IRAN'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY CONTINUES: AN EVALUATION OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION By Ali Abootalebi*
The disqualification of thousands of reformist candidates by the Council of Guardians for the seventh parliamentary elections on February 20, 2004 has resulted, according to most observers, in Iran's most serious political crisis in the past twenty-five years. But is this the end of the reform movement? Even from the regime's standpoint, trying to block change altogether will lead to a build-up of problems and opposition that could eventually bring down the Islamic Republic.
The disqualification of thousands of what both groups want--an Islamic reformist candidates and subsequent results Republic. of the parliamentary elections in Iran in The 2004 election ended in an February 2004 is widely viewed as a major overwhelming victory for the regime's setback, if not a deathblow, to the reformist forces, which had disqualified those who forces and their democratic agenda. The could have beaten them. The biggest pro- wave of reform efforts based on reform faction, the Islamic Iran transforming the regime through electoral Participation Front, had most of its top victories, which began with the election of leaders disqualified and did not take part. President Muhammad Khatami in 1997, is The crisis was compounded by the seen by Iranians in general as well as persistent socioeconomic problems and foreign observers as having come to an corruption faced by Iran. But in this case end, or at least a period of paralysis. there was also widespread political apathy However, the pressure for political among the youth, the cornerstone of the democracy, social reform, and economic electorate, which had swept President viability in Iran cannot be stopped. The Khatami to power in 1997 and again in population is politicized, and given the 2000. current economic and social problems, the A few days before the voting, on only viable solution for the preservation of February 11, Iran's government marked the cultural Islam and the social status of the Islamic revolution's 25th anniversary with 'ulama themselves is to allow for gradual nationwide rallies. At one of these rallies, political, economic, and social reforms to President Muhammad Khatami proclaimed forge ahead. Democratic reforms need not that the country was at a crossroads. The contradict Islam nor the fundamental role adherents of one path, he said, want to of the 'ulama as the guardians of Islam. A ignore Iran's religious and cultural identity prolonged confrontation between the more and copy the West, while those of a traditional conservative thinkers and second, extremist, path ignore people's Islamists in the regime will undermine needs, views, and votes and "under the flag of the religion and values is overtly or 38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004)
Iran's Struggle for Democracy Continues: Twenty-Five Years after the Revolution covertly struggling with freedom and improvements. After all, what kind of democracy and considers itself [to have Islamic culture can blossom where poverty the] right to decide on behalf of the people. and underdevelopment is present, popular The third way is the way of the Islamic sovereignty is ignored or suppressed and Republic of Iran in [the] true meaning of religious fanaticism is legitimated through the word. The result of our revolution was extrajudicial and/or manipulative political the Islamic Republic of Iran."(1) practices? In Iran, it seems the minority is Khatami himself, however, became a suppressing the rights of the majority subject of criticism among many through openly manipulating and abusing disappointed reformists who had hoped he democracy.(2) would refuse to endorse the elections But, as I have argued elsewhere, the unless they were free and fair. He could development of democratic ideals and have challenged Ayatollah Khamene'i, the principles--for instance, the expansion of country's spiritual guide and the strong man universal respect for the political and civil of the regime, by calling for the elections' rights of the individual--does not occur cancellation or for officials to resign over overnight but over decades and even the issue. But such moves could have led to centuries. The development of such rights in political paralysis, widespread protests, and the West itself, where modern democracy even violence. In the end, he remained true first emerged, has taken centuries to develop to his deep-rooted belief that only through into the present situation where political the rule of law and patience can the long democracy is equated with freedom. More term goal of a truly democratic Islamic important, however, to the process of Republic be realized. democratic development, the expansion of Given the changes in the past 25 years political and civil rights has been the result in the dynamics of state-society relations in of struggle and competition among Iran, the "Talibanization" of Iran is very contending groups in society (e.g., labor, unlikely, even with the conservatives' women, minorities) over political power and election victory and crackdown on the socioeconomic resources. opposition. Ultimately, the alternative to a It is only through a power struggle for the popular Islamic democracy is a religious extension of such rights that the opportunity dictatorship that in the long run will for contesting power, what Robert Dahl severely