. These trends related to the ideological reasons for men's radicalization are very similar to the responses and trends of women and girls. 4. Socio-economic factors According to analysis, 91% of the respondents believe that unemployment or lack of job opportunities, especially among young people, is now considered one of the most important factors promoting radicalization, especially in urban areas. This is why 61% of respondents believe that when young people find themselves in this precarious situation, they succumb to the temptation of gain facile (“easy gain” as detailed above), particularly through banditry or membership in radical groups, which will enable them to generate income to support social or marital happiness, which is also a socio-economic reason for radicalization.

Figure 6: Socio-economic reasons for participating in radicalism/violence

10 Socio-economic reasons why men, including young boys, may join radicalism/violence

Manque d'opportunités d'emploi.

Facilitation des activités génératrices de…

Opportunités d'accès au bonheur social ou…

Denie des ressources et d'opportunités…

Aucune

Autre précisez

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%

Kayes Bamako

Figure 6: reasons – English:  Lack of employment opportunities  Gain facile  Opportunities for social happiness  Denial of opportunities and resources  None  Other

5. Political factors Figure 7: Political and governance-related reasons for participating in radicalism/violence Political and governance reasons that may push men, including young boys, to join radicalism/violence

Mauvaise Répartition des ressources. Insuffisance de la présence l'Etat. Sentiment d'impunité. Inégalité Bavures militaires. Restriction des espaces de liberté. Aucune Autres précisez

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Kayes Bamako

Figure 7: reasons – English:  Misallocation of resources  Insufficient state presence  Sense of impunity  Inequality  Military operations  Restriction of free spaces  None  Other

11 Analysis of the results shows that 85% of respondents in the Kayes region and the district of Bamako think that public resources are poorly managed by the state and communities. This feeling is more emphasized by the interviewees in the Kayes region, 92% of whom believe that their region does not benefit enough from the resources it produces. Respondents' perception of political and governance reasons is a major factor that can lead to violence towards government and officials. 62% of the interviewees mention the weakness of the state, or at least its weak presence, as a political and governance reason driving radicalization. The different political and governance reasons are intimately linked and constitute a cycle of cause and effect. If the presence of the State is deemed insufficient or weak, this situation can promote inequalities and impunity, which are also reasons for radicalization or violence. 51% of respondents overall think that the feeling of impunity can lead to radicalism and violence, and in Kayes in particular, 57% of respondents believe this. For example, there have already been several violent protests by the youth of the Kayes region concerning local elections, certain government decisions or against the police. The most striking and recent case is the one that occurred in the town of Kayes on 11 May 2020.

Workshops: VRAI Results and Targeting

In order to present the results of the VRAI mapping, discuss key findings, and proceed with the selection of target communes for the project, the program organized two workshops to reflect on the preliminary results of the VRAI mapping in Kayes and Bamako. The workshop in Kayes was held on 05 June 2020 in the meeting room of the Governorate of Kayes with the participation of the representative of the Governor of Kayes, the Prefects and Presidents of the councils of the circles of Kayes, Diéma and Yélimane, the Regional Director of Social Development and Solidarity Economy of Kayes, the Representatives of the youth and CAFO and finally the RECOTRAD of Kayes. The Bamako workshop was held on 25 June 2020 in the office of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Mali under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Worship. It brought together 22 participants including representatives of the Ministry of Social Cohesion and National Reconciliation, the Mayor's Office of Commune 3, the Governorate of the District of Bamako and civil society organizations.

The discussions focused first on the VRAI results, followed by participants completing a tool used to guide selection of the target communes.

Table 2: Targeted communes identified Cercles /District Targeted communes Koussané Kayes Falémé Béma Diéma Diancounté Camara Konsiga Yélimane Fanga Guidimé Kremis Bamako Commune II Commune IV

Photo : VRAI Result Workshop in Bamako, Mercy Corps, 2020

 Activity 1.2: 80 Sport for Change Clubs set-up to involve 2000 youth at risk of participation in conflict in identification and resolution of conflict in collaboration with youth leaders.

