Research in Drama Education,Vol. 5, No. 1, 2000

Drama as Ethical Education

BRIAN EDMISTON School ofTeaching and Learning, Ohio State University, 200Ramseyer Hall, 29 WestWoodruff Avenue, Columbus, OH43210,USA (e-mail: [email protected])

ABSTRACT In this article theauthor outlines atheory ofdrama as ethical education.He contrasts his theoretical and philosophical framework, whichis grounded in the writings ofMikhail Bakhtin, withwhat he argues is theneo-Aristotelian approach developedby Joe Winston. In an analysis ofseveral practical examplesheexamines the pedagogicalimplicationsofbothframeworks and illustrates differencesin assumptions about whatit means tobecome ethical. He considers therelevance ofa theory of discourse for analysing howethical understandings can develop in dialogue about narratives.Further, he discusses howthe conceptof positioningcan complicateour view ofthe ethical dimension ofongoing interactions in and outof role. Finally, theauthor shows howdialogic sequencing can create conditions in whichstudents may begin to re-examine theethical assumptions oftheir discourses. He closes by raising whathe considers tobesome ofthe more pressing questions about drama’s potential as ethical education.

Introduction Howdo webecome ethical?This question,whichpeople inevery society from agrarian Greeceto post-industrial America have pondered, has gained asense ofurgency for many educators in thewake ofrecent homicides by children on bothsides ofthe Atlantic. Calls for character education in theUnited States and moral education in Britain suggest that people still assume that teachers in schools have aresponsibilityto bring an ethical dimension toeducation. Drama’s potential in ethical education has untilrecently been considered by few scholars (Colby, 1982,1987;Winston, 1994,1995,1996;Edmiston, 1994,1995,1998a, 1998c). Withthe publication ofJoe Winston’s (1998)book, Drama, Narrative and Moral Education ,thereis nowlikely tobemore serious considerationofthe power of drama as ethical education {1}.In this article Ioutline atheoretical and philosophical frameworkofdrama as ethical education,whichis grounded in thewritings ofMikhail Bakhtin. Iexamine thepedagogical implications ofthe framework as Icompare and contrast itwith the neo-Aristotelianapproach developedbyJoe Winston. Ibelieve that itis important torecognise areas ofagreement and differencein order touse theseto generate further discussion about theplace and value ofdrama inethical education. It is in this spirit ofhopefulness thatI have writtenthis article.

1356–9783/ 00/010063–22 Ó 2000Taylor &FrancisLtd 64 B. Edmiston

Winston has developed an extensive argument proposing thatclassroom drama can be signiŽcant in students’moral education, enabling themto express, explore, and develop complex conceptual moral understandings. Having advanced asimilar but much sketchier argument myself (1995),Iam in completeagreement withhim onthis major thrust ofhis book. As someone whohas been critical ofthe theoretical assumptions whichunderpin and dominate theŽ elds ofmoral education and moral development,Iam indebtedto Winston for his compellingsynthesis and critique of,in particular, thetheoretical positions ofLawrence Kohlberg. Though Ihave some fundamentaldisagreementsabout theadequacy ofneo-Aristoteliantheory as an alterna- tive framework, nevertheless Winston has used this approach todevelop powerful arguments for using classroom drama in moral education. Inthis introductorysection Ilay outa conceptual map for readers comparing neo-Aristotelian and Bakhtinian theories ofethics{2}.

Philosophicaland Theoretical Differences Atthe core ofdifferencesin our philosophicaland theoretical views are our conceptu- alisations ofthe self in relation toothers. Winston’s neo-Aristotelian framework promotes an atomistic view oftheself— seeing people as inherently separate from each other and from theworld. Becoming moral isapersonal quest. There isan underlying beliefthat we can come toknowthe world, includingmorality,throughrational,logical analysis ofasituation. Winston wants children tostudy virtues and totalk about how virtues operate in particular situations, especially in stories, so thatthey might under- stand themin more complexity and rely on themlater as moral guides. Though he advocates critical analysis and debate, his isasocially conservative view ofsociety and morality, withhis aim being that through their analysis ofstories, and use ofdrama to do so, children can learn tobemore virtuous in thesocial roles they are born intoor acquire. Rather than seeing individual virtuous behaviours in aŽxed view ofsociety as the goal, myaim is ethical social responsibility and critical analysis notonly ofnarratives butalso ofsocietal relations—equitableand inequitable—fromthe viewpointsofall its members. The Bakhtinian framework thatundergirds my approach views theself as comprehensible in terms both ofhow people view each other and howthey view themselves. Thus, being and becoming ethical is asocial project, notan individual journey.Values are notacquired fromoutside us, butrather, they are forged indialogue among people and texts.Thus, encounters withstories orpeople, in everyday lifeand in theimaginationof drama, are sites fordialoguethroughwhichwe can becomeclearer about theethical views weor others already hold and through whichour ethical positions can change. Bakhtin argues that understandingmorality is ameans totheend ofacting ethically, and notan end in itself.As Iargue in this paper, becoming ethical is notmerely a rational endeavour—itinvolves imaginativeshiftingofpositionstoextendexperience to include multipleand oftencon ictingviews ofevents. FollowingBakhtin,our values are always already apart ofhow we view theworld, whatever our age. Ethical views are afacetof all thelanguage and thought weuse and encounter daily. Drama as Ethical Education 65

The following chart outlines some ofthe key terms thatI use as Iexplore the implicationsofour theoretical and conceptual differences.I willalso consider concep- tual differencesin our use ofother terms, especially ‘action’, ‘evaluate’, and ‘dialogue’.

TABLE I.Philosophicaland theoreticaldifferences

Neo-Aristotelian Bakhtinian

Self Selfis always in relationto other Practiceof virtues Answerability Narrative Discourse Dichotomise Dialogise Role Position

