Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Amsterdam
Master thesis Political Science: International Relations
Muslim Community in the City of
Amsterdam
Their role in countering radicalization
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Supervised by: mw. Prof. dr. M. de Goede
Second reader: mw. Dr. Anja van Heelsum
Research project: European Security Politics
Name: Skander Alexander Ghehioueche
Student number: 11125144
Date: August 7, 2016
Abstract
This thesis takes on the topic of identifying the role of the Muslim community in relation to counter radicalization efforts. The role is presented from two perspectives: the perspective of the local government of the city of Amsterdam and the perspective of the Muslim community itself. The topic is researched by having recourse to several sets of interviews with various actors that are directly engaged with counter radicalization initiatives from both sides of the spectrum in addition to analysis of sets of governmental grey documents as well as counter radicalization programs. The research resulted in identifying three roles that has been ascribed by the government which are the following: resilience to radicalization, cooperation with the government and finally alliance and actively engaging the radicalization threat. From the point of view of the Muslim community only two roles have been identified: passive participation or active participation or in other terms resilience to radicalization and engagement with countering radicalization. The roles that have been identified are relatively similar with the exception of certain minor differences but in general terms they seem to be aligned in terms of how to handle the threats of radicalism and terrorism.
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Index
Abstract ...... 2
1. Introduction ...... 5
2. Theory ...... 9
Concept of Radicalization ...... 9
Suspect Community ...... 13
Conception of risk: Muslim community being at risk and risky ...... 17
3. Methods ...... 22
4. Background ...... 28
Islam in the Netherlands ...... 28
Muslims/Islam in Amsterdam ...... 28
Muslim Organizations in Amsterdam ...... 30
Relations with the government ...... 30
Identifying the Muslim Community ...... 31
5. Analysis ...... 34
5.1 The role attributed to the Muslim Community by the City Council of Amsterdam ...... 34
5.1.1 At National Level ...... 35
5.1.2 At the local level (Amsterdam) ...... 41
5.1.2 Police force ...... 47
5.1.3 Conclusion Part1 ...... 54
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5.2 The role the Muslim community ascribe to themselves ...... 54
5.2.1 The feelings concerning radicalism / terrorism...... 56
5.2.2 The relationship with the authorities ...... 58
5.2.3 The communities counter terrorism efforts ...... 62
5.3 Synthesis of the findings ...... 65
Conclusion ...... 68
References...... 79
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1. Introduction
The start of the Arab spring in 2011 was at first met with optimism as the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) were toppled and an era of freedom and democracy was expected to take root in the region. However, with the exception of Tunisia that has somewhat managed a democratic transition all of the other revolutions seem to have failed as the authoritarian regimes seem to have been either replaced by states of chaos or failed states and a dramatic rise in Islamic Fundamentalism or violent Salafism.
The ongoing crisis in the MENA region is not only disrupting the affected regions and their bordering countries but also Europe and the West as the sectarian wars on populations and faiths, in addition to the rise of the Islamic State, is raging through the region causing destruction, massive refugee flows in addition to political and religious motivated radicalism/terrorism.
The latter has been gaining renewed public, media and political attention in the west as the consequences of the abovementioned events, in the form of terror threats and attacks for instance both Paris attacks of 2015, have increased the level of threat that is described as substantial in several European countries including The Netherlands (NCTV, 2015) in addition to creating tensions within western societies. It is worth mentioning that the terror threat is not only seen as an external threat but also as an internal one with the apparition of the so called foreign fighters as well as home grown terrorists. These Foreign fighters and the home grown terrorists represent nowadays a bigger threat due to the external situation in the MENA region and more commonly the civil war in Syria that provides them with sanctuary, training and financing that would be
5 used to perpetuate attacks on their country of birth or other in the Schengen space, due to the open borders and freedom of movement.
Based on the current analysis of the terrorist threat, European governments present radical Islam as a risk to society and what is being described as the western way of life. In order to face the threat, several soft as well as hard measures have been used as methods to counter the radicalization of European youth, which are considered as the most vulnerable population within the community.
The Netherlands is no exception, even though it has not experienced a terrorist attack on the same scale as other European countries such as the UK, Spain or Norway, it still had to deal with several radicalization and terrorism incidents (Eijkman et al, 2012). The most notable terrorism incident in recent years was the murder of the controversial film maker Theo van Gogh by the
Dutch Moroccan dual national Mohamed Bouyeri in 2012 (BBC News, 2002).
Even though the Netherlands have not suffered any major Islamist terror attacks the risk is still considered to be substantial as the threat posed by individuals travelling to Syria to fight in the civil war is considered to be real. The Dutch authorities fear that the traumatic experiences of the foreign fighters and their further indoctrination may result in further radicalization and thus potentially increase the eventuality of them returning to commit attacks domestically as it was the case in the Paris latest attacks (ICSR, 2013).
In order to minimize the risk of Islamic terrorism the Dutch government has taken steps in order to prevent the radicalization of Dutch citizens with Muslim background in addition to disengaging those who already possess radical views to stay clear of turning to violence.
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It is worth mentioning that radicalism is perceived by many scholars and security professionals to be the precursor to acts of violent radicalism or in other words terrorism.
In an effort to counter radicalization, the Dutch government has opted for a combination of both hard and soft measures. The hard measures include punitive actions whereas soft measures are in the form of programs that aim in most cases at prevention. The hard punitive measures serve the purpose of punishing those who do not respect the rule of law and at the same time serve as a deterrent. When it comes to soft measures, several institutions, both governmental as well as nongovernmental have been set up in order to counteract the radicalization of disillusioned youth, with little to no proof of effective results. These measures have been targeting the Muslim community as tool of governance with the aim of imposing control and prevent further radicalism. However in the case of the Netherlands the government’s approach has been more focused on soft measures. On these terms and in an effort to effectively apply counter radicalization programs the government attempts to include the affected community, which is the
Muslim community, which it considers as being the breeding ground for terrorism; as it is a strict interpretation of the Islamic faith on which the terrorists base their ideology. The government seeks therefore to include the Muslim community in its counter radicalization efforts in order to reach better effectiveness as they are considered the concerned party. Based on this duality one could wonder about the role the government has attributed the Muslim community since in some respect they are considered as both the pest and the cure. In addition, the perspective of the community is often overlooked when it comes to their role in counter radicalization.
Based on the latter, the following research question could be asked:
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What is the role the Muslim community, in the Amsterdam, has assigned itself in countering radicalization? And what is the role that has been assigned to it by governmental agencies?
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2. Theory
In this chapter the theoretical starting points will be discussed which will lay the foundations for building a thesis and answering the research question mentioned above. For this purpose three main theories have been selected: The concept of radicalization, suspect communities and concept of risk.
Since the thesis deals with the controversial topic of counter radicalization it is in its place to start by analyzing the much discussed and controversial concept of radicalization. The suspect community theory aims at exploring the status that has been attributed to the Muslim community. Finally, the conception of being risky and at risk serves the purpose of highlighting the duality of roles attributed to the community.
Concept of Radicalization
The radicalization discourse emerged as a consequence of lack of understanding as well as difficulties in applying the various conventional linear wisdoms to the emanation of Islamic terrorism (Rapoport, 2002) which generated the problematique of how to govern the emerging problem of home grown terrorism. The home grown terrorism issue gained prominence in 2005 as a result of the 7th of July London bomb attacks where four British radicals committed a series of coordinated suicide attacks in central London that targeted civilians using public transportation during the morning rush. The 7/7 bombings confronted the British public with a threat that was perceived to be external with the reality of a threat that came comes from within
9 and that in this case did not align itself with the conventional radicalization/terrorism discourse
(Sedgwick, 2010). The City of Amsterdam experienced a similar incident but at a smaller scale with the murder of Theo Van Gogh in 2004 by a home grown terrorist. In other practical terms, the radicalization discourse implies that the term radicalization is a tool of power that is exercised by the policy makers, state apparatuses, media and scholarly communities to control
Muslim communities (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010).
Since radicalization has become a hot topic governments have had trouble to define and administrate the threat emanating from radicalism. Therefore, in order to govern be able to govern radicalization a radicalization discourse was created by the government. For instance, the
Dutch Security Service the AIVD (2005) defines radicalization as "Growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order." Such a working definition permits the state apparatuses to take action against an indefinable concept.
The manner by which the radicalization discourse is created happen by generating a linear narrative that explains the production of terrorism through the process of radicalization without taking into account the multitude of ways that may lead to terrorism and the validity of such a narrative when radicalism is tested against real transitions to violence. The creation of a radicalization process that leads to terrorism enables the problem to be governable and thus enters the concepts of risk that in turn classifies the Muslim communities (Githens-Mazer and
Lambert, 2010).
The conventional wisdom of Islamic radicalization asserts that issues linked to identity, integration, lack of secularism, Saudi Arabian and Middle Eastern influences (such as the
10 financing and supporting of Salafist groups) and other related factors might trigger a switch in individuals within the Muslim community which leads them to violent extremism. This extremism is externalized by means of either contextualizing the violence or by actively supporting it (Philips, 2006) in other words by either committing violent acts or supporting them.
Radicalization is hard to define as the term is used differently in various fields and there seems not to be a consensus on the usability of the term however there seems to be an agreement on the idea that, as Mark Sedgwick (2010, 479) simply put it, radicalization represents a rough signifier for “what happens before the bomb goes off”.
There is therefore talk about a plurality in understanding of the radicalization concept as there are a multitude of various publications around the subject that could be classified in two main categories: those who advocate for the existence of a radicalization process and those who argue against the existence of such a process by highlighting the complexity of the radicalization process.
First, in the understanding of radicalization as a singular process there are a myriad of theories, approaches and understandings that attempt to shed light on the process such as the effects of group dynamics and transformative learning. In their report on understanding of the process of online radicalization Stevens & Neuman (2009, 10) explain radicalization in these terms “Most of the definitions currently in circulation describe radicalization as the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political aims.”
The following are some of these academic definitions presented from different perspectives:
One of these perspectives is the effects of group dynamics in the process of radicalization in
11 which the concept is described as an "Increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in group." (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 416). The process of radicalization has also been viewed from the perspective of sociological and psychological concepts. Based on their review of the psychological and the sociological concepts in radicalization, Crossett and Spitaletta
(2010: 10) presented radicalization as "The process by which an individual, group, or mass of people undergo a transformation from participating in the political process via legal means to the use or support of violence for political purposes (radicalism)." In a different approach, Wilner &
Dubouloz discussed how home grown terrorism and extremism is influenced by the process of transformative learning. In their publication, Wilner & Dubouloz (2010: 38 page) define radicalization as “a personal process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence. It is both a mental and emotional process that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour." Based on these definitions it is possible to observe that all of them, while taking into consideration the variety of the sources, subscribe that radicalization ultimately leads to violence and terrorism.
However, even though the conventional wisdom of radicalization might have a degree of truth it does also oversimplify the complex realities of the radicalism triggers, process and outcome
(Heath-Kelly, 2013). Further research and analysis reject the idea of the existence of a single theory or a process that could be applicable to all radicalization cases (Borum, 2004). Efforts have been made in order to uncover a possible sequence of stages, trigger events or sets of issues that could generate a universal process that begins with radicalization to end with committing violent acts of terrorism but failed. The same is applicable to terrorism theories as the search for
12 a general theory is misguided since there are several types of terrorism in existence and their character is in constant motion as its character changes over time and space (Laqueur, 2003).
Heath-Kelly (2013) takes the criticism of the conventional wisdom even further by comparing it to the theory of dark matter that exists to fill holes in existing theoretical physics. The latter supports the assumptions that most of the conventional views concerning radicalization particularly what has been written about it leading to violent terrorism are more conceptual rather than empirical (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010) since it is clear that radicalization pathways are based on the individual and mechanisms function in different ways for different individuals
(Borum, 2011). On this basis, it may seem that at an operational level a non linear understanding of radicalization could be more beneficial in search for understanding the question of ‘how do individuals adopt radical doctrines and translate them or not into committing violent terrorism?’ and thus be able to better develop practices that could prevent the spread of violent extremism.
For this thesis, an understanding of the complexity of radicalization process is imperative as it will help better understand the stance of the Muslim community when it comes to the radicalization issues in addition to explaining the role(s) it perceives it has in countering radicalization. From the local government side such an understanding of radicalization will explain the various programs and approaches it has to countering radicalization which in turn would explain the role it has attributed the Muslim community in countering radicalization.
Suspect Community
A number of scholars subscribe to the idea that when it comes to governmental counter terrorism efforts Muslims have been unintentionally categorized as being part of what has been labeled as a suspect community (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011). The analyses that lead to the conclusion that the Muslims are indeed part of a suspect community can be observed in the various counter
13 radicalization / counter terrorism policies and initiatives that have been gradually implemented in order to face the threat of homegrown terrorists. These measures will be discussed later on.