This activity began with an orientation session by Mercy Corps to the partner Think Peace on the Sport for Change (S4C) approach. This was followed by establishing the sports clubs, identifying coaches and reviewing the first eight modules before the first training session for coaches was organized.

Sport for Change training The program conducted training of trainers on the Sport for Change approach as well as on the first 8 training modules. Trainers were coaches and Think Peace field staff. This session enabled the program team and Think Peace staff to establish a shared understanding of the S4C approach and to review the first eight modules (Self-esteem, Leadership, Inclusion, Teamwork, Responsibility, Common Interests, Competition and Collaboration, and Pressure).

Establishment of sports clubs After validating the TORs, a preliminary survey was carried out on the sports practices in each locality, the existence of sports clubs, the participation of girls in the sports activities, and existing sports infrastructure.

In accordance with the established criteria and in collaboration with the local youth offices, physical education teachers and administrators, the program team organized in each commune community meetings to explain S4C approach and objectives. With the involvement of local authorities, community representatives provided the members and supported on the coaches identification process. In total, the program identified 54 coaches including 19 women, out of the planned total of 60 coaches. There are still 6 coaches to identify, who will be primarily women. The following table summarizes the identification of coaches for each circle.

13 Table 3: Summary of clubs set up and coaches identified

Circles/District Men Women Total Target Identification rate Kayes 8 4 12 12 100% Diema 12 6 18 18 100% Yelimane 8 4 12 18 67% Bamako 7 5 12 12 100% Total 35 19 54 60 90%

In the Konsiga commune in Yelimane, we are facing a challenge caused by a leadership and political conflict, which has prevented operations thus far (further detail in Challenges & Lessons Learned below).

Training session - coaches from Faleme and Koussane communes

This session, facilitated by the Lafia Program Manager, aimed to allow coaches from the communes of Falémé and Koussané to have a better understanding of the S4C approach, to go through the roles and responsibilities of a coach, to train coaches on the modules of self-esteem, leadership, communication, inclusion, teamwork, responsibility, common interests, competition and collaboration. Ultimately, this session have allowed participants to master the tools for facilitating S4C sessions. It brought together 12 coaches, including four women, as well as trainers from the partner Think Peace.

The next steps will be training coaches from the Diema and Yelimane circles.

 Activity 1.3. Youth design and implement action plans that address risk factors for violence.

This activity will start after S4C first sessions and will allow the clubs members and coaches to share their thoughts, opinions and concerns and as part of the action plan development process.

Objective 2: Traditional, religious, and female leaders and government officials resolve inter-group conflicts peacefully and reduce conflict drivers.

Activities under this objective started with the identification of local leaders and monitors, followed by the first training session on conflict analysis and resolution, and initial steps in setting up the Early Warning, Early Response system (EWER).

 Activity 2.1. Traditional, religious, women, and government leaders increase their capacity in dispute resolution.

The first training session brought together leaders and monitors from the commune of Koussané. The participants included community leaders, young women, young men, and women leaders as well as the mayor of the commune of Koussané and the sub-prefect. With a total of 20 participants, including 7 women, the objectives of this session were to strengthen the capacities of community leaders on conflict resolution techniques and to discuss the role of community leaders in the development of responses to the alerts and incidents that the EWER system will produce. In addition to conflict analysis and resolution techniques, participants revisited local mechanisms such as the palaver tree and cultural joking as recourse for resolving certain types of conflicts. This session also allowed the authorities present, the mayor and the sub-prefect, to present numerous cases of land conflicts that served as practical case studies for the analysis and resolution.

14  Activity 2.2. Trained leaders participate in 12 conflict resolution forums to share lessons and develop/adapt EWER systems to needs of zones of intervention This activity will follow the establishment of the EWER system. In order to operationalize this early warning system, the program has engaged the communities in exchanges that have led to the identification of 29 monitors, including ten women. The criteria include: having strong analytical capacity and a good knowledge of the socio-cultural dynamics of the commune in general, being involved in or informed about community dynamics, and maintaining good relations with community members, despite socio-cultural differences.