Ethical Evaluation ofAction TwoApproaches toEvaluating Action Winston’s view ofaction is related to‘ practising being virtuous’. He argues thatin drama students come tounderstand thecomplexity ofmorality as they practise, or rehearse, being virtuous in differentsituations and in particular social roles, for example, showing fairness, forgiveness, or generosity. Evaluation, for Winston, is most important whenchildren evaluate acts for their virtue and consider whethersuch acts are indicative ofthe sort ofperson they would wantto become. The stories explored and developed through drama willbe ‘shared communal experiences’which can also become shared moral referencepoints for a classroom communityagainst whichchildren can, withthe aid ofateacher, ‘gauge their ownactions and those ofothers whenever such references are needed on future occasions’(1998,p. 117). Winstonproposes thatclassrooms wouldideally become ‘communitiesof virtue’with evolving moral conversations about thecomplexities ofmoral life(p. 174). Drama wouldbe especiallysigniŽcant whenthe virtues embeddedin narrativeswere‘ problema- tized,played with,subverted, reframed, or brought intocon ict with one another’ (p. 176). Ifully endorse Winston’s vision ofthe classroom as aplace wheredrama and narrative are integral toongoing moral conversationsthat examine thecomplexities of being ethical. His view has much in common withKohlberg’ s idea ofthe school as a ‘just community’(Power et al.,1989).However, Ineed toraise several practical and theoretical questions about howdrama might advance such an ethical agenda. Howadequate as amoral compass is theneo-Aristotelian theory advanced by Winston? The theory is especially important in highlighting theneed toexplore the complexityofmorality and inshowing howmaking moral meaning inlifeis inextrica- bly connectedwiththestories weknow.However, Isuggest thatneo-Aristoteliantheory alone is ultimatelyrestricting. Aview ofaction as rehearsal ofvirtuous behavioursand 66 B. Edmiston aview ofevaluation as assessing thesort ofperson Iam tobecome severely limits our ethical expectations for theefŽ cacy ofdrama. Likethe neo-Aristotelians, Bakhtin (1990,1993)is highly critical ofaKantian quest for abstract moral principles tobe applied universally. Similarly, heargues thatethics cannot bedivorced from aconsiderationofhowpeople act inspeciŽc situations. Like neo-Aristotelians, Bakhtin values writtennarratives, especially novels, as sources and sites ofethical deliberations and he regards people as authors oftheir ownlife narratives. However, rather than rely on rational interpretations ofnarratives for possible moral guidance inface-to-faceinteractions, Bakhtin’s (1984,1986,1990,1993) theories ofthe self and ethicspropose thatone person’s actions must always be evaluated in relation toother people. Bakhtin’s relational view ofthe self extends Aristotle’s concern withmoral end-pointsofaction and personal virtuousoutcomes.For Bakhtin, being ethical means evaluating actions as weare interacting in particular ‘prosaic’moments. Thus, weare notonly ethical whenwe have high stakes choices. We are ethical in theordinarinessofour everydaylifeinteractions.Later reection onaction is essential, butBakhtin also emphasisestheimportanceof ongoingevaluationof action. Bakhtin’s (1986)concept of ‘ outsideness’emphasises thatwe must get outside our individual intentionin order toview and evaluate our actions from theviewpoint of those affected.Concern for thetype ofperson wemight become can only be in relation tohowothers wouldor might relate tosuch aperson. Thus, forBakhtinacting ethically is much more socially and culturally interconnectedand immediatethan ‘practising the virtues’. Bakhtin’s (1990,1993) theory of‘ answerability’is much more extensive than the prevalent, more limited view ofseeing people as ‘responsible’for their actions. For example, wemight expectchildren toexplain why they did something and have them live withthe ‘ natural consequences’of their actions. Bakhtin proposes thatin ethical action wemust repeatedly balance attentionon ourselves withattention on both how weevaluate theconsequences ofothers’ actions and on howthey evaluate theconse- quences ofour actions. To judge myself ethically, Imust be answerable toothers’ evaluationsof myactions at thesame timeas Iexpectthem to beanswerabletome, and answerable toothers. The criminal justicesystem is based on atheory ofresponsi- bility—break thelaw and you knowthe consequences. For wrongdoers tobe answer- able wouldrequire perpetrators toattemptto knowhow victims feel,to hear them,to Žnd outhow their lives have been changed, and only thenbegin toanswer their questions about whatshould happen now.However, aperson’s answerability is never complete.Being answerable is ongoing as people shiftpositions, attenddifferently, and extendtheir evaluationsofothers’actions as meanings and discourses ofself and other are illuminated bypublic and private events. Thus, Bakhtinargues thatto be ethical wemust always respond totheimmediate and subsequent effectof actions on others; weshould be as concerned withthe social as much as withthe personal aspects ofmorality, and withevaluating present actions as much as withinterpreting futureor past events. Ifweare toconsider theethics of our actions, thenwe must always be concerned with,and answerable for, theconsequences ofour actions and howthey affectother people as wellas ourselves. Weremain answerable toothers as they evaluate our present and past actions from different Drama as Ethical Education 67 positions. Inother words, asking Aristotle’s question ‘What sort ofperson am Ito become?’can be toolimiting bothsocioculturally and in its sole orientation tothe future.Bakhtin argues that instead weshould in effectrepeatedly ask questions like, ‘Am Iacting ethically nowin relation toothers?’, ‘DidI act ethically thenin relation to others?’and ‘Howmight myactions affectothers in thefuture?’ .

Imagining Ethical (and Unethical)Actions Ihave argued above that (a)acting ethically means being prepared tobeanswerable to anyone, at any time,for theconsequences ofmy actions, and that(b) in ethical evaluation Iconsider howmy actions affect,have affected,or are likely toaffectother people. Inthis section Iconsider therelevance ofdrama tothe ethical evaluation of actions. Imaketwoproposals:(1)in drama wecan adopt multiplepositionsin addition tothose ofour everydaylives; in imaginaryimmediateprosaic situationswecan explore howwe might have acted ifwehad adopted such positions; and (2)through drama we use imagination toshift positions so that welearn howto evaluate actions from the positions ofthose affectedby theconsequences ofour actions. Imaginationis inextricablyinterconnectedwithethics. Learning tobeethical requires thatwe use imaginationtoconsider past, present and futureevents from other people’s positions(Johnson, 1993).Ethical actions in everyday lifemean thatwe are answerable topeople inface-to-facecommunications,whether ornotwe are immediatelyaware of this ethical relation. Wepay attentiontothemeanings ofthe words and gestures others use, butin addition weare frequently imagining whatthey are thinking about us and howthey may be evaluating us. Further, in order toconsider howour actions have previously affected,or are likely toaffect, other people, weuse imagination torecall events and toproject intopast or possible futuretimes and places. Wecan have imaginarydialogueswithpeople as weanswer thequestionsweimaginethey might pose tous. Thus, interactionswithothers and considerationofhow others might evaluate us requires imagination. Ihypothesisethat drama provides children witha medium through whichthey could learn touse imaginationin theways weneed touse itforethical action in everyday life. When weact ethically in everyday lifewe imagine from other people’s positions. However, people do notdo so automatically and may also have alimited range of positions from whichthey imagine. Incontrast, through drama wecan enact our imaginingsand give themlife. Children are able toshiftto any location,many ofwhich might nothave occurred tothem in adiscussion. Isuggest thatrepeated use of imaginationin theseways through drama is likely tomakeitfeel quite ‘ normal’to shift positions in imagination at other times. Further, Ipropose thatour ethical imaginationcan give usavision ofhow the world could be differentand whatour lives wouldbe like ifwe acted in differentways. Students and teacher imagine whatit would mean tobe ethical professionals in Heathcote’s (Heathcote&Bolton,1995)‘ mantle ofthe expert’ approach toeducation. Her system is groundedinaprolongedexplorationofwhat it would mean toact in the world as an ethical person, given one’s evolving vision ofhuman relations. Heathcote is emphatic thatthe children invent ahistory oftheir enterprise thatillustrates the 68 B. Edmiston experts’professional and ethical standards. Intheir projects and investigations over time,children can notonly learn about thesocial, cultural, or historical dimensionsof contentin imagined and actual situations, butalso explore, through imagination, the ethical dimensions ofthe problems and challenges thatthe experts face. Weoftenwonder ‘IfIwerein thatperson’ s position, wouldI think and act in similar ways?’In drama wecan enact whatwe imagine. Inimagination,wecan beanswerable toanyone for theconsequences ofour imagined actions as wepretend tointeract with thepeople affected.By enacting whatwe imagine wecan explore howpeople might be affectedby theconsequencesof actions thatwe could notor wouldnot take in everyday life.We can thenshift positions toimagine howsome ofthose people whomight have been affectedby theconsequences ofthose actions might evaluate theoriginal actions. The mantle ofthe expert approach seems an ideal way touse drama tolearn about ethical action. However, this does notpreclude imagining withstudents thatthey are acting immorally.Iargue thatthrough drama wecan imagine whatwould happen ifwe acted inways thatrange along thefull spectrum from good toevil deeds. Winstonseems excessively concerned about children imagining thatthey act in ways thatwould be considered unethical. For example, heseems apprehensive about children even viewing violence in drama, and thereis an implicationin his book that only theteacher should represent immoral acts. However, ithas been myexperience that as children approach social problems and moral dilemmas,imaginingthatthey are acting unethicallymay be thebest place tobegin. Asan example, Ionce spent 40 minutes imagining withtwo 13-year-oldboys, who had been researching MaŽa activities in the1930s,that they weremembers ofaMaŽa family (Edmiston,1998b).The boys wereclearly fascinatedwithhow people could have become involved in MaŽa activities, though they said thatif they had been alive at the timethey wouldnot have joined and wouldnever have killed anyone. Our drama work became an exploration ofhow it might have been that such things happened. We imagined how,as young immigrantsstruggling tomake money in America, they could have needed protection.We created narratives thatexplored why they might have hidden contrabandgoods and thenbeen faced witha choicebetween prison or joining an illegal organisation.Under threat ofviolence totheir families they chose toagree to show their loyalty and joined inaraid, whichturned outto betheSt. Valentine’s Day Massacre. Wespent an entireclass period imagining immoral acts, culminating in a machine gun attack withme representing avictim. However, wealso shiftedpositions toevaluate theconsequences ofevery action from outside theposition ofthose caught up in whatone ofthe boys called ‘thefamily ofhate’ . Wemoved among thepositions ofpolice ofŽcers, family members, MaŽa people, and ourselves as researchers, to evaluate theconsequences ofproposed orprevious actions: thepolice ofŽcers trying to stop corruption; thefamilies terriŽed ofwhat might happen tothem; theMaŽ a people looking after their own;ourselves wonderingwhy people wouldact as they did. As an evaluativelens wekeptreturning totheir original beliefthat they wouldhave been able toresist joining in violence. By theend ofthe session theboys said thatthey had changed their minds, saying thatthey thought they might wellhave become involved. Having acknowledgedtheir potential toact in away that countered their initial ethical beliefs, they could nowbegin toimagine howthey might resist or challenge such a complex social dynamic. Drama as Ethical Education 69

