UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Mozi on Warfare:

A Critical Analysis of Mohist Military Thought

by

Geoffrey Peter Crookes

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER, 2008

© Geoffrey Peter Crookes Library and Bibliotheque et 1*1 Archives Canada Archives Canada Published Heritage Direction du Branch Patrimoine de I'edition

395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada Canada

Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-44302-6 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-44302-6

NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive exclusive license allowing Library permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives and Archives Canada to reproduce, Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public communicate to the public by par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, prefer, telecommunication or on the Internet, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans loan, distribute and sell theses le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, worldwide, for commercial or non­ sur support microforme, papier, electronique commercial purposes, in microform, et/ou autres formats. paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur ownership and moral rights in et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. this thesis. Neither the thesis Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de nor substantial extracts from it celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement may be printed or otherwise reproduits sans son autorisation. reproduced without the author's permission.

In compliance with the Canadian Conformement a la loi canadienne Privacy Act some supporting sur la protection de la vie privee, forms may have been removed quelques formulaires secondaires from this thesis. ont ete enleves de cette these.

While these forms may be included Bien que ces formulaires in the document page count, aient inclus dans la pagination, their removal does not represent il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. any loss of content from the thesis. •*• Canada Abstract

Studies on Mozi (470-391 BCE) and his philosophical school neglect the military content of his teachings. Yet almost one third of the text which documents his thought is specifically dedicated to military affairs. This neglect distorts our understanding of Mohism and strips Mohism of its essential military character. To remedy this, the neglected military chapters of the Mozi were analyzed in this study, and the content and character of Mohist military thought were brought forth. The Seven Military Classics of ancient China were also analyzed for content to establish an understanding of contemporary Chinese military thought. The results of these analyses show that Mohist military thought is founded on a highly intellectual strategic understanding of warfare that is consistent with both Mohist sociopolitical philosophy and the fundamentals of the Chinese military classics. Consequently, the military genius of Mozi is unveiled.

iii Dedication

To my father, for all his help and encouragement in school

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval Page ii Abstract iii Dedication iv Table of Contents v-vi

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER ONE: MOHISM AND ITS INFLUENCE 5 1.1 Mozi: Emerging from Obscurity 5 1.2 Organization, Influence, and Activities of the School 14 1.3 Qualifying Mohism 24 1.4 Mohist Philosophy 26 1.5 Mohist Doctrine: Ten Themes 29 1.5.1 Promoting Worth (shang xian foJM) 30 1.5.2 Conformity with Superiors (shang tong fnf|q]) 31 1.5.3 Impartial Caring (jian ai HtH) 31 1.5.4 Denouncing Aggressive Warfare (fei gong #J&) 33 1.5.5 Moderation in Expenditure (jie yong W>Wi) 34 1.5.6 Simplicity in Funerals (jie zang ffftfp) 35 1.5.7 The Will of Heaven (tian zhi 5^S) 37 1.5.8 Explaining Ghosts (minggui ^MM,) 38 1.5.9 Condemnation of Music (fei yue #^) 39 1.5.10 Rejecting Fatalism (feinting ^np) 40 1.6 Mohism Reviewed 41

CHAPTER TWO: CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT 47 2.1 Introduction 47 2.2 Project Considerations 48 2.3 Methodology 50 2.4 The Seven Military Classics 56 2.4.1 The Methods ofSima (Simafa) 56 2.4.2 Sunzi's Art of War 59 2.4.3 Wuzi 63 2.4.4 WeiLiaozi 66 2.4.5 Taigong's Six Secret Teachings 67 2.4.6 Three Strategies of Huang Shi Gong 69 2.4.7 Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong 72 2.5 Chinese Military Thought 74 2.6 A Modern Perspective 80 2.7 Excellence in Warfare 85 2.8 Civil and Military (wen-wu) ~$0^ 87

v CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY CHAPTERS OF MOZI 90 3.1 Introduction 90 3.2 Methodology 91 3.3 The Text. 92 3.4 Analysis Results 95 3.4.1 Civil-military affairs a) Civil organization, distinction, and control 99 i.) Organization and Distinction 99 ii.) Control 101 hi.) Law and punishment 104 iv.) Mutual responsibility 107 3.4.2 b) Military organization, distinction, and control 110 3.4.3 c) Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi H) 112 3.4.4 d) Management of social mobility 114 3.4.5 Defensive preparation c) Provisions/materials/logistics 116 3.4.6 Selection and employment of men 118 3.4.7 Assessment and evaluation of enemy 120 3.4.8 Generalship 124

