1 .U. Definability and Ordinal Definability
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Mathematisches Forschungsinstitut Oberwolfach Computability Theory
Mathematisches Forschungsinstitut Oberwolfach Report No. 08/2012 DOI: 10.4171/OWR/2012/08 Computability Theory Organised by Klaus Ambos-Spies, Heidelberg Rodney G. Downey, Wellington Steffen Lempp, Madison Wolfgang Merkle, Heidelberg February 5th – February 11th, 2012 Abstract. Computability is one of the fundamental notions of mathematics, trying to capture the effective content of mathematics. Starting from G¨odel’s Incompleteness Theorem, it has now blossomed into a rich area with strong connections with other areas of mathematical logic as well as algebra and theoretical computer science. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 03Dxx, 68xx. Introduction by the Organisers The workshop Computability Theory, organized by Klaus Ambos-Spies and Wolf- gang Merkle (Heidelberg), Steffen Lempp (Madison) and Rodney G. Downey (Wellington) was held February 5th–February 11th, 2012. This meeting was well attended, with 53 participants covering a broad geographic representation from five continents and a nice blend of researchers with various backgrounds in clas- sical degree theory as well as algorithmic randomness, computable model theory and reverse mathematics, reaching into theoretical computer science, model the- ory and algebra, and proof theory, respectively. Several of the talks announced breakthroughs on long-standing open problems; others provided a great source of important open problems that will surely drive research for several years to come. Computability Theory 399 Workshop: Computability Theory Table of Contents Carl Jockusch (joint with Rod Downey and Paul Schupp) Generic computability and asymptotic density ....................... 401 Laurent Bienvenu (joint with Andrei Romashchenko, Alexander Shen, Antoine Taveneaux, and Stijn Vermeeren) Are random axioms useful? ....................................... 403 Adam R. Day (joint with Joseph S. Miller) Cupping with Random Sets ...................................... -
Set-Theoretic Geology, the Ultimate Inner Model, and New Axioms
Set-theoretic Geology, the Ultimate Inner Model, and New Axioms Justin William Henry Cavitt (860) 949-5686 [email protected] Advisor: W. Hugh Woodin Harvard University March 20, 2017 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics and Philosophy Contents 1 Introduction 2 1.1 Author’s Note . .4 1.2 Acknowledgements . .4 2 The Independence Problem 5 2.1 Gödelian Independence and Consistency Strength . .5 2.2 Forcing and Natural Independence . .7 2.2.1 Basics of Forcing . .8 2.2.2 Forcing Facts . 11 2.2.3 The Space of All Forcing Extensions: The Generic Multiverse 15 2.3 Recap . 16 3 Approaches to New Axioms 17 3.1 Large Cardinals . 17 3.2 Inner Model Theory . 25 3.2.1 Basic Facts . 26 3.2.2 The Constructible Universe . 30 3.2.3 Other Inner Models . 35 3.2.4 Relative Constructibility . 38 3.3 Recap . 39 4 Ultimate L 40 4.1 The Axiom V = Ultimate L ..................... 41 4.2 Central Features of Ultimate L .................... 42 4.3 Further Philosophical Considerations . 47 4.4 Recap . 51 1 5 Set-theoretic Geology 52 5.1 Preliminaries . 52 5.2 The Downward Directed Grounds Hypothesis . 54 5.2.1 Bukovský’s Theorem . 54 5.2.2 The Main Argument . 61 5.3 Main Results . 65 5.4 Recap . 74 6 Conclusion 74 7 Appendix 75 7.1 Notation . 75 7.2 The ZFC Axioms . 76 7.3 The Ordinals . 77 7.4 The Universe of Sets . 77 7.5 Transitive Models and Absoluteness . -
UNIVERSALLY BAIRE SETS and GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS TREVOR M. WILSON Introduction Generic Absoluteness Principles Assert That Certai
