[02/05/2006] [Pe

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B - POLICY DEPARTMENT -

NOTE

On NOTE: on ESDP Mission "EUFOR R.D. Congo": in support of UN Mission (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) during the elections expected in July 2006.1

Abstract:

On 27 April 2006 the EU adopted a much anticipated Joint Action which establishes a legal basis for an EU ESDP Operation, to be known as EUFOR R.D. Congo, in support of the UN’s MONUC during the election period in the DRC. EUFOR R.D. Congo will be an autonomous ESDP operation with Germany acting as “Framework Nation”, providing the Operational Headquarters from Potsdam, as well as its Operations Commander. The mission is expected to include a forward presence of about 400-450 troops (including 38 additional police officers assigned to the existing EU Police Mission “EUPOL Kinshasa”) based in Kinshasa and supported by an “over the horizon force” most likely situated in Gabon and including a substantial French role. The operation was widely anticipated after the UN (Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations) invited the European Union on December 27th 2005 to consider providing support to strengthen the United Nations Peace keeping Operation in the DRC (MONUC) during the 2006 elections. The elections now expected on 30th July will be the first elections to be held in DRC for 40 years. This article sets out the context for an operation specific to the DRC as well as outlining the key stages over last four months that led to the development of the ESDP Mission “EUFOR R.D. Congo”. Finally the article discusses some implications for the role of the European Parliament (EP).

Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

1 At the time of writing Press reports indicated that the elections would now be postponed to late (30th) July rather than the earlier dates of June 18th and July 6th. DGExPo/B/PolDep/Note/2006_ [N°] [02/05/2006]

[PE N°] EN This paper is published in the following languages: English

Author: Dr Gerrard QUILLE

Manuscript completed in 05/2006.

Copies can be obtained through: E-mail: [email protected]

Brussels, European Parliament, 04/06/2006.

2 Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 4 2. Background...... 5 2.1. DRC in transition ...... 5 2.2. EU in the DRC: supporting transition...... 6 3. An ESDP Military Operation in the DRC?...... 7 3.1. Background...... 7 3.2. EU Military Options for supporting MONUC during the elections in the DR Congo. . 8 4. Legal Basis and Next Steps towards a European Council Decision to launch the Operation ...... 10 4.1. Preparing the Ground: European Council and German Government and Parliament . 10 4.2. Crisis Management Concept...... 11 4.3. UNSC Resolution 1671...... 11 4.4. EU Joint Action ...... 12 4.5. Financial Aspects ...... 12 5. Perspectives from European Parliament ...... 13 5.1. The European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE)...... 13 5.2. Election Observation Mission in the DRC ...... 14 6. Final Observations and Analysis...... 15 6.1. Evolving ESDP...... 15 6.2. The Constitutional Treaty...... 16 6.3. The reflection period...... 17 6.4. The EP and ESDP: Balancing Political and Budgetary Authority?...... 17

3 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION Policy Department

NOTE: on ESDP Mission "EUFOR R.D. Congo": in support of UN Mission (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) during the elections expected in July 2006.1

1. Introduction

This Note has been written to support discussions in the EP (in particular its Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) at its meeting on 4 May 2006) and is written in six main sections:

• the first provides some brief background information on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and examines the current security environment leading up to the elections currently expected in early July 2006; • the second highlights the existing role of the EU in the DRC; • the third outlines the political developments towards a decision to send an ESDP Mission “EUFOR R.D. Congo”; • the fourth section details the elements set out in the UN Security Council Mandate and EU Joint Action for EUFOR R.D. Congo; • section five puts such developments in the context of the evolving ESDP and the implications for the role of the European Parliament; and • the final section extrapolates some conclusions on the challenges posed by the evolving ESDP to the “scrutinising” role of the European Parliamentary.

1 At the time of writing Press reports indicated that the elections would now be postponed to late (30th) July rather than the earlier dates of June 18th and July 6th. 4 Further information on the DRC, the financing of ESDP operations, and on the role of national Parliaments in CFSP/ESDP can be found in other Policy Department Notes.1

2. Background

2.1. DRC in transition2

The DRC has been in a state of civil war since 1998. The war started in August 1998 when Laurent Kabila issued a decree expelling Rwandan troops from the country. In the civil war that followed, elements of the armed forces of Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda operated inside the DRC in support of the rebels, whereas elements of the armed forces of Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported the Government of the DRC. More than 3 million people are estimated to have died in the Congo's complex four-year civil war, which has involved eight foreign armies and numerous rebel groups often fighting among themselves.