Ihave argued in this section that in drama wecan imagine actions and imagine how others might evaluate theconsequences ofthose actions. None ofthis is tosay that drama is notalso about reacting tothedeeds ofother people. However, whenwe judge others’actions, thereis apersistent danger ofmoralising about whatwe would have done—giving advice withoutdeeply consideringwhy aperson might have acted as they did and notin other ways. Atworst we may begin todemonise others, feelcompletely separated from them, and Žnd their actions incomprehensible.This was atrap, into whichWinston sometimes seemed about tofall. Wewill reduce or avoid our tendenciesto moralise or demonise whenwe imagine from theposition ofpeople whoseactions weare going toevaluate and judge; whenwe present and interpretimages oftheir deeds wecan try tounderstand their motivation at thesame timeas wecritique or rethink theintersections ofour value systems. This was whathappenedwiththe boys whowereresearching MaŽa activities.They had been very judgemental,saying they could notunderstand why people had notjust refused to join. Itwas notuntil theboys, in imagination, took up theposition ofthose people whom they had judged, as wellas thepositionsofothers, thatthey began tounderstand possible motivation and became more empathetic withtheir dilemmas. Finally, Iwantto add anoteof caution about issues ofcultural representation.The powerof imaginationtoshiftpositions in order toexperience from other perspectives seems potentiallylimitless. However, whenwe imagine thewords and deeds ofpeople from other positions wedraw onthelimited knowledge wealready have about those particularsocial and cultural events. Wealways imaginewhat might have happenedand theimages ofrepresentationsof those events are always incomplete.The boys whowere researching theMaŽ a had been studying thetopic for several weeks.I was also quite conversant withthe period and events ofthe1930s.Thus, Iwas notoverly concerned about misrepresentingtherealities faced by people at thetime. Though our knowledge ofevents was extensive, itwas, nevertheless, limited as always. Iwantto stress that whenwe represent people and dilemmas through drama, theseare neither asubstitute for discovering additionalrelevant cultural knowledge nor for discussing withstudents theincomplete nature ofour knowledge about people wholive orlived in other times and places withcomplex systems ofvalues and relations thatmay be wellbeyond our imagining.

Analysis ofan Example Inorder tocontrast theimplications for drama work ofa neo-Aristotelian and a Bakhtinian view ofethical evaluations ofactions, Iwillanalyse themajor example whichWinston gives ofpractising virtues (1998,pp. 115–117). The drama work was developed as a‘sequel’to an Indian folktale, ‘The Brahmin, theThief and theOgre’ , that had previously been read, discussed, and morally critiqued byWinston and aclass of7– 9-year-oldchildren. The ogre did notappear inthesequel. Intheoriginal story the Brahmin hitthe thief over thehead beforehe could steal one ofhis calves. Before working through drama, thechildren chose possible morals oftheoriginal story from alist provided by theteacher. The most popular were‘ Ifyou are kind you willbe rewarded’and ‘No matter howpoor you are you must notsteal’ . Winston used the 70 B. Edmiston latter as afocus for two50-minutesessions. The children also volunteeredexamples of whatthey regarded as good ethical conduct(these included afarmer giving theBrahmin acalf)and bad ethical conduct(theseincluded thethief stealing and theBrahminhitting the thief). Drama work began whenin role as villagers thechildren Žrst encountered Winston in role as thewife of the thief. They agreed toprevent her husband, thethief, from doing anything else wrong. Nextthey interrogated Winston in role as thethief, questioned him about his motives, discovered thathe wantedthe Brahmin togive him acalf, and discussed whatought tohappen. They thenmet Winston in role as the Brahmin and tried topersuade him toshare. Finally, insmall groups they acted outan ending tothedrama work. Winston quotes and analyses an extract from thework when,in therole ofthe villagers, thechildren discussed withthe teacher, in role as aBrahmin, howhe should respond tothe man whohad previously stolen acalf, butwho was nowasking the Brahmin togive him one ofhis calves. Winston’s aim was toexplore moral complexity through problematisingthe thief’s ‘vice’of theftby placing itin conict with a demand by him for theBrahmin topractice the‘ virtue’of sharing. Winstonnotes thatvia thediscussion in thedrama work, in additiontopractisingand applying thevirtue ofcon ict mediation, thechildren werealso able toargue for the virtues ofgenerosity, fairness, forgiveness and compassion. Inthis example,and almost withoutexceptionin theexamplesthroughoutWinston’s book, thestudents evaluated theconsequences of other people’s actions—in this case those ofthe Brahmin and ofthe thief. What was missing was any evaluation ofaction actually taken bythestudents in role {3}.From his description, itseems thatWinston invented theevents in thenarrative ofthe sequel. When thechildren methim in role he repeatedly narrated for themwhat he had invented had already happened—their purpose was toevaluate themorality ofthese different actions. This practice is not unlike thepresentation of,and discussion about, moral dilemmasthatKohlberg used to elicitand extendchildren’ s moral reasoning (1984).Though thereis clearly value in moral discussions and theuse ofdrama tobring themto life in theways Winston describes, Iargue thatan exclusive use ofsuch an approach is inadequate ifdrama is tobeused for ethical education. Drawing, in particular, onBakhtiniantheory, Ipropose alternative ways tostructure thework. The teacher could have begun by asking thechildren, for example, ‘Why might aperson in thattime and place have been driven totake an animal like acalf for food, even whenthe person knewit was stealing?’Through discussion and using dramatic conventionswiththe teacher, thechildren could have considered theteacher’s ideas, butalso imagined,presented, extendedand interpretedsome oftheir ownimages and ideas about such an ethical dilemma. The ambiguity ofthe situation wouldbe inherent in any subsequent dramatic explorations because theevents tobe explored wouldbe about people whohad been in positions torn betweena need totake and a knowledgethat they wouldbe judged as doing wrong. Inavariety ofbrief orextended encounters thechildren could have used drama toexplore both howothers might have evaluated theseactions and howthose whohad stolen might have evaluated the judgements ofothers. By switching positions thechildren could have evaluated and Drama as Ethical Education 71 re-evaluatedtheir actions from multiple viewpointsand theteacher could have adopted theposition ofany role toencounter thechildren for thepurpose ofassisting themin their ethical explorations.Examplesofdifferent positions include: theowners ofstolen animals whoare themselves hungry, those whoseperceived need drove thepeople to steal and whoare worried about being blamed, or theGods whowant to be fair to everyone. Further inventionscould have occurred withthe children for thepurposes of tightening themoral dilemmas and exploring some oftheoriginally unforeseen conse- quences ofactions. For example, whatwould the wife have done toget food?What wouldthe Brahmin doat thefuneral ofthe family ofachild whodied from starvation? Howwould a thiefreact tosomeone whohad stolen from him? Though my ideas for structuring thework are superŽcially similar toWinston’ s example,thereare signiŽcant differencesthatI hope illustrate howBakhtin’ s theories of ethicsand theself can extendand differentlyinform practice thataims todevelop ethical sensibilities in children.