A suspect community is a sub group of a certain population that is being singled out by the government for being problematic in nature and is therefore targeted by the state for being part of the group. A suspect community is singled out based on one or several attributes that delineate the group such as gender, language, ethnicity, race, religion, political ideology etc (Pantazis &
Pemberton, 2009). In other terms, the state apparatuses would draw extra attention, on the group in question for being problematic, through intelligence and police authorities by means of control and surveillance. However, the security apparatuses are not only governmental entities that are increasing their focus on the community. Other state apparatuses at all levels such as ministries, local governments and city councils does draw added attention to the problematic community but in contrary to the security services with more focus on the preventive rather than surveillance.
The measures deployed against the suspect community, which is in this case is the Muslim community, can be categorized into hard and soft measures. It is worth mentioning that this thesis will mainly draw its focus upon the preventative counter radicalization measures as it is more relevant to the topic at hand.
The notion of suspect community will reveal how the Muslim community in Amsterdam is in fact treated as a suspect community. It will facilitate the comprehension of how the Muslim
Community is being singled out and based on the manner in which the local Police and the local government of Amsterdam perceive the role of the Muslim community.
In Pantazis and Pemberton’s (2011) view the suspicion that is subjected to the suspect community has different levels and is represented in a form of a pyramid where the bottom is
14 composed of the Muslim Community as a whole that is targeted by the media and political discourses, in the middle informal suspects that are targeted by stop and search measures, and topping the pyramid is a minority of formal suspects that are targeted by the security apparatus using means of control and surveillance.
In their understanding of the notion of community, Pantazis and Pemberton (2011) had recourse to Ferdinand Tönnies (2001) perspective of community that is characterized by common ways of life, concentrated social ties and tradition. Using that logic, Pantazis and Pemberton (2011) argue that the suspect community is defined by a common subjective experience which in the case of the Muslim community is based on ummatic attachments which can be explained in their understanding of a community that is based on a common feeling of solidarity and experience.
Although the Muslim Community or the “Ummah” is often regarded as a community like any other it does have its differences from other communities. The American-Palestianian philosopher, Isma'il Raji Al-Faruqi (1998) has defined the Ummah as “a universal society whose membership includes the widest possible variety of ethnicities or communities, but whose commitment to Islam binds them to a specific social order”. Moreover, geographic boundaries are not recognized in the Islamic society as it was asserted by Al-Faruqi the ummah is “not determined at all by geographic considerations. Its territory is not only the whole earth, but all of creation.” (Al-Faruqi, 1998).
Although the theory of suspect category can be understood and applied, just as Ragazzi (2016) argued it is rather incomplete, as the situation is more complex and those within the community can be further divided and subdivided into three categories or roles: Trusted, victims and risky.
Ragazzi justifies his approach by explaining how the state classifies sub groups within the community depending on their level of threat or usability. In other words according to Ragazzi
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(2016) the roles of the Muslim community is divided into passive by standers (potential victims) or allies “trusted”. In this sense the trusted Muslims are those being pulled closer to the government in order to establish a relationship of collaboration. The techniques the government use of the ‘trusted ones’ are those of empowerment, partnership and community policing.
This relationship is beneficial for both parties as the state apparatuses profit from the reach of the trusted Muslim that could, due to their status within the community, attain hard to reach individuals and/or provide insider information by having recourse to their social, cultural and linguistic understanding that permits them greater reach than ‘outsiders’. In return the trusted ones gain monetary and social benefits in form of employment, funding and social capital which in return would help increase the individual’s status and increased reach. The increased social capital comes in form of training, leadership programs, participation in radicalization awareness programs etc (Ragazzi, 2016).
In the case of the Netherlands, these programs are offered to a selection of individuals based on their status within the community. The selection criterion is yet to be available. Those who are not among the trusted community and who not align either willingly or not with the requirements of the state agencies fall into the category of being at risk and potentially risky and are thus subject to the same pressures as the rest that include most of the Muslim community. As for those deemed risky, they are subject to harsh forms of preventative measures such as constant surveillance, assets freezing, passport retraction and provisory detention or harsh punitive measures such as retrieval of citizenship, blacklisting and deportation among other.
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Based on the latter, an image of how the government classifies the Muslims and their roles can be extracted through Ragazzi’s understanding of the roles, which have been confirmed through the interviews. In addition, Ragazzi (2016) argues that there are no clear boundaries between the trusted and those at risk / risky as the categories of suspicion are many and in constant movement. This means that the line between these categories is in constant negotiation and depending on minor elements could topple the balance one way or the other from trusted to suspect and vice versa. Ragazzi’s (2016) classification of the roles of individuals within the suspect community as well as the interchangeable categories of suspicion will permit to understand the workings of the roles assigned by the government on the Muslim community and how the suspect community is formed through counter radicalization measures.
Ragazzi’s suspect categories provided us with a clearer framework from which to approach the
Muslim community in this thesis which will help extract the roles that have been ascribed to it.
However, although Ragazzi’s notions do help in shedding light on the government’s perspective on the role of the suspect community, little light is shed on the how the community perceives its own role. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to shed light on the other side of the story and uncover if both visions do align.
Conception of risk: Muslim community being at risk and risky
The concept of suspect community can also be engaged from the point of view of risk, risk society and risk management (Beck, 1999) that leads to the creation of risk knowledge that has been used in terrorism studies to make terrorism preemptively governable. The creation of risk knowledge and making risk actionable results eventually in the production of what it is supposed
17 to target, in other words it renders risk to become performative (Heath-Kelly, 2013). The fact that risk has become actionable, in light of the fight against terror, permits the governmental agencies to have recourse to preventive measures in the form of surveillance, asset freezing and preventive detention among other measures. Counter terrorism initiatives rely therefore on the invention of the radicalization discourse as well as the process that leads to terrorism in order to govern communities that are considered suspicious which in turn make terrorism identifiable and thus governable through the conceptions of risk.
The radicalization discourse serves the objectives of the state by generating a counterfactual to terrorism which renders the future (terrorism) knowable, hence governable (Heath-Kelly, 2013).
Taking the latter into account, the invention of radicalization discourse as a tool for governance in post 9/11era and the creation of knowledge about transition to terrorism, had lead to the creation of a suspect Muslim community that is supposedly knowable and thus governable through the conception of risk (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009). Radicalization is once again presented to be a threat to the wider population as it is the precursor to terrorism that is bred within a Muslim community that is framed as both victim and a threat or as at risk and risky.
Therefore, the government seeks to steer the conduct of the Muslim communities by classifying the individuals in terms of risk in order to govern those who are considered to be risky in addition to those who are at risk by having recourse to the acquired knowledge to perform counter terrorism (Heath-Kelly, 2013).
The conception of a risky and at risk community comes from the assertions that radical ideology becomes salient to the individual through social networks and the influence of peers (Horgan,
2008) as those who tend to become violent radicals share specific networks that could be either virtual (online), real or both. Following the same logic, violent radical ideas are compared to a
18 virus by drawing a parallel to the contagiousness of radical ideology; those who come in contact with the source become contaminated with the radical doctrine. Thus, the community is being at risk and at the same risky as it is within semi clandestine / underground networks that radical ideology develop and flourish (Crenshaw, 1995).
From the point of view of the governmental agencies, what accentuates the riskiness of the community is the surface normality of the radicals or home grown terrorists as often those individuals are described as regular law abiding citizens by their community and that their actions came as surprise to everyone. Moreover, in many cases these violent radicals are highly educated well integrated individuals which make them escape detection of the state apparatuses as well as the civil society.
The contagiousness of the radical ideologies paired with the apparent normality of terrorists are used to justify the framing of the Muslim community through the discourse of managing the unknown, since it is this opacity that generates the need for knowledge and its production, while emphasizing the intrusive needs for security practices that could better identify the dangerous
Muslims within the community (Heath-Kelly, 2013).
At risk populations can also be produced as risky through actions of security management by turning the at risk population’s vulnerability into potential dangerousness which means that they are already considered as being a threat to society (Heath Kelly, 2013). Although the Muslim community is framed as both a potential victim and a suspect it is also considered to be a vital ally within the fight against terrorism since the community itself is not only considered to be the problem but also part of the solution (Hickman et al, 2011). The Muslim community is usually the best placed to prevent the young from becoming radicalized by either challenging the
19 extremist narratives or by detecting signs of radicalism and potential dangers and informing the local authorities about potential risks (Briggs, 2010); Networks of radical islamists exist within the Muslim community and in certain cases are known to many. The local government uses therefore their partnership with the police, the mosque and the local community in order to identify and reach out to those who are considered to be at risk of contagion and support them.
Based on the abovementioned concepts of being risky and at risk, one can observe contradictions of the radicalization discourse in its governance purpose since it generates the risk it is intended to manage or in other words, produces risk which in turn enables intervention. Therefore, the radicalization discourse provides more knowledge concerning approaches to terrorism and future governance rather than motivations, reasons and causes for transitions to radicalism (Heath
Kelly, 2013).
The approaches, concepts and theories, that were discussed in this section, provide valuable insights into the concept of radicalization, risk and riskiness as well as the suspect community they present these issues from the point of view of the policy makers and governmental institutions and their perceptions in the governance of the terrorism threat by having recourse to the most accessible tool available the governance of radicalization.
Although much is being written concerning these issues from the policy makers stand points and their view of the Muslim community, very little has been written about how they perceive the role of the Muslim community in countering radicalization and even less concerning how the community view their role in countering radicalization. In the coming sections views from both sides of the spectrum will be presented, in the case of the city of Amsterdam, by adapting them
20 to the abovementioned theories and at a later stage comparing and contrasting them in order to uncover a possible alignment in or conflict in point in their respective visions.
In this section, the theoretical framework has been defined for the thesis, concepts of radicalization, suspect communities and risky/at risk have been explained and put into the context. In the coming section the methodologies and the operationalization of will be presented and developed.
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3. Methods
For the thesis a qualitative approach will be taken in order to answer the research question by determining the role of the Muslim community in countering radicalization from the point of view of the local government and the Muslim community itself and looking for signs of discrepancies. The analysis part will be divided into two parts. The first part will cover the government view of the role by having recourse to grey documents and interviews and a second part will cover the view of the Muslim community’s view of the role through a combination of three interviews.
The timeframe that will be used has its starting point the killing of Theo van Gogh, since it is the event that marked the start of the Dutch counter radicalization policies, until today.
The analysis will comprise government publications will be used to determine the manner in which the local government of the city of Amsterdam defines the role of the Muslim community in light of the relations between the policy and the goals (Geva-May & Pal, 1999). The analysis will be of existing policies in an attempt to explain the government’s approach in tackling counter radicalization through which roles that have been implicitly assigned to the Muslim community could be revealed. This part is commonly analytical and descriptive.
The documents that will be used will be a compilation of grey documents in from the central government as well as the local city government since each city has the possibility to apply policies in their own way in addition to reports of the AIVD and the NCTV that constitute the basis of all policy decisions. The documents in question are Annual reports of the AIVD,
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Amsterdam City Council, We Amsterdam initiative, The NCTV yearly security and risk analysis
DNT and finally The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism- a collaboration of the Ministry of Security and Justice, the National Coordinator for Security and
Counter-Terrorism and the Ministry of Social Affairs. These documents have been chosen for the particular reason that it is believed that through the governmental policies and reports it is possible to determine the role it has attributed to the Muslim community.
A lack of documentation when it comes to the role Muslim community has assigned itself in relation to counter radicalization efforts has made it hard to make a comparative analysis of the
Governmental and the Community stance. The latter lead to the decision of holding interviews with representatives of the community “the mosque” and policy advisors of the local city government in order to get a clearer picture and be able to compare and contrast both sides.
Concerning the interviews, they have been held with individuals from both sides of the spectrum and thus governmental officers that are directly involved with Islamic communities when it comes to counter-radicalization initiatives in addition to imams or local figure heads in the
Islamic community as to interrogate them about their concerns and perceptions of the counter radicalization programs that aim in part in securitizing these communities by labeling them as being at risk and risky while at the same time presenting them with the responsibility of dealing with the problems internally.
The interview would provide the research with insight into the Islamic community concerning the above mentioned dilemma, as well as the internal mechanisms and the main thoughts that are roaming the corridors of the authorities, of the city of Amsterdam, concerning the Islamic community as well as the role it plays.
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Before moving on it is important to mention that in this research the Muslim community will be represented by the religious authority of the mosque and Islamic centers as those can be perceived as unofficial community leaders since in the Muslim world imams are highly respected within the community and are often consulted in religious as well as social matters. I will also be specifically looking into the Sunni Muslim community as it is the largest Muslim denomination
(PewResearchCenter, 2009) and that is also followed by extremist terror groups such as Al-
Qaida and the Islamic State.