In an effort to end the war, the heads of six governments involved (Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) signed a cease-fire agreement on 10 July 1999 (known as the 'Lusaka Peace Agreement'). However, implementation of the accord was delayed, due in part to inflexibility on the part of Kabila’s government. The signing of two peace agreements with Rwanda in August 2002 and Uganda in September 2002 gave the Lusaka Peace Agreement a new momentum. In March 2003 the DRC was prepared to allow an international force into the capital and other major towns until a new army was established. The implementation of the accord has had significant set backs along the way.

On 30 July 2002 Rwanda and the DRC signed the so-called Pretoria Accord. Under this agreement, Rwanda was to withdraw its troops, consisting of approximately 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers, within 90 days. The DRC government, on the other hand, committed itself to dealing with Rwanda's main security concern by co-operating with the UN in disarming the Rwandan Hutu rebels, the Interahamwe, responsible for the 1994 massacres. There were, however, serious obstacles to implementing the agreement. The exploitation of resources in the area is another incentive for foreign forces to remain in the country.

South Africa has played a key mediating role in the peace negotiations between the different parties in the Inter-Congolose Dialogue (ICD).

Agreement was reached in Pretoria on 17 December 2002 by the parties to the ICD on the establishment of a transitional power-sharing government. It was set up in June 2003 and is headed by Joseph Kabila as president along with 4 vice-presidents. The Presidency is the executive body with the main responsibility of managing the government. Initially elections were to be held within two years, i.e. in June 2005 in accordance with the Pretoria Accord, but have since been postponed twice and are now expected in early July 2006.

The Transitional Government (collectively known as the “espace presidential”) is composed of:

1 This section has been modified and updates from a Policy Department Note N°: DG ExPo/DIR B/POLDEP/NOTE/2005_005 2 Poldep Note, op cit. 5 • President Joseph Kabila, • And 4 Vice-Presidents, namely Mr Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (former Government), Mr Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-Goma), Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), Mr Arthur Zahidi Ngoma (political opposition and civil society).

President Kabila is responsible for promulgating laws and nominating (and revoking) ministers and army officers. The four vice-presidents (nominated from among the rebel movement, current government, unarmed oppositions and civil society groups) are responsible for co- ordinating their commissions as well as implementing decisions taken by the cabinet.

On 7 January 2005, the elections chief Malu Malu announced that new elections, initially due in June 2005 might take place in October. This was postponed for a second time to the summer of 2006 (two six-month delays are allowed).

This announcement was followed by heavy protests in Kinshasa. Whilst a constitution to be put in place after the elections was adopted in early 2006, there are still significant obstacles to holding elections, not least the commitment by all the interested parties and rebel groups to see a successful outcome.

2.2. EU in the DRC: supporting transition

The EU has been working for some time in support of peace processes in the Great Lakes region. This has included political (not least represented by the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes, Aldo Ajello), economic and development support. In 2003, it showed its commitment to promoting security and stability by launching an ESDP military operation known as "Artemis" in the Ituri province. In September 2003, this operation ended, and full responsibility was handed back to MONUC.

Whilst Europe's interests stem from its colonial past, it has evolved into one based on significant political dialogue, trade flows as well as aid. The EU is the biggest donor in Africa accounting for 60% of all official ODA.

The recently adopted EU Africa Strategy reminds us of the EU instruments and policy frameworks that have been developed for engaging with Africa, namely the recently revised Cotonou Agreement (dating from the original Lomé I Agreement signed in 1975 for sub- Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific countries), the Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (with South-Africa), the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy (for North African countries).1 The EU Africa Strategy also complements key EU security reference documents, namely the European Security Strategy, that highlight a desire by the Union to balance security and development interests whereby peace and security are the first prerequisites to sustainable development.

European interests in Africa are by no means altruistic, they reflect long standing economic, developmental and security interests in the region. In the DRC it is clear that the Union can stand to benefit from having a stable region for many reasons:

1 Communication from the Commission on 12 October 2005 entitled an 'EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro- African pact to accelerate Africa's Development', page 2. Can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/communications/docs/eu_strategy_for_africa_12_10_2005_en.pdf 6 § not least as a trading partner rich in mineral resources (including copper, cobalt, zinc, manganese, uranium, Diamonds, coal, gold, silver and, particularly important, Coltan) and there are also major deposits of offshore petroleum near the mouth of the Congo River, § to see a positive return on large sums of development assistance (such as 750 million euro between 2003-2007), § to see a positive return on international financial assistance for example in June 2002 the IMF approved a three-year US$ 750 billions PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) and the Paris Club of donors pledged a further US$ 5.7bn for the period 2005- 2007, § to avoid large scale humanitarian crisis which might result in the need to deploy substantial numbers of troops, as well as increased sums of humanitarian and development assistance, § to avoid large scale population movement which in turn will increase regional instability and lead to increased immigration at the borders of Europe.