damage the 'ulama's political and called Polyarchy,(3) and eventually religious legitimacy, undermining Islam democracy can emerge. The struggle for itself and paving the way for a "Western- democracy in Iran must be understood style" secular democracy. This is within this broader context: the politics of something both conservatives and electioneering and establishing the religious-nationalist reformists would like fundamental institutional framework for to avoid. It is only through adoption of competitive politics (e.g., parliament, democratic values, institutions, procedures, presidency), despite all its shortcomings and and practices that the appropriate place of even seemingly undemocratic features (e.g., Islam in society and politics can be found. the absence of real political parties, the all Moreover, the Iranian hardliners' too-powerful office of the rahbar or velayat- insistence on Islam playing a central role in i faqih) can, in the long run, develop more politics, society, and foreign policy is democratic features. Moreover, the politics merited only if their "Islamic policies" in of electioneering on its own is educational pursuit of spiritual fulfillment are and also mobilizes the populace at large. accompanied by real socioeconomic This is not to argue that elections by Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) 39
Ali Abootalebi 40 themselves mean that a democratic state Obviously, the separation of church and exists or is on the horizon. But, it is state in the West has not led to the inconceivable for a democracy to emerge separation of religion and politics. without elections and electoral processes in However, the interplay between religion place.(4) and politics in democratic societies takes The degree of elite cooperation has been place within political and social instrumental in the development of institutions, is based on law and the democracy in Western democracies. In the consensus of the majority, and without the case of Iran and other late-developers, the suppression of minority rights. Elections sudden and rapid expansion of political are mechanisms to ensure that the line of participation coincided with immediate communication between the electorate and demands for liberalization that could easily public officials are open, so that aggregate degenerate into elite rivalry and infighting. social preferences are given due weight in The future of democracy in Iran thus relies the political process and policy decision- heavily on the resolution of the ideological making. rivalry within and among the conservative The participation of religious political and reformist political/religious elites in and parties in democratic political systems, out of government, which must have real however prone to controversy or difficult implications for the distribution of to manage in coalition building--as in socioeconomic resources and political Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, and Pakistan, power. The resolution of these differences among others--can take place without can benefit both groups by preserving their sacrificing democracy in the name of socioeconomic privileges while promoting religious preferences. Similarly, the society Iran's economic development and political as a whole must, through democratic democracy. In contrast, the failure to procedures, decide, within the prevailing cooperate can lead to continuing political socio-cultural and historical context, the paralysis, slower economic development, extent of secularization and liberalization social frustration, and relative international of social and moral values. A free and isolation. democratic Muslim society, therefore, need Democratic rules and procedures need not look and act like "excessive" liberal not necessarily be devoid of all religious societies in the West. norms, values, and moral codes. Khatami's Nevertheless, the "Islamization" of insistence on the rule of law and civil Iranian society has failed for the most part society is correct and admirable, and so is and the success of marrying Islam with his intention that Islam should play a republicanism remains in doubt. This is not central role in Iranian society to help so much because Islam and democracy counter excessive and unbridled cannot coexist, but because most secularism. This is a belief that he shares traditionalist 'ulama continue to insist on with religious and political conservatives in building a modern, prosperous, and and out of the government. At the same spiritual Iran without allowing for a time, however, the issue of secularism is national dialogue that can slowly but surely being, perhaps deliberately, confused with address issues of socioeconomic and popular sovereignty and political political governance within an Islamic democracy by small numbers of influential context and without advocating unbridled religious and political conservatives who secularism. The slow progress in resolving have enriched themselves through the some of the seeming contradictions existing systems. between Islam and republicanism has been due fundamentally to the absence of a 40 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) Iran's Struggle for Democracy Continues: Twenty-Five Years after the Revolution national debate involving the 'ulama, the foundation of the new state was based on intellectuals, and the populace at large over economic populism and the "Islamization" the proper place and the role of Islam and of social and political institutions, in spite the 'ulama in governance and overall state- of Iran's religious, ethnic, and linguistic society relations.