The choice of interview type that was considered to be the most appropriate for the thesis would be semi structured interviews. The choice for conducting semi structured interviews lies within the fact that in contrast to the rigidity of structured interview it offers a flexibility that allows to bring new ideas and questions during the interview, asking following up and probing questions, improvising off the answers of the interviewee (Berg, 2007). There is of course initial questions and an initial framework that has to be respected within the theme that is to be explored (Berg,
2007). The interview questions were at first standardized to all participants then at a second stage they were slightly adapted to each interviewee. The standardized questions can be found in the
Annex I. The reason for adapting the questions lies in need to formulate the questions in the vocabulary of the participants for instance a police officer does not use the same vocabulary as an Imam. It is therefore important to approach the world from the subject’s perspective ( Berg,
2007).
Both interviews could be compared and contrasted to each other as well as to the policy documents in order to locate any discrepancies or inconstancies in the discourses as well as assessing to what extent the policies mirror what is happening on the field.
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For my thesis I have conducted interviews with on the one hand, a spokesperson of Amsterdam
Badr mosque Abdelhafidh El Mouddin, the chairman of the Contactorgaan Moslems en de
Overheid (CMO) Euboubaker Ozture and an Imam Al Omrani who is a leader of an Islamic youth association named ‘Al-Huda’, to represent the Muslim community. On the other hand, interviews have been conducted with Anas Chrifou Project Manager within the city council who deals with counter radicalization in addition to a police inspector Youssef Gharbi who is stationed within a district with a Muslims Majority.
The reason for which the decision to speak to the imam of the Moroccan mosque Badr is that it is the biggest Sunni Moroccan/Arab mosque in Amsterdam with the capacity of approximately
1000 adherents. Concerning Al-Huda youth center it was selected because of its numerous social activities within the local community. In addition, the reason behind approaching the
Contactorgaan Moslem en Overheid (CMO), an organization that is led by Turks, is that the organization represents 80% of all Turkish and Moroccan mosques and organizations in the
Netherlands. Moreover, the CMO has been recognized by the Dutch government as a dialogue partner in order to reach out to the community and in order to deal with issues related to the
Islamic community. The CMO is the organization with most adherents with over 500, 000 and it represents mainly the Sunni branch of Islam.
The choice for selecting a Turkish led organization (CMO) as well as a Moroccan mosque was motivated by the fact that they represent the two main Sunni Islamic congregations that represent the two biggest minorities in Amsterdam. In addition, the importance of the mosque, in most cases, resides in its size and number of adherents as it is the biggest mosques that attract the most faithful, that have the most financial power due to support and donations etc.
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The reason for choosing to address both Moroccan and Turkish Islamic organizations is motivated by the fact that they represent the largest Muslim communities in Amsterdam.
Attempts have been made to contact Al-Tawheed mosque, a known Salafist mosque with a controversial history and that is publicly known to have drawn the attention of the AIVD in the past. Al-Tawheed mosque has categorically refused all requests for interviews. It could be interesting to mention that the board of Al-Tawheed mosque is composed of Egyptian nationals.
From the government’s side the reason for interviewing the counter radicalization professional is simply his position as the focal point of all radicalization related issues and is responsible of all counter radicalization projects in his designated district which sets him in prime position to have substantial knowledge about the topic of counter radicalization and how the city council perceive the roles of the Muslim community. The thesis would have been missing valuable information if one did not look at the various governmental efforts at a micro level. For that reason it deemed important to conduct an interview with a police inspector whose jurisdiction falls within a suspect Muslim community. The combination of these two interviews from the different state apparatuses permit to view the governmental workings on both the preventive as well as the punitive side.
It must be stated that all interviewees accepted to speak under their real names. A cover of anonymity was offered however it was gracefully rejected by all as they do not oppose to stand for what they are saying.
The manner in which I contacted the various individuals was by calling them directly after conducting research on their establishment. I perceived the telephone call as a more direct and persuasive technique in order to convince the interviewees to accept the interview request. In
26 addition, in order to gain their trust and have a more open interview I addressed the interviewees with North African origins for instance the Imam, the spokesperson and the police officer in their native Arabic.
The choice of selecting the city of Amsterdam fell naturally as a consequence of wanting to focus on one city in order to acquire as much information as possible about once city and a more accurate examination between the Muslim Community and the local government. Moreover having fragmented findings, spread over different cities, would weaken the quality of the findings. Finally, the choice of Amsterdam was also made due to the fact it has the biggest
Muslim population in the Netherlands in addition to it being an example of diversity.
In the coming section will begin by uncovering the historical as well as societal context of Islam in the Netherlands and more specifically in the city of Amsterdam in order to have a clear grasp of the various implications and notions that the thesis will draw upon.
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4. Background
In order to be able to gain a good understanding of the full picture it is important to start with setting the background and the context of the topic which is in this case the Muslim community in the Netherland and Amsterdam and how it is structured and organized
Islam in the Netherlands
Historically Muslims have settled in the Netherlands for almost 5 centuries now as various counts state that they settled in the Netherlands at the wake of the 16th century when Ottoman traders settled in the major port cities (Van Gelder, 2015). It must be taken into account that the
Muslim presence was considered insignificant until the start of the labor migration waves of the
60’s and 70’s that brought nowadays largest minorities in the Netherlands, namely Moroccan,
Turks and Surinamese.
In the Netherlands, Islam has the second biggest congregation, after the various branches of
Christianity, and it is estimated to be practiced by 5% of the Population (Centraal Bureau voor
Statistiek, 2015). The vast majority of the Muslims residing in the Netherlands are affiliated with
Sunni Islam whereas a minority is affiliated with Shia Islam and a lesser number to various other sects (PewResearchCenter, 2009). The majority of Muslims in the Netherlands reside in the country’s biggest cities namely Utrecht, Den Haag, Rotterdam and Amsterdam.
Muslims/Islam in Amsterdam
As the capital city of the Netherlands, it does not come as a surprise that the majority of the
Muslim population is residing in Amsterdam. The Islamic population as a whole, including all
28 branches of the faith, represents approximately 14% of the entire Amsterdam population (Bureau voor Onderzoek en Statistiek, 2012). Seven of the fifteen Amsterdam districts have a significant number of Muslims. The districs are the following: De Baarsjes, Oud-West, Slotermeer, Oost-
Watergraafsmeer, Slotervaart, Osdrop and Bos en Lommer (Open Society Institute, 2007).
The city of Amsterdam’s total population is about, as of December 2015, 821.702 (iamsterdam,
2015) with approximately 73,210 inhabitants are of Moroccan descent, 42,358 of Turkish descent and 25,988 of Indonesian decent (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015). The latter three communities are not only the largest Muslim communities in Amsterdam but also among the top four populations by country of origin (ibid). Others are from Egyptian, Pakistani and Surinamese decent.
The Muslim population in Amsterdam is considered to be relatively young which is mirrored at the peak of immigration of the 80’s-90. Over 50 per cent of the Muslims in Amsterdam are first generation immigrants whereas those belonging to the second generation represent slightly less than 50 per cent (Open Society Foundations, 2010); the first-second generation ratio is rather balanced.
As of 2016, there are approximately 44 mosques in the city of Amsterdam. Most mosques are can be attended by most but their boards are divided by ethnicity, most of them cover the four biggest foreign populations in Amsterdam, Moroccan, Turks, Surinamese, Indonesian and of course a smaller number of mosques for other religious or ethnic minorities (Wildeman, 2016). It is worth mentioning that most of the city mosques are linked to the Sunni branch of Islam. In addition to mosques the city offers several other Muslim foundations and centers that represent the cultural, ethnic, and spiritual diversity of the Muslim scene in Amsterdam.
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Muslim Organizations in Amsterdam
In addition to mosques there are many Muslim organizations in Amsterdam that represent
Islamic youth, women, in addition to several other umbrella and cultural organizations, most of which are affiliated with either the Turkish or Moroccan Diaspora.
There are approximately 20 Turkish religious organizations in Amsterdam most of which are either affiliated with the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation that is linked to the Turkish
Diyanat, Ministry of Religious Affairs, or The Millî Görüş Movement.
On the Moroccan front there are approximately 30 Muslim organizations in the capital city most of which belong to either Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands
(UMMON) or the Urban Moroccan Council and a union of Moroccan Mosques in Amsterdam and Surroundings (UMMAO) (Schriemer, 2004).
Relations with the government
Ever since the severance of the ties between the State and the Church/Religious institutions in the 80’s the Netherlands has been a secular state that is based on secular constitutional principles.
In such an environment Muslims enjoyed their freedom of religion with the likes of other faith practitioners in the country.
The situation started changing ever since the terror attacks of 9/11 and then rapidly escalated in
2004 after the Madrid bombings and most importantly for the Dutch context the assassination of the Filmmaker Theo van Gogh by the Dutch-Moroccan Muslim Fundamentalist Mohamed
30
Bouyeri. The murder of the film maker rendered the Islamist threat real to the Dutch public as well as Amsterdam policy makers that were pushed to take action.
The latter lead to the securitization of the Muslim community in Amsterdam which in its turn led to targeting them with counter/de-radicalization programs. As a consequence the local government felt the urge to reach out to the community and agreed on opening a dialogue with two Islamic organizations that have been recognized by the national government namely
Contactorgaan Moslems en de Overheid (CMO) and Contact Groep Islam (CGI). In this thesis the focus will be on the CMO as it is the contact group that has the most adherents, over 500,000, represents the main Turkish as well as Moroccan mosques and organizations, and represents a majority of the Sunni branch. Since the topic is related to Islamic terrorism and it is the followers of a subcategory of the Sunni branch that are mainly involved in terror organizations the likes of
ISIS and Al Qaida.
The CGI on the other hand is a contact group that also represents non Sunni minorities such as the Shia, Alewites, Soufies etc, it has approximately 115,000 members. Therefore, due to its sectarian diversity and lack in numbers of adherents the CGI will be discarded from the analysis.
Identifying the Muslim Community
If it were to be simplified, the Muslim community of the city of Amsterdam would be those who adhere to Islam as a faith. However, the simplification leads to a lack of accuracy as there are several branches within Islam namely Ahmadiyya, Sunni, Shia and Khawarij. As it has been mentioned previously in this paper the main focus will of this paper will be on the Sunni branch of Islam as it is the branch to which the most active terror organizations adhere to. It is very
31 limiting to believe that the Sunni are one united bloc as they can be divided into several Schools or jurisprudence Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi’I (Gregory, 2012).
These schools of jurisprudence have different ways of interpreting the sources of Islam and determining whether certain acts are Halal (Permissible) or Haram (Impermissible) although there is a general agreement on most theological issues (Ibid). Each of these schools is usually practiced in specific parts of the world however due to globalization and facility of movement and political support to certain schools such as the Saudi Hanbali support for Wahabism and
Salafism. Wahabism and Salafism have been classified by the European Parliament as the roots of global terrorism (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, 2013).
Based on the latter, even though it might be possible to generalize by marking them as the same we can conclude that the Muslims are not a fixed determined group that has defined boundaries, ethnicity nor national identities, Muslims are a diverse set of individuals with different backgrounds, practices and cultures. A common mistake would be also to link a certain group due to their national identity or ethnicity to Islam even though they may be practicing another faith or even none, for instance not all Moroccans are Muslims but are assumed to be by others or governments.
Therefore, the estimation of the numbers of Muslims in the city of Amsterdam is done using methods that are usually based on ethnic backgrounds as it is impossible to accurately determine an individual’s faith based upon appearance or other tangible methods. It is clear though that within certain communities a majority ascribes to Islam for instance 90 per cent of the people of
Moroccan descent and 70 per cent of the people of Turkish descent state their affiliation to the
Islamic faith (Open Society Foundations, 2010).
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After looking into the theoretical framework, setting up the operationalization of the thesis and introducing the Islamic community, in the coming section will be discussed the role the local government of the city of Amsterdam or more precisely the City Council of Amsterdam has attributed the Muslim community in countering radicalization. In order to understand how the city council view this role, policy documents need to be examined from both the various counter terrorism agencies in addition to those of the central government. Even though it might seem odd to look into documents of the likes of the NCTV, AIVD or the central government for a thesis with a thematic that focuses on the city of Amsterdam, there is a logical thought behind the approach which starts by understanding how city councils implement policies in the Netherlands.
In addition to the role attributed to the Muslim community by the local Amsterdam government the role it has been attributed by the local Police force will also be looked into. One must not forget that violent radicalism is a penal matter and thus the role of the police is therefore primordial in understanding the full picture. Interviews with professionals within both organs have been conducted and will be used throughout this analysis.
The analysis part will commence by explaining the political decision making in the Netherlands and how it affects the local government.
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5. Analysis
This chapter will include the analysis of the various documents, programs and interviews that will help identify the roles attributed to the Muslim community. In the first part of this chapter we will look into the roles that have been attributed by the local government while in the second part we will look into the roles that have been ascribed by the Muslim community to itself.