All these economic, developmental and political actions serve to underpin the EU's longer-term role in supporting the DRC to transition and helping to build a stable regional actor.

More immediately the EU has invested substantially in the election process. Over half of the funding for the elections comes from EU resources. This includes an additional 60 million in November 2005 towards the support programme for electoral reform on top of the 89 million allocated in 2004. This is the largest ever Community contribution to an electoral process.

Further support to transition and specifically to the electoral process has been provided for by the launch of an ESDP Police Mission known as EUPOL Kinshasa. It was the first ESDP EU civilian (police) mission in Africa. In December 2004, the PSC decided that EUPOL Kinshasa should pursue a three-fold approach to assist with the rehabilitation and refurbishment of a training centre and the provision of basic equipment; to assist with the training of the Integrated Police Unit (IPU); and to follow-up, monitor, and oversee the implementation of the IPU's mandate after the initial training phase. Furthermore, on 8 June 2005 (for a 12 month period) the EU also launched a Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC known as EUSEC DRC. The main objective of EUSEC DRC is to provide advice and assistance on Security Sector Reform (SSR) and in particular to contribute to a successful integration of a united Congolese army.

The EU has, therefore, wider interests than the colonial legacies of predominantly France, UK and Belgium (and more distant relationships of Germany with DRC's neighbours in Rwanda and Burundi) that represent immediate security, economic and political interests of Europe today.

Collectively, these factors provide important additional information for understanding the EU's current support to the DRC during the election period.

3. An ESDP Military Operation in the DRC?

3.1. Background

On December 27th 2005 the UN (Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations) invited the European Union to consider providing support to strengthen the United Nations Peace keeping Operation in the DRC (MONUC) during the 2006 elections. The principal request from 7 the United Nations is understood to be to strengthen MONUC, in particular its rapid reaction capability, during a four period around the elections. The elections will be the first elections to be held in DRC for 40 years.

Currently a UN force of 17,000 is located mostly in the east of the DRC with only two battalions to cover the rest including Kinshasa and potentially difficult regions like north Katanga and the two Kasai’s (western and eastern). MONUC has also reinforced its Mission in recent months in order to try and impose greater stability before the elections. For instance, a small contingent was redeployed from Burundi in January, but more significantly a larger deployment of troops from Benin (currently at a strength of approx. 800 and expected to increase to 1,400) are taking up a presence in north Katanga where they are expected to meet strong resistance from (Mai Mai) rebels.

In addition, efforts continue to create a unified Congolese army which also has a role to play in supporting the election process. In this respect, so-called Integrated brigades are being developed to unite some rebel factions into a single Congolese army. In relation to the elections (and being trained as part of the EU SSR mission EUSEC DRC), 6 brigades have been deployed in the East, another 3 will be deployed in May and a final 3 in June. In all, this means that there will be 12 brigades (of about 4000 soldiers in each brigade) deployed before elections in early July. The head of EUSEC DRC General Joana, had originally indicated that 18 brigades would be necessary to secure the elections, but now it is suggested that 12 will be enough. Nevertheless, concerns remain that most of the brigades are poorly trained, poorly managed, and have shortfalls of food, shelter, equipment and medicine.

Furthermore, in Kinshasa there are also a number of European countries, that have a mostly police presence, including France, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as the EU.

3.2. EU Military Options for supporting MONUC during the elections in the DR Congo.

Following the invitation from the UN, the EU responded cautiously and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) instructed the EU Military Committee (EUMC) with the Civilian Committee (CIVCOM) to prepare options. Early deliberations concluded that the EU required more information in order to base any decision about supporting MONUC during the elections in the DRC. Two steps were taken:

§ a questionnaire (drawn up by the EU Military Staff) was taken to the United Nations (N.B that the EU already has liaison arrangements with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations) in New York with questions designed to elicit more precise information on what kind of military force, if any, the UN required - such as size, duration, geographic coverage, autonomy and so on; § secondly, a fact-finding mission (the first of several) made up of military and civilian experts was sent to the DRC in order to facilitate the EU's analysis and needs assessment (N.B that the EU has already military and civilian advisors in the DRC working under its ESDP Police Mission EUPOL Kinshasa and its Security Sector Reform mission EUSEC DRC).