(5) differences. The challenges to the new state In the long run, the Iranian populace after the revolution were also compounded should decide on the desired extent of by the American-led economic sanctions, a "Islamization" of society and social values devastating eight-year war with Iraq, the through legal and political avenues, but flow of Afghan and Iraqi refugees, and freedom to choose need not bring about the rapid population growth and urbanization. demise of all religious values and Among the state's public policy principles. Even among the industrialized achievements have been providing the democracies of the West, religion basic necessities of life to the poorest continues to shape social, legal, and segments of Iran, including water, paved political behavior in varying degrees and in roads, and electricity. After the different ways. The controversy over nationalization of banks, factories, and abortion in the United States or in Ireland, major industrial enterprises immediately or whether French Muslims have the right following the revolution, however, the state to wear their Islamic hijab in state schools came to rely heavily on the public sector to without undermining the French proud manage Iran's vast economy and provide tradition of secularism, or the controversy social services. In the political arena, the in the United States over gay marriage, or top leadership's insistence on marrying the plethora of moral and religious Islam with Republicanism created added questions in the field of genetics (most challenges, slowly leading to the notably the controversy over human ideological polarization of political and cloning), are but a few examples. social forces within both the state and There is, then, space for the existence of society. The public sector has been an "Islamic" Republic in Iran that respects incapable of creating enough jobs and democratic values and allows the citizenry meeting the demands of the public for the to incorporate Islamic values into the basic necessities of life, and worse yet, the political arena as well as their daily lives. vested interests of the economic elites in Without a democratic framework, however, Iran resist attempts at privatization. This is crises are going to become progressively most evident in the existence of more acute and lead to religio-political foundations (Bonyads) that are in charge of dictatorship, even more international vast resources and accountable to no one isolation, and ultimately--and ironically--a but Ayatollah Khamene'i himself. total divorce (not separation) between As Forbes Magazine reported in July Islam and politics that will realize the worst 2003, "With 9 percent of the world's oil nightmare of both conservatives and and 15 percent of its natural gas, Iran reformists. should be a very rich country. It has a young, educated population and a long IRAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY tradition of international commerce. But The demise of the monarchy and the per capita income today is 7 percent below powerful families associated with it has what it was before the revolution and resulted in the rise of a new religious class Iranian economists estimate capital flight that controls the state ideology and (to Dubai and other safe havens) at up to $3 apparatus. From the beginning, the billion a year." The sad state of the Iranian Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) 41
Ali Abootalebi 42 economy is blamed by the report on "the without access to improved water clerical elite [which] has mismanaged the resources. It is slipping back, however, in nation into senseless poverty."(6) ensuring that all children complete primary However, a closer look at Iran's political education and in terms of the net primary- economy reveals a complex interplay school enrollment ratio.(8) among domestic, regional and international With its large population, state- factors shaping the dynamism of Iran's dominated economy, and the U.S. trade political economy and reveals serious sanctions, Iran's GDP per capita si much problems but also great potential. lower than that of other regional oil Iran is the Middle East's second-biggest producers, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and producer of oil, relying on oil and gas for the UAE. Iran ranks 106th on the UN's more than 80 percent of export earnings, index of overall human development, well and its economic growth is heavily behind such oil producers as Saudi Arabia influenced by oil prices. Higher oil prices and Venezuela, as well as countries with during the twenty-first century's opening much lower GDP per capita, such as the years helped an economic boom, with Philippines and Uzbekistan.