Narratives and Discourses Winston rightly argues thatstudents need torecognise thevalue-laden nature of narratives. Rather than accept withoutquestion thevalues embedded in thenarratives they read or hear, children need tobe critical ofthe implicit morality ofall stories. He stresses that‘ weneed toremain alert toexactly what they are telling us’(1998,p. 176, his emphasis). Iwantto argue thatWinston seems toregard narrativesas ‘outthere’ made by others and implies thatwhen we evaluate actions in narratives thatwe can remain somehow detached from thecharacters or situations constructed in thestory. Further, Winston seems toassume thatmaintaining thechildren in an evaluative position fairly distant from theemotional centreof a narrative, for example, as villagers whowere not personally involved in theactions ofthe story, is sufŽcient for ethical engagement. I disagree withboth assumptions. Central tomy critique is an understanding ofdis- courses {4}. Bakhtin (1981,1984)conceptualises narratives as composed ofdiscourses. Complex narratives, like novels, have amultitudeof discourses, whereas more straightforward narratives like folktales are likely tohave only afew.Discourses are embedded in speciŽc situations butare deeper than theplot of a story. The characters in stories operate outof discourses explicitly and implicitly constructed by theauthor, who recognises (butalso overlooks) differentdiscourses, meanings, and social relations. In moralistic stories thediscourses are never questioned withinthe narrative— these narratives have whatBakhtin calls more ‘monologic’or ‘authoritative’discourses and tellthe reader whatto think and howto evaluate. Novels, however, tendto be composedofmore ‘dialogic’or ‘internallypersuasive’discourses because characters and author are in complex dialogues about why people act as they do. The relations and consequencesare uncertain and vary in meaning dependingon thecharacters’ position- ality relative toothers. Discourses are always intertextually connectedwith other people and withother narratives. Discourses are neither in speciŽc locations, like particular books, nor are 72 B. Edmiston they inindividualpeople. Rather, they are dispersed among people, texts,and sociocul- tural events. Discourses have been constructed, developed, recorded, and changed over timein previous interactions betweencountless people. Some have become codiŽed in laws, some entrenchedin moral rules, and some are integral tohoweach one ofus views the world. Discourses are implicit whenever thedifferent languages ofcommunicationare used. As wetalk, write,move, draw, interact, think and act, weare doing so through discourses. However, weare typically notaware ofthe discourses outof which we operate. Itis only whenwe encounter achallenge toatacitbelief that our beliefs and values might become visible and available for critique. Discoursesare internallyconstructedframeworksthat wehave created outof amyriad ofprevious encounterswithpeople and texts.Bakhtin argues thatthemore our pervasive discourses are authoritative,themore wewilltend to be uncompromisingand rigid in our thinkingand approach tolife.The more internallypersuasive they are, themore of amaverick wemay be. Ideally, our discourses should balance views ofauthority (like social appropriateness) withour owninternal views (likeour beliefs onequality). The conceptof discourses radically alters howwe view interactions withnarratives and theevaluationofactions throughdrama. Wecan neither understanddiscourses nor extensively critique themwithout engaging withthem and entering intodialogue with them. Ifdiscourses are so pervasive yet so elusive, thenhow can weknowwhat they are? Discourses are hintedat in our languageand in our actions. One metaphorI have begun touse is that ofshadows. Wemay notbe able tosee discourses butwe can see the shadows they cast—in other words, ways ofviewing theworld inform howwe position ourselves, howwe evaluate others, and howwe act. Prior, immediate, and anticipated actions are tangible(especiallywhenwe make themvisible through drama conventions) and can always be interpretedand evaluated from theposition ofthe person acting and aperson affected.When weevaluatetheconsequencesof our actions from thepositions ofthose affectedby our actions,thenit is as ifwesee theshadows cast byour discourses. Wecan thenbegin toconsider ifthose ways ofacting— and thus theunderlying discourses—are ones weidentify with,or not. Ihave only begun tounderstandhowsigniŽ cant drama might bein assisting children and teachers tobecome aware ofthe discourses outof whichthey operate. Oneway in whichdrama work is unique is thatit allows us tooperate outof discourses in imagination withoutactually having tolive withthe consequences ofthe actions we imagine taking. Inother words, wecan align ourselves withany possible discourse and discover theshadows cast bythose ways ofacting in theworld. Drama also encourages us toshiftpositions as weimagine and act from theposition ofa person affectedby our actions. Inother words, wecan get outside adiscourse and evaluate itfrom different positions.

Dialogue and Positioning Dialogue as Conict of Discourses Neither discussions nor changes in role in themselves are aguarantee ofdialogue. Drama as Ethical Education 73