Figure 1: Lafia EWER System structure

The actors in the commune of Koussané, including, the mayor, the sub-prefect, religious leaders, head of villages, youth and women associations leaders, monitors discussed the structure of the EWER system, the role of each actor, including those of the administrative authorities, as well as the indicators to be monitored. This meeting also clarified the roles and responsibilities of monitors and strengthened their capacities to support the operation of the early warning system and effectively management of information and alerts. It should be noted that the Lafia program has taken into account the lessons learned from the previous USAID/CMM-funded ARPP project by including the mayor as a key actor. This will ensure the sustainability of the system, which will be linked to the national early warning system (EWS).

Table 4: EWER Indicators

A INTRA- AND INTERCOMMUNITY COHESION Code 1 Chieftaincy conflict and challenge to Customary and/or religious authority A1 2 Denigration of a religion, desecration of a sacred symbol or place A2 3 Propagation of identity and hate messages A3 4 Propagation of persistent rumours A4 5 Ethnic or community confrontation A5 6 Interprofessional confrontation A6 7 Tension over common natural resources A7 8 Seizure, theft or destruction of crops, agricultural, livestock or fishery products A8

15 9 Obstacle to the free movement of persons and goods A9 10 Exclusion or marginalization of a group, community or ethnicity observed A10 11 Reduction in interactions between communities, ethnic groups or groups A11 observed 12 Tensions related to political opinions and/or affiliations A12 B ARMED VIOLENCE AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE 1 Ethnic or community confrontation with the use of firearms or edged weapons B1 2 Interprofessional confrontation with the use of firearms or edged weapons B2 3 Firearms or edged weapons use in hold-ups/cut-backs B3 4 Assaults/threats with firearms or edged weapons B4 5 Assassinations/killings with firearms or edged weapons B5 6 Incursion or attacks by armed gangs B6 7 Sequestration or kidnapping with firearms B7 8 Rape/sexual assault with or without firearms or weapons B8 9 Domestic/marital violence with or without weapons B9 10 Incitement to violence B10 11 Acts of revenge or reprisal B11 12 Destruction of property and religious and cultural public buildings B12 13 Other unspecified cases of violence B13

 Activity 2.3. Justice and security officials, land commission members, and community leaders participate in eight community dialogues to discuss conflict risks and causes, and create action plans to prevent violence.  Activity 2.4. Communities, in collaboration with local authorities, implement joint projects that address one or more conflict drivers.

Activities 2.3 and 2.4 are a continuation of the training sessions. They will enable community leaders and the authorities, based on their new knowledge, to analyze local contexts and propose action plans that should lead to the implementation of joint projects addressing the causes of community violence. These activities will begin during the next quarter.

 Activity 3.1. Civil society organizations, including youth associations, increase their knowledge of the CVE strategy.  Activity 3.2. Youth association leaders disseminate information among target youth about the CVE strategy and collect input for the action plan.  Activity 3.3. Community leaders, local government actors, and Ministry of Reconciliation officials share lessons from EWER system and develop plan to integrate EWER into national policy.

These activities require the involvement of two ministries: the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Worship, which is responsible for the national strategy to prevent violent extremism, and the Ministry of National Reconciliation. Mercy Corps and Think Peace have held a coordination meeting with the UJMMA and the CNJ, and discussions have begun with the two ministries for the development of a common intervention strategy. Unfortunately, the process has been interrupted due to the political crisis in the country. However, contact is ongoing and these activities can begin in the next quarter.