5.1 The role attributed to the Muslim Community by the City Council of
Amsterdam
It is rather complex to uncover what role is attributed to the Muslim community in counter radicalism since no central governments nor do local governments go out publicly with their views on the subject since it is a sensitive one. Therefore, as it was mentioned earlier in the methodological section of the thesis, to uncover how the city council of Amsterdam views the role of the Muslim community in countering radicalism an analysis of grey documents, the various counter radicalization programs as well as an interview with a radicalization project officer that is linked to the Amsterdam City Counsel. However, in order to be better equipped to understand the role that has been ascribed to the Muslim community it is important to have an understanding of the counter terrorism programs and initiatives that are proposed at a national level since these programs already implicitly accord a role to the Muslim community.
In the Netherlands, when it comes to policy making in matters of counter terrorism or any other political issue it is the central government that is based in Den Haag that makes the decisions that it disseminates through to the various states or provinces. However, the Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state which means that the different states, provinces or even municipalities possess a degree of autonomy. This autonomy enables the cities councils to create and
34 implement self drafted policies that concern city life and well being such as infrastructure, working environment, safety and security etc. In addition, policies are based on the guidelines of the central government and are negotiated at the three government levels. The idea behind such a system lies in the thought that the municipalities are closer to the populations and thus have the possibility to listen and then react upon what is required within the society (Association of
Netherlands Municipalities, 2008).
This structure is also used in matters of counter radicalization as the central government makes its decisions based on the suggestions made by the competent authorities, for instance the AIVD and the NCTV, when it comes to risk assessment of the terrorist threat and the likelihood of an attack by home grown terrorists. The local government applies then the policies proposed by the central government in a way it sees best fit its situation and its needs. For instance even though the central government has a unified counter terrorism and counter radicalization policy cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam or Den Haag have different approaches to how they are applying these policies depending on their needs.
As a result it is possible to have recourse to documents that are produced by the central government and / or the security services in the analysis part of the thesis. Therefore, an overview over the efforts that have been made to promote Islamic integration and countering terrorism as well as radicalization should be presented and roles extracted.
5.1.1 At National Level
The first substantial Dutch counter terrorism and counter radicalization action plans were first created prior to the Theo van Gogh assassination which hugely impacted the Dutch society
35 generally and the city of Amsterdam specifically. The assassination of the public figure was motivated for religious reasons. This resulted in the Muslim community being pressured by the general public, the media and the political elite to distance themselves from the murder and at the same time show their loyalty to the values of democracy and integration (Penninx, 2006).
Moreover, critical voices rose to condemn what they called lenient and naïve migrant policies on behalf of the central government (Hajer & Uitermark, 2008).
Since the terror attacks of 9/11, a decline has been observed in the political multicultural discourse as it has gradually fallen out of favor among politicians in Europe (Joppke, 2004).
Politicians such as the British David Cameron (Dailymail, 2013) and the German Chancellor
Angela Merkel voiced their dissatisfaction of Multiculturalism by labeling it as a failure.
The tone in the Netherlands was not different as the Dutch government explicitly expressed distancing itself from multiculturalism as it is shown through the covering letter of an integration bill that was presented by the former minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations Piet Hein
Donner in which it is stated that "The government shares the social dissatisfaction over the multicultural society model and plans to shift priority to the values of the Dutch people. In the new integration system, the values of the Dutch society play a central role. With this change, the government steps away from the model of a multicultural society." (Ministerie van Binnenlandse
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2011).
The justification for distancing from multiculturalism comes under the form security and counter terrorism arguments in addition to an alleged link between multiculturalism and homegrown terrorism (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). The abandonment of the Multiculturalism project, of permitting different foreign cultures to exist and flourish within national framework, for the
36 abovementioned security reasons, is one of several reasons that lead to the employment of counter terrorism / counter radicalization measures against a targeted Muslim community.
Therefore, as a result of the hefty criticisms the government increased drastically its counter terrorism spending and in the following years 28 million Euros were spent in order to tackle violent radicalism and its causes (Vermulen & Bovenkerk, 2012). The Dutch approach on tackling radicalization and violent extremism had a strong focus on social issues especially economic discrimination and deprivation of the Muslim community. The Dutch government’s stance is that dire economic and social situation may create a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism. In order to tackle these issues the government decided to focus on having recourse to soft preventative measures that would improve the situation for the Muslim population and thus by implementing social projects and promoting integration (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012).
It can be said that the Netherlands has a century old history of cultural tolerance that has seen waves of immigrants settling in the country for reasons of escaping prosecution, labor migration or to seek better life opportunities. In more recent history, in the 1970’s, the Dutch government adopted a multiculturalist policy in an effort to promote and compel social integration (Archick et al, 2011).
The integration policy has been aimed at integrating both newcomers as well as later generations born within the Netherlands. Already in 1990’s, the Ministry of Interior launched a policy aimed at integrating disadvantaged minorities by improving their social economic positions. The policy stressed the importance of cooperation between the minorities and the government. The government’s responsibility lied in facilitating integration by providing the necessary tools and
37 help while the minorities’ responsibility was to use these tools to assimilate with the Dutch society (Raymunt, 2011).
In addition the Dutch government created several programs with the intention to thwart discrimination. For instance, a law was passed in 2009 under which the local governments have the obligation to make available non discrimination services and offices that will permit the locals to complain about any acts of discrimination at a municipal level (Raymunt, 2011).
Moreover, the authorities have implemented various programs with the objective of counteracting extremism such as increasing knowledge about Islam in order to produce a counter narrative for radical Islamic doctrines in addition to providing the possibility for Muslims to integrate their religion in the local society (Vermulen & Bovenkerk, 2012).
However, the Dutch government did not only have recourse to soft measures, hard measures were taken in order to target and isolate the extremist threat by ways of disciplinary and legal means. Anti-terror laws were created and amended several times over the years that made it easier to prosecute suspects that are part of or planning to join terror groups or committing terrorism or even providing support. The Dutch security services such as the intelligence services, the AIVD, have been expanded and the police force have been improved to be able to deal with the new and constantly changing threat of terrorism (Rabasa et al, 2010). These measures included increased surveillance of certain individuals organizations or mosques, deportation of radical preachers, revocation of travel documents of suspected terrorists and stop and search warrants subjected to a specific geographic area, among other measures (Ministry of
Security and Justice; National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism; Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment, 2014). These hard measures tend to target mostly Muslims which as a
38 consequence provoke feelings of vulnerability, dissatisfaction and anger within the Muslim community, in other words generate a sense of suspect community and exclusion (Ragazzi,
2016).
What is interesting in the Dutch government’s approach to counter radicalization / counter terrorism is that Religion is hardly mentioned as a link to violent extremism. This has not always been the case. By comparing the ‘Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland’ (DTN) or the Terrorist
Threat Assessment Netherlands over the past years one can observe a difference in the terms employed. In the first DNT publication, DNT1, the emphasis was put on the ‘Islamic terrorist threat’ (DNT1, 2005). However, ten years later in DNT40 the term has evolved to ‘Jihadist threat’ (DNT40, 2015). The change of the terminology can be considered deliberate since it can also be observed on other types of documents that are produced by the NCTV or the AIVD. In the AIVD annual report for 2015, only the term Jihadism has been used in order to describe the threat of Islamic extremism. However, in the AIVD annual report from 2005a thorough analysis of the Islamic extremism threat was conducted. Under the Radicalization section of the 2005 annual report, various ethnic groups were specifically mentioned and their level of threat assessed based on their Islamic affiliations with a special emphasis on the Moroccan community
(AIVD, 2005). Such classification would evidently lead entire communities to feel under pressure, isolated and segregated, which in turn would increase polarization, particularly the
Islamic Moroccan community.
It is believed that the aim of choosing a different tone in more recent documents such as the 2015
AIVD Annual report is to attempt to separate religion, Islam, from terrorism in order to be less
39 divisive and discriminatory even though the Muslim community as a whole is still subject to counter radicalization measures.
As a result, the Dutch government portrays violent extremism as a phenomenon that is linked to isolated youths in search for an identity, opportunity and a place in society. This is why the
Dutch authorities counter radicalization initiatives aim at enhancing social cohesion and integrating alienated groups into mainstream society (Rabasa et al, 2010). It is worth mentioning that the Dutch authorities based on the reports by the AIVD were not only concerned about violent radicals but also non violent radicals as they feared the creation of a parallel society with the Dutch society were anti-democratic ideologies would prosper (Vidino, 2009). Therefore, the thought is that by improving the integration of Muslims the number of potential radicals would decrease.
Although there are several differences between the two annual reports separated by a decade both organizations consider Salafism a threat since the doctrine provide a breeding ground to violent radicalism in addition to holding divisive anti western rhetoric and undemocratic views
(AIVD, 2005; AIVD, 2015). This was also expressed during the interviews with the police officer as well as the counter radicalization project manager. Both governmental interviewees were hesitating in confirming the perceived threat of the salafists. Moreover, in order to further demonstrate to what extent Salafism is perceived as a threat, the AIVD and the NCTV have jointly published a 16 page report entitled ‘Salafism in the Netherlands: Diversity and Dynamics’ that sheds light on the development of the Salafist movement in the Netherlands and explains its dynamics (AIVD & NCTV, 2015). This reveals the existence of an official stance aimed at the general public and a practical one for professional purposes. The professional purposes would be
40 to be able to monitor and isolate the Salafist threat whereas the official stance would be to avoid singling out any particular group in order not to generate divisions and polarisation. In addition, the inclusion of Salafism as a constant threat for over a period exceeding a decade highlights the existence of different shades of perceived Islamic threats by the authorities.
In spite of the fact Salafism is being singled out as a potential precursor to a terrorist threat the rest of the Islamic community is still subject to counter terrorism/ counter radicalization measures for the simple reason that Sunni non Salafist Muslims are ‘at risk’ of becoming radicalized by the Salafi doctrine as the following quotes show:
“[…] certain elements of Salafist ideology can breed radicalisation leading to jihadism.”
(AIVD, 2015. P33).
“The AIVD has also witnessed cases of Salafists attempting to impose their ideology upon those around them. Moderate Muslim communities, in particular, are coming under pressure from these fundamentalist ideologues.” (AIVD, 2015. P33).
5.1.2 At the local level (Amsterdam)
As it was previously mentioned, the policies of the Dutch capital city, Amsterdam, is obligated to follow the great lines of the central government’s counter terror / radicalization policies even though the application of these policies may slightly vary. However, in this case the local policies are quite aligned with the national policies and that for two main reasons. The first reason is that the local government reached the same conclusions as the nation government, of the importance of focusing on social issues and prevention, and secondly, because most of the project financing are provided for by the state (Vermeulen & Kooiman, 2009).
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The local government for the city of Amsterdam has three main official policies when it comes to countering radicalization, which are the following: the de-radicalization of radicals or those who are on the verge of becoming radicals, increasing and strengthening resilience against extremism among the Muslim population and targeting breeding grounds for radical and extremist ideologies (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012). In light of these policies the city of
Amsterdam has set up both soft and hard measures in their counter radicalization initiative.
The policy concerning the de-radicalization of radicals or those who are on the verge of becoming radicals is twofold and encompass both soft and hard measures. The hard measures, which are deployed by the city of Amsterdam, are in alignment with the national security policy.
These measures include improving surveillance, monitoring and identification of possible suspects through the security services, other state apparatuses and professionals such as: workers at all education levels, welfare workers and other professionals.
Since 2006, state and private professionals are required to report any suspect behavior that could be linked to radicalism, in their close surroundings, to the Informatie Huishouding
Radicalisering (the Information Household Radicalization). The Information Household
Radicalization is a central office for coordinating the counter radicalization measures. The center collects all relevant suspect information that is reported to it by the professionals and provides them with additional information and advice on how to proceed whenever it is needed. The
Informatie Huishouding Radicalisering conducts an assessment of the data it was provided and in the case of radicalization is confirmed the professional who reported the case is advised to reach for the cooperation of the people in the radicalized individual’s circle such as family members, friends, imam or any person with a significant importance to the radicalized. After that, the problems of the individual are addressed. These problems could be anything varying
42 from unemployment, health, truancy, abuse etc (Van Heelsum, 2009). One of the most important steps is when the suspected is encouraged to hold a religious dialogue with a religious expert or an imam in order to address his / her motivations and attempts to correct the distorted interpretation of Islam as well as their tainted worldview. During the talk the imam will discuss the consequences of the extremist’s ideas, provide religious counterarguments and push the suspect into reasoning by asking him / her questions that would stimulate critical thinking.