Dialogue is notsynonymous withconversation or argument—dialogue is ‘more than talk’between people (Edmiston,1994).Dialogue among people may be experienced as externalconict but more importantis aperson’s experienceofinternal conict between differentcompeting positions in whichthe underlying discourses in narratives are ‘dialogised’(Edmiston, 1994,1995,1998a). Discourses are dialogised whenone discourse is placed in dialogue withanother so thatthe underlying assumptions ofone discourse, including ethical ones, are ‘seen’ through those in another. Through dialogising discourses wecan stand outside and evaluate theassumptions thatunderlie aparticular aspect ofhow we view theworld. My writing and reading in thepreparation ofthis paper were,for me, examples of dialogising discourses. Inreading Winston’s book through my understandings of Bakhtin, his theoretical and practical assumptions came more clearly intoview. Addi- tionally,in reading drafts ofmywriting as wellas in rereading Bakhtin,Idid so through mychangingunderstandingsof neo-Aristoteliantheory and achieved moreclarity about my understandings ofBakhtin, and some changes in my theorising about my drama practice. Discourses can be dialogised in drama whenthe language and actions in one encounterare ‘read’through those in another. Placing children in aposition wherethey have tochoose betweendifferent options is unlikely tobe sufŽcient to dialogise discourses. Further, dialogising discourses produces thekind of‘ both/and’thinking needed tocreate more complex understandings.When discourses are notbeing dialo- gised thenpeople can easily driftinto the kind of‘ either/or’thinking that can result in an experience ofadichotomousbinary. Though theremay bean intentiontodialogue, theresult may be theopposite. As Winston stresses, dialogue may also result in an intensiŽcationor ‘deepening’of previously held positions (1998,p. 84).Instead ofwhat Bakhtin calls ‘interillumination’between different positions, people may become more resistant todifferentpositions, and more entrenched in their existing views (Edmiston, 1998b,pp. 110–112). Ibelieve thatthis occurred, tosome extent,in theexample from Winston’s work thatI discuss below(1998,pp. 144–171). InŽ ve one-hour sessions with9– 10-year-old children following thereading and discussion ofatraditional Ojibway Native American tale, ‘The Star Maiden’, Winston initially tookon therole ofa young Tribal Chairman and thenthe role ofhis grandfather{5}.When thechildren werein role, this was mostly as tribal members. His aim was topresent thestudents witha conict between contemporary and traditional values. The Tribal Chairman advocated aWestern ethicof ‘ economic progress’to be created through theproposed sale oftribal land; his grandfather opposed any sale of land. Inhis analysis Winston lamented that‘ Isingularly failed toarouse any sympathyfor his dilemma…theChief’ s arguments in favour ofa hospital, newhousing, jobs, and betterprospects fellon deaf ears again and again’(1998,p. 168).Factors that may well have been signiŽcant and whichWinston suggested in his search for an explanation werethe students’ age and a‘dramatic imbalance’between his representation ofthe grandfather as asympathetic victim and his representation ofthe grandson Tribal Chairman as amodern executive. However, Isuggest that Winston may have inadvertentlysetup dichotomousethical 74 B. Edmiston stances because thediscourses underlying each position werenot being dialogised in dialogue. As in theprevious example, Winston seems tohave assumed thata repeated use ofteacher in role wouldbe sufŽcient for thestudents toexperience amoral dilemma. Again, thestudents wereprimarily positionedas reactive evaluators, never as people whohad taken signiŽcant action. The students did create images, butthese were toexplain adream ofthe Tribal Chairman’s that theteacher narrated; they showed images ofselling land withoutthe people’ s consent. The images represented highly ethical feelings ofbetrayal thatsolidiŽ ed during thedrama sessions. However, they did notcreate images ofactions that might have been taken in response tothe moral dilemma. Careful sequencing ofactivities, whatI have called ‘dialogic sequencing’(1994),can promote thedialogising ofdiscourses so thatthe children experience aresonance with theconsequencesof actionsfrom previousencounters.The conict that occurs in drama is notactually betweenpeople butbetween the discourses outof which different people are operating. Sequencing whichrecognises this willmean thatstudents willbe more likely toexperience, and over timeexplore, thecon icting discourses ofa moral dilemma orother ethical aspects ofnarratives. Alternatively, ifprior tomeeting theTribal Chairman thestudents had initially invented their ownimages ofhow people on thereservation might have experienced hardships leading tothe highly improbable scenario that Tribal Chairman wantedto sell offland, thenthey could have taken actions and shown interactions grounded in discourses of‘ economicprogress’. Then whenthe children metthe teacher in role as the Tribal Chairman much ofwhathe and they wouldsay could connectwith the actions and discourses thatthe students wouldhave previously invented. SuperŽcially the encounter betweenTribal Chairman and people wouldhave seemed no different,but thequality ofthe dialogue wouldhave been changed. Instead ofan exchange ofwords, therewould have been morelikelihoodofadialogueinvolvingaconict and dialogising ofdiscourses, and thus an exploration ofthemoral dilemma, at least from aWestern perspective. Winston usefully identiŽes threekey facetsof ‘ dramatic dialogues’(1998, p.113). First, dialogues should be emotional in Martha Nussbaum’s sense that cognitive illumination occurs through theemotions experienced in Žctional encounters. Second, they should explore themoral ambiguities ofnarratives rather than implicitly accept a story’s didactic ‘moral’. Third, as Martin Esslin has argued, thewords in dialogues should be actions in thesense thatthey have an effecton howspeaker and/orspoken tosees their situation and changes subsequent actions. Considering thethree facets of dialogue, whichWinston identiŽes, is crucial; however, structuring for dialogue that dialogises discourses is more complex than this list suggests. The emotionalnature ofdialogue must bemore than feelings inthemoment. Unless thechildren care about theproblems being explored in drama and deepen their care over timethere will be littleengagement (Edmiston, 1998d) and no possibility of dialogue. Further, their emotional engagement has tobe with multiple sides of a dilemma.That is why itis so importantfor thechildren tocreate their ownimages and express their ownpositions. Similarly, as Ihave discussed above, themoral ambiguities ofnarratives cannot Drama as Ethical Education 75 simply be presented tothechildren; thechildren themselves must actively beinvolved in creating asequence ofactivities thatwill lead toan experience ofcon ict between discourses. Finally, Ipropose thatit is whenthe children experience aconict among discourses that discourses are dialogised, so that as Esslin notes, words become actions affecting viewpoint and later actions.