UNIVERSALLY BAIRE SETS AND GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS TREVOR M. WILSON Abstract. We prove several equivalences and relative consistency re- 2 uBλ sults involving notions of generic absoluteness beyond Woodin's (Σ1) generic absoluteness for a limit of Woodin cardinals λ. In particular,e we R 2 uBλ prove that two-step 9 (Π1) generic absoluteness below a measur- able cardinal that is a limite of Woodin cardinals has high consistency 2 uBλ strength, and that it is equivalent with the existence of trees for (Π1) formulas. The construction of these trees uses a general method for building an absolute complement for a given tree T assuming many \failures of covering" for the models L(T;Vα) below a measurable car- dinal. Introduction Generic absoluteness principles assert that certain properties of the set- theoretic universe cannot be changed by the method of forcing. Some pro- perties, such as the truth or falsity of the Continuum Hypothesis, can always be changed by forcing. Accordingly, one approach to formulating generic ab- soluteness principles is to consider properties of a limited complexity such 1 1 as those corresponding to pointclasses in descriptive set theory: Σ2, Σ3, projective, and so on. (Another approach is to limit the class ofe allowede forcing notions. For a survey of results in this area, see [1].) Shoenfield’s 1 absoluteness theorem implies that Σ2 statements are always generically ab- solute. Generic absoluteness principlese for larger pointclasses tend to be equiconsistent with strong axioms of infinity, and they may also relate to the extent of the universally Baire sets. 1 For example, one-step Σ3 generic absoluteness is shown in [3] to be equiconsistent with the existencee of a Σ2-reflecting cardinal and to be equiv- 1 alent with the statement that every ∆2 set of reals is universally Baire. -
Axiomatic Set Teory P.D.Welch
Axiomatic Set Teory P.D.Welch. August 16, 2020 Contents Page 1 Axioms and Formal Systems 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Preliminaries: axioms and formal systems. 3 1.2.1 The formal language of ZF set theory; terms 4 1.2.2 The Zermelo-Fraenkel Axioms 7 1.3 Transfinite Recursion 9 1.4 Relativisation of terms and formulae 11 2 Initial segments of the Universe 17 2.1 Singular ordinals: cofinality 17 2.1.1 Cofinality 17 2.1.2 Normal Functions and closed and unbounded classes 19 2.1.3 Stationary Sets 22 2.2 Some further cardinal arithmetic 24 2.3 Transitive Models 25 2.4 The H sets 27 2.4.1 H - the hereditarily finite sets 28 2.4.2 H - the hereditarily countable sets 29 2.5 The Montague-Levy Reflection theorem 30 2.5.1 Absoluteness 30 2.5.2 Reflection Theorems 32 2.6 Inaccessible Cardinals 34 2.6.1 Inaccessible cardinals 35 2.6.2 A menagerie of other large cardinals 36 3 Formalising semantics within ZF 39 3.1 Definite terms and formulae 39 3.1.1 The non-finite axiomatisability of ZF 44 3.2 Formalising syntax 45 3.3 Formalising the satisfaction relation 46 3.4 Formalising definability: the function Def. 47 3.5 More on correctness and consistency 48 ii iii 3.5.1 Incompleteness and Consistency Arguments 50 4 The Constructible Hierarchy 53 4.1 The L -hierarchy 53 4.2 The Axiom of Choice in L 56 4.3 The Axiom of Constructibility 57 4.4 The Generalised Continuum Hypothesis in L. -
Integer-Valued Definable Functions
Integer-valued definable functions G. O. Jones, M. E. M. Thomas and A. J. Wilkie ABSTRACT We present a dichotomy, in terms of growth at infinity, of analytic functions definable in the real exponential field which take integer values at natural number inputs. Using a result concerning the density of rational points on curves definable in this structure, we show that if a definable, k analytic function 1: [0, oo)k_> lR is such that 1(N ) C;;; Z, then either sUPlxl(r 11(x)1 grows faster than exp(r"), for some 15 > 0, or 1 is a polynomial over <Ql. 1. Introduction The results presented in this note concern the growth at infinity of functions which are analytic and definable in the real field expanded by the exponential function and which take integer values on N. They are descendants of a theorem of P6lya [8J from 1915 concerning integer valued, entire functions on <C. This classic theorem tells us that 2z is, in some sense, the smallest non-polynomialfunction of this kind. More formally, letm(f,r) := sup{lf(z)1 : Izl ~ r}. P6lya's Theorem, refined in [3, 9J, states the following. THEOREM 1.1 [9, Theorem IJ. Iff: C --, C is an entire function which satisfies both f(N) <::: Z and . m(f, r) 11m sup < 1, r-->x 2r then f is a polynomial. This result cannot be directly transferred to the real analytic setting (for example, consider the function f (x) = sin( K::C)). In fact, it appears that there are very few results of this character known for such functions (some rare examples may be found in [1]). -