CHAPTER FOUR: MOHIST MILITARY THOUGHT 127 4.1 Contemporary Perspectives on War 127 4.2 Mozion War: Attitude and Involvement 130 4.3 Activism 136 4.4 Excellence in Warfare: Manipulation of Disposition 142 4.5 Counterattack Capability 146 4.6 Strength through Fierceness 147

CONCLUSION 151

BIBLIOGRAPHY 155

APPENDIX A: STATES OF THE EASTERN ZHOU ERA 160

vi 1

INTRODUCTION

In ancient China there was a scholar named Mozi (470-391 BCE) who had a profound effect on society. In the Warring States period (ca. 481-221 BCE) his influence rivaled, and perhaps even exceeded, that of the famous educator Confucius (551-479 BCE). The school that Mozi founded remained active for close to three hundred years and was unsurpassed as one of the most organized and focused groups of the pre-Qin era. The existing record of Mozi's teachings can be found in a text titled after him.1 The oldest available records indicate that the Mozi originally contained seventy-one chapters in fifteen books, which is consistent with the extant edition.2 While it is unknown whether or not Mozi himself wrote any of the text, it is believed that the majority of it should be attributed to his disciples. The text covers a range of topics including epistemology, ethics, religion, economy, politics, science, and military tactics, all of which has been associated with the Mohist tradition. Little was known about the Mohists until more recent scholarship revealed their involvement and influence during the Warring States period. The disappearance of the discipline in the centuries following Mozi's death, and a general disinterest in Mohist philosophy, kept Mohism hidden from historians. The extant Mozi has done little to

1 For this study, I have consulted five different English translations, a modern Chinese translation, and the original classical Chinese text. Unless otherwise noted, all proper citations of the text refer to the Library of Chinese Classics edition of Mozi, translated into English by Wang Rongpei and Wang Hong (Changsha, Hunan: Hunan People's Publishing House, 2006). This will simplify the citation process because this edition of the text (which is the only complete English translation to date) has the original classical Chinese (based on Sun Yirang's Mozi Re-annotated) adjacent to the English and modern Chinese translations. References to the text will thus refer directly to the original Mozi, as presented in this edition. Direct quotes will be appropriately highlighted, where used, as will any personal modifications of the translated text. I have also relied heavily on Mei Yi-pao's critical English translation The Ethical and Political Works ofMotse (1929; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1993). Its high quality and accessibility renders it an essential in the study of the Mozi. 21 recognize that Burton Watson and Robin D.S. Yates both note the proper difference between 'books,' 'chapters,' and 'sections' in the Mozi. There are properly fifteen chapters and 71 sections in the text. However, in this study I have adopted the terms used by Mei Yi-pao's in his English translation. Therefore, I refer to fifteen books and 71 chapters in the Mozi. This has been done more for coherency than anything else, as the informal use of the word 'section' (which is analogous to "portion") can lead to undesirable ambiguities. 2 improve this. The text is notoriously corrupt and fragmentary, following from its careless transmission, and the grammar and semantics used are outdated and, in places, cryptic. As a result, modern scholars have limited their studies to those portions of the text that are best preserved and thus most easily understood. Although this is a convenient approach to the material, it is also academically irresponsible, as it disregards portions of the text because of difficulty alone. This has resulted in an historical interpretation of Mozi, his teachings, and his school that is heavily skewed towards only his social philosophy. Studies on Mohism generally emphasize his more unique philosophical concepts, including "universal love," condemnation of warfare, and his belief in an interactive Heaven. One modern scholar has even noted, "Mozi was the only native religious teacher that China ever had, it is customary to say."3

Among the neglected portions of the text are twenty-one chapters, almost an entire third of the Mozi, dedicated specifically to military affairs and city defence. Scholars who have not bothered to study these chapters in detail have questioned their authenticity, because they assume that these chapters cannot possibly relate to Mozi's social philosophy, which in general disapproves war. How could a social philosopher who condemns warfare and promotes universal love possibly be interested in how to fight wars? Other skeptics have suggested that these chapters are the product of a late branch of Mohist followers who committed themselves solely to military affairs. This suggestion similarly preserves the separation between Mohist social doctrine and military thought. Of course, the implication is: If the Mohists' interest in military affairs is isolated to a small fraternity of late quasi-practitioners, then it can be discounted as genuinely Mohist. In both cases, scholars have attempted to defend an accepted perception of Mohism by precluding military affairs from mainstream Mohist thought.