According to press reports (dated 15 February) and desk-interviews these two steps led to the EUMC providing the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with three military

8 options/scenarios. These options were discussed by the PSC on Tuesday February 14 2006 and have been reported as:

Option 1. A deployment of between 200-500 troops in the DRC (from the military staff as well as information specialists and forces protection specialists);

Option 2. An additional 200 troops (ie. a total force of 400-700) with air support;

Option 3. An additional 800 troops (i.e. reaching a total of 1,250 troops) including a Rapid Reaction Force.

According to all 3 Options not all such troops would be deployed in the DRC but could be held on standby in Europe, a neighbouring country (or at the French base in Djibouti) or even pre- positioned on a naval vessel.

All options would include the need for a "footprint" presence (anything between 50 and 400 people) before the elections in Kinshasa. Particular attention has been drawn to securing the capital Kinshasa and its international airport N’Djili. Other areas mentioned for consideration are the provinces of Katanga in the South West and Kasai. The duration for such an operation would be approx. 3-4 months and would be accompanied by a reinforced presence (alongside the current EUPOL Kinshasa) of about 50 European police also to be located in Kinshasa.

These three options have been drawn up with 7 tasks in mind which might, according to reports, include:

§ Securitisation of the capital, § Support to the DRC Military Force (FARDC), § Information collection, § Map drawing for the military staff, § Evacuation of personnel, § Airport protection, § Support to MONUC's stabilisation efforts.

It is reported that Ambassadors emphasised that any EU role should be of a preventive and deterrent character because the EU does not intend to substitute MONUC or deploy to the whole of the DRC.

The confidential note of the Council underlines the necessity to have one of the Member States leading such an operation (known as a ‘Framework nation’), but initially France, the UK and Germany (the only three countries of the Union with the military capability to command such an operation) were unwilling to take the lead. The UK made it clear that it would not stand in the way of country wanting to launch such an operation, but that it had significant other commitments during this period, not least in Afghanistan and Iraq. France, however, seemed to be playing a waiting game. Insisting that it had already been Framework Nation for the Union's first Africa Mission, known as Artemis, and that it was time for another European country to take the lead. From the beginning, therefore, all eyes turned to Germany to step forward and lead any potential ESDP Mission.

Furthermore, all three countries are aware of the risks associated with intervening in a country that has been in civil war since 1998 and is the size of western Europe. The EU Member States

9 also realised that it will take time to negotiate with the Congolese government on the exact nature and role of an EU mission.

The German Defence Minister Frans Josef Jung was initially reported to have ruled out a leading role for his country. However, other reports suggested that Angelika Merkel was reflecting very seriously on such an option. An additional point worth recalling is that when the Batttlegroup concept was first developed by France and the UK, some scepticism was expressed in Germany because of fears it would be used to pursue UK and French foreign policy interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Germany is due to lead the first fully operational Battlegroup (with Dutch and Finnish contributions) in the first half of 2007.

A provisional election timeline is developing as follows:

§ Late July (approx 30th July) - Parliamentary elections which should elect a national Parliament.

§ Late July (approx 30 July) - Presidential elections. Should the current President, Kabila, be returned with a 50% majority he will be appointed President. However, current indicators suggest he will not get 50% of the vote but will have to run off against 2 or perhaps 3 other candidates.

§ August 28th - Second round of elections.

§ approx. 15th September - installation of the new Government.

§ Should the EU decide to launch a mission it is expected the "footprint" will be in place in early June (ie 5 June), and the full mission will last until the installation of the new government in September. This would be about 3-4 months.

4. Legal Basis and Next Steps towards a European Council Decision to launch the Operation

4.1. Preparing the Ground: European Council and German Government and Parliament

The European Council will decide on the launch of the operation but key steps leading up to that decision as well as the day-to-day oversight of the operation is handled by the PSC. Before the European Council decision well established EU Crisis Management decision-making procedures are now fully underway (including drawing up the Status of Forces Agreement and the Rules of Engagement) corresponding to the following main steps:

• EU action considered appropriate (Political and Security Committee) • Approval of the Crisis Management Concept (European Council) • Decision to take action (European Council) • Approval of the Concept of Operations (European Council) • Approval of the Operational Plan (European Council) • Legal basis adopted in the form of a Joint Action (European Council) • Decision to launch the operation (European Council)

10 To-date all ESDP operations have also sought the legitimacy provided by a UN Security Council Resolution as well as an exchange of letters from the host/nation inviting an ESDP operation on to its territory.