Positions and Social Roles in Drama Ineed todiscuss why, in addition tothemore usual term ‘role’, Ihave been using the term ‘position’throughout this paper. Inthis section Ishow why Isee theconcept of positioning as integral tounderstandingtheethical nature ofdialogue. Bronwyn Davies and Rom Harre´(1990)have recently proposed theconcept of ‘positioning’as amore useful way toconceptualisewhat happensas people interact and encounter conicting interpretations ofevents. When wetalk about aperson’s social role in everyday lifeor in drama, theterm emphasises individualityand suggests that their relationship withothers is somehow static. However, as Davies and Harre´ demonstrate,two people whoeach maintaintheir same social roles are at thesame time in dynamicinteractionswith others—each has a‘position’relative totheother informed by theimmediate situation and bysocial narratives. Davies and Harre´explain positioning in terms ofnarratives—as each person speaks he or she positions theother person toaccept their narrative thrust ofthe unfolding ‘story’that is being advancedand co-constructedthroughtheback-and-forthexchanges ofthe dialogue. However, as Iargued in theprevious section, wecan usefully see narratives as composed ofdiscourses. Indialogue thatevaluates prior events, different people willoffer different interpretations ofactions. These interpretations willbe debated as people try toco-construct, agree on, and evaluate thestory ofwhat happened, why ithappened, and whatshould happen in response. These evaluations willbe grounded in differentdiscourses. From an ethical standpoint,changes inour positions affecthow we evaluate actions. People’s interpretations and evaluations ofevents are differentbecause each person operates outof different discourses. People ‘see’and interpretthe world differently because they have previously formed differentassumptions, expectations,and explana- tions for why people act as they do. As Winstonargues, whenwe make sense ofactions wedraw on thenarratives wealready know(1998, pp. 18–24). However,his assumption thatprior narratives willnot dictate our choices as wenarrate our lives or create a narrative withothers in drama assumes arational detachment from thediscourses embedded in those narratives. Davies and Harre´wouldargue, as wouldBakhtin, that such detachmentisimpossible. The narratives wealready knoware intertwinedwithin and across thediscourses that inform our viewpoints on theworld and which,in particular,guide our views ofhowwe ought tointerpretand evaluateaperson’s actions and thenreact. Just as Heathcote(1984)turned to sociology toappropriate Erving Goffman’s term ‘role’for theŽ eld ofdrama, Isuggest thatwe return tosociologyfortheterms‘position’ and ‘positioning’.Thinking ofourselves solely in terms ofbeing ‘in’or ‘out’of ‘role’can be very limiting. Wemay deceive ourselves intothinking that negotiationshave largely ended among teacher and students once thereis agreement on aŽctional situation and 76 B. Edmiston talk as ifin adifferenttime and/ or place. The ‘roles’we adopt give usgeneric social status, authority, and potential powerrelative toone another. However, aperson’s ‘position’describes howhe orshe uses status, authority,and powerin the‘positioning’ ofothers. Aperson’s changing positions relative toothers are grounded in theethical assumptions he orshe brings toeach particular encounter, each speciŽc interpretation ofevents, and his or her evaluation ofhow people ought toreact. Consideringhowpeople jostle forpositioningremindsus thatmaking drama together involves notonly negotiationsabout theunfolding drama narratives butalso astruggle around whichdiscourses willbe examined or interrogated leaving other discourses to operate largely unquestioned.When werecognise thatin every exchangepeople position themselves and each other, thenwe can more easily realise thatthe negotiation of meanings in drama is also an ongoing struggle for agreement about whichethical discourses willpredominate in theevolving drama narratives. Likewise,we must recognise that howstudents position each other, theteacher, and themselves as wellas howthe teacher does likewiseaffects how discourses are operatingin theinterpretation and creation ofnarratives. Imake twoproposals: (1)teachers’ understanding ofhow positioning operates is important for understandinghowto sequence drama work so thatdiscourses may be dialogised;and (2)students’ understandingof howpositioning operates in drama could help themunderstand its operation ineveryday life.This section provides an introduc- tory consideration ofthe Ž rst proposal, and leaves thesecond largely unexamined. Inorder toillustrate howstudents and teacher can position each other in drama, I reproduce, in its entirety, an example from Winston’s drama work thatfollowed reading thefolktale ‘The Brahmin,theThief and theOgre’ (1998,p. 114).The teacher, in role as theBrahmin, was asking thestudents, inrole as thevillagers, howhe should respond tothethief asking him for one ofhis twocalves.

Brahmin: So is he threateningme? Ishesaying, ‘Give meacalf orelse I’mgoing to steal something? Villager: No! Villager: Heonly wants tobe your friend. Brahmin: Heonly wants tobe my friend?So hecomes round and tries tosteal things from me!Is thatthe way tobe friendly tosomebody? Villager: No, hewants tostart anewlife. Villager: Hewants you tohelp him as well. Brahmin: Well look, Idon’t know. Villager: Well you’re being abitgreedy withtwo. Whydon’t you give him just one? Brahmin: I’mnotbeing greedy withtwo! They’ re mine. Villager: You shouldn’t have two!You should have one! Brahmin: Why should Ionly have one? Villager: You’re toogreedy! Villager: Cos, ifyou give him one you’ll still have one left,won’ t you? Brahmin: Doyou think that’s fair? Villager: Yeah! We’re only trying tohelp him! Villager: Give him acalf! Drama as Ethical Education 77

Brahmin: Is thatgoing tohelp him be abetterperson? Villager: Yeah! Villager: He’ll behappy ifyou did that. Brahmin: He’ll behappy and abetterperson? Villager: He’s got threechildren and he can’t get ajob and he needs food. Villager: And hecan’t get any money. Brahmin: Will Ibe abetterperson ifI give him acalf? Villager: Yeah! Brahmin: Why willI be abetterperson ifI give him acalf? Villager: ’Cos you’ll be sharing. Villager: You could share withhim. Brahmin: Ifyou wereme wouldyou give him acalf? Villager: Ofcourse, Iwould! Villager: Yeah! Brahmin: ButI’ llhave towork harder withjust one calf! Villager: Butif you have one calf and he has one calf theneveryone willbe happy.

Intheencounter,thechildren werepositioned toreact toWinston/Brahmin’sauthori- tative discourses about right and wrong and becoming good. Initially, Winston posi- tionedhimself as operating outof a discourse thatcould be described as ‘nottrusting aperson whohad been athief’. Afterbeing positionedbychildren as greedy, heshifted position tooperate outof a discourse of‘ giving makes areceiver and agiver better people’. Those children whospoke, maintainedtheir positionsthroughoutthe exchange.They positionedthemselves,relative tothethief,as operatingoutof a discourse offriendship: ‘Heonly wantstobeyour friend …wantsyou tohelp him …we’re trying tohelp …give him acalf …he’ll be happy…he needs food …you’ll be sharing…everyone willbe happy’. The children/villagers positioned theteacher/ Brahmin throughout as someone whoought tohelp thethief. The encounter was astruggle betweendifferent discourses as towhichwould be the predominantway ofethically evaluating theactions ofthethief (‘ nottrusting aperson whohad been athief’vs ‘friendship’).The children’s discourse of‘friendship’prevailed. Overall, thechildren’ s experience ofthe encounter seemed closer toa positioning of discourses as adichotomouspresentationofstances than itwas toadialogic exchange. This exchange was successful in thesense that because ofthese interactions the children wererequired toexpress, clarify, and explain an ethical position {6}.However, they did notexamine orcritique thediscourse of‘ friendship’out of which they were operating.Nor did they seriously explore theteacher’ s positions.The teacher/Brahmin’s initial discourse (‘nottrusting aperson whohad been athief’) was overridden and his subsequentdiscourse (‘givingmakes areceiver and agiver betterpeople’ ) was leftlargely unconsidered. Inre-examination ofmy ownpractice, Irecognised many similar encounters where studentsexperiencedcompetingdiscourses as binary oppositions—toomany resulted in unproductiveconfrontations.However, once Ibegan tosequence dialogicallyIdiscov- 78 B. Edmiston ered that early experiences ofbinary oppositions,whenregarded as astarting point for further work, wereactually productive. Oneexample comes from theŽ rst ofthree approximatelyhour-long sessions in ‘The Space Traders Drama’, based onthepremise ofashort story byDerekBell (1993). Iwill describe themajor activities in asequence conductedwith one ofŽ ve groups of 13-year-oldstudents {7}. Session One. The students agreed toadopt therole ofUS Senators in the futurewith authority for major national policy decisions. As yet, thedis- courses associate withtheir positions wereunstated. Using still images they invented howthe country might beseen tobe facing economic and environ- mental ruin from theposition ofpeople affectedby actual and imminent disasters; they also listed areas ofgovernment expenditure. When asked to identify and justify thepossible elimination ofbudget items, students gave short speeches from thepositions ofsenators whocould exercise powerand make policy as they voted overwhelminglyto eliminate welfarepayments. As ifin secret,the students/senatorsthenmet the teacher, inrole as aspace trader from another planet, withthe position ofbeing prepared totrade gold (more than enough toaddress their problems) for their ‘least valued people’. After intense discussion thestudents decided thatthe senators wouldhave voted overwhelmingly toaccept theoffer and exchange welfarerecipients for the gold. Students/senatorsgave reasons for their decisions wheninterviewed as if by aradio talk-show host. Finally, through guided imagery, still images, and writing at home, students imagined events that, from theposition ofwelfare recipients, could have been contributoryfactors in their needing public assist- ance. The particularencounterIanalyse initially is whenthe senators gave reasons fortheir decisions. As theteacher Iwas basically afacilitator at this timeand was largely uninvolved inpositioning. Despiteasking students tophysically place themselves ona continuum from ‘completely in agreement’to ‘ totally opposed’, as students voiced opinions theclass atmosphere became polarised. On theone hand werethe vast majority whowere in favour, typiŽed by thedominant voices ofRon (‘…Itdoesn’ t matter ifthey die, they’re worthless anyway…’)and Nancy (‘…weshould cutwelfare and send thesepeople withthe aliens …they willbe made todo some good for society …’).These twopositioned themselves, relative tothe welfare recipients, as in broad agreementwiththe extreme elementof ahighly authoritativedominantdiscourse, whichwas prevalent at that timedue tointense national debate about ‘welfarereform’ . This was adiscourse thatcould be summarised as follows:‘ most welfarerecipients neither needed nor deserved Žnancialpublic support’. The positionthestudents adopted remained consistent despite thecomments ofthose in oppositiontothetrade. Bethany was one ofa minority whopositioned herself, relative tothe welfare recipients, as operating outof a discourse thatevaluated theproposed action as theenslavement of people. Bethany:‘…Mistreatingpeople!It’s just like theslaves! Wehave noright todo this!… ’.Relative toeach other thestudents positioned one another oppositionally. Positions wereexpressed, and perhaps clariŽed, butthere was no apparent reconsider- ation ofdiscourses. Drama as Ethical Education 79