Only one modern scholar has made a substantial effort to correct this conception of Mohism.4 His work, which is largely technical and focused on the practical side of

3 Frederick W. Mote, Intellectual Foundations of China, 2nd Ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989), p. 79. 4 See Robin D.S. Yates, "The Mohists on Warfare: Technology, Technique, and Justification," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 47 (no. 35, Thematic Issue), (1979): pp. 549-603. 3

Mohist military techniques, provides the foundation on which a more comprehensive appreciation of Mohist military thought can be built. This thesis project was born from the recommendation that I investigate the military chapters of the Mozi, following the scholarship of the above-mentioned academic, to determine what is in these chapters, how it relates to philosophical Mohism, and how it relates to mainstream Chinese military thought. These chapters are distinguished in the Mozi by their deliberate and elaborate discussion of military affairs. It is for this reason that their relevance to the Mohist tradition has been questioned, as they do not appear on the surface as though they are consistent with philosophical Mohism. However, this has never been proven analytically and this perception exists because of the casual treatment of these chapters.

If military thought is to be examined and appreciated in the Mozi, the analysis of it needs to be supported by an understanding of military thought in general. Most importantly, this understanding needs to be context-specific. In other words, an ideal standard is required against which to measure Mohist military thought. Therefore, I have also decided to conduct a content analysis of the Seven Military Classics of ancient China as part of this project. This content analysis assumes an entire chapter of this thesis, the results of which will be provided in full. By doing so, I will establish the parameters that will be used in the analysis of the military chapters of the Mozi. The perspective gained by analyzing the principal works of Chinese military strategy will assist and guide the analysis and interpretation of Mohist military thought in the Mozi, which will itself be accessed through a content analysis of the military chapters.

Military strategy in the Mozi is not explicit the way it is in contemporary military writings. It is this implicit nature that makes it essential to conduct the examination of the military chapters as explicitly as possible. Mozi's primary objective is not how to fight wars, but how to create a better society, in part by preventing them. However, as it will be shown, for Mozi this sometimes requires engaging in warfare, not out of want but out of necessity. In other words, preventing wars sometimes means participating in them. 4

The progressive activities of the Mohist School demonstrate that this was Mozi's attitude toward warfare, but in his philosophy this is much more subtle. That does not mean, however, that strategic thought in the Mozi is any less significant or intellectual than that found in contemporary military writings. In fact, this thesis will show that Mozi's ideas on warfare are quite similar and in places identical to those found in the military classics. His approach to warfare is unique, but his values are not dissimilar. More significantly, it will be evident that the military thought of the Mozi is entirely compatible with Mohist sociopolitical philosophy. To understand the content and character of Mozi's military thought is to offer the opportunity to incorporate the neglected military chapters into the existing discourse to generate a credible and comprehensive account of Mohism.

Through an analysis of the military chapters of the Mozi, I will argue that Mozi had a complex strategic understanding of warfare, which is coherent with his social philosophy, and similar to that of the Chinese military classics. In this analysis there are four principal components: an examination of the history and ideology of the Mohist School; a technical content analysis of the Seven Military Classics of ancient China; a technical content analysis of the military chapters of the Mozi; and a reconciliation of the results found therein, with an emphasis on military thought. This project will, in this manner, illustrate that Mozi was indeed a military expert, in addition to whatever other attributes history assigns him. 5

CHAPTER ONE: MOHISM AND ITS INFLUENCE

1.1 Mozi: Emerging from Obscurity There are very few histories of early China that emphasize the historical importance of the school of Mohism and its enigmatic founder. It would be fair to say that Mozi 3"?, or 'Master Mo,' has not been one of the most popular individuals of historical study. First of all, the existing records have comparatively little to say about the life of Mozi. His actual surname is not even known with certainty.5 Secondly, and more importantly, the school of Mohism disappeared as an institution. The Mohist teachings lost their appeal as the political environment changed. A solid measurement of this can be taken from China's Grand Historian Sima Qian Wj^M (ca. 145-89 BCE), the great biographer of early imperial China, who makes only a few brief references to Mozi and denies him a full personal history.6 Conversely, the life and times of Mozi's main philosophical rival, Confucius (Kongfuzi •}L^.~f') are treated at length, suggesting both

the dominance of the Confucian school by this time and Sima Qian's personal interest in it. Despite the lack of abundant material on Mozi and his school, there is a meaningful history behind Mohism, and it is central to understanding much about the early development of Chinese civilization. Mozi had the common name of Mo Di Hil- All records from antiquity identify

him by this name, although it remains unclear whether Mo M was his actual surname or

an assumed name.8 In the Yuan period (1271-1368 CE), a scholar named Yi Shih-chen was the first to claim that Mo was not his ancestral name.9 He claimed that Mozi's actual