During the interview, Imam Al Omrani (Annex II) mentioned a case of a young individual who was referred to him for having radical thoughts. This individual was however ready to depart for
Syria in order to join presumably the Islamic State. In addition to the latter, the local government increased awareness and knowledge about extremism within the various apparatuses by deploying expert knowledge and increasing collaboration between the institutions (Vermeulen &
Bovenkerk, 2012).
Concerning the policy aimed to target the breeding grounds of terrorism the city leaned on the national policies of fighting intolerance and segregation. This policy targets the Muslim community by reaching to areas that are considered to be potential breeding ground of radicalism. However there is no real definition to what a breeding ground is. Therefore, the question arises of whether the Muslim community as a whole is considered to be a breeding ground of radicalism.
The policy in question pursues the strengthening of intercultural dialogue by arranging cultural initiatives and events such as the annual Ramadan festivals, open days at mosques, interfaith debates and dialogues etc at different locations within community neighborhoods such as mosques, community centers, youth centers etc. During the interview with both the police and the city council (Annex II) these actions are apparently common practices that are held on a
43 yearly basis. A project entitled ‘Muslim Youth Amsterdam’ was launched with the aim of improving the image of Muslims and Islam in Amsterdam by illustrating the diversity of Islam and providing information concerning this Abrahamic religion (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009).
These initiatives aim at making knowledge about Islam more accessible to the non Muslim population, thus increase understanding and strengthen their relations (Gemeente Amsterdam,
2009).
Regarding the Amsterdam policy of increasing Muslim resilience to radicalism has been applied by implementing various projects to tackle extremism. The projects aim among other things at providing counter narratives to radical Islam, realization of youth programs such as sports clubs or social activities as an alternative to extremist groups. In addition, several training programs to teach about how to detect and deal with extremism are proposed to imams, board members of mosques and other key figures within the Muslim community (Vermeulen & Bovenkerk, 2012).
The Board member of Badr Moskee has also taken part in such a training program.
Recently, in 2015, in the same spirit of promoting resilience a project named ‘Stay West’ was launched in the Amsterdam West district (Gemeente, 2015). The program aims and making everyone in the West district of Amsterdam to feel at home. It focuses on three groups: Muslim youth; aims at keeping them away radicalism and joining terror organizations abroad. The Jewish community; aims at preventing them of immigrating to Israel out of fear. Local Amsterdammers, those who are born and raised in the area; aims at and providing them with a homey feeling
(Chrifou, Interview/Annex II). When it comes specifically to the part of the program concerning the Muslim youth the action plan teaches them about how to cope with radical doctrines by holding open discussions, debates about difficult subjects they might have encountered either religious or social. The program aims at making the parents and the youth to have open lines of
44 communication and thus be better equipped in facing radicalization. The program trains teachers, police officers, imams, youth workers and other key figures etc on how to work and deal with
Muslim youth. One of the main points of this program is the importance of collaboration sharing experiences between the program members (Chrifou, Interview/Annex II).
One can observe from the above that the Amsterdam authorities are willing to engage with
Islamic organizations in order to counter radicalization since an Islamic related element is present in most projects. The importance of having trusted allies (Ragazzi, 2016) within the
Muslim community has been stressed in the joint counter terrorism action plan published by the
Ministry of Security and Justice, National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism and the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2014, pp 17-20). In the chapter about counter radicalization of the publication the first two actions are Cooperating with the Muslim community and Strengthening of existing networks of local and national key figures. The
Cooperating with the Muslim Community policy is an existing one however it is stated that it will be strengthened and thus by considering Imams and mosque boards as allies in the war against terror and countering radicalization of Muslim Youth in addition to holding periodic consultations with imams in order to address specific themes such as:
- countering radicalization through early detection, counter narratives, the role of the imam in the community and the connection between the Muslim community and the local government.
- Increasing transparency and strengthening the educational and pedagogical in relation to
Islamic and Quranic in addition to enhancing identity building through informal parenting support.
- Ways of opposing islamophobia and discrimination.
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When it comes to the Strengthening of existing networks of local and national key figures, it is a new measure which includes providing training and assistance to key figures, within the Muslim community, in order to be able to better express their opposition against radicalism and terrorism. Providing security and support to key figures who have been subjected to threats and intimidations because of their stance against jihadism by incorporating them in the Surveillance and Protection System. Finally, setting up local networks of key figures and further training them with the aim of opening discussions around sensitive issues within the Muslim community such as alienation, radicalization and foreign fighters etc. (Ministry of Security and Justice; National
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism; Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment,
2014).
On a similar note, the city of Amsterdam has applied various counter radicalization measures that were proposed in the Action Programme to combat jihadism by engaging with the religious infrastructure of the city. The Islamic organizations are viewed as important tools in fighting radicalism because of their unique knowledge of the community and reach. In addition, one of the main reasons for using key allies in the countering radicalization lies in the secular nature of the Dutch state. The separation of the religious institutions and the state renders the government unable to directly interfere within the affairs of a mosque or an Islamic center and therefore it is impossible for both central and local government to implement policy. As a point of note it is worth mentioning that the Dutch government usually only allies itself with moderate mainstream Muslim organizations whereas orthodox extremist Muslim organizations i.e. Salafists are not regarded suitable for partnership even in the case they subscribe to a non violent version since their interpretation of Islam is considered dangerous and in contradiction with democratic values of the Netherlands.
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Based on the various measures and approaches in countering terrorism one can conclude that the
Muslim community has been attributed several roles by the local government. The Muslim community is expected to be resilient and resist contamination of radical ideologies, cooperate by facilitating the work of the authorities and finally become an ally and actively combating radicalization.
5.1.2 Police force
In order to get a complete picture it was deemed important to mention the manner in which the punitive part of the local government operates and how they view the role of the Muslim community. This part is important since in many cases the police is the first institution that is in touch with the citizens for various reasons and similarly to most countries, the Police in the
Netherlands have the task to subordinate to the competent authority and in accordance with to ensure the applicable rules for the effective enforcement of the rule of law and providing assistance to those in need. None the less, many of the youth in certain districts with minority backgrounds view the police organ as an enemy for various reasons (Annex II). Therefore, the central government pushed for establishing programs aimed at increasing community trust and engagement with the police forces.
These programs include open days at the police station, holding meetings and events with neighborhood residents and youth in specific districts where the need is pressing to have a good contact and collaboration with the community. In the Amsterdam West district several meetings were arranged with local youths in order to explain their role in the community, get to know the police officers on a personal level and not only as law enforcement officers and for the local youths to express their views about the role and the works of the local police district. During
47 summer 2015 the local police district of the same district arranged an open Iftar, evening meal when Muslims break their fast during the holy month of Ramadan, with the help of Al-Huda
Islamic youth association, where they brought together local Muslims with non Muslims for an evening of openness and sharing. Such initiatives are periodically taken in order to increase social cohesion within the neighborhoods and also to create ties with the local police forces which are there first and foremost to protect the inhabitants of the area (Yerbi, Interview).
In addition to the fact that police is looking into increasing its contacts with minority dominated communities the Dutch government through the interior ministry have since a long time had the objective of diversifying the police force. Positive action programs, internal monitoring mechanisms and quotas among other initiatives and protocols have been implemented by the ministry of Internal Affairs in order to achieve the objective of increasing the percentage of ethnic minorities within the Dutch police force (Kleijer-Kool, 2013). In 2002, in the city of
Amsterdam officers with minority backgrounds represented 10% of the police force, this number rose to 14% per cent in by the end of 2012 (Codrington, 2014). These numbers show how the local government is indeed looking to increase the minority numbers amongst the ranks of the police force with the thought that a heterogeneous police would help improve social marginalization of and improve contact with communities of ethnic minorities, in our case the
Muslim community. This logic subscribes that officers of ethnic minorities would have better reach within the communities through their networks (Codrington, 2014). However, even though there has been a slight increase in the numbers of police officers with ethnic minority background the rise can still be considered as being almost negligible in terms of numbers. In addition, the figures do not reflect the demographics of the city of Amsterdam where the number of citizens with minority background lies around 50% (Codrington, 2014). The low numbers of
48 police officers with ethnic minority background has been uncovered through the Interview with the inspector (Annex II) where he stated that he is one of only two Muslim/North African officers of the law in his district, which is known to have a majority of Muslim citizens of North
African descent.
Even though the numbers of minority officers are not mirroring the demographics of the districts, efforts are being made to provide training to native Dutch police officers by sending them on cultural courses to learn about the various ethnic minority groups (Kleijer-Kool, 2013). Teaching native Dutch officers to be culturally sensitive and understand the different dynamics within certain cultures has the same aims as the increase of recruitment of officers with ethnic backgrounds. However, providing courses does not guarantee efficiency and success in dealing with cultural sensitive matters and dealing with what could be described as a foreign mentality.
Stories of success have been mentioned such as the story told by Inspector Yerbi (Annex II) of the white blonde police woman that is loved and appreciated by the Muslim citizens of her area since she is open minded and managed to integrate and understand their customs. Her judgment is considered to be fair. The interviewed inspector also provided accounts of failed cultural understanding that has lead to miscommunication between officers and citizens that has resulted in escalation instead of the defusing of a situation. For instance, a police officer witnessed a
Moroccan insulting another by shouting that he intends to kill him. Viewed platonically such a statement can be considered as a threat to life which is a serious offense. However, culturally in
Arab / North African cultures it is considered as merely an insult and in certain contexts could also be considered as a harmless joke. Such cultural affinities could be hard to grasp for ethnic
Dutch individuals and then wrong judgment can occur.
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During the approximately two hour long interview with the inspector he also stressed the important job conducted by the Wijkagent in countering radicalization. The tasks of the wijkagent vary depending on the neighborhood and its demographics, wealth and social welfare.
It was explained during the nearly two hour long interview that in neighborhoods with a predominantly Muslim citizenry increased attention is placed on the population in terms of security, contacts with the population and surveillance. The latter explicitly demonstrate how the
Muslim community is perceived to be risky as the police forces seem to observe special attention to the Muslim community in terms of potential breeders of radical jihadist ideologies.
The wijkagent or the buurtagent is a police officer that functions as a district superintendent who maintains close contacts with the residents of a specific neighborhood. He / she usually has either a territorial or a functional task. The wijkagent duties include general police work in addition to serving as the link between his/her appointed district on the one hand and the police team on the other. The district police officer or inspector represents the eyes and ears of the commissariat and therefore needs to maintain good contact and connections within the community. One of the main tasks of the buurtagent is “knowing and being known" which means the officer needs to be visible and reachable in order to build bridges with the community. In Amsterdam, the legal number of inhabitants a wijkagent is responsible for is 5000 inhabitants, divided by regional units. The work of the neighborhood officer is defined in the Police Act 2012.
Furthermore, to improve law enforcement efforts and increase community trust and engagement with the local police authorities, the government encouraged private initiatives such as the neighborhood fathers (buurtvaders) initiative by providing funds for it. The program consists of having neighborhood fathers patrol the streets during night time in order to keep an eye on the
50 youngsters in ethnic minority neighborhoods (Open Society Institute, 2010). The program led to a good partnership between the participants, the police and the municipality.
In neighborhoods dominated by non-western ethnic minority population agents of the law from similar backgrounds can the role as bridge-builders, inform bout aspects that are important for understanding and interacting with the local population and assist in building trust with the population. They may also act as role models for local youths in the neighborhood.
Part of the Dutch national policy on community policing is aimed at preventing radicalism and protecting against terrorism. For this matter several initiatives have been implemented for at different time periods for various reasons that all have counter radicalization and counter terrorism elements. In the city of Amsterdam, the police authorities have implemented several of these initiatives such as the following:
Neighborhood director work alongside regular police officers to enforce the rule of law but do additionally have a more of social oriented tasks. This demand of them to be in permanent contact with the designated area population, organizations and businesses and to be aware of everything that is happening even behind closed doors. Therefore, in order to effectively deal with this role the director has to invest time and effort in building and maintaining relations of trust with all segments of the population.
Street coaches have also been deployed in Amsterdam in an effort to maintain order and combat conflict in certain neighborhoods, mostly with a majority of ethnic minority background. A majority of the street coaches are of Moroccan descent. Their work consists of patrolling the neighborhood streets and reporting of any problems to other teams that in turn visit the families
51 of trouble makers. These teams do not fall under the authority of the police but of the local municipality (Yerbi, interview).
It is important to mention that the police respondent stated that the programs mentioned above are not aimed specifically for countering the radicalization or terrorism threat but serve as multipurpose programs that are there to prevent all types of crimes and violence in addition to elements of counter radicalization. There is a specific counter terrorism task force that deals with specific surveillance and monitoring of terror suspects (Yerbi, Interview).
It noteworthy to mention that the deterrence / bridge building programs also serve implicitly as surveillance programs in order to have a greater reach and access to vital inside information within the affected communities. Based on the latter one can observe that the local police have a one sided view in dealing with Muslim community as they are considered as both at risk and risky however as Heath Kelly (2013) mentioned it, being vulnerable to be influenced and becoming contaminated by the radicalism virus also makes the community dangerous as there are no clear indicators as of when a radicalized individual switches to becoming a violent radical.