Finally, Germany will lead EUFOR R.D. Congo (i.e. act as “Framework Nation”) and will therefore have to seek approval for the launch of the operation from its Parliament (the Bundesrat). Currently, it is reported that the German Cabinet will approve the Mission (i.e. approve approaching Parliament for a decision) on May 3rd and the decision is expected to be put before Parliament on May 11th. The decision of the Germany Parliament is crucial because no other “Framework Nation” has so far emerged as an alternative. According to the rules of the German constitution, the Bundesrat has to reply to the submission of the government by either voting “yes” or “no”.

Once the German Parliament has given its go ahead, the EU can complete preparations (including the force generation process, Rules of engagement, Status of Forces Agreement) and the European Council will be in a position to make a decision to launch the operation

4.2. Crisis Management Concept

Initial discussions in the PSC, on 14 February, on the main military options did not draw any conclusions. Further discussion took place in the margins of the 27 February General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting which resulted in the following statement that "...following a request by the UN, the Council is considering how best to provide support to the UN in this endeavour. To this end, contacts with the UN and the DRC authorities are being pursued, as well as with the AU."

Finally, on 23 March 2006, following a recommendation from the Political and Security Committee the European Council approved the Crisis Management Concept for a possible operation. This kick-started the above mentioned crisis management decision making procedures.

4.3. UNSC Resolution 1671

On 25 April UNSC Resolution 1671, endorsing an EU Mission under Chapter VII (of the UN Charter) was passed unanimously. This is a normal de facto step for all ESDP Missions thus far (although it was reported to have been a condition set by Germany). Concurrently, steps were taken to have an exchange of letters between the EU and Congolese authorities.

The UNSC Resolution 1671 refers to key tasks of the Mission as being to protect civilians, help guard the Kinshasa airport, protect its own personnel and installations, execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger and support the UN.1

1 UN S/RES/1671 (2006), 25 April 2006 11 4.4. EU Joint Action

The European Council adopted a Joint Action on 27 April 2006 setting out the legal basis (article 14 of the TEU) for the Mission. The Mission is being referred to as "EUFOR R.D.Congo" and as anticipated Germany was confirmed as the "Framework Nation". The Joint Action confirmed that Option II (above) would be the preferred operational commitment, which includes sending an advanced presence to the capital Kinshasa of about 400-450 military personnel (including about 38 police personnel from Europe and select African States to reinforce EUPOL Kinshasa). A battalion-size force will be on-call "over-the horizon" (ie outside the country and mostly likely based in Gabon) ready to deploy quickly should the EU decide to do so. The decision to launch an operation will be made at a later date by the European Council. The Operational Headquarters is confirmed in the Joint Action to be the Armed Forces Operations Command (Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr (EinsFüKdo Bw)) in Potsdam. The Operations Commander is Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck (German) and the EU Force Commander will be Major General Christian Damay (French). Whilst the Operation will be multinational the specific commitments of contributing EU Member States (and 3rd States) has not been confirmed. Press reports speculate that contributing states will include: Poland, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Austria. We can imagine other countries will step forward when the time comes (even if it is just with staff officers to be located at the Operational Headquarters in Potsdam). The Joint Action also foresees third states from the "non-EU European NATO members" and "candidates for accession to the EU and other potential partners may be invited".

4.5. Financial Aspects

The financial Framework identified in the Joint Action is 16.7 million for "common costs" to be managed by the ATHENA Mechanism.1 This is in addition to costs borne directly by Member (and contributing 3rd) States a practice known as "costs lie where they fall".

Gernot Erler, a Minister in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, has been reported to have said that expected costs for the German contribution will amount to approximately 20 million euros which will be covered through the German defence budget.2 He went on to provide an indicative estimate for the entire operation at 60 million Euros.3

The Minister was quick to qualify the significance of the finances by referring to the much bigger German and EU investment in the transition process in the DRC. He stated that:

“One could approach the matter differently by saying that this investment into EUFOR is being made to safeguard the much bigger investments made into the Congo over the recent years. Indeed, we are talking about financially securing the entire transition process to avoid that this investment is not made worthless on the home stretch. That is why I do not expect the question of the costs for EUFOR will have any significant impact in Germany.”

1 OJ L63, COUNCIL DECISION 2004/197/CFSP, pp. 68-82, 28 February 2004 2 Source interview with Gernot Erler posted on the MONUC Website: http://www.monuc.org/News.aspx?newsID=10810 3 Ibid. 12 This argument situates the relatively small Mission, EUFOR R.D. Congo, in the context of supporting the longer term investment by the EU (political, economic and developmental as set out above) in the transition process in the DRC and Great Lakes region of Africa.