E-RECURSIVE INTUITIONS in Memoriam Professor Joseph R. Shoenfield Contents 1. Initial Intuitions 1 2. E-Recursively Enumerable V
E-RECURSIVE INTUITIONS GERALD E. SACKS In Memoriam Professor Joseph R. Shoenfield Abstract. An informal sketch (with intermittent details) of parts of E-Recursion theory, mostly old, some new, that stresses intu- ition. The lack of effective unbounded search is balanced by the availability of divergence witnesses. A set is E-closed iff it is tran- sitive and closed under the application of partial E-recursive func- tions. Some finite injury, forcing, and model theoretic construc- tions can be adapted to E-closed sets that are not 1 admissible. Reflection plays a central role. Contents 1. Initial Intuitions 1 2. E-Recursively Enumerable Versus 1 4 3. E-Recursion Versus -Recursion 6 4. Selection and Reflection 8 5. Finite Injury Arguments and Post’sProblem 12 6. Forcing: C.C.C. Versus Countably Closed 13 7. Model-Theoretic Completeness and Compactness 14 References 16 1. Initial Intuitions One of the central intuitions of classical recursion theory is the effec- tiveness of unbounded search. Let A be a nonempty recursively enu- merable set of nonnegative integers. A member of A can be selected by simply enumerating A until some member appears. This procedure, known as unbounded search, consists of following instructions until a termination point is reached. What eventually appears is not merely Date: December 10, 2010. My thanks to the organizers of "Effective Mathematics of the Uncountable," CUNY Graduate Center, August 2009, for their kind invitation. 1 E-RECURSIVEINTUITIONS 2 some number n A but a computation that reveals n A. Unbounded search in its full2 glory consists of enumerating all computations2 until a suitable computation, if it exists, is found. -
Definable Isomorphism Problem
Logical Methods in Computer Science Volume 15, Issue 4, 2019, pp. 14:1–14:19 Submitted Feb. 27, 2018 https://lmcs.episciences.org/ Published Dec. 11, 2019 DEFINABLE ISOMORPHISM PROBLEM KHADIJEH KESHVARDOOST a, BARTEK KLIN b, SLAWOMIR LASOTA b, JOANNA OCHREMIAK c, AND SZYMON TORUNCZYK´ b a Department of Mathematics, Velayat University, Iranshahr, Iran b University of Warsaw c CNRS, LaBRI, Universit´ede Bordeaux Abstract. We investigate the isomorphism problem in the setting of definable sets (equiv- alent to sets with atoms): given two definable relational structures, are they related by a definable isomorphism? Under mild assumptions on the underlying structure of atoms, we prove decidability of the problem. The core result is parameter-elimination: existence of an isomorphism definable with parameters implies existence of an isomorphism definable without parameters. 1. Introduction We consider hereditarily first-order definable sets, which are usually infinite, but can be finitely described and are therefore amenable to algorithmic manipulation. We drop the qualifiers herediatarily first-order, and simply call them definable sets in what follows. They are parametrized by a fixed underlying relational structure Atoms whose elements are called atoms. Example 1.1. Let Atoms be a countable set f1; 2; 3;:::g equipped with the equality relation only; we shall call this structure the pure set. Let V = f fa; bg j a; b 2 Atoms; a 6= b g ; E = f (fa; bg; fc; dg) j a; b; c; d 2 Atoms; a 6= b ^ a 6= c ^ a 6= d ^ b 6= c ^ b 6= d ^ c 6= d g : Both V and E are definable sets (over Atoms), as they are constructed from Atoms using (possibly nested) set-builder expressions with first-order guards ranging over Atoms. -
Strong Logics of First and Second Order∗
