Multy-Party Negotiation

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Multy-Party Negotiation Multy-party Negotiation 5+1 and Six-Party Talks Multi-party negotiation • Multilateral negotiation (within international organizations; rules and procedures of decision-making; coalition formation; universality) • Like-minded «consensus groups» regular meetings (G20, G7/8, BRICS, etc.), indirectly related to international organizations; minimal procedural arrangements; no decision-making; self-appointment or cooptation. • Ad hoc multi-party negotiation (outside international organizations; informal decision-making; selectivity) P5+1 - Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) P5+1 P5+1 P5+1 (or E3+3) Iran-EU-3's first meeting, Sa'dabad Palace, Tehran, 21 October 2003. EU-3 ministers and Iran's top negotiator Hassan Rouhani Fundamentals • Non-proliferation • Regional Security • Negotiation vs. confrontation • International institutions (IAEA, UN) • "Ad hoc" multilateralism • Diplomacy vs. military option P5+1 STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT Regional security complex (RSC) • Regional security complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” • Within security regions, interactions between states (units) are characterized as deeply rooted and durable “security interdependence” within a “geographically coherent grouping” . (Buzan 1983) Iranian influence in the Middle East Iranian nuclear sites Shahab-3 estimated range Iranian nuclear programme NEGOTIATIONS Balancing objectives International community Iranian objectives: objectives: • Preserving regime, avoiding attack • No Iranian nuclear weapons from the US and Israel • Broad and verifiable gap • Status and prestige as leader of between permitted nuclear developing, Islamic world activities and a nuclear • Recognition of its regional power and role weapons capability • Domestic popularity (“Persian • Addressing – or at least not pride”; framing issue as “colonial making worse in a nuclear powers trying to take away our deal – Iranian behavior on God-given right to technology” Syria, Israel, etc. • Economic development • Civilian nuclear energy • Reassuring regional allies • Nuclear weapons option (or more?) (Israel, Saudi Arabia) • Improving relations with EU, US, others 20 Nuclear Talks with Iran - Key dates 1. Aug. 2002 - Oct. 2003: Iran's secret work is revealed 2. Oct. 2003 - May 2005: Iran enters talks with the E3 (France, GB, Germany) on its nuclear program 3. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three (EU3) European countries in June 2006 (P5+1) 4. June 2006 - Sept.30, 2009: talks deadlock and then collapse over Iran's enrichment efforts 5. 1 October 2009 : Iran agrees to restart negotiations on its nuclear program with the P5+1 (US, China, Russia, France, GB + Germany) 6. 23 november 2013: announcement of a provisional deal 7. 14 July 2015. After 17 days of almost uninterrupted negotiations, a historic deal is reached in Vienna. 27 Contrasting interpretations Gevena, 23 November 2013: • Zarif, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that two references in the agreement meant that “this recognition is there — that Iran will have an enrichment programme”. • U.S. State Secretary Kerry, by contrast, said: “The first step does not say that Iran has a right to enrichment.” The JCPoA content Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - Implementation QuickTime™ and a decompressor are needed to see this picture. NEGOTIATION ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM - ANALYSIS Iran nuclear program mythbusting 1. Iran is an irrational actor. 2. Iran is an existential threat to Israel. 3. Iranian civilian nuclear activities are a cover for nuclear weapons program. 4. Iran has sufficient nuclear fuel to make a bomb. 5. Iran is on the brink of producing a nuclear weapon. 6. Iran’s enrichment activities are a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran – 5 policy options • Maintain the status quo • Regime Change • Military Strikes • Grand Bargain • Contain and engage Kennan’s «containment» and Iran • More than 30 years of punitive measures and a lack of sustained engagement have not made Iran any less dangerous to its neighbors and U.S. regional interests. • The United States has not yet applied a genuine containment strategy to Iran. • U.S. policies directed toward political and economic development of regional allies could help counter the perception that Washington’s relationships are centered solely on defense cooperation with unpopular governments that lack legitimacy. This would be more in line with the way containment was practiced in the early years of the Cold War. • Such a containment strategy would also require far more extensive direct engagement with Iran to attempt to temper its behavior over the