5. Perspectives from European Parliament

The prospect of another ESDP Military Mission provides an opportunity to discuss important questions about the role of the European Parliament in the rapidly expanding policy area of ESDP.

5.1. The European Parliament’s Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE)

The European Parliament has been following the debate on a possible ESDP mission to the DRC. In particular, at the beginning of the 2004 legislature the European Parliament (EP) set up a new Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) within its Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET). SEDE has taken up its task of engaging in discussions on the evolution of ESDP as well as scrutinising ESDP Missions with careful attention. For many years ESDP has been criticised for its development behind closed doors thereby creating a democratic deficit and a lack of (national or European) Parliamentary scrutiny in an important area for the future of Europe and the EU. By creating SEDE, the EP is offering the Member States in the Council the opportunity to come in from the cold and bridge both a gap in Parliamentary scrutiny as well as an important gap between ESDP and the broader European population.

The Chair of the new Sub-Committee on Security and Defence, Mr von Wogau has been quoted by Agence France Presse as saying that he: "...deplored the lack of control on the part of the European Parliament when it comes to taking decisions relating to European defence policy. The Parliament could discuss the EU's military intervention criteria, during one of its plenary sessions in March, and adopt a resolution on this theme, the MEP said, hoping that the Parliament would take a stance on this point before the EU decides to send a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).1

On Thursday 23 March, this was followed through and the European Parliament took a position on the mission in the form of a resolution in which its two main operative paragraphs stated that the Parliament:

"1. Considers that the following conditions must be fulfilled for this complex and potentially risky engagement of troops under the command of the EU:

§ such an operation should have a strong and clear mandate that will refer exclusively to the security of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2006, § the military operation would have to be limited in time to the period of the elections. There has to be a clear strategy on how to transfer the tasks, after the expiration of the operation's mandate, to the UN and/or the Congolese police and military,

1 Source: our publication Atlantic News. See: (EU) EP/DEFENCE: Debate on EU military intervention criteria Brussels, 28/02/2006 (Agence Europe). 13 § security in the country, especially in the Katanga region and in the border region with Rwanda, should remain under the responsibility of the UN; the geographical scope of the EU mandate must be determined in accordance with the number of available troops, their security requirements and the operational requirements of the mission, § under no circumstances should the military operation consist of troops from only one Member State. The European character of the operation should be expressed in the participation of several Member States, § an intervention from the EU could only take place at the formal request of the Congolese interim government, § the deployment of troops under the command of the EU would have a double task: deterring possible trouble-makers and encouraging the DRC's citizens to exercise their right to vote. The European operation must therefore be of an adequate and credible size, § in order to achieve these goals, the Council would have to develop a clear concept of how to deploy the necessary military or police (possibly gendarmerie) forces, § a time-limited military operation would have to be closely linked with the efforts of the international community for the reconstruction of the DRC after the civil war, § clear commitments have to be made by the international community to improve the long- term efficiency and sustainability of the Congolese police and armed forces;

2. Calls on the Council to appear before Parliament to present a clear proposal with a clear mandate fully based on a well-established scenario of needs, including a timetable; notes that for a possible EU mission to the DRC, there will need to be a specific EU mandate, based on the UN Charter."1

In general, the development of the ESDP mission to-date satisfies most of the Parliament's demands under paragraph 1. However, some ambiguity or differences of interpretation could be understood, in particular, with the apparent limiting of the geographic mandate of the operation in the clause that states "security in the country, especially in the Katanga region and in the border region with Rwanda, should remain under the responsibility of the UN". In paragraph 2 the European Parliament will be satisfied with the conclusion of a new UN Mandate but it has not been adequately informed by the Council in the detail and development of the Mission. It is fair to say that the Press has been better informed than the EP. This is an unsatisfactory situation which must be addressed during the development of the mission for the DRC and for all subsequent ESDP operations (of which we can expect to continue seeing increases).

5.2. Election Observation Mission in the DRC

The prospect of an ESDP Military Mission to support the election process in the DRC raises a more immediate and specific question in relation to the role of the European Parliament in the Election Observation Mission (EOM).

This was apparently touched upon in the PSC but not resolved, and refers to the relationship between the ESDP Military Operation and the Election Observation Mission (EOM). There is currently a team on the ground in the DRC discussing the modalities (number of long term and short term observers etc) of an EOM.