(9) Today, higher prices pushing growth to 7 percent because of rapid population growth, two- in 2002 and 2003. The non-oil sector has thirds' of the country's population is under also shown signs of growth. Iran has 30 and job creation has lagged. Moreover, invested heavily in health care and self-imposed limits on imports to promote education, achieving standards above the self-reliance and to save foreign exchange, regional average. as well as black marketeering, economic The gap between male and female mismanagement, and the presence of a literacy has narrowed among the younger large, inefficient public sector, have led generation. Women now make up an simultaneously to high rates of estimated 60 percent of students enrolled in unemployment and inflation, hurting large higher education, although the number of segments of the population. women working remains well below the Inflation, about 16 percent in 2002, has number of men. Women have had the vote hit particularly those such as teachers and since 1963, and until the February 2004 civil servants whose wages are not driven parliamentary elections, there were 13 by consumer prices. Unemployment is a female members of parliament. serious problem, with about 28 percent of Iran has more telephones and personal 15–29 year olds out of work, and high rents computers per 1,000 people than the are also a concern for the young.(10) regional average, although the spread of Unemployment and inflation have televisions and mobile phones has been seriously undermined the standard of living comparatively slow. There has also been for most Iranians, contributing to rapid growth in internet use, with one in ten widespread bribery and corruption, late people now thought to have some access to marriages (because couples simply cannot the Web.(7) Overall, Iran is making afford it), and drug abuse and addiction. progress towards its Millennium An estimated two million Iranians use Development Goals. It is "on track" in the drugs and heroin injection is believed to be following areas: halving the proportion of responsible for the rising HIV/AIDS rate people suffering from hunger and among the prison population. According to undernourishment, eliminating gender the Iranian Coroners Organization, 1,039 disparity in education, reducing by two- people died of drug-related causes in the thirds the under-five and infant mortality third quarter of the Iranian year that began rates, and halving the proportion of people on March 21, 2003. Furthermore, drug 42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) Iran's Struggle for Democracy Continues: Twenty-Five Years after the Revolution trafficking costs Iran more than $2 billion a Oppressed and War Invalids Foundation, year, with 3,300 soldiers and police meanwhile, through government subsidies officers killed in attempts to curb drug and various charitable activities, rallied imports from neighboring Afghanistan, support among the urban and rural poor for which is responsible for two-thirds of the new regime. The Martyr Foundation global opium production. Contrary to (Bunyad-i Shahid) was set up to disperse expectations, the fall of the Taliban in economic and social assistance to the Afghanistan has actually led to higher families of the war veterans and those levels of opium production.(11) martyred for the revolution, while the The Islamic foundations run a large Mobilization Corp (Basij) recruited young segment of Iran's economy, which, in 2002, Islamic zealots to help control the general accounted for an estimated 20 percent of population, as well as to assist in post-war the nation's $115 billion GDP. For reconstruction efforts. Powerful economic example, the Mostazafan & Janbazan units with extensive connections to the Foundation (Foundation for the Oppressed ruling political personalities are now a and War Invalids) is the second-largest strong force for maintaining the economic commercial enterprise in the country, status quo and resisting efforts toward trailing only the state-owned National privatization.(13) Iranian Oil Company. The foundation Influential political leaders have also employs about 40,000 workers and has enriched themselves and their families and over $10 billion in assets. The largest real friends at a time when the average Iranian estate holding charity organization, the must hold two or more jobs to make ends Razavi Foundation, owns vast tracts of meet. Among the beneficiaries of the urban real estate all across Iran, as well as average Iranian misfortunes is Mohsen hotels, factories, farms, and quarries. Some Rafiqdoost, who heads up the Noor Iranian economists estimate its holdings at Foundation. This foundation owns $15 billion or more.(12) Some of these numerous apartment blocks and makes an foundations have also grown into estimated $200 million importing influential forces that block any economic pharmaceuticals, sugar, and construction privatization and reform attempts and are materials. The most notable example, usually exempt from taxation and any however, is the wealth accumulated by parliamentary investigation. Perhaps the former president Rafsanjani and his family. most notable example is the Paul Klebnikov of Forbes Magazine aforementioned Foundation for the observed: Oppressed and War Invalids, which is under the authority of Ayatollah The 1979 revolution transformed Khamene'i. the Rafsanjani clan into commercial In the 1980s, the state particularly relied pashas. One brother headed the on these foundations and its other country's largest copper mine; institutions like Sipah-i Pasdaran, Bunyad- another took control of the state- i Shahid, and Basij to rally popular support owned TV network; a brother-in- for its policies and to discredit its law became governor of Kerman opposition. The Revolutionary Guards province, while a cousin runs an (Sipah-i Pasdaran), for example, made the outfit that dominates Iran's $400 state less dependent for its national security million pistachio export business; a on the regular army, whose loyalty to the nephew and one of Rafsanjani's new Islamic government was suspect. The sons took key positions in the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) 43