long-term. • A more comprehensive and sophisticated containment strategy toward Iran should at least be tested to address what is likely to be a long-term and difficult challenge. Spatial models The key ingredients: • policy space • actors • preferences • behavioral assumptions (sincere vs. strategic behavior) • institutions (rules of the game) • information Spatial model: Iranian nuclear capacity policy continuum Policy preferences for selected stakeholders 11 UN Security Council Resolutions on the Iranian Nuclear Program • The Council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006. • The following three resolutions, 1737 adopted in December 2006, 1747 adopted in March 2007, and 1803 adopted in March 2008, imposed incremental sanctions on Iranian persons and entities believed to have been involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. • Resolution 1835, adopted in September 2008, reiterated the demands made in resolution 1696 without imposing additional sanctions. • The UNSC significantly expanded sanctions in June 2010 with the adoption of Resolution 1929. • The UNSC Resolution 1984, passed on 9 June 2011, extended the mandate of the panel of experts established by Resolution 1929, that supports the Iran Sanctions Committee for one year. • The following three resolutions (2049/2012, 2105/2013, 2159/2014) did the same. • The UNSC Resolution 2231, passed on 20 July 2015, endorsed the Iran Nuclear Deal and lifted all previous sanctions on Iran provided that Iran remains in compliance with the its responsibilities in the nuclear deal. Sanctions Incentives Effects of sanctions on Iranian economy Models of security cooperation • Security community (collective security; solidarity clause; es. NATO; Western Europe) – A security community is a region in which a large-scale use of violence (such as war) has become very unlikely or even unthinkable. • Cooperative security (identifying common challenges; exchanges of information; pragmatic cooperation; no solidarity clause) • Security complex (security interdependence) • Alliances (specific objectives; mutual assurance) A Middle East “cooperative” security framework • There is one region of the world where there is the complete absence of any regional system of collective security: Middle East. • It seems impossible to have in the Middle east a system of collective defense • But what about a “cooperative” security framework? A system of that sort will be open to all the countries of the region, if they decided to join; and it would not be aimed at countering a specific country, so much as developing a code of conduct and associated dialogue mechanisms in order to implement it. 41 Models of security cooperation Security Cooperative Security Alliance community security complex Grade of Medium/High Medium/Low Very low/ Absent integration absent Grade of High Medium/Low Very low/ Very low solidarity absent Six-Party Talks Addressing North Korea Nuclear Program Six-Party Talks China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, South Korea, United States, Russia and Japan Axis of Evil • Former president George W. Bush included North Korea in the "Axis of Evil" during his 2002 State of the Union address, while the CIA concluded later that year that Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium enrichment program that violated a 1994 normalization agreement. • North Korea admitted its activity and subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), restarting its plutonium enrichment program and forcing the departure of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Bush's "axis of evil" included Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. "Beyond the Axis of Evil”(John Bolton, 6.5.2002) included Cuba, Libya, and Syria. The three 'outposts of tyranny' described by Condoleezza Rice (January 2005): Belarus, Burma, Zimbabwe are green. Round 1 • The first round of the talks started in August 2003 with senior officials from the six countries gathering in Beijing. After the meeting, a Chairman’s Summary was agreed to as the basis for further rounds of talks. • Only the beginning…. Rounds 2-3 • In February 2004, a second round was held. The Chairman’s Statement featured seven points, including denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peaceful co-existence of participating states. • The six parties also agreed to hold the third round of talks in 2004. This round reaffirmed the group’s commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Rounds 4-5 • The first major achievement of the six-party talks came in September 2005 during the fourth round of talks in Beijing. Known as the September 19th Joint Statement, the US agreed to refrain from attacking the DPRK, while the DPRK promised to abandon all nuclear programs
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