5 Mote, Intellectual Foundations, p. 78. 6 Mei Yi-pao, Motse, The Neglected Rival of Confucius (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973), pp. 30, 183-184. 7 Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, The Period of the Philosophers: From the Beginnings to Circa 100 B.C., trans. Derk Bodde, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 76. 8 Hsiao Kung-chuan, A History of Chinese Political Thought, Vol. 1, From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century A.D., trans. F. W. Mote, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 214. 9 Yi Shih-chen, Lang-huan chi, cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 214. 6 surname was Chai and his given name Wu. Centuries later, Chou Liang-kung (1612- 1672) of the Qing dynasty also agreed with this claim,11 and more recently, Chiang Ch'iian further suggested that Mo designated the philosophical school itself, rather than its founder.12 Another scholar, Ch'ien Mu, has likewise suggested that "Mo Di was not surnamed Mo; 'mo' designated persons on whom punishment had been afflicted." The uncertainty surrounding Mozi's name exists in part because it is not known whether Mo was an authentic family name or not. There appears to be no evidence in the records of a Mo clan thriving at this time, and the name has no noted significance outside the Mohist tradition. Then again, if Mozi came from a family of poor stature, as has been suggested,14 it would be highly unlikely that the family name would have made it into the history books, excluding his personal fame.

Complicating the issue, the character mo M on its own carried the meaning

"black, lampblack, ink, the dark mark of a brand or tattoo."15 This has led some to suggest that Master Mo might have been a craftsman or someone who worked with his hands, and by analogy would have had a blackened dirty face.16 However, as Ch'ien Mu has argued, the word mo alternatively referred to the lightest of the five corporal punishments of ancient China, which was a branding or tattooing of the face used to label accused criminals. It is therefore also possible that Master Mo might have been someone who received criminal punishment at some point in his life and thence derived his name. Another alternative is also possible. As Chiang Ch'iian first suggested, because Mozi prided himself in being a humble philosopher and one who stood in opposition to

Chou Liang-kung, Yin-shu-wu shu-ying, cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 214. 12 Chiang Ch'iian, Tu-tzu chih-yen, cited in Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 79. 13 Ch'ien Mu, Kuo-hsueh Hsiao-ts'ung-shu, cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 214, and Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 79. 14 See Mote, Intellectual Foundations, pp. 78-79. 15 Ibid., p. 78. 16 Chiang Ch'iian, Tu-tzu chih-yen, pp. 129-151, cited in A.C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978), p. 6n. 17 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 214. 7 the official ruling class, he may have actually wanted his school to be associated with the hardworking professions of the common man or the non-conforming spirit of the branded criminal-slave. Fung Yu-lan has suggested that such an association might have appealed to Mozi ideologically in the same way that the cynical Antisthenes of Greece presumably took pride in being called a "downright dog" by the established aristocracy.19 Fortune has it that all of the references to Mo Di in the historical texts are unanimous in identifying him as either Mo Di or Mozi.20 Chronological dates for Mo Di are just as widely contested as his name. Unfortunately, historical documents exclude dates for the birth and death of Mo Di. This has left scholars to estimate these by various means. The earliest of these estimations place him as contemporary with Confucius who is known to have lived from 551 to 479 BCE. The origins of this seem to lie with Sima Qian, who wrote, "Some say he was contemporary with Confucius, while others say he came after."22 However, chapter 49 of the Mozi records an interview between Mo Di and a Prince of Lu Yang that Mei Yi-pao has definitively dated to 393 BCE, marking the earliest possible date for the death of Mozi. While is it possible that he lived beyond the age of one hundred, it is unlikely. Furthermore, there is additional evidence suggesting that Mo Di lived until the end of the 5 century. Sima Qian wrote in his biographical essay on Zou Yang that "The ruler of Song took Ze Han's advice and imprisoned Mozi." Mei Yi-pao has pointed out that the Han Feizi ^Ijffi-f- and The Annals of Lu Buwei (Liishi Chunqiu Si^^^C) both mentioned that Ze Han then murdered the ruler of Song.25 Mei determined the date of

Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 79. 19 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 20 Following Mo Di's death, the leader of the Mohist School was given the title Juzi ^f~, which means 'Grand Master.' If Mo Di adopted and used the name Mo only for representative purposes, it might be considered strange that Mo did not continue to refer to the school's leading dignitary. Perhaps this adds credibility to the argument that Mo was his hereditary surname after all. 21 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 79. 22 [Modified from:] Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 76, and Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 30. 23 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 33. 24 Ibid., p. 37. 25 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 37. 8 this event to be 404 BCE, when Duke Zhao of Song is known to have died. Mozi's imprisonment, then, must not have been much earlier than this date.27 Additionally, the Mozi also details an interview with Tian He, the Lord of Qi, later known as "Grand Lord of Qi," who only usurped the State from the reigning Lii family in 410 BCE.28 Their meeting must have occurred sometime after this date. At any rate, it seems evident that Mozi was still active near the end of the century, and hence still alive. Hu Shih noticed that in The Annals of Lii Buwei it is said that the head of the Mohist School at the time of the military general Wu Qi's death (i.e. 381 BCE) was Meng Sheng, the immediate successor of Mo Di.29 This guarantees that Mozi died prior to this date and narrows the date of his death to between 393 and 381 BCE.30 A note in the biographical essay on "Chang Heng" in the History of the Later Han Dynasty (Hou Honshu f^HU) written approximately 445 CE reads, "Both Pan and Mo Di were contemporaries of Ze Si and lived after Confucius's time."31 'Pan' refers to the military craftsman Gongshu Pan from chapters 49 and 50 of the Mozi, who was probably born around 490 BCE.32 Ze Si was Gongshu Pan's contemporary, born in 492 BCE.33 If these two men are of the same generation as Mo Di, then his date of birth must be around the same time. However, given his probable date of death, this would effectively mean that Mozi lived for an entire century. It is more likely then, that Mozi was a younger contemporary of these two individuals.

In the Mozi, Gongshu Pan and Mozi compete in a contest of military wit, during which Mozi claims he has disciples waiting in Song "numbering three hundred."34 As Mei Yi-pao has argued, with a group of followers this large, "Mozi could not have been

Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 37. 27 Ibid. 28 Mei, Neglected Rival, pp. 33-34. See Mozi, Ch. 49, p. 244. 29 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 35. See John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, trans., The Annals of Lii Buwei, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 487-488; Lushi Chunqiu, 19/3/4. 30 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 76. 31 History of the Later Han Dynasty, quoted in Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 31. 32 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 32. 33 Ibid., p. 35. 34 Ibid., p. 32. 9 much younger than 30 years old." This encounter, which Mei Yi-pao dates to 435 BCE, suggests that Mozi must have been born before 465 BCE.36 His date of birth is now narrowed between 490 and 465 BCE. In light of all of these considerations, Mei Yi- pao proposed the dates of 470-391 BCE.37 He called these dates "somewhat arbitrary and

on certainly approximate.. .yet it cannot be far from the truth." As for Mozi's birthplace, again the trouble seems to stem from Sima Qian's inadequate 24-character "biography" appended to the end of the essay on Mencius (Mengzi) ]£•? and Xunzi IrHp. It reads: "Mo Di was a great official of the State of Song. He was skillful in maintaining military defences, and he practiced economy. OQ Some say he was contemporary with Confucius, while others say he came after." A comment in the Bibliographical Notes in the History of Han also states, "Mozi served as a minister in Song."40 When considered alongside the story from chapter 50 of the Mozi, where Mozi outwitted Gongshu Pan, thus saving Song from the pending attack of Chu, it appears that Song was especially important to Mozi. Furthermore, it has been suggested that there is a positive correlation between Mohist philosophy and the traditions of the Song state. One scholar, Yii Cheng-hsieh (1775-1840 CE), has extensively explored this relationship and has concluded that Mozi must have been a native of Song. However, at the end of the story from chapter 50, it is stated: "On his way back, Mozi passed through Song."42 This hardly seems to indicate that Song was his final destination. The State of Lu was probably Mozi's native state. In his biography of Mo Di, Sun Yirang was the first to conclude that Mozi must have come from Lu.43 Using the support found explicitly in the Mozi, both Mei Yi-pao and Chang Ch'un-yi have used a