Ali Abootalebi 44
Ministry of Oil; another son heads the United States, Israel, and the wider the Tehran Metro construction international community, especially in light project (an estimated $700 million of the recent revelations that chief spent so far). Today, operating Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer through various foundations and Khan marketed nuclear know-how and front companies, the family is also materiel to Iran.(15) The United States also believed to control one of Iran's remains concerned about Russia's decision biggest oil engineering companies, to continue the $800 million deal to build a plant assembling Daewoo Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. automobiles, and Iran's best private Given Iran's dependence on investments airline (though the Rafsanjanis in its huge oil and natural gas industries, insist they do not own these the cost to socioeconomic development of assets).(14) isolation can be immense. Ninety percent of Iran's trade earnings still come from oil Iran's foreign policy in the past 25 years export, with carpets and pistachios as major has for the most part adversely affected its non-oil exports. Iran's estimated 812 domestic politics and damaged its pace of trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven natural socioeconomic development. But, largely gas reserves is second only to those found due to the reformist dominated Parliament in Russia, and natural gas accounts for half and the administration of Khatami since of Iran's energy consumption. The 1997, improvements have been made in government plans to spend billions of restoring and pursuing more pragmatic and dollars investing in the oil and natural gas less ideological foreign policies. In sectors. Despite its huge oil reserves, Iran's principle, Iran remains committed to the nine operational oil refineries (as of Palestinian cause and the propagation of January 2003) had a mere total capacity of Islamic ideals, but is now more cautious in 1.47 billion barrels per day (bpd), meaning balancing its ideological rhetoric with its that Iran is currently facing a shortage of pragmatic national interest. Iran's relations gasoline and is forced in the short run to with the Persian Gulf states, and the Arab import its shortfall from abroad. world in general, have improved The energy sector remains the major drastically. Likewise, for the most part Iran source of attraction to foreign investors, has been able to neutralize U.S. efforts to although under Iranian law, foreign isolate it in the international community companies are allowed no more than 49 with its active diplomatic engagement and percent of Iranian oil refining assets. This expansion of ties with the Russian is bypassed through a policy of "buy back," Federation, the European Union, India, which allows for foreign investment and China, and other major actors. ownership for the duration of the Iran has thus far escaped the attention of contract.(16) In spite of U.S. sanctions, the architects of the war on terrorism, Iran has attracted investment in its energy despite the presence of U.S. forces on its sector from French, Italian, Russian, immediate borders and U.S. mistrust of its Japanese, and Malaysian companies policies. The controversy over Iran's (among others). The signing on February nuclear problem, however, remains 18, 2004, of a $2.8 billion agreement with explosive and can potentially undermine Japan to develop the Azadegan oil field Iran's efforts to reduce its international was a major victory for Iran's energy isolation through the European Union's sector, which overcame U.S. pressure to policy of "constructive engagement." Iran's convince Japan not to forge ahead with the nuclear program remains a major worry to deal. 44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) Iran's Struggle for Democracy Continues: Twenty-Five Years after the Revolution
The defeat of the reformists in the generation more concerned with parliamentary electio n can hurt Iran's sociopolitical freedom and tangible efforts to attract foreign investment and material gains than spiritual fulfillment engagements. The conservatives have through living an "Islamic" life. Iranians already been emboldened by the remain concerned with their future, and widespread international criticism of the like people elsewhere, they mostly care U.S. unilateralist approach in its declared about their families and their economic war on terrorism and in its difficulties in well-being. securing Afghanistan and Iraq. The A poll by Siyasat-i Ruz reported on July conservatives in Iran and especially in its 23, 2002, that the greatest public concerns top political leadership, however, must take were inflation, unemployment, and the note that the reformists' policy of resulting problems. Of the people surveyed, engagement has been successful in 74.6 percent said that economic issues were countering the U.S. pressure and in the biggest societal problem. Almost 50 promoting Iran's national interest, all this percent said that inflation is their biggest without compromising its fundamental concern, 18 percent complained about ideological principles and while still acting unemployment, and 10 percent mentioned as a prominent voice for the cause of Islam corruption. When asked to prioritize their and Muslims. concerns, however, unemployment came Twenty-five years after the revolution, out ahead of inflation and high prices.