1 P6_TA-PROV(2006)0111, European Parliament, Thursday 23 March 2006 14 This is very important for the European Parliament should it decide to send a delegation as part of an EOM. At the every least it would seem that the European Parliament's role in election observation provides it with a strong argument for being closely informed about any possible ESDP Military Mission in support of the DRC elections. Apart from the general relationship of the EP with ESDP (discussed below) a number of important practical points need to be discussed:

§ What should the European Parliament's relationship be with such a military mission that is being carried in the name of the European Union? § Should all 3 interested institutions draw up a joint communications strategy to improve EU coherence of external action? § Several of the possible tasks (listed above) imply a link with the EOM such as securitisation of the capital, evacuation of personnel (which personnel?) and securitisation of the international airport.

Currently MONUC has the responsibility for such tasks. These are all important details which are relevant to the EP's own decision to send a delegation to the EOM and to understand what its relationship should be to any prospective ESDP Military Mission.

Even should no ESDP Military Mission be deployed the very fact of having an EOM raises the need to have a clear understanding by the EP on the ongoing role of the EU in the DRC (namely under EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DRC) in order to base its decision to send a delegation.

The role of the EU and even its perceived role in the security environment in the DRC is an important issue that must be factored into the Parliament's position. For instance efforts in Security Sector Reform (EUSEC DRC) also relate to helping smooth the path to elections.

Not only do we have questions on the relationship of any ESDP Military Mission to EP election monitors, but we currently have questions about the ongoing role of the EU in the security environment of the DRC. This needs to be factored into any EP decision on election monitors as well as its opinion on a possible ESDP Military Mission.

6. Final Observations and Analysis

6.1. Evolving ESDP

We have witnessed a strong momentum behind the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) since it was incorporated into the EU framework at the 1999 Cologne European Council and formalised in the Treaty of Nice. These developments after the Franco-British push at St Malo in 1998, resulted in new institutional arrangements under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This was structured around the Political and Security Committee which could oversee day-to-day decision making in ESDP operations after a European Council decision to launch such an operation. The PSC in preparing its deliberations on defence and security was supported by a Military Committee which in turn could draw upon an EU Military Staff.

There is currently strong political pressure to push ahead with the development of ESDP even in the absence of the Constitutional Treaty. The key message from the Member States in the Council has been to do what is possible within the existing treaty framework, and where not possible or not considered prudent to do it outside such as with the EU Battlegroups and 15 Gendarmerie forces. Nevertheless, all such developments are described as part of the development of the ESDP.

6.2. The Constitutional Treaty

The articles covering defence in the Constitutional Treaty reiterate the commitment to “the progressive framing of a common defence policy” which could lead to a common defence “when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.” The most important change, however, is in the acceptance of a new form of “permanent structured cooperation” within the Union that would allow those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area to carry out missions on behalf of the EU.

Article I of the Protocol states that permanent structured cooperation shall be open to any Member State: • that undertakes to proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the EDA, • that has the capacity to supply by 2007 at the latest targeted combat units for the missions planned … with support elements including transport and logistics.

Article II states that to achieve these objectives Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall: • cooperate to achieve approved objectives concerning the level of expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives in the light of the security environment and of the Union’s international responsibilities, • bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics, • take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures, • work together to make good the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the “Capability Development Mechanism,” • take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the Agency.

Article III refers to the EDA and states that it shall contribute to the regular assessment of Member States’ contributions with regard to capabilities.

There are complicated proposals for the use of QMV in taking decisions under permanent structured cooperation but experience suggests that Member States would be very reluctant to break from the traditional principle of unanimity in defence matters.

Another change is the mutual assistance/solidarity clause which, while acknowledging the commitments of NATO Members States says that “if a Member State is the victim of 16 armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power….” This has been read as more of a political gesture than an attempt to create an EU defence alliance. But it serves to underline the basic solidarity between Member States.

6.3. The reflection period

Currently we are in what is referred to as the reflection period, but nevertheless, there is a clear effort by the Member States to push ahead with their Constitutional ambitions on ESDP (this includes the establishment of the European Defence Agency, work towards the Headline Goal 2010, the establishment and operation of Battlegroups from January 2007 as well as more ambitious ESDP missions). All of this is possible within the confines of the existing treaties (in particular with the new institutions confirmed by the Nice Treaty including, the PSC, EU Military Committee, and EU Military Staff).

Furthermore, with the adoption in 2003 of the European Security Strategy (and a host of follow- up implementing strategies) the promise of the EU as a security actor has raised expectations for more and more action. We have now witnessed 13 operations around the world from the Neighbourhood, to sub-Saharan Africa to Indonesia.

6.4. The EP and ESDP: Balancing Political and Budgetary Authority?

The only concrete limit, apart from a lack of political will (currently not evident), on the ambitions for ESDP come from insufficient finances (see previous Policy Department Note on the Financing of ESDP).