35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 31. 38 Ibid. 39 [Modified from:] Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 76; Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 30; and Scott Lowe, Mo Tzu's Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia: The Will and the Way, (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), p. 30. 40 Bibliographical Notes in the History of Han, quoted in Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 38. 41 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, pp. 78-79; Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, pp. 214-215. 42 Ibid. Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 214. 10 triangulation process to confirm this. As Mei has illustrated, the following statements all concur on one location: "On his way from Lu to Qi..."; "Mozi was going north to Qi..."; "The Lord of Yue was greatly pleased...and so fifty wagons were made ready to go to Lu and welcome Mozi."45 Additionally, the Huainanzi t$= f^f-p" and The Annals of Lu Buwei both contain passages that identify Mozi with the State of Lu.46 In particular, they both report the story of Mozi traveling to Chu to prevent the attack on Song. The Annals of Lu Buwei reads: "Gongshu Pan constructed Cloud-ladders in order to attack Song. Mozi heard of it and set out from Lu. Upon being received by the King of Chu, he introduced himself saying: 'I am but a rustic from the North.'"47 Finally, in another passage from The Annals of Lu Buwei, it is said that as a boy Mo Di studied in Lu. The text reads: Duke Hui of Lu [r. 768-723 BCE] sent minister Rang to the Son of Heaven to request the rules of proper etiquette for the sacrifices made at the suburban altar and in the ancestral temple. King Huan [r. 719-697 BCE]48 dispatched the historian Jiao. Duke Hui retained him; his descendents continued to live in Lu, and Mo Di studied under them.49

This is perhaps the most reliable information on Mozi's birthplace, as it would be highly unlikely that, as a child, Mo Di would have traveled beyond his native state to receive an education. Therefore, the only sensible rationalization must be that he was from Lu.

Mei, Neglected Rival, pp. 40-41; Chang Ch'un-yi, Mo tzu chi chieh (Shanghai: World Book Company, 1936; reprint ed., Taipei: Wen shih che ch'u pan she, 1982), cited in Lowe, Mo Tzu's Religious Blueprint, p. 31, and Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 214. 45 Respectively: Ch. 47, pp. 430-431; Ch. 47, pp. 440-441; Ch. 49, pp. 474-475. See Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 40. 46 Evan S. Morgan, trans., Tao, the Great Luminant: Essays from the Huai Nan Tzu (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1934), pp. 225-226; {Huainanzi, Ch. 19), and Knoblock, Annals of Lu Buwei, p. 90, pp. 560-561; Ltishi Chunqiu, 2/4/3, 21/5/2. 47 Liishi Chunqiu, 21/5/2, quoted in Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 41. 48 A discrepancy exists in the reigning dates of these two rulers. Knoblock tells us (p. 713) that the inquiry took place in 729 BCE according to the Bamboo Annals, and perhaps King Ping (r. 770-720 BCE) was meant in place of King Huan (r. 719-697 BCE). 49 Liishi Chunqiu, 2/4/3. I have altered this translation. I found Knoblock's translation (Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, p. 90) to be unsatisfactory. As a result, both Fung Yu-lan's (Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 77) and Hsiao Kung-chuan's (Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 215) were also borrowed from. Fung translates shi Jiao '$clftl' as "historian Jiao"; whereas Knoblock translates this as the proper name "Shi Que", which even in his Hanyu pinyin should read "Shi Jue." In his notes (p. 713), Knoblock speculates that Shi Que could have been a descendent of court historian Yin Yi. However, there is no other reference to Shi Que elsewhere in the 160 chapters of the Liishi Chunqiu. All speculation aside, Fung's translation conveys the intended meaning better. 11

Mo Di's educational background and profession remain the final components of his identity. It has just been noted that Mo Di studied under the descendants of an esteemed scholar (namely, historian Jiao) appointed by the Zhou royal family. However, in an almost unanimous verdict, modern academics have established that he must have been schooled originally as a Confucian, perhaps by one of Confucius's seventy immediate disciples or possibly by a pupil contemporary with his grandson Zisi.50 It is highly unlikely, though, that his teacher could have been of both backgrounds. Confucianism was not yet a well-established institution (in the sense of 'an organization'), nor was it imperially endorsed.51 Confucius's personal regret, expressed prior to his death, over the failure of his principles, emphasizes the point more poignantly.52 Mo Di, who was born only a few years following Confucius's death, did not live in a world that was a Confucian haven, as it might be suggested. Many of the social problems Confucius himself set out to fix remained problems during Mozi's lifetime. Regardless, it would not be an overwhelming leap to suppose that the descendents who taught Mo Di "allied themselves with the early followers of Confucius." The early Confucians were, after all, known particularly for their role as educators. In all practicality, there can be no question as to whether or not Mo Di would have been exposed to Confucian ideas during his education as a child and youth in Lu. Confucius was a native of Lu, and his influence was most profound there, where he founded his school.54 It is only a small step then to assume that Mo Di actually studied in the Confucian School itself. However, there is in fact only one statement in the histories that