16 Challenges and Lessons Learned In addition to the consequences and implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was included in the previous quarterly report and has forced us to reduce the total number of sports clubs to be created from 80 to 60, we faced two major challenges this quarter. The first relates to the socio-political tensions in Bamako, which is the epicenter of the demonstrations and the resulting violence. This situation forced the Lafia program to suspend activities in Bamako for most of June. The program will focus on activities in the Kayes region until the situation in Bamako is conducive to the resumption of activities. The second major challenge relates to the ongoing conflict situation in Konsiga, one of the target communes in the Yelimane cercle. The sub-prefect of the district explains the situation:

“The conflict started in 2016. Following the communal elections, part of the community contested the results. The case was decided in court and the current mayor won and was officially recognized as mayor of the commune. This verdict has aggravated the situation. From 2016 to 2018, the mayor's office was besieged by young demonstrators. The mayor did not start working until 2018 after an intervention by the army to clear the demonstrators. Since then, he has been rejected by the other part of the community. The village chief is also rejected because he is the uncle of the mayor. In June 2019, by order of the regional governor, the sub-prefect was asked to hold consultations to designate an official village head and Mr. Abdoulaye Kebe, the uncle of the mayor, was appointed and recognized as village chief according to custom. Following this, the protesters filed a petition with the Bamako Court of Justice and, according to the latest news, the case is now at the Supreme Court of Justice level. Almost all activity is impossible in this village due to this situation. The population is divided in two, all the projects that come in have difficulties to be established, even if the administration gives orientations to NGOs. It is the lives of the agents that will be threatened. No project can succeed there with an insolent and aggressive youth. The former governor organized a large mediation process. He involved all heads of the villages and griot of Diafounou in addition to the Kassonké chiefs who are joke cousins to the Soninké. Despite all these interventions they refused to accept each other and to make peace, and he himself as sub-prefect, he almost lost his life one day during a consultation in Kersignagné. From then on, he had decided not to go there again. Everyone did what they could, but nothing changed. They refuse to make peace, the only advice he can give as a representative of the administration is not to go and work in this village under these conditions, and if possible to change the commune of intervention to avoid any risk of reprisals, because once the mayor and the village chief are involved in a project, the other section of the community automatically rejects it.” For Lafia activities, we have decided to send an information letter to the Governor of the Region in order to inform him and to make a communal decision with him and other actors on the best way to proceed. In the meantime, activities are suspended in this commune. Sustainability As a core strategy to the program’s implementation, Mercy Corps supports local existing institutions and partner organizations to deliver program interventions. By doing this, Mercy Corps ensures local partners and other program stakeholders to have ownership of the program design and delivery. The Lafia team engages youth, governmental structures (e.g. land commissions), community leaders (e.g. traditional leaders), and youth in social cohesion activities to promote national reconciliation.

Environmental Compliance

17 No activities are presently planned that require environmental review. However, Mercy Corps is corresponding closely with USAID, particularly around the selection of joint projects that may impact the local environment and require mitigating actions according to the approved Initial Environmental Examination (IEE).

Proposed Activities for Next Quarter

Objective 1: Youth reduce their vulnerability to participating in conflict and violent extremism. In the coming quarter, Lafia will continue the training sessions for sport clubs’ coaches so that each club will start the sport for change activities. That’s step will allow us to launch action plans designing and implementation.

 Activity 1.2: 80 Sport for Change Clubs set-up to involve 2,000 youth at risk of participation in conflict in identification and resolution of conflict in collaboration with youth leaders.  Activity 1.3. Youth design and implement action plans that address risk factors for violence.

Objective 2: Traditional, religious, and female leaders and government officials resolve inter-group conflicts peacefully and reduce conflict drivers. During the next quarter, Lafia will finalize all of the training session for community leaders and the EWER system will be functioning in each targeted region.

 Activity 2.1. Traditional, religious, women, and government leaders increase their capacity in dispute resolution.  Activity 2.2. Trained leaders participate in 12 conflict resolution forums to share lessons and develop/adapt EWER systems to needs of zones of intervention.

Objective 3: Local communities actively engage with relevant government authorities and civil society actors in the implementation of national policies that prevent violent extremism and promote reconciliation. Under this objective, Think Peace will develop a strategy with the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Worship regarding how the program will work on the national CVE strategy and identify all stakeholders to be involved in the process.