1 1991 Pulse of Europe SECTION I SUMMARY and OVERVIEW After

1991 Pulse of Europe SECTION I SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW After fifty years of world war, cold war and communism, Europeans are in the process of resuming the twentieth century. The end of communism in the East and the immanent economic integration in the West have unleashed forces of nationalism and ethnicity contained for the last 45 years by the exigencies of the Cold War. From the Atlantic to the Urals the publics of Europe are once again in conflict over the issues and questions that dictated the course of European history in the past. The Times Mirror Survey suggests that contradictory forces are pulling Europe in opposite directions. One side is the Europe of the past, filled with ethnic hatreds, animosities and possible conflict. On the other is the new Europe of cooperation and enlightened tolerance. As the twentieth century comes to a close the two Europe's exist side by side, present in every society examined, and struggling to determine which will dominate the future. Our in depth survey of 13,000 European in nine nations and the Republics of Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania finds many reasons to be pessimistic about future developments. Eastern Europeans and citizens of the former Soviet Union are reconsidering their governance, their economy, and large parts of their social structure. These fundamental questions are before publics that are deeply skeptical of political leadership, profoundly depressed by 1 economic conditions, and reawakening to nationalist impulses and ethic grievances. In Western Europe, despite apparent political tranquility, questions about race, the protection of borders, and the reemergence of a dominant Germany take on new significance as the economic integration of Europe speeds ahead. The most optimistic finding is that, in general, the younger and best educated citizens have their feet firmly planted in the New Europe. Increasing emphasis on education and the speed and impact of global communication provide reason to believe that the more positive attitudes of these citizens may one day dominate the European landscape. However, the troubling implications of expressed ethnic hatreds, even among significant numbers of the educated young, are clearly the most troubling of the study's results. With no tradition of ethnic multi-culturalism and an absence of communist enforced tolerance, Eastern Europeans and Soviet publics readily voice their antagonisms toward ethnic minorities within their countries and toward the people of neighboring nations. In the west, hostility toward minority groups is quite evident as the major countries of the EC become more ethnically heterogenous on the brink of the integration. German views of Poles and French opinions of North Africans are every bit as negative as the opinions of Eastern European toward their minority populations. In every country in the east 40% or more of respondents said they held unfavorable opinions toward the principal minority people 2 of that nation. 41% of Poles said they dislike Ukrainians, 49% of Czechoslovaks said they disliked Hungarians. Four in ten Russians and Ukrainians said they had an unfavorable opinion of Azerbaijanis. To put these finding in perspective 13% of white Americans hold unfavorable opinions of blacks. This is one third the percentage of Germans who dislike Poles or Frenchmen who dislike North Africans. Overwhelmingly, Eastern European people believe that recent economic and political changes have led to an increase in ethnic tensions. This is the case in ethnically, pluralist countries, such as the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, where separatism is very much at issue, but it is also the prevailing opinion in Eastern European countries with generally homogeneous populations. Ethnic hostilities in these countries reflect centuries old disputes over borders, religion and other matters of national eminence. No fewer than six in ten Hungarians and Poles believe that there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to Poland and Hungary, respectively. Hungarian antipathy toward Rumanians and Polish dislike of Ukrainians give testimony to the feelings of peoples whose borders are flash points that stir deep emotions. Opinions about two minority groups, Jews and Gypsies are obviously a different matter, because of historical context and current condition. Gypsies are clearly the most disliked ethnic group in Europe. 3 For example, in Spain, where Gypsies are most tolerated, 50% held unfavorable opinions of them. At the other extreme, in Czechoslovakia nearly everyone questioned (91%) had some thing unfavorable to say about these nomadic people, who are hated openly, and equally often at all levels of European society. In contrast, Europeans are much more circumspect about dislike of Jews. "No opinions" ran as high as three in ten in some countries. However, in the Jewish killing fields of Europe, from Germany eastward, about one in five expressed anti semitic beliefs. But, in Poland and Slovakia we found, as many as one in three holding unfavorable opinions of Jews. (For perspective - in the United States 6% of respondents give Jews an unfavorable rating). The correlates of anti semitism in this survey had a familiar ring. In almost every country Jews were more disliked by less well educated people and by those who were unhappy with the political situation. In Poland, where there are almost no Jews left to dislike and where anti semitism has been corollary to all sides, in all arguments, we found a clear relationship between religious profession and the holding of unfavorable opinions of Jews. Recent events in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union underscore the volatility of Eastern European societies and their potential for disestablishment and conflict. Most notably we found Czechoslovakia to be even more two nations today than before the revolution. By so many indicators Czechs and Slovaks see the world through different eyes and could 4 well concur that their differences are insurmountable. To the south, ethnic differences are equally large, but passions seem to run even higher: tensions between Hungarians and Rumanians over disputed Translyvania are palpable, and in Bulgaria, antagonism toward the muslim minority and neighboring Turkey is a threat to that society. As Eastern Europeans wrangle with age old ethnic rivalries they are also engaged in a new experiment in democracy - the results of which are inconclusive. The vast majority of Eastern Europeans approve of multi party pluralism and like their new found personal freedoms. But with few exceptions, opinions of fledgling political institutions, political leaders and parliamentary bodies tends to be unfavorable. Political leadership in the new democracies of the east has to overcome extraordinary public mistrust of governance. Eastern publics are deeply suspicious of their political leadership's motives and skeptical that their newly elected officials care what they think. Overwhelmingly, people who have lived under communist rule do not believe that the state runs for the benefit of the people. For all the talk of increasing political alienation in the US, former Soviet bloc publics easily eclipse American skepticism of their political leadership. However, a more crucial difference between east and west is that people of the east have yet to feel empowered by their votes. Relatively, few Russians, Ukrainians or Hungarians believe their votes give them a say in how their 5 government runs things. Even though only half the eligible vote bothers to turns out for a presidential election, 73% of Americans think that voting empowers them. A lack of connection to the fundamentals of democracy show up in other ways in the study. Eastern peoples are far more likely than western Europeans to favor measures that would deny freedom of speech to people espousing unpopular political views. - ie only one in three Americans or British citizens think that freedom of speech should not extend to fascists, while 67% of Czechoslovaks and 65% of Russians take that position. Holding aside Russia and the Ukraine, where opinion about democracy and political freedom was to some extent equivocal before the coup attempt, Hungary and Poland may provide the earliest test of whether democracy will take root in former communist countries. In Poland, feelings of national accomplishment regarding the over throw of communism and the ouster of the Russians have not deterred the public from disillusionment with the individuals and institutions that led the revolution: trade unions, Walesa, and the Church. Public support for all three have plummeted, as resentment has grown toward the new power centers of Polish society. Hungarian disillusionment with its political leadership and parties runs even deeper. Fewer than half of the public approves of the political and economic changes that have taken place in country and a small vocal minority volunteers that the democracy itself is what's wrong with the way Hungary has changed. Many more people voice less strident, but similar discontents. 6 A plurality of Hungarians feel that the parliament is having a bad influence on the way things are going in the country, and if parliamentary elections were held, Hungarians would splinter their votes between six parties. And in a country that has struggled to achieve freedom for the past 40 years, today no fewer than 54% say they are losing interest in politics. Indeed, majorities or near majorities of the publics in every former communist country, except Czechoslovakia, say they are losing interest

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