50 Mote, Intellectual Foundations, p. 77. 51 It was not until the early Han Dynasty (206 BCE-CE 220) that Emperor Wu (140-87 BCE) gave the Confucian School its first official state endorsement. 52 Frederick Mote has argued: "In 484 BCE, a disappointed old man, [Confucius] returned to Lu; five years later he died there. He had achieved nothing by which he himself or his contemporaries could count him a success. One of his students once asked him how he should be described, and his answer is his best epitaph: 'He is this sort of man: so intent upon enlightening those eager for knowledge that he forgets to eat, and so happy in doing so that he forgets his sorrows, and does not realize that old age is creeping up on him.'" Mote, Intellectual Foundations, p. 33; the Analects, 7/18. 53 Lowe, Mo Tzu's Religious Blueprint, p. 35. 54 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 79. 12 technically declares Mo Di studied as a Confucian, and this statement, from a 2nd century BCE source, requires the proper qualifications. The Huainanzi says "Mozi received the training of a Ru ffjf."56 The word Ru ff§ itself is the Chinese character for "Confucian." This statement, therefore, appears to substantiate the claim that Mo Di started his philosophical career in the Confucian School. However, it has been highlighted by several scholars that this character did not

en always carry the meaning 'Confucian.' In fact, the character itself originally symbolized someone experienced in orthodox tradition; the Confucian school only later adopted the name. Hsiao Kung-chuan has cited Chang Ping-lin as recognizing three CO original meanings for Ru. The first was a generic name indicating "all who were versed in specialized arts." The second was a class name, "applied to those of the Ru who had knowledge of rites, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics [i.e. the Six Disciplines]." ° The third was a proper name, "referring to those of the Ru who regarded Confucius as their Master."61 Needless to say, "from this it is evident that the name 'Ru' was not established by Confucius, but the way of the Ru was enlarged in

55 Interestingly, the Huainanzi was written under the patronage of Liu An, the King of Huainan, who was the uncle of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, who, granted the Confucian School its first imperial endorsement. Might this suggest that Liu An was himself fond of the Confucian School? Perhaps, this would explain why it is written in the Huainanzi that Mo Di originally studied as a Ru, if this indeed meant "Confucian." 56 Huainanzi, Ch. 21, cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 216. The full passage reads: "Mozi received the training of a Ru and was educated in the doctrines of Confucius, but he was displeased by their rites [//ll], which were to him complicated and troublesome; by their elaborate funerals, which were so costly that they impoverished people; and by their extended periods of mourning, which were injurious to the health and interfered with work. Thereupon he turned his back on the Zhou dynasty practices and made use of the methods of government of the Xia dynasty." The later half of the passage (that which was omitted in the main body of text) is of less consequence. That Mozi had at some point studied the Confucian principles and had knowledge of Confucian practices has already been established. Furthermore, this could be concluded easily from the Mozi alone. (The full translated passage has been modified with reference to Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 77). 57 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 42; Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 87. 58 Chang Ping-lin, Kuo-ku lun-heng, hsia, "Yuan ju," cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 87. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 13 significance by him." Confucius himself even famously stated that he was not an innovator, but rather a mere "transmitter" of the lessons from antiquity.63 When exactly the Confucian school formally adopted the name Ru is not altogether important, but to say that Mo Di received the training of a Ru might be no different than to say that Confucius received the training of a Ru. In fact, this is exactly what is suggested in another chapter of the Huainanzi, which says: "Confucius and Mo Di practiced the arts of the ancient Sages and were learned in all the discourses on the Six Disciplines."64 This suggests that both Confucius and Mozi received the same, or at least, similar training. This is further supported by Fung Yu-lan who quoted the "Yi Wen Zhi" chapter of the Qian Han Shu WWiM (Book of Former Han), stating: "The Mohist teachings began with the guardians of the temples." This indicates that Mo Di was educated in the traditional sacrificial rites of ancestral worship, the same basic education Confucius is said to have had. Mozi probably benefited from the educational reforms enacted by his predecessor. After all, Confucius expanded education, its methods and ideals; he truly believed in the broad liberal arts learning. But that Mozi actually studied in the Confucian School is doubtful.