Session Two. Aftersharing extracts from thewriting they had completedthe previous evening, students imagined being able tosecretly observe thepeople (theformer welfarerecipients) in aholding prison. Then they imagined the thoughts offamily members, and gave public interviews as family members and other citizens.In positioningthose others thestudents tendedto operate outof discourses that stressed thehumanity ofthe people. For example, Nancy wrote:‘ …Isitaperson’s fault ifthey don’t have ajob?…Ican see that itmight notbe aperson’s choice… ’.

Using still images in small groups, thestudents presented possible worstand best outcomes from thepositions ofthe people as they discussed whetherthey wouldhave risked one for theother. Their discourses nowrelated mostly tolikely social and cultural losses, for example, family members they wouldnever see again, having fun withfriends, and missed major sporting events. Finally, in writing lettersfrom the position ofthe people on their last night on Earth reacting toprevious events, some students broadened their discourses tobecome more political. Nancy wroteto the President: ‘…haven’t you ever heard ofsomeone making amistake orhaving problems beyondtheir control?…I’m worried thatmy children won’t get an education…Ididn’t think this was whatAmerica was all about …you‘re notsolving theproblem, you are running away from it!… ’.

Session Three. The teacher, in role as theprison warden, arrived toremove thepeople— the students refused toleave. Later, returning tothe role of senators, they reconsidered their previous position as they revoked theearlier vote and decided tochange government policies and Žnancial priorities. Finally, thestudents discussed questions raised for themabout issues of welfareand social justice.

Incontrast totheencounter from Session One, Iwantto examine theencounter at thebeginning ofthe third session whenthe teacher in role as theprison warden attemptedtohand over thepeople tothespace traders. The teacher/warden, relative to thewelfare recipients, positionedhimself as insupport ofthe discourse whichhad been so dominant in theŽ rst session (‘most welfarerecipients neither needed nor deserved Žnancial public support’), echoing earlier studentcomments through his attitudeand language: ‘You’re just worthless. Idon’t knowwhy thealiens wantyou …you can’t even followthe rules ofsociety. You are scum!’. Inresponse tothis positioning, and relative tothe welfare recipients, students operated outof discourses ofrespect for people whohave their ownhistories and are in favour ofhelping, rather than hurting, people whoare in need. The exchange withthe students was intense as thestudents retorted:‘ You’ve no right totalk tous like that!…You don’t even knowour stories …Didyou ever think ofhelping instead ofkicking people whenthey are down?’ Inthis dramatic encounter (as wellas in their subsequent discussions), thepreviously dominantdiscourse was being seriously challengedfrom alternativediscursive positions. Though therewere heated exchanges, itseems thatfor many students at least the discourses werenot experienced as locked in binaries. Though voiced by theteacher, following theintervening sessions, thepreviously dominant discourse (‘most welfare 80 B. Edmiston recipients neither needed nor deserved Žnancial public support’) was no longer as authoritativein theclassroom— itcould nowbe viewed byevery studentthrough all the additionaldiscourses whichhad been voiced in theinterim. For those students whohad previously resonated strongly withdiscourses that weredismissive ofwelfarerecipients thedialogic sequencing ofthe work created astrong likelihood thatsuch discourses wouldbe dialogised and thatthey wouldexperience internal conict among different discoursesthatcan be drawn on toevaluatethesocioculturalissue ofwelfare. Ron’ s and Nancy’s subsequent statements suggested that this had occurred for them.Ron: ‘I’ve changed mymind. You can’t decidefor people. Even ifwe need themoney wecan’ t make themgo— they’ re people too… and wehave toconsider their families and their feelings and what’s really fair …Ithink wewouldbe just causing more problems that wesolved …’.Nancy: ‘…Eliminatingwelfare isn’t even thepoint tome now.The point is makingitclear whatwe care about, howwe wantpeople tobehave and howwe will help themto do thatbefore and whenthey have problems, because theproblems will happen’. The dialogic sequencingofdrama can create a‘layering’effect of positioningso that, as thedramanarrativesare being negotiatedand debated,more aspects ofthediscourses outof which students (and as Iconsider below,the teacher) are operating can become visible and more contested.One discourse becomes more visible whenit is illuminated through another.This may lead tostudentssubstantiallyre-evaluatingpositionsand the ethical assumptions underlying them. Inhis critique ofmywork, Winston makes avery importantpoint, withwhich I am in fullagreement, thatthe experiencesofafewstudents cannot be generalisedas aclaim for achange in attitudesbyeveryoneinaclass (1998,p. 83){8}.In reviewingthechapter (1995)to which he was referring, Ican nowsee from my choiceof words that it was reasonable for Winston tobelieve thatI was making such aclaim. So, letme make itvery clear nowthat I am notsuggesting thatthe discourses ofall students willbe dialogised in drama as their positions shiftin dialogic sequencing. Iam only proposing thatour sequencing can make itmore likely thatthis occurs for more children. Furthermore, Iwantto emphasise thatwhen discourses are dialogised this does not mean thatwe discard one toreplace itwithanother. Iam notsuggesting thatbecause students switchedpositions indrama or showed achange in attitudeand language (as therewas withsome ofthestudents) there had been aradical move from being callous tobeing caring, or from being prejudiced tobeing unprejudiced {9}.Rather, some students, like Ron, seem tohave become more aware oftheimplications ofoperating outof a highly authoritative discourse that, for example, positions people receiving welfarebeneŽ ts as ‘worthless’. However, notall discourses willbe engaged and dialogised during drama work. Other authoritative discourses, for example, those whichposition people paternalisti- cally, may beleftuncontested. Nancy’s Žnal writtenremarks suggest thatshe may have been operating outof such adiscourse, whenshe said that‘ we’(and thus not‘ them’) need tobe ‘clear whatwe care about, howwe wantpeople tobehave and howwe will help themto dothat’. Since discoursesare not‘ mine’but are socially constructedand culturallyshared ways ofinterpreting and evaluatingpeople’s actions in theworld, dialogisingdiscourses does Drama as Ethical Education 81 notmean thatwe ever letgo ofparticular ways oflooking at theworld. However, by evaluatingtheconsequencesof our actions in drama fromthepositionofthose affected, wemay be able tostand outside and begin toevaluate those discourses through which wehave viewed theworld {10}.