Strong Logics of First and Second Order∗ Peter Koellner Abstract In this paper we investigate strong logics of first and second order that have certain absoluteness properties. We begin with an investigation of first order logic and the strong logics ω-logic and β-logic, isolating two facets of absoluteness, namely, generic invariance and faithfulness. It turns out that absoluteness is relative in the sense that stronger background assumptions secure greater degrees of absoluteness. Our aim is to investigate the hierarchies of strong logics of first and second order that are generically invariant and faithful against the backdrop of the strongest large cardinal hypotheses. We show that there is a close correspondence between the two hierarchies and we characterize the strongest logic in each hierarchy. On the first-order side, this leads to a new presentation of Woodin’s Ω-logic. On the second-order side, we compare the strongest logic with full second-order logic and argue that the comparison lends support to Quine’s claim that second-order logic is really set theory in sheep’s clothing. This paper is concerned with strong logics of first and second order. At the most abstract level, a strong logic of first-order has the following general form: Let L be a first-order language and let Φ(x) be a formula that defines a class of L-structures. Then, for a recursively enumerable set T of sentences of L, and for a sentence ϕ of L set T |=Φ(x) ϕ iff for all L-structures M such that Φ(M), if M |= T then M |= ϕ. -
Combinatorics with Definable Sets: Euler Characteristics and Grothendieck Rings
COMBINATORICS WITH DEFINABLE SETS: EULER CHARACTERISTICS AND GROTHENDIECK RINGS JAN KRAJ´ICEKˇ AND THOMAS SCANLON Abstract. We recall the notions of weak and strong Euler characteristics on a first order structure and make explicit the notion of a Grothendieck ring of a structure. We define partially ordered Euler characteristic and Grothendieck ring and give a characterization of structures that have non-trivial partially or- dered Grothendieck ring. We give a generalization of counting functions to lo- cally finite structures, and use the construction to show that the Grothendieck ring of the complex numbers contains as a subring the ring of integer poly- nomials in continuum many variables. We prove the existence of universal strong Euler characteristic on a structure. We investigate the dependence of the Grothendieck ring on the theory of the structure and give a few counter- examples. Finally, we relate some open problems and independence results in bounded arithmetic to properties of particular Grothendieck rings. 1. Introduction What of elementary combinatorics holds true in a class of first order structures if sets, relations, and maps must be definable? For example, no finite set is in one-to-one correspondence with itself minus one point, and the same is true also for even infinite sets of reals if they, as well as the correspondences, are semi-algebraic, i.e. are definable in the real closed field R. Similarly for constructible sets and 2 maps in C. On the other hand, the infinite Ramsey statement ∞ → (∞)2 fails in C; the infinite unordered graph {(x, y) | x2 = y ∨ y2 = x} on C has no definable infinite clique or independent set. -
Basic Computability Theory
Basic Computability Theory Jaap van Oosten Department of Mathematics Utrecht University 1993, revised 2013 ii Introduction The subject of this course is the theory of computable or recursive functions. Computability Theory and Recursion Theory are two names for it; the former being more popular nowadays. 0.1 Why Computability Theory? The two most important contributions Logic has made to Mathematics, are formal definitions of proof and of algorithmic computation. How useful is this? Mathematicians are trained in understanding and constructing proofs from their first steps in the subject, and surely they can recognize a valid proof when they see one; likewise, algorithms have been an essential part of Mathematics for as long as it exists, and at the most elementary levels (think of long division, or Euclid’s algorithm for the greatest common divisor function). So why do we need a formal definition here? The main