For his profession, Mozi essentially modeled himself after Confucius.67 Mozi began his career with an advanced education in the classics of antiquity. In these texts he found solutions to the problems of his own age, which he then sought to apply through the formation of a school dedicated to the education of students and the cultivation of future political officials. Mozi was more active than Confucius in his promotion of pupils to government office among the different states of the Central Plains (i.e. China). And this was consistent with the premium he placed on active participation in worldly

Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 85; the Analects ll\. ^Huainanzi, Ch. 9, quoted in Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 77. ' Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 43. ' Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 77. ' Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 221. ! Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 45. 14

affairs. Mozi did not promote education for the value it had in itself; education was the means for bettering one's world. He was even seen, on one occasion, towing a collection of books behind him.69 As the Grand Master of his school, Mozi himself was very energetic in his travels between the states; he frequently sought audience with the feudal lords through whom he hoped to establish his social and political ideals and nurture them to fruition.

1.2 Organization, Influence, and Activities of the School The school established by Master Mo was called Mojia Ml^, i.e. literally "School of Mo," and in English the practice is known as Mohism. Students of Mozi were known as Mozhe H^ or Mohists.70 As a philosophical system, Mohism was the most

influential school during the Warring States period. Comparisons to Confucianism have been drawn, but Mohism was a much more structured discipline at the time. It should be noted that the Confucians were the educators and transmitters of tradition, and as a discipline, the school did not take its eventual form until the involvement of later individuals, such as Mencius and Xunzi, who refined the teachings. The Mohists, on the other hand, were from the start an identifiable group, who embraced a structured philosophical system and a strict military-style organization, distinct from other intellects of the Eastern Zhou (770-256 BCE) era. Some commentators have even likened the Mohist organization to that of a cult, a characterization which, although fallacious, does illustrate the tight structure of this group.72 It would be fair to say that there were Confucians in all vocations, but a Mohist was first and foremost a Mohist.

Mote has comically pointed out that the "h" is used to disyllabize the name because, "there is surely nothing 'moist' about Mohism." Mote, Intellectual Foundations, p. 79. 71 A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), p. 31. 72 That the Mohists were a cult is established on a misinterpretation of a text. In the Liishi Chunqiu IIAIZ, Mohist Grand Master Meng Sheng dies alongside a large group of Mohists in defence of a fief. Inaccurate translations have interpreted this event as a mass suicide. Unfortunately, Mei Yi-pao, whose academic work is generally above-average, is among those who misinterpreted this text. See Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 172. 15

Either just before or just after Mozi's death around 391 BCE, an individual named Meng Sheng was given the leadership of the Mohist organization.73 As the new Grand Master, or Juzi HEB1, it became his responsibility to "propagate the code of conduct of the Mohist school and carry on its tasks."74 The position of Grand Master was filled by at least three different men after Mozi: Meng Sheng of Chu, Master Tian Xiang of Song, and Fu Tun of Qin. Given that Mozi was himself from Lu, this assortment of leaders demonstrates the international character of the Mohist organization. In function, the post of Grand Master was comparable to the role of a Principal over a school. Naturally, Mozi was himself the first de facto Grand Master of the school. Following his death, the nomination process was never regulated, but it remained determined on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, the position was transferred to individuals who seemingly exemplified the principles of Mohism and demonstrated the fortitude of character necessary to lead the organization. When Grand Master Meng Sheng passed the leadership to Tian Xiang of Song, he neutralized doubt regarding the survival of the school by stating, "Tian Xiang is worthy. Why need we be concerned that Mohism shall be cut off?"76 The Grand Master became responsible for providing leadership, direction, and inspiration to all members of the organization. Most importantly, it was his duty to set the standard for all Mohists. As the Zhuangzi jffriF said, the Mohists "regarded the Juzi

as a Sage."77 It is clear that Mozi set an example for the Grand Masters who succeeded him, as the mantra appears to have been 'lead by example.' Like Mozi, who famously endured personal hardships to prevent a war that did not directly concern him, his successors demonstrated equal conviction and determination during their tenures over the school. The Annals ofLii Buwei recount the story of Grand Master Meng Sheng who was willing to die to uphold an oath he had made, choosing the preservation of his honour

73 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 83. 74 Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, pp. 487-488; Lushi Chunqiu, 19/3/4. 75 Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, pp. 75,487-488; Lushi Chunqiu, 1/5/5,19/3/4. 76 Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, pp. 487-488; Lushi Chunqiu, 19/3/4. 77 