It is also on this issue of finances (notably the CFSP budget) that the EP is beginning to exert a role vis-à-vis ESDP in particular over civilian crisis management operations.

This means that the current CFSP budget (approx 62 million euro in 2006 and 102 million euros in 2007) has been insufficient to support the demands placed upon it. Whilst ESDP military operations are funded outside the general budget of the EU (on the basis of ‘costs lie where the fall’ for Member states or managed under the ‘Athena mechanism’ for certain common costs), the Member States are not prepared to set up a standing ESDP budget for military operations. On the other hand, civilian crisis management is funded predominantly under the CFSP budget, but is competing with needs for EU Special Representatives and Non-proliferation and Disarmament programmes.

The role of the European Parliament in this area is important in relation to these budgetary discussions. Demands for more money under the CFSP budget heading are met within the EP by demands for greater scrutiny and better provision of information on CFSP and ESDP.

A deal has now been agreed under the 2007-2013 Financial Perspectives to allocate approx. 250 million euro a year for the CFSP. In addition the Community's Stability Instrument will also have a role to play with some 2.5 billion euro being allocated over the period of the FP 2007- 2013. This will be important because the key operative provisions of the Stability Instrument place an emphasis upon crisis management (rather than longer term multi-annual programming) which in turn will provide more resources in support of CFSP actions and potentially broader 17 Civilian Crisis Management. On this basis we can expect to see a continued increase in ESDP actions in the following seven years.

The EP whilst only being informed on developments under CFSP and ESDP (according to article 21 Treaty on EU) has an important role to play in respect of expressing its opinion and asking questions on the basic choices of the Council. This is usually done to support the development of a coherent CFSP and it also helps in respect to the role of MEPs in explaining to their electorate the basic direction of CFSP. Explaining the coherency of EU External action is an extremely important responsibility, which is not made easy by the notorious inter-pillar (Community and CFSP) conflict.

In relation to reaching an agreement on the Financial Perspectives 2007-20103 a new draft Inter- Institutional Agreement (IIA) is currently under review. In that IIA the European Parliament's demands for a forward looking document reviewing CFSP priorities would be provided along with Ambassadorial level presence at Council-European Parliament information exchanges on the CFSP budget (to take place approximately 4 or 5 times per year). This marks a qualitative, albeit incremental, improvement in the European Parliament's scrutiny role in relation to CFSP/ESDP.

With the growing role of the EU in ESDP operations it will be natural for the EP to want to exercise its Treaty obligations and ensure it puts forward its opinion on the extent to which any operation supports the objectives of the Union and its CFSP. When one considers CFSP funds might also be involved in supporting Civilian aspects of ESDP then the need for an EP opinion would seem all the greater.

Furthermore, should other community instruments that fall under co-decision be used (such as the four new instruments under heading 4 of the Financial Perspectives) then the need for an active and engaged EP role in monitoring CFSP and ESDP is enhanced. In short, there is both a willingness and a demand (with a legal basis in the Treaties, from MEPs constituents, from third countries and international organisations, and not least from the media) for MEPs to play an increasing role in external relations. With this rise in supply and demand comes a need to ensure all relevant EU actors are working coherently and not undermining the objectives of the Union in this area.

These points support the Chairman, Mr Karl von Wogau, of the EP Sub-Committee on Security and Defence who argues that before each and every operation the EP should give its opinion on the validity of the operation. The proposed DRC Mission is the first to undergo such scrutiny.

Should the EP decide to commit itself to providing its opinion before each ESDP operation then it must be better informed on the background, context and decisions for such operations. Whilst the EP has access to sensitive information from the Council through its ad hoc Special Committee (as according to Annex VII of the Rules of Procedure on "Confidential and sensitive documents and information"), it is also necessary to acquire a more systematic flow of information from the Council. Considering the complexity of the DRC mission and the de facto role of Parliament in the Election Observation Mission it might also be sagacious to extend the current joint Council-Commission "Information Strategy" to be a trilateral Parliament- Commission-Council "Communication Strategy" for this ESDP operation and all subsequent operations.

18 This all needs to be reflected upon both for the immediate needs of the Union to support MONUC during the election period and for the longer term coherency and support of CFSP/ESDP. The new draft IIA represents an incremental step forward. However, better structured information flows from the Council to the Parliament could be improved in the first instance and followed by immediate discussions on how to improve coherency in Communication between Parliament and Council in the area of CFSP/ESDP. This flow of information does not include interfering in the decision-making process of the Council.

Dr Gerrard QUILLE, 02.05.2006