use is twofold. Firstly, a formal definition of proof (or algorithm) leads to an analysis of proofs (programs) in elementary reasoning steps (computation steps), thereby opening up the possibility of numerical classification of proofs (programs)1. In Proof Theory, proofs are assigned ordinal numbers, and theorems are classified according to the complexity of the proofs they need. In Complexity Theory, programs are analyzed according to the number of elementary computation steps they require (as a function of the input), and programming problems are classified in terms of these complexity functions. Secondly, a formal definition is needed once one wishes to explore the boundaries of the topic: what can be proved at all? Which kind of problems can be settled by an algorithm? It is this aspect that we will focus on in this course. -
Forcing? Thomas Jech
WHAT IS... ? Forcing? Thomas Jech What is forcing? Forcing is a remarkably powerful case that there exists no proof of the conjecture technique for the construction of models of set and no proof of its negation. theory. It was invented in 1963 by Paul Cohen1, To make this vague discussion more precise we who used it to prove the independence of the will first elaborate on the concepts of theorem and Continuum Hypothesis. He constructed a model proof. of set theory in which the Continuum Hypothesis What are theorems and proofs? It is a use- (CH) fails, thus showing that CH is not provable ful fact that every mathematical statement can from the axioms of set theory. be expressed in the language of set theory. All What is the Continuum Hypothesis? In 1873 mathematical objects can be regarded as sets, and Georg Cantor proved that the continuum is un- relations between them can be reduced to expres- countable: that there exists no mapping of the set sions that use only the relation ∈. It is not essential N of all integers onto the set R of all real numbers. how it is done, but it can be done: For instance, Since R contains N, we have 2ℵ0 > ℵ , where 2ℵ0 0 integers are certain finite sets, rational numbers and ℵ are the cardinalities of R and N, respec- 0 are pairs of integers, real numbers are identified tively. A question arises whether 2ℵ0 is equal to with Dedekind cuts in the rationals, functions the cardinal ℵ1, the immediate successor of ℵ0. -
THE NON-ABSOLUTENESS of MODEL EXISTENCE in UNCOUNTABLE CARDINALS for Lω1,Ω Throughout, We Assume Φ Is an L Ω1,Ω Sentence Wh
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Diposit Digital de Documents de la UAB THE NON-ABSOLUTENESS OF MODEL EXISTENCE IN UNCOUNTABLE CARDINALS FOR L!1;! SY-DAVID FRIEDMAN∗, TAPANI HYTTINENy, AND MARTIN KOERWIENz Abstract. For sentences φ of L!1;!, we investigate the question of absolute- ness of φ having models in uncountable cardinalities. We first observe that having a model in @1 is an absolute property, but having a model in @2 is not as it may depend on the validity of the Continuum Hypothesis. We then consider the GCH context and provide sentences for any α 2 !1 n f0; 1;!g for which the existence of a model in @α is non-absolute (relative to large cardinal hypotheses). Throughout, we assume φ is an L!1;! sentence which has infinite models. By L¨owenheim-Skolem, φ must have a countable model, so the property \having a countable model" is an absolute property of such sentences in the sense that its validity does not depend on the properties of the set theoretic universe we work in, i.e. it is a consequence of ZFC. A main tool for absoluteness considerations is Shoenfields absoluteness Theorem (Theorem 25.20 in [7]). It states that any 1 1 property expressed by either a Σ2 or a Π2 formula is absolute between transitive models of ZFC. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the question of how far we can replace \countable" by higher cardinalities. As John Baldwin observed in [2], it follows from results of [6] that the property of φ having arbitrarily large models is absolute (it can be expressed in form of the existence of an infinite indiscernible sequence, which by Shoenfield absoluteness is absolute).