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S. HRG. 115–761 NOMINATIONS TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION FEBRUARY 14, 2018 Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation ( Available online: http://www.govinfo.gov U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 39–877 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020 VerDate Nov 24 2008 07:54 Mar 02, 2020 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 S:\GPO\DOCS\39877.TXT JACKIE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman ROGER WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington TED CRUZ, Texas AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota DEB FISCHER, Nebraska RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JERRY MORAN, Kansas BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts DEAN HELLER, Nevada TOM UDALL, New Mexico JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma GARY PETERS, Michigan MIKE LEE, Utah TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire CORY GARDNER, Colorado CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada TODD YOUNG, Indiana JON TESTER, Montana NICK ROSSI, Staff Director ADRIAN ARNAKIS, Deputy Staff Director JASON VAN BEEK, General Counsel KIM LIPSKY, Democratic Staff Director CHRIS DAY, Democratic Deputy Staff Director RENAE BLACK, Senior Counsel (II) VerDate Nov 24 2008 07:54 Mar 02, 2020 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 S:\GPO\DOCS\39877.TXT JACKIE C O N T E N T S Page Hearing held on February 14, 2018 ....................................................................... 1 Statement of Senator Thune ................................................................................... 1 Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 2 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 Statement of Senator Moore Capito ....................................................................... 8 Introductory statement .................................................................................... 9 Statement of Senator Blumenthal .......................................................................... 54 Prepared statement from the Congressional Antitrust Caucus ................... 84 Statement of Senator Schatz .................................................................................. 55 Statement of Senator Udall .................................................................................... 57 Statement of Senator Hassan ................................................................................. 59 Statement of Senator Cantwell .............................................................................. 61 Statement of Senator Lee ....................................................................................... 64 Statement of Senator Wicker .................................................................................. 66 Statement of Senator Markey ................................................................................. 68 Statement of Senator Klobuchar ............................................................................ 69 Statement of Senator Cortez Masto ....................................................................... 71 Statement of Senator Cruz ..................................................................................... 73 Statement of Senator Moran .................................................................................. 75 Letter dated January 30, 2018 from Hon. Jerry Moran and Hon. Richard Blumenthal to Hon. Maureen Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, Federal Trade Commission ........................................................................................ 76 Statement of Senator Baldwin ................................................................................ 77 Statement of Senator Tester ................................................................................... 79 WITNESSES Hon. Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator from Utah .......................................................... 4 Introductory statement .................................................................................... 6 Hon. John Cornyn, U.S. Senator from Texas ........................................................ 7 Introductory statement .................................................................................... 8 Joseph Simons, Nominee for Commissioner/Chairman Designate, Federal Trade Commission ............................................................................................... 10 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 Biographical information ................................................................................. 11 Christine S. Wilson, Nominee to be a Commissioner, Federal Trade Commis- sion ........................................................................................................................ 23 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24 Biographical information ................................................................................. 25 Noah Joshua Phillips, Nominee to be a Commissioner, Federal Trade Com- mission .................................................................................................................. 33 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 Biographical information ................................................................................. 36 Rohit Chopra, Nominee to be a Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission ...... 40 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 Biographical information ................................................................................. 42 APPENDIX Letter dated November 3, 2017 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill Nelson from former Chairs (as well as current Chairs) of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association ................................................................ 87 Letter dated February 20, 2018 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill Nelson from Stanley Pierre-Louis, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Entertainment Software Association .................................................................. 88 (III) VerDate Nov 24 2008 07:54 Mar 02, 2020 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 S:\GPO\DOCS\39877.TXT JACKIE IV Page Letter dated February 26, 2018 to Hon. John Thune and Hon. Bill Nelson from Heidi K. McAuliffe, Vice President, Government Affairs, American Coatings Association ............................................................................................ 90 Chris W. K. Fetzer, Dentons US LLP, prepared statement ................................. 90 Response to written questions submitted to Joseph Simons by: Hon. John Thune .............................................................................................. 91 Hon. Roger F. Wicker ....................................................................................... 92 Hon. Roy Blunt ................................................................................................. 93 Hon. Jerry Moran ............................................................................................. 93 Hon. Dan Sullivan ............................................................................................ 94 Hon. Dean Heller .............................................................................................. 95 Hon. Jim Inhofe ................................................................................................ 95 Hon. Bill Nelson ............................................................................................... 96 Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 97 Hon. Richard Blumenthal ................................................................................ 97 Hon. Brian Schatz ............................................................................................ 100 Hon. Tom Udall ................................................................................................ 102 Hon. Tammy Duckworth .................................................................................. 103 Hon. Catherine Cortez Masto .......................................................................... 103 Response to written questions submitted to Christine S. Wilson by: Hon. Roger F. Wicker ....................................................................................... 107 Hon. Dan Sullivan ............................................................................................ 107 Hon. Dean Heller .............................................................................................. 108 Hon. Jim Inhofe ................................................................................................ 108 Hon. Bill Nelson ............................................................................................... 108 Hon. Amy Klobuchar ........................................................................................ 110 Hon. Richard Blumenthal ...............................................................................
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