Multy-party Negotiation

5+1 and Six-Party Talks Multi-party negotiation

• Multilateral negotiation (within international organizations; rules and procedures of decision-making; coalition formation; universality) • Like-minded «consensus groups» regular meetings (G20, G7/8, BRICS, etc.), indirectly related to international organizations; minimal procedural arrangements; no decision-making; self-appointment or cooptation. • Ad hoc multi-party negotiation (outside international organizations; informal decision-making; selectivity) P5+1 -

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) P5+1 P5+1 P5+1 (or E3+3) Iran-EU-3's first meeting, Sa'dabad Palace, Tehran, 21 October 2003. EU-3 ministers and Iran's top negotiator Hassan Rouhani

Fundamentals

• Non-proliferation • Regional Security • Negotiation vs. confrontation • International institutions (IAEA, UN) • "Ad hoc" multilateralism • Diplomacy vs. military option P5+1 STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Regional security complex (RSC)

• Regional security complex is defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” • Within security regions, interactions between states (units) are characterized as deeply rooted and durable “security interdependence” within a “geographically coherent grouping” .

(Buzan 1983)

Iranian influence in the Iranian nuclear sites Shahab-3 estimated range Iranian nuclear programme

NEGOTIATIONS

Balancing objectives International community Iranian objectives: objectives: • Preserving regime, avoiding attack • No Iranian nuclear weapons from the US and Israel • Broad and verifiable gap • Status and prestige as leader of between permitted nuclear developing, Islamic world activities and a nuclear • Recognition of its regional power and role weapons capability • Domestic popularity (“Persian • Addressing – or at least not pride”; framing issue as “colonial making worse in a nuclear powers trying to take away our deal – Iranian behavior on God-given right to technology” Syria, Israel, etc. • Economic development • Civilian nuclear energy • Reassuring regional allies • Nuclear weapons option (or more?) (Israel, ) • Improving relations with EU, US, others 20

Nuclear Talks with Iran - Key dates

1. Aug. 2002 - Oct. 2003: Iran's secret work is revealed 2. Oct. 2003 - May 2005: Iran enters talks with the E3 (France, GB, Germany) on its nuclear program 3. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three (EU3) European countries in June 2006 (P5+1) 4. June 2006 - Sept.30, 2009: talks deadlock and then collapse over Iran's enrichment efforts 5. 1 October 2009 : Iran agrees to restart negotiations on its nuclear program with the P5+1 (US, China, Russia, France, GB + Germany) 6. 23 november 2013: announcement of a provisional deal 7. 14 July 2015. After 17 days of almost uninterrupted negotiations, a historic deal is reached in Vienna.

27 Contrasting interpretations

Gevena, 23 November 2013: • Zarif, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that two references in the agreement meant that “this recognition is there — that Iran will have an enrichment programme”. • U.S. State Secretary Kerry, by contrast, said: “The first step does not say that Iran has a right to enrichment.” The JCPoA content Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - Implementation

QuickTime™ and a decompressor are needed to see this picture. NEGOTIATION ON IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM - ANALYSIS Iran nuclear program mythbusting

1. Iran is an irrational actor. 2. Iran is an existential threat to Israel. 3. Iranian civilian nuclear activities are a cover for nuclear weapons program. 4. Iran has sufficient nuclear fuel to make a bomb. 5. Iran is on the brink of producing a nuclear weapon. 6. Iran’s enrichment activities are a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran – 5 policy options

• Maintain the status quo • Regime Change • Military Strikes • Grand Bargain • Contain and engage Kennan’s «containment» and Iran

• More than 30 years of punitive measures and a lack of sustained engagement have not made Iran any less dangerous to its neighbors and U.S. regional interests. • The United States has not yet applied a genuine containment strategy to Iran. • U.S. policies directed toward political and economic development of regional allies could help counter the perception that Washington’s relationships are centered solely on defense cooperation with unpopular governments that lack legitimacy. This would be more in line with the way containment was practiced in the early years of the Cold War. • Such a containment strategy would also require far more extensive direct engagement with Iran to attempt to temper its behavior over the long-term. • A more comprehensive and sophisticated containment strategy toward Iran should at least be tested to address what is likely to be a long-term and difficult challenge.