(18) Iran is still struggling to build the just and The economic hardships, compounded by prosperous "Islamic" society Ayatollah social pressures limiting self-expression Khomeini and the Shi'a clerical leaders and freedom of thought, have led to envisioned. The takeover of the state widespread cynicism and mistrust of the ideology and apparatus by the 'ulama and political leadership. When Reporters their allies has led to the creation of an Without Borders published its first expanded network of personalities and worldwide press-freedom index in October institutions united by their common 2002, Iran was ranked 122 out of 139.(19) "Islamic" ideology and privileged The government of Khatami has strived, economic and political positions in society. with limited success, to champion But the 'ulama are no longer perceived as privatization and to break Iran's isolation sincere men of God and immune from within the global political economy. Iran's corruption. Overall, "the clergy's direct long-term economic success depends on involvement in state affairs has made it the large domestic and foreign investments in main target of blame for the ills of society oil and gas, petrochemical and heavy and the state. The cleric's mismanagement industries, railroads and ports, and of the economy, their almost totalitarian information technology. But the real source control over the country's cultural life, and of economic growth and prosperity in Iran above all the abuse of power have severely is the potential consumption power of the undermined their once untarnished moral middle class and the unrealized authority."(17) entrepreneurial potential of small-business Society in Iran in the meantime has owners. The government should encourage gone through drastic socioeconomic and the expansion of business entrepreneurs cultural changes, much of it because of the and the privatization of public sector ideology and policies of the state itself. holdings. Iranian society today is dynamic and Iran's exports outside the oil industry burgeoning with an energetic young are limited and trade alone is not the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004) 45
Ali Abootalebi 46 answer to its chronic economic problems. There are severe economic and social Longer-term economic development in Iran problems in Iran and the polarization of demands foreign investment and expanded politics in the past 25 years has damaged trade, which is impossible without efforts to realize a true "Islamic Republic." pragmatic foreign policy behavior. Iran has the potential and the capacity to overcome much of its current problems, but CONCLUSION the price of failure can jeopardize the very Political Islam can participate and essence of the Republic, Islam, and the positively contribute to the process of 'ulema. democratization in Iran and elsewhere in the Muslim world, should the rules of *Ali R Abootalebi, an Associate Professor democratic politics be put in place, of Global and Middle Eastern Studies at institutionalized, and practiced. But the the University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire, is cost of inaction and allowing the hijacking the author of Islam and Democracy: State- of popular sovereignty and individual Society Relations in Developing Countries, rights through orchestrated parliamentary 1980-1994 (Garland Publishing, 2000). elections, not to mention years of "judicial Among his other publications are "Islam dictatorship," is to sanction the continuing and Democracy," in Barry Rubin (ed.), abuse of Islam in the name of Islam. Power Revolutionaries and Reformers: has transformed political Islam in Iran into Contemporary Islamist Movements in the religious/political factionalism and Middle East (SUNY Press, 2003). His latest economic cronyism.(20) article, "Political Islam, Governance and Viable options to realize an "Islamic Democracy" is forthcoming in Turkish Republic" require policies not only Policy Quarterly. promoting economic prosperity, social harmony, and spiritual fulfillment but also NOTES international cooperation with regional and 1. Bill Samii, Iran Report, Radio Free global actors. Nothing short of the Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Vol. 7, expansion of popular sovereignty within No. 7 (February 16, 2004). Islamic principles can resolve Iran's long- 2. Ali Abootalebi, “Civil Society and Iran's term problems. The monopolization of Quest for Democracy,” Iran Analysis political power and significant economic Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 2003), resources and wealth by personalities, pp. 2-5, powerful families, and wealthy elites--all
5. On these issues, see Ali R. Abootalebi, 17. Naser Momayesi, “Iran’s Struggle for Islam and Democracy: State Society Democracy,” International Journal on Relations in Developing Countries 1980- World Peace, Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 1994 (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), p. 53. 2000); and Barry Rubin (ed.), 18. RFE/RL, Iran Report, Vol. 5, No. 31 Revolutionaries and Reformers: (August 19, 2002). Contemporary Islamist Movements in the 19. RFE/RL, Iran Report, Vol. 5, No. 39 Middle East (New York: SUNY Press, (October 28, 2002). The index measures 2003). how much freedom journalists and the 6. Paul Klebnikov, “Millionaire Mullahs,” media have and what efforts the Forbes Magazine, July 21, 2003 government undertakes to ensure freedom