Closing Questions Ihave outlined some ofthe practical implications ofsequencing drama for ethical educationusing aBakhtiniantheoreticalframework.I do notwant to suggest thatI have thereby reached atidy conclusion.To emphasise mydesire for more dialogue Iclose by sharing some ofmy more pressing questions. Ihave describedand analysedethicaldimensionsof using dramaover arelativelyshort period oftime.I wonder howeffective using drama over amuch more extensive period might beinassisting students and teachers tobecome more aware ofthecomplexities ofethical discourses operating in our lives, in thelives ofothers, in narratives, and in society as awhole.In particular, howmight drama help usdevelop asense ofagency and powerrelated todiscourses? Wetendto considerhowstudents’ discourses and positionsare affectedby drama. But whatof our ethical assumptionsas teachers and our positioningof students?Wecannot teach withouttaking ethical stances, buthow can webecome more critically aware of howour ownethical understandingsground themoves wemake as teachers? And how can wemore effectivelydialogise our owndiscourses so that wecan avoid more subtle manifestationsofmoralistic and relativistic ethical stances? Ibelieve thatbecause weultimatelyteach whoweare, wewouldbe denying our own humanity ifwe did notbring whatwe value and whatwe have come tobelieve about justiceand equity intothe classroom and intoour drama work. Ibelieve thatwe should strive tomake theclassroom an ethical space, one thatacknowledges and explores diverse and contradictoryexperiences and stances (1998c). Imake no apology about my advocacy ofkindness, respect, tolerance, equity, and justiceand myoppositiontohatred, disrespect, intolerance,inequity, and injustice {11}. Istrive todevelop an ethical stance thatdoes notjudge others as moral/immoral people butdraws attentionto the consequences ofoperating outof discourses thattend to promote discrimination,injustice, racism, sexism, and other ways in whichadults and children are demeaned and treated inequitably. However, every discourse casts a shadow. Iwouldbe foolish ifI did notrecognise thatstudents experience in different ways thepower and authority which owfrom mydiscourses. Even whenI intendto be just and equitablein dialogue(as wellas open and acceptingofall positions)Icannot avoid some unintentional closing downof options and ideas. Further, from some people’s ethical viewpoints Iwillbe perceived as promoting unjust or unfair views. Though Iam ready tobe answerable, Iwonder howI might become more aware and accepting ofthe inevitable incompleteness and inadequacy ofmy ethical positions, discourses, and actions. For Bakhtin, ‘Lifeby its very nature is dialogic. To live means toparticipate in dialogue:toask questions,toheed, torespond,toagree …{aperson} invests his {orher} entireself in discourse, and this discourse enters intothe dialogic fabric ofhuman life’ (1984,p.293).As Istruggletorecognise,accept, question,and reshape my understanding 82 B. Edmiston ofthe complexity ofthediscourses outof which we operate, Iseek those withwhom Ican discover greater understandingthrough ongoing dialogue.

Notes {1}Note that Winston and Iboth usethe terms ‘ ethical’and ‘moral’interchangeably. {2}It isimportantto stressthat my understandingsare the result of developmentsinmythinking overmost of theprevious decade. What I statehere is not alwaysentirely consistent with my earlierwritings. Additionally, in attemptingto synthesiseand distinguishbetween our philo- sophicaland practicalapproaches, I amaware that I amlikely to haveovergeneralised and misrepresentedsome of Winston’s complex theoreticalpositions and sophisticatedpractice. I apologisefor these errors in advance.My aim is not todenigrateWinston’ s work, sincehe is clearlyboth acommittedteacher and awell-readscholar, but to evaluatethe meaning and practiceof ethicaleducation using a differenttheoretical framework. {3}Note that I amhere taking ‘ action’to meanphysical action. In thenext sectionI consider Winston’s point thatwords canalso be consideredas action. {4}See Edmiston (1998a)for afullerdescription of discoursesand ethics. {5}I could considerissues of culturalrepresentationat this point todiscussthe cultural dimension of ethicsand how valuesfrom one culturecan be imposed on another.However, I havechosen not todo so becauseof thefocus of thispaper. In Chapter10 Winstonhas,at length,addressed potentialdifŽ culties with respectto issuesof representation.Inherreview of Winston’s book, SharonGrady (1998)has madereference to someof heradditional concerns,which Ishare.As Inoted in theprevious part of thepaper, when weattempt to representpeople and dilemmas fromother cultures, we need to acknowledgethat no matterhow much weintend to‘getit right’, wecan just as easily ‘ getit wrong’ . Winston has,I believe,got it wrong in thiscase. First,though he notes(p. 116) thathis intention wasto drawa parallelbetween money made on reservation-situatedcasinosand aproposal tosellnative land, it is almostunthinkable that atriballeader would promote thesale of nativeland in contemporaryrelationsbetween native and non-nativepeople.Second, the term for an electedmale leader is not a‘chief’but a‘tribal chairman’or ‘chairperson’. {6}Based on hisdescription, I disagreewith Winston’s beliefthat there was an ‘interrogationof theirview of fairness’(p. 115). {7}Winston (1998,pp. 82–84)critiques a brieferand lessdeveloped descriptionof thisdrama work (Edmiston, 1995).The descriptionsin thispaper are based on alatermore extensive analysis (Edmiston, 1998a).Winston (p.83) makesthe very important point thatreaders should be scepticalof generaliseddescriptions of dramawork thatcan all too easilymake no reference to how work canbe introduced in such awayas to indicatewhat responses the teacher is expecting.I fullyagree with hiscautionary comment. One focusof mydoctoral dissertation (1991)was relatedto thispoint. WhilstI havebeen impressedwith thedetail of hiscase study descriptions,I amalso aware that we cannot alwaysdescribe practice adequately to suitall readers’purposes. I haveprovided asdetailed descriptions as I could of thiswork, giventhe spaceconstraints. {8}Winston furthersuggests that children may be sayingwhat they perceive the teacher wants to hear.Though Iagree,in principle,with hispoint, forthe reasons outlined in thispaper, I disagreewith hisinterpretation as an adequateexplanation. {9}Winston (1998,p. 82) impliesthat I believethis happened. Iwantto be clearthat if myearlier writingsuggested this I now rejectsuch anotion. {10} An importantaspect of thepositioning of discoursesthat I havenot addressedin thispaper is thefact that as we evaluate one discoursewe are always operating out of otherdiscourses. Morecomplex dialogicstructuring that is multilayered creates the opportunity formany discoursesto be illuminatedsuccessively. Drama as Ethical Education 83

{11} Winston (1998,p. 83) arguesthat, by wanting students to be lessprejudiced, I had asingle perspectivein mind asa predeterminedmoraloutcome. Itshould be clearfrom this paper that adesirefor equity does not equatewith havinga moralisticagenda. Further, he arguesthat my own ethicalunderstandings werenot open to critique.Again, if my earlierwriting suggested such aview,I arguethe contrary. In ethicaldeliberationswe must be preparedto scrutiniseour own discourses.

References

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