Spatial models

The key ingredients: • policy space • actors • preferences • behavioral assumptions (sincere vs. strategic behavior) • institutions (rules of the game) • information

Spatial model: Iranian nuclear capacity policy continuum Policy preferences for selected stakeholders 11 UN Security Council Resolutions on the Iranian Nuclear Program

• The Council first demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities with the adoption of resolution 1696 in July 2006. • The following three resolutions, 1737 adopted in December 2006, 1747 adopted in March 2007, and 1803 adopted in March 2008, imposed incremental sanctions on Iranian persons and entities believed to have been involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. • Resolution 1835, adopted in September 2008, reiterated the demands made in resolution 1696 without imposing additional sanctions. • The UNSC significantly expanded sanctions in June 2010 with the adoption of Resolution 1929. • The UNSC Resolution 1984, passed on 9 June 2011, extended the mandate of the panel of experts established by Resolution 1929, that supports the Iran Sanctions Committee for one year. • The following three resolutions (2049/2012, 2105/2013, 2159/2014) did the same. • The UNSC Resolution 2231, passed on 20 July 2015, endorsed the Iran Nuclear Deal and lifted all previous sanctions on Iran provided that Iran remains in compliance with the its responsibilities in the nuclear deal. Sanctions Incentives Effects of sanctions on Iranian economy

Models of security cooperation

• Security community (collective security; solidarity clause; es. NATO; Western Europe) – A security community is a region in which a large-scale use of violence (such as war) has become very unlikely or even unthinkable. • Cooperative security (identifying common challenges; exchanges of information; pragmatic cooperation; no solidarity clause) • Security complex (security interdependence) • Alliances (specific objectives; mutual assurance) A Middle East “cooperative” security framework

• There is one region of the world where there is the complete absence of any regional system of collective security: Middle East. • It seems impossible to have in the Middle east a system of collective defense • But what about a “cooperative” security framework? A system of that sort will be open to all the countries of the region, if they decided to join; and it would not be aimed at countering a specific country, so much as developing a code of conduct and associated dialogue mechanisms in order to implement it.

41 Models of security cooperation

Security Cooperative Security Alliance community security complex Grade of Medium/High Medium/Low Very low/ Absent integration absent Grade of High Medium/Low Very low/ Very low solidarity absent Six-Party Talks

Addressing Nuclear Program Six-Party Talks China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, , United States, Russia and Japan

Axis of Evil

• Former president George W. Bush included North Korea in the "" during his 2002 State of the Union address, while the CIA concluded later that year that Pyongyang was pursuing a uranium enrichment program that violated a 1994 normalization agreement. • North Korea admitted its activity and subsequently withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), restarting its plutonium enrichment program and forcing the departure of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Bush's "axis of evil" included Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. "Beyond the Axis of Evil”(John Bolton, 6.5.2002) included , Libya, and Syria. The three 'outposts of tyranny' described by (January 2005): Belarus, Burma, are green. Round 1

• The first round of the talks started in August 2003 with senior officials from the six countries gathering in Beijing. After the meeting, a Chairman’s Summary was agreed to as the basis for further rounds of talks. • Only the beginning…. Rounds 2-3

• In February 2004, a second round was held. The Chairman’s Statement featured seven points, including denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peaceful co-existence of participating states. • The six parties also agreed to hold the third round of talks in 2004. This round reaffirmed the group’s commitment to denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Rounds 4-5

• The first major achievement of the six-party talks came in September 2005 during the fourth round of talks in Beijing. Known as the September 19th Joint Statement, the US agreed to refrain from attacking the DPRK, while the DPRK promised to abandon all nuclear programs and return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon as possible. • That same year, a fifth round of talks started. In a Chairman’s Statement, the six sides reaffirmed their commitment to solving the nuclear issue through the "action-for-action" principle. Rockets, satellites and nuclear test

• In 2009 the talks stalled when the DPRK quit in protest over a UN statement that condemned its long-range rocket test in mid-April of that year. • Tensions on the peninsula then began to escalate, with the DPRK successfully launching a satellite into space in December last year. They reached a climax in February, when the country conducted a nuclear test in defiance of international warnings. Issues Six Party Talks

Strategic issues Nuclear weapons as a «shield»?