The police’s role in society is to enforce the rule of law and thus by means of deterrence, by being visible and present in certain areas in addition to the implementation of the various programs as it is mentioned above, and by penalizing those who break the law. One can therefore assume that in areas with high number of programs aimed at deterrence and with a higher police presence is an area that is considered dangerous or potentially dangerous to say the least. Using this logic the areas with a significant number of Muslims are considered to be a threat to society by the Amsterdam-Amstelland police department.
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However, even though the police force seem to observe the Muslim community as a risk it does acknowledge that there are ‘good Muslims’ that seek to coexist, cooperate and protect their way of life and the society they live in and it is these good ones that make police work effective.
These Muslims tend to cooperate with the government for purposes of improving the state of their community as well well the society as a whole or for selfish reasons such as monetary benefits, social status etc (Ragazzi, 2016).
How the police force classifies the Muslim community is only one part of the story, the second part would be how does it perceive the Muslim communities role in countering the terrorist threat?
In order to answer this question one must look through the various elements that are included in the various efforts the police disposed of in these Muslim communities. In broad terms there are good, risky and vulnerable Muslims that are at risk of becoming risky. The risky ones are those the police are monitoring, the vulnerable are those they are attempting to prevent and the good ones are the allies. The role the police defined to the allies is relatively clear as they are given already the role they are recommended to fulfill. The risky/at risk are those the police force is attempting to infiltrate and to dissuade, their role is to become allies, to reject radical ideologies and participate in defusing radicalism and related tensions that may rise. The bridge building serves to disseminate ideas, programs and other valuable information that would serve in order to keep the peace within the community. Therefore the role of the Muslim community, according to the police force is to take part in by not breaking the law, rejecting radical ideologies, cooperate with the adequate authorities in maintain peace and being receptive to police information. As the interviewed inspector himself put it they need to ready to accept help for self help.
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5.1.3 Conclusion Part1
Based on the interviews with the Police officer and the local government counter radicalization project manager in addition to grey literature of security services and the city council there are two main conclusions have been reached. First, the Muslim community is not targeted evenly when it comes to countering radicalization as the local authorities engage differently with different actors within the community it rewords certain groups the ‘allies’ while it monitors other groups, mosques, neighborhoods, establishments and individuals. For instance, Salafists are the only group of orthodox Muslims that are investigated in the Netherlands (Risbo-
Research-Training-Consultancy, 2014). Secondly, different group classifications within the
Muslim community lead to different roles. The various instances of the local authorities seem to share the same roles that are implicitly attributed to the Muslim community: Resilience, cooperation and alliance. However, these roles are somewhat problematic since the Muslim community is expected to be part of the solution whilst at the same time are considered to be part of the problem. This imposes the following question: How does the Muslim community perceive their role when it comes to countering radicalization?
5.2 The role the Muslim community ascribe to themselves
In this section we will look into the role that the Muslim community has attributed itself in countering radicalization. As it was mentioned in the methodology section, it is difficult to obtain a full impression of how the Muslim community perceives their role in countering radicalization since the community itself is composed of a large group of individuals with different backgrounds, affiliations and opinions. Therefore, in order to have a greater reach and attempt to get a sense of the general opinions the choice was made to interview religious authorities who
54 are linked to the religious institutions as well as a youth center since it is believed that these people have knowledge of the ins and outs of their respective communities.
At the start of all the interviews that were conducted for this thesis one of the first questions that were asked was whether approaching mosques and a youth center is an efficient method to feel the pulse of the Muslim community is the subject. The reply of the Mosque, the CMO and Al
Huda youth center was positive. The unanimous agreement on the method used to collect information about the Muslim community is encouraging and can be considered as a sign of being on a good track. However they all agree that it is physically impossible to speak for every single individual within the community but there is no other way of representing the community.
This part will exclusively rely on the interviews that were conducted due to lack of previous research or documentation surrounding the role the Muslim community subscribe to themselves in countering terrorism. As a start the contents of the interviews will be exposed followed by the analysis of their content. In the previous section about the roles that have been ascribed to the
Muslim community by the local government the roles were identified through the actions and initiatives that were undertaken by the governmental institutions. However, in this part and based on the interviews three main themes were extracted from which it could be possible to define the roles the Muslim community subscribes to itself. The themes are as follows: The feelings concerning radicalism / terrorism, the relationship with the authorities, and finally the communities counter terrorism efforts.
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5.2.1 The feelings concerning radicalism / terrorism
The reason for inquiring about the feelings and perceptions of the Muslim community when it comes to radicalism and terrorism is to identify whether there is widespread approval of these elements. In the eventuality of a community approval of radicalism and terrorism researching a counter radicalization role becomes irrelevant.
- Badr Moskee
The first finding according to the interview with Badr Moskee is that most of the faithful
Muslims are indeed moderate and hold views that are against radicalism and terrorism. “You previously mentioned the issue of radicalism in Amsterdam and the Netherlands. This topic is on the minds of most Muslims in the country and they are moderate Muslims, peaceful Muslims, they want peace and good things for everyone. There is a very small number of this community that radicalize and lean towards extremism” (Abdelhafidh El Mouddin). This quote clearly states the position of Muslims concerning radicalism and terrorism. In addition, the majority of
Muslims react with disbelief to terror and “cannot imagine that a normal Muslim would commit such acts” (Annex II). Therefore, the majority rejects violent extremists from their faith “as
Muslims these actions must not be linked with Islam or Muslims” (Annex II). However, although the Muslim community reject violent extremists and consider them as outsiders they do still discuss these issues and acts that are committed in the name of Islam. It is perceived as their responsibility to raise the topic and act on it as it is their responsibility as practicing Muslims to defend their faith “Of course we discuss these issues and bring it up at the mosque and other organizations or institutions independently of the government’s wishes. This is our responsibility as Muslims!” (Annex II).
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- Contactorgaan Muslim en Overheid (CMO)
The feeling concerning radicalism is that of fear sadness and frustration, particularly from the older generation to whom the radical form of Islam is unknown. Even Imams have trouble comprehending radicalism/terrorism (Ozture, Interview).
- Al Huda Youth Center
Most people within the Muslim community are against radicalism and strongly denounce radicalism as well as violent radicalism. However, radical ideologies and views do exists among some of the Muslim youth. Radicalism is mainly widespread by the Muslim youth because the older generations have had a better religious education and are therefore more resilient to radical ideologies. For the majority of the Muslim community, terrorism is a sin and a crime. In addition, radicalization generates feeling of fear not only for the physical consequences of terrorism but also the consequences on the Muslim community in terms of counter terrorism measures and legislations that could negatively affect the daily life of moderate Muslims. There is also fear that terrorism with lead to the rise of right wing parties such as Geert Wilders PVV that could threaten their safety and their lifestyle (Annex II).
From the above it is noticeable that the majorities of Muslims strongly condemns any acts of terror and are repulsed by it. This indicates that the Muslims do indeed see a role to themselves in counter radicalization since it seems they are against terrorism as well as a radical view of
Islam.
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5.2.2 The relationship with the authorities
In this section, the relationship with the authorities will be assessed in order to determine whether or not or to what extent the community collaborates with the local government in counter radicalization initiatives with the aim of determining their role.
- Badr Moskee
From the interview it is clear that the relationship of the Muslim community has with the local authorities are mixed depending on the individual as well as the spatio-temporal. The relationship with the local government has overall been good as there are open channels of communication between the concerned parties as it was explained by the spokesperson of
Badrmoskee “Truthfully, ever since it was established the relationship of the Mosque with the city government has always been good. Always whenever there is any issue from any side, we establish contact with each other.” (Annex II). The latter gives the impression of a seamless relationship, however, like all relationships there are ups and downs.
According to Abdelhafidh (Annex II) the relationship has known times of deteriorations caused by both sides. Firstly, he started by accusing some politicians both locally and nationally for using the radicalization and terror rhetoric for electoral purposes “unfortunately some political leaders here in the Netherlands forget about the Muslim community as a whole and decide to focus on the minority within the group in order to use it for electoral purposes, which is unfortunate” (Annex II). A negative anti Muslim political rhetoric does negatively resonate within the community. However, these types of political discourses are rather the exception not the rule. The second periodic deterioration was caused by a distancing by the mosque board from
58 the local government motivated by a need to stay completely independent. “The former board had a different vision, they used to reason in the following manner ‘this is my mosque and I am running the mosque and there should be no interference from anyone in the manner the mosque is run or the lessons or activities are planned’ In other words the mosque at the time got isolated from the environment it was existing in.” (Annex II). However, these fluctuations within the relationship are normal and the current relationship between the mosque and the local government has improved with the current board as their vision has changed to become more open as the following quote states “the faithful that come to this mosque are part of the environment or society they live in and therefore it is necessary that there is interactions and discussions surrounding the problems that face those who visit the mosque and even those neighboring the mosque. It is necessary to open discussions, you cannot live as if you were on an island, you are living in a society and therefore you need to be part of it.” (Annex II).
Accepting that the relationship is good is a superficial statement, therefore how does the communication work between the community and the local government? The local government does not have the capacity to communicate with every Muslim and therefore go through Islamic organizations and mosques in order convey a message. The communication between both entities is generally lacking structure and is rather seasonal or incidental (Annex II). For instance, communication happens when the month of Ramadan is near to resolve practical issues or to organize events debates or happenings from either side. Abdelhafidh cited the example of a discussion on the topic of radicalization that was requested by the local government and that was hosted at the mosque (Annex II). The latter example show that even though there are no structure in place for communicating and working together collaboration still occur. It can be speculated that the lack of structure is due to shared trust in addition to the good relationship between the
59 community and the local government. It is important to mention that even though there are no structured high level communications, the mosque receives weekly informal visits of a wijkagent to discuss general matters as well as matters related to radicalization (Annex II). According to the Badrmoskee spokesperson the Muslim community or the mosque does not feel any pressure from the local government nor the local community when it comes to countering radicalization initiatives or taking a stand against terror (Annex II).
When it comes to radicalization Abdelhafidh admitted that in a situation where there is suspicion of a radicalized individual the first reaction is to contact the parents or the entourage of the individual to attempt to de-radicalize the person before resorting to contacting the authorities as a last alternative (Annex II). The latter is justified by the difficulty of risking complicating a loved one’s life if the problem could be internally resolved. This demonstrates that even though cooperation does exist between both parties it is still not aligned with what is required by the government. In addition, although the idea of being pressured by the government was rejected by not reporting an individual who is at risk based demonstrates the harshness of the consequences of reporting someone. This reveals that the Muslim community is subject to pressure by the government of which they are aware.
We can therefore conclude that the relationship the Muslim community has with the government is context depending subject to fluctuations based on individuals or spacio-temporal factors.
However in general terms the relationship appear to be that of understanding and collaboration as it is demonstrated by the open channels of communication and mutual trust.
“Muslims do not encourage people to kill, bomb or shed blood, this is unacceptable. So no, we do not feel any pressure from the authorities” (Annex II).
- Contact Orgaan Muslim en Overheid (CMO)
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The relationship with the government is rather good since it has been authorized as a communication partner with the government. The fact that the CMO is a recognized dialogue partner does not necessarily mean that the relation to the government is seamless. As in any partnerships there are high and low points, the same applies to the CMO/government relation that is dependent on people and circumstances. For instance, the chairman of the CMO explained that their relationship with the government has been periodically fluctuating depending on the government and the party that is in power. There was a period of two years where some ministeries cut ties with the CMO, for instance the ministry of Housing Communities and
Integration during the office Eberhard van der Laan, the current mayor of Amsterdam. The contact was reestablished with the next minister (Ozture, Interview). When asked about pressure from the government (Ozture, Interview) stated “there is not pressure from the government but from the society. Because the non Muslims, the society and NGO’s are saying what are the
Muslim organizations doing on this topic?”
- Al Huda Youth Center
The relationship with the government of Amsterdam is good. The Muslim community is enjoying their full rights and there is no government interference. On the contrary the government provides mosques and other Islamic organization with financial support and help when it is requested. The government provides information to the Muslim community through for instance mosques, community or youth centers etc but would never interfere in their internal affairs.
According to the Imam of the Youth center (Annex II) the relationship with the government is:
With the city council the relationship is rather stable and cooperative. The relationship with the police there is somewhat different. “There is a feeling of prudence as there is tension between
61 the authorities and the Muslim youth that is due to fear between both parties. Some of the
Muslim youth is anticipating aggressive discriminatory reactions while the police officer expects violence. For instance there are several examples of police officers aggressively arresting
Muslim youth with no valid cause” (El-Mouddin, Interview).
In addition, what has been frequently mentioned in the interview with the Imam is that the several of the Muslim community understand the fears of the government and the measures that have been taken as a result of terror attacks that have taken place in the Netherlands or abroad
(Annex II).
In this section it is noticeable that the relationship with the government has been fluctuating over the past years depending on several factors such as what government is in place and political priorities or the resistance of certain mosques to be open and collaborate with the government in matters related to radicalism. However, the general impression is that overall the relationship appears to be rather stable and collaboration is currently a reality as the Muslim community realized the importance of being part of the fight against terrorism in addition to feeling responsible to take action. The latter leads to the next section which will determine what kind of actions are being undertaken by the community to counter radicalization.
5.2.3 The communities counter terrorism efforts
In this section, the Muslim community’s counter radicalization efforts will be presented and analyzed. In addition, the role of the community will be extracted depending on the approach and the initiatives they undertake.
- Badr Mosquee
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From what has been expressed during the interview the majority of Muslims strongly condemns terror and distance themselves from it and consider violent extremism to be intrusive to their religion “These individuals are the furthest you can get from the teachings of our religion which is a religion of forgiveness and moderation” (Annex II). It has been previously mentioned in the sub section feelings concerning radicalism / terrorism that the Muslim community feels helpless however feels responsible to counter radicalization as well as improve the image of Islam. In that respect counter radicalization initiatives have been introduced through debates, lessons in religion, awareness campaigns, Friday prayer sermons etc. Most of these initiatives are arranged by the mosques or youth and cultural centers. These lessons, debates and preaches aim at warning the Muslim youth from the dangers of radicalization in addition to providing a counter narrative to ISIS type doctrines (Annex II).
In many cases these initiatives are also being encouraged by the local government that provides financial support “…there are several Muslim organizations that arrange religious lessons and events in order to counter radicalization and in many cases it is the city council of Amsterdam that provides financial support.” (Annex II). In addition to funding from the government Imams and key figure heads within the community receive relevant counter radicalization training i.e. how to detect a radical and how to proceed if the suspicion is confirmed (Annex II). However, since the Netherlands is a secular state these individuals/organizations cannot be forced to cooperate which indicates a level of autonomy and free will.
- Contactorgaan Muslim en Overheid (CMO)
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In order to counter radicalization, the CMO has been organizing events and conferences about various relevant hot topics such as detecting signs of radicalization, training imams in dealing with radicalized individuals etc… (Ozture, Interview)
- Al Huda Youth Center
The counter radicalization efforts are mostly the same that have been previously mentioned in both interviews above.
What has been uncovered from the three interviews is that the Muslim communities feels responsible to denounce terrorism and defending their religion from extremism, have an overall cooperative relationship with the government and finally actively participates in counter radicalization initiatives. Therefore, as a conclusion the role the Muslim community has attributed itself is that of ensuring resilience and countering radicalization either on their own or in collaboration with the government.
5.3 Conclusion part 2
Based on the interviews as well as the selected criteria, feelings concerning radicalism / terrorism, the relationship with the authorities and counter radicalization efforts, it is possible to notice a rather uniform pattern concerning the role the Muslim community has assigned itself.
Not all interviewees agree on all points however the broad lines are the same. The vast majority of the Muslim community observe themselves as part of the Dutch society which makes them frustrated with radicalism and terrorism but on a different level since they perceive the threat as coming from within their group. This generates a feeling of responsibility towards the Muslim community and the rest of society of which they are part of. However, the ordinary Muslims do
64 not have the knowledge, the tools nor the resources to counter the threat of radicalism and thus fail in taking action against radicalism. Therefore, the Muslim community has an understanding view of the various governmental hard and soft measures taken, sometimes inconvenient, and accepts the reality they have been subjected to. Moreover, the community also relies on the efforts made by their own in form of organized groups such as associations, community centers, mosques etc. that work either independently or in collaboration with the government in order to counter the radicalization of their youth.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the mainstream Muslim community perceive their role on different levels: Those who denounce radicalism as simple bystanders and those who reject it and are actively engaged against it.
5.4 Synthesis of the findings
The purpose of this thesis is to uncover whether the view of the local government as well as the
Muslim community itself in terms of the role of the Muslim community in Amsterdam in matters of counter radicalization are aligned and whether there are any discrepancies.
It has been concluded in the first part of the analysis section that the Amsterdam local government has attributed the Muslim community three main roles in terms of counter radicalization: Resilience, cooperation and alliance. On the other hand, the mainstream Muslim community have self subscribed a passive and an active role. The passive role can be paralleled with resilience where the Muslim community denounce and resist radicalization without taking action to necessarily prevent further radicalization of the Muslim youth. The second role that the
Muslim community has attributed themselves would be an active role that consists of organized groups of people who actively work with the aim of fighting radicalization. In terms of roles attributed by the government these individuals fall under the scope of allies. The term ally is
65 used in relation to the government. However, the term allies could further be divided into two sub categories. For instance, there are those who willingly are the allies of the government and who seek it for personal gain and benefits. And there are those who are allies who work with the government for the sake of the communal good.
Concerning the role of collaboration that has been assigned by the government there is no direct counterpart in the Muslim community. However, there are elements of collaboration in both the active as well as the passive roles. As it was mentioned previously the members of the community that are passive still understand the governmental decisions that could affect their lifestyle and would also collaborate with the government whenever they have been requested to.
Concerning the active roles, it is rather clear that collaborating with the government is implied.
Based on the above, we can conclude that the roles the mainstream Muslim community has attributed itself is overall aligned with the role it has been attributed by the government.
However, it is important to stress that the muslim community is general terms is a diverse unit and that these findings do not represent the totality of the defined group. Islamic communities such as the more orthodox salafists have different views and opinions concerning the matter however none of the salafist organizations or mosques agreed for interviews. It was uncovered during the interviews with moderate Muslims expressions of tension with the salafists that are at the one hand respected for their religiosity but that are at the same time criticized for their blind following of certain sheiks/imams as well as their extreme views that could lead to terrorism. It has been implicitly and carefully suggested that it is certain salafist groups/ideologies and that could lead to indoctrination that leads to radicalism that could possibly lead to terrorism. In addition, it was stressed the economic muscles that these group possess and that is used in recruitment to their way of interpreting Islam. The picture could have been more complete if a
66 study or interviews concerning the role of the salafists in countering radicalization could perhaps provide a clearer view of the various role dynamics within the Muslim community.
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6. Conclusion
This thesis aimed at uncovering the role that has been assigned to the Muslim community in countering radicalization from both the perspective of the Amsterdam Government as well as its own perspective. In addition, the aim is also to uncover to what extent the government assigned roles are aligned with the roles the community sees to itself since. After conducting interviews with representatives of the Muslim community and the governmental workers and after consulting grey documents published by the Dutch security services the following roles have been uncovered:
- From the point of view of the government the role of the community is threefold. It
consist of resilience to radicalization, cooperation with the government and finally
alliance and actively engaging the radicalization threat. These roles can easily intertwined
and interchangeable depending on the community’s degree of collaboration or not.
- From the point of view of the community their role has been limited to two, resilience
and engagement, either with the government or with own means. They can also be
classified as passive participation or active participation.
From the latter, it can be said that the roles that have been assigned from both parties are indeed aligned to a certain degree as there is a certain mutual agreement on being actively engaged against radicalism and threat of terrorism. However it should be stated that the opinion that have been collected through the interviews are the opinion of the mainstream moderate Sunni
Muslims, which is a representative majority, and not the opinion of others that practice a more traditional orthodox version of Islam such as salafism.
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Annex I: Interview Questions
1. Could you say that the Mosque represents the Muslim Sunni community?
2. How do you see the relationship between the Muslim community (or the Mosque) and the local government?
3. How do for example practicing Muslims perceive their role in countering radicalization? Do they feel responsible to act or do they simply distance themselves and deny responsibility?
4. Do you feel that the Muslim community has been attributed a countering radicalization role by the government? If yes, what?
5. Does the Muslim community do any countering radicalization initiatives?
6. What is the final opinion about the governments counter radicalization efforts?
7. Does the Muslim community seek further improvements or collaborative efforts?
8. Comments or Suggestions?
Annex II: Interview Transcriptions
Interview with Mosque Spokesman
S = Skander Alexander Ghehioueche
A= Mosque Spokesman
S: First of all i would like to thank you for agreeing to meet for an interview. And to start with I would like to ask you to introduce yourself.
A: I am one of the leaders and board members of this mosque. Since 1994 I have always been an active member of this mosque. I am also in charge of different activities of the mosque such as teaching and dealing with the external relations with the Dutch authorities.
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S: In my research I am researching the Muslim community, and of course it is impossible to communicate with the community as a whole. Therefore, in my opinion I thought that if I held talks with mosques so they could answer my questions instead. Do you think this is the right approach? Do you think that the official members of the mosque are able to answer my questions about the Muslim community?
A: Of course, since the mosque is part of the Muslim community. In the Netherlands when you think about the Muslim community two nationalities comes to mind, the Moroccans and the Turks. However this does not eliminate other nationalities such as the Indonesians, Malaysians and Pakistanis as I previously mentioned. Once again yes, since the Moroccans are part of the Muslim community then it represents the Muslim community.
S: In my research that exactly what I did, I took the Moroccans and the Turks. Of course there are Shia and other groups but for my research I am looking into the Sunni’s. I am aware that there are a variety of nationalities however one cannot take the opinions of every single one of these different groups. Therefore, I decided to look into the two major representative groups.
I wanted to hold talks with Badr Mosque, which is one of the bigger mosques here in Amsterdam and also I have heard that you arrange discussions and meetings which is why I decided to get in touch with you.
My next question is, how do you perceive the relationship between the Muslim community and the city council?
A: Truthfully, ever since it was established the relationship of the Mosque with the city government has always been good. Always whenever there is any issue from any side, we establish contact with each other. The communication has always been there and there were no interruption until a few years ago there has been a distancing between the local politicians and the board of Badrmoskee which was caused by the non alignment in vision in matters that concern the Muslim community. The former board members had a different view on matters which is different from the current.
You previously mentioned the issue of radicalism in Amsterdam and the Netherlands. This topic is on the minds of most Muslims in the country and they are moderate Muslims, peaceful Muslims, they want peace and good things for everyone. There is a very small number of this community that seek to radicalize and lean towards extremism. But unfortunately some political leaders here in the Netherlands forget about the Muslim community as a whole and decide to focus on the minority within the group in order to use it for electoral purposes, which is unfortunate.
S: You just mentioned that there was distancing at some point, what was the cause of this?
A: The former board had a different vision, they used to reason in the following manner ‘this is my mosque and I am running the mosque and there should be no interference from anyone in the manner the mosque is run or the lessons or activities are planned’ In other words the mosque at the time got isolated from the environment it was existing in. The current board says no, the faithful that come to this mosque are part of the environment or society they live in and therefore it is necessary that there is interactions and discussions surrounding the problems that face those who visit the mosque and even those
70 neighboring the mosque. It is necessary to open discussions, you cannot live as if you were on an island, you are living in a society and therefore you need to be part of it.
S: In your relationship with the local government how are you in contact with them? And how does the communication work?
A: Well the contact between us is not structured; it is more seasonal or incidental.
For example, Ramadan is close, during this period greater numbers come to pray in the mosque which could cause some nuisance to neighbors. So what we do is that we inform the local commune that Ramadan is close which might cause some jams etc. that’s why it might cause some nuisance to the neighbors. On the other hand we get in touch with the neighbors in order to clarify the situation and discuss how to minimize the nuisance.
Another example is, during January the local government wanted to organize a debate around the topic of radicalization. We proposed to hold the debate here at the mosque since the topic also involves us. Therefore, we ended up organizing the event here.
Of course we know people from the city council and the commune and they know us, the same applies to the police. Approximately every week a wijkagent visits us, drinks coffee, exchange thoughts etc.
S: When it comes to the topic of radicalization, do you feel like you are being monitored by the government or from these weekly police visits? From my researched I got to know that some people within Muslim communities have been assigned the task of detecting signs of radicalism, or people attempting to indoctrinate others etc.
A: This problem is strange in nature. Praise be to Allah, here at the Badr mosque we never had a case of a radicalized individual. However, hypothetically if we were to notice that any of the faithful or any of the youngsters started having certain ideas, I won’t call the police on him. I would start by engaging with the person and have a conversation. I would perhaps get in touch with the Imam to talk to him. If myself or the Imam were able to convince the person to withstand from those radical ideas then the problem is resolved.
S: So what you are saying is that at a first stage you would attempt to resolve the problem by bringing it up with the individual himself internally?
A: Yes that’s correct. The police man who visits us every week is also Muslim and he comes to pray with us from time to time. And of course if he noticed anything or requested information about anyone and we have information about the individual in question of course then we would provide him with it. Our objective is the one and the same which is to protect this neighborhood and this city and the society from these horrendous ideas.