• Nuclear weapons are a core-value weapon: because of their costs for use, they can only be credibly threatened in the face of a serious threat. • Opponents have the incentive to curtail their aggression against a nuclear state so that nuclear use is not a credible option. • Nuclear weapons thus become shields to their possessors that make them less vulnerable to adversary aggression Hypothesis: Opponents of nuclear states are less likely to resort to violent aggression. Nuclear Weapons as a «shield»?

Nuclear programs have the potential to destabilize relations among states • 2003 US invasion of Iraq and preceding UNSCOM crises in the 1990 • The Israeli strike on Osirak, Iraq 1981 • USA–North Korea crisis in 1992 • Crisis on the Iranian nuclear program (2003-2015) Nuclear weapons as a «shield» Conclusions

• Nuclear weapons do confer observable benefits to the possessors by making them less likely to be targets of violent aggression. • However, nuclear weapons do not make states completely immune to hostile acts of aggression, as evident in the Israeli–Arab and India– Pakistan cases. • Proliferation does not necessarily translate into either greater stability or net utility gains in the international system • Proliferation appears to be destabilizing to the international system as the nuclear program states tend to be the target and source of much hostility. • Nuclear program states have some heightened tendencies toward aggression, despite the incentives to lie low during the development stage.

Six-Party Talks

National positions United States

• For Washington, the Six Party Talks serves as a platform for the multilateral mediation on North Korea's nuclear program. • The chief U.S. concern remains Pyongyang's nuclear program and the possible sale of nuclear materials and technology to hostile states and terrorist groups. • As part of any agreement, Washington wants the reclusive state to consent to visits from IAEA monitors. North Korea

• The regime seeks a nonaggression security pledge from the United States, which deploys 28,500 troops in South Korea and maintains a heavy naval presence in the Pacific • Pyongyang also wants normalized relations with Washington and access to economic aid from other Six Party countries South Korea

• Frozen in an unresolved conflict with North Korea, Seoul's ultimate goal is the denuclearization and reunification of the Korean peninsula. • The South also wishes to liberalize North Korea's decrepit economy through greater financial engagement aimed at mitigating the potential cost of future reunification.

China

• Beijing serves as Pyongyang's long-standing ally and main trade partner and has used its influence to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. • Although this leverage has boosted its relations with Washington, Beijing also fears a rush of refugees across its border and has thus provided the North with energy and food assistance. • In March 2013, China finally agreed to sponsor UN sanctions alongside the United States, and it has since then increased its rhetoric for the resumption of talks. Russia

• Moscow's position at the table allows it to reassert its influence in Northeast Asia. Although it has traditionally joined China in warning against harsh sanctions, North Korea's recent provocations have driven it to issue condemnations against the regime's nuclear testing. • Russia ultimately backed renewed UN sanctions against Pyongyang over its nuclear tests, and it has consistently expressed concerns about the North's activities. Japan

• Tokyo worries that North Korea's missile tests could potentially reach Japan. But it also views the Six Party Talks as a forum for negotiating a resolution to the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korean spies in the 1970s and 1980s. • The issue remains a divisive point in U.S.-Japan relations, as Tokyo had not wanted Washington to remove North Korea from its State Sponsors of list until the issue was resolved Six-Party Talks

Negotiation structure

North Korea’s goals

• Pyongyang's priority is to solidify its deterrent capabilities. • For Mr Kim, this means boosting his political authority and legitimacy at home. • He can take comfort from China's apparent reluctance to engage in a much tougher way. • He can also calculate that ultimately the United States will accept the need to negotiate some form of intermediate freeze in the North's military capabilities • Mr Kim may hope he will be able to secure a range of concessions from the US and South Korea: economic assistance, conventional arms reductions, or more importantly the political respect and status as an independent, sovereign state