S: What do you believe the role of the Muslim community is in counter radicalization?
A: Truthfully there is a structural problem. You are speaking of a Muslim community which is something big and there is unfortunately no one who can speak for the community. This means that everyone is entitled to their own opinions however sometimes thoughts and ideas converge and are expressed. In general terms the community is not organized which makes it difficult even for the Dutch government to
71 communicate with representatives of the Muslim community but who are they going to address? There are organizations that attempt to represent the Muslim community or the Turks or the Moroccans parts.
S: I have heard about this organization the CMO is it efficient?
A: The problem is that this organization is made up of a few people that lack a base behind them. They have no relation with mosques. They are isolated from those they are talking on the behalf of. They do not know the Muslim community and the Muslim community does not know them. They were chosen by the Dutch government and not by the Muslim community which is problematic. There is indeed a problem of representativeness.
S: So what you are saying is that they are only good on paper?
A: Indeed! It seems that it is a good organization but the basis is not there which the community is. These people advise the Dutch government according to their own perception in total absence of the Muslim community.
S: I know that you cannot speak for the whole community but how do the people generally feel about acts of terrorism? Do they feel responsible? Or Do they say it’s not my concern? Or perhaps we should have done something?
A: To my knowledge, people get sad and frustrated and many times they feel powerless for not being able to do anything about it. For instance, each time a terror attack occurs there is a sense of shock and surprise that spread among the people. How did this happen? How did this kid get these ideas which lead him to Syria? Is there a problem with the Imams, the parents or the schools? People start asking themselves all sorts of questions.
Until this day I haven’t met a single person saying that have had ideas that supported terror attacks or joining terror groups. The feeling has always been that of sadness and complaints about what is happening.
In the debate that was organized at this mosque on the 28th of January there were two young men who brought up an important issue which is the fact that the imams here in the Netherlands should be able to communicate in Dutch in order to be able to communicate effectively with the younger generations that have been brought up and raised in this country. It is a fact that most Moroccans and Turkish imams only communicate in either Arabic or Turkish language whilst many of the younger generation communicate in Dutch and are not proficient in these languages, which is a problem. On the other what is also important to know is that people who have become radicalized almost never have become this way by frequenting a mosque. Radicalization happens usually outside the mosque through either the Internet or individuals that they happen to meet but who have no affiliation to a mosque.
There could be clandestine improvised prayer rooms but most of these things happen underground away from the eyes of others.
S: During my research I found out that there is a mosque that has been labeled as suspicious and that have even been closely monitored by the secret service. I believe it is called Al-Tawheed. Could you tell us more about this mosque?
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A: Recently things have become clearer. In the minds of many ethnic Dutch as well as Dutch politicians all Salafists are radicals which automatically lead to Jihad. This is not true, there are Salafists that do not go in that direction, they might be extremists in their practice of the religion but they hate all these jihadist operations and bombings etc and they do not wish to have anything to do with terrorism.
Now back to the Al-Tawheed Mosque, the board members as well as the faithful who attend that mosque are Salafists but this does not automatically say that they are linked to Jihadism.
S: I am sure that you are aware of the various policies the Dutch government is applying for countering radicalization, do you feel that the Muslim community is pressured by the local government to be part of the countering radicalization measures?
A: Well first of all this is a matter of conviction and we feel for this issue even before the government or anyone else does. I believe that as Muslims these actions must not be linked with Islam or Muslims. We cannot imagine that a normal Muslim would commit such acts. Of course we discuss these issues and bring it up at the mosque and other organizations or institutions independently of the government’s wishes. This is our responsibility as Muslims! Muslims do not encourage people to kill, bomb or shed blood, this is unacceptable. So no, we do not feel any pressure from the authorities.
S: Does the Muslim community itself participate in counter radicalization efforts, do they do anything about the issue or are they rather passive?
A: Well, yes there are efforts but mostly within the mosques, through religious education and Friday prayer preaches that goes in that direction that Islam has nothing to do with what we now call Daesh. These individuals are the furthest you can get from the teachings of our religion which is a religion of forgiveness and moderation. Even though these individuals speak in the name of the Koran they employ it or use it for political purposes. So through the lessons we warn the youth and others from the dangers of these ideologies. In addition, there are several Muslim organizations that arrange religious lessons and events in order to counter radicalization and in many cases it is the city council of Amsterdam that provides financial support.
S: Do you believe the Muslim Community would like to get closer to the local authorities?
A: I believe that there are some organizations or mosques that do not mind collaborating with the local authorities. However there are also those who do not like to collaborate with external groups and just would like to focus on their own thing. The latter is not problematic for the government since the Dutch state is secular, so you can practice your religion freely as long as it is not interfering with the freedom of others.
S: In my research I have come across several articles that state that in some cases when an individual is showing signs of radicalization members of the community might cover it up since reporting the individual could be considered treachery. This might lead to the isolation of the community and creates a gap between themselves and the local authorities.
A: This is not farfetched, cases like this do exist. Not everyone has the courage, the capability or the wisdom. I imagine myself if I know a cousin that is holding radical views, I would wonder how should I deal with this? Should I report him? Should I try to talk to him? Should I tell the parents? It is difficult to
73 know what is the best thing to do. Perhaps some would imagine that it is an easy matter but it is not. I am familiar or a case here from here in Amsterdam, from the district of Slotervaart. There was a young man that intended to travel to Chechnya. Who do you think informed the police and the local authorities? It wasn’t the Wijkagent or his neighbor it was his father! The father felt that there was a danger to and from his child and he contacted the authorities after exhausting all other measures. Therefore as I said earlier, I do not believe the majority or Muslims would help nurture or spread radical views. Personally I believe that most Muslims myself included would not ignore a case of a radical individual and would attempt to talk to the individual, talk to his parents and perhaps even call the authorities. It is a personal responsibility and if it such a thing is ignored it would be considered as betrayal not only to one self but also to Islam.
S: Does the imams and key figures in the community receive training in counter radicalization?
A: Yes, yes! For instance myself and two others from the board received training.
S: What kind of training is it? What does it include?
A: Well, this training did not teach me anything from before but it is mainly about how to identify a person that might hold radical views. Like for instance a person who has a sudden change in his clothing, a change in mosque attendance frequency, having certain views about specific topics, might hold radical views that again might lead to…
S: So until now you haven’t been confronted with this kind of situation?
A: Well in this mosque is sometimes attended by some salafists, who hold radical views which are different from the majority of the attendees. However we and these salafists all condemn the usage of terror and violence.
I don’t know if you have heard of Imam xx and xx? They are the symbols of salafism in the Islamic world. Now there are new cheikhs that broke away from the traditional ones like for instance Rabi Al Madkhali who broke away from his teachers and he is even more radical. However, he does not motivate the young to kill and bomb nor to take a stand against state leaders. But imagine if one day Cheikh Al Madkhali says to his followers ‘go to the jihad!’ people would go. This shows that sometimes words from a certain person could have great impact. These individuals say that they do not belong to a political party or a group but their allegiance lies with this cheikh. Imagine if this cheikh tells them go to Syria … this is a problem.
Lately, we attended a play in a theater in Meervaart. The play was about Jihad and showed how the young are manipulated to go to Syria. After the play a young man came to tell his story of how he changed his mind at the last minute and not travel to Syria. Basically he was getting ready to leave but he got ill and it was his illness that kept him from traveling to Syria. While he was ill he reconsidered himself and his ideology and ended up changing his mind. He was ill with cancer. The people who were indoctrinating him kept talking about the ‘kuffar’ unbelievers and how it is a sin to talk to them, sit with them, deal with them etc. However while he was at the hospital who was treating him? An unbeliever! She was talking to him, asking him how he felt, give him his medicine etc. He was shocked how this unbeliever was helping him etc.
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S: Once again thank you very much for agreeing to this interview, any last words?
A: Good luck and may god be with you
Interview with Project Manager within the City Council
S= Skander Alexander Ghehioueche C= Project manager City Council
S: Could you provide me with a brief introduction?
C: Central city council is under the leadership of the mayor and 7 city districts. I work for city district Amsterdam west. There are 140.000 inhabitants in this district.
S: What are the counter radicalization efforts made by municipality of Amsterdam
C:
Preventive policy = StayWest program Curative policy = municipality Repressive policy is what police, AIVD and justice department are doing
StayWest: everyone needs to feel at home in district West. Focus on three groups:
Muslim youth: stop them of going to conflict areas to fight Jews: Prevent them emigrating to Israel out of fear Local Amsterdammers (Born and raised in Amsterdam): Keep them feeling at home in their city
S: How is the cooperation between the central city and the districts and between the districts?
C: Districts are chosen so the work independent from the city center but at the same time the mayor is the head of the city districts. They have regular meeting and cooperate but essentially everyone works within their own district.
S: How is the cooperation and contact between the Muslim community and the municipal?
C: I am born and raised here so that helps. There are nine mosques here. A meeting every 6 months with these nine and the district. We have people working for us who are Muslims. And other cultural backgrounds, so it is very diverse. We also in contact with parents.
S: How do you reach the parents?
C: People working in community centers we there are meeting and open consultations so that it easy for people to reach us and talk to us, and we to them. This also sometimes happens via mosque or other
75 organizations. If someone is on the radar with the policy they alarm the district, but also sometimes parents themselves come to use with concerns. So there are many different options/opportunities to initiate contact and we are very accessible because there are many different way of reaching out to us.
Many times there are comparisons between the Netherlands and Belgium or France. In the Netherlands we are good in keeping contact with the people also in more deprived area. Which are not so bad as in these other countries (Molenbeek). This is because we have an army of professionals that is concerned with the topic who are in contact with the people. so we see what happens. This is the big advantage we have compared to these other countries. This does not mean that we see everything or van prevent everything, there are people who went to Syria, but less dramatic than expected. This is also because for example gyms (sport is important) are cooperating, so it is almost difficult to hide your intentions.
S: Is the Muslim community cooperating with the musicality
C: Mostly yes. Sometimes out of fear, lack of trust, people don’t report, but most of the times they do. The Municipality is accessible and mostly the trust is there.
S: How do you try to improve this?
C: Make this more open. Talk about it, inform people. Inform them about the process what happens when the reach out to the government or policy. We want to gain trust. Let them know that we don’t immediately lock them up and let them know that it is important to react in an early stage. This will benefit all people involved. Because in an early stage you can sometimes help before the damage (as going to Syria) is done.
S: Is cooperation with the mosque important?
C: Yes. We are cooperating with them. They are an important institute in this matter. 20.000-25.000 Muslims in west, most of them are in contact with the mosque. Most of them are traditional.
S: Could you then say that the mosque represents the Muslims here
C: One should be careful with saying that because yes a large part is connected to the mosque. But there are also Muslims, although a minority, which are not. So you also need to use different channels, for example coffee places. And people who are radicalized don’t go to the mosque, they isolate themselves.
S: Do you think the Muslim community sees a role for themselves in this issue of counter radicalization?
C: When I started with this work I had to push and pull the community. At that time, the problem was not pressing. But since the war in Syria, the attacks in Paris and Brussels people started to see a role for themselves. So the problem being more topical has helped in that sense. Everyone (indirectly) knows someone who left to Syria. So they can’t ignore the problem anymore. They feel the pressure from within to do something.
S: How do you see their role?
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C: The key of the problem lies with the community itself. Stable homes, moderate teaching of Islam of the young. Counter narrative has to come from within, this is not something the government can do. If you don’t agree with the image in the news speak up and explain that is not Islam, arguments from within the religion. Now many imams don’t speak Dutch.
S: Does the municipal pressure the community to take part in counter radicalization. If yes how?
C: Pressure is a strong word, you can’t really pressure them. Pressure comes from the media and of events such as the attacks that happened. So we don’t have to pressure but the external pressure helps us. We work together, and have a practical approach. But we can’t pressure unless they break the law.
S: How is the counter radicalization resources divided?
C: We can apply for funds with Amsterdam, the Netherlands or the EU. If there is a risk, then we make an analysis of what we need and then we apply for funds. Every district applies for fund based on their needs.
S: do you have a different approach to different mosques (salafist mosque)?
C: Only when there is a history. And some extra eyes on the salafist.
S: Is there anything we missed?
C: Most important is to prevent! Prevent youth to radicalize by offering them other options, better opportunities and activities to prevent boredom. The local relation between the governments and the community is important. You cannot have that type of contact on a national level.
About the Stay west program:
Projects to make the youth resist radicalization by talking to them about different and difficult subjects. These projects are done with the cooperation of among others schools and community centers. It also encourages parents and youth to talk about difficult subjects
We train everyone who works with youth: teachers, police, imams etc.
We make sure that all involved actors talk to each other exchange thoughts and experiences
We organize debates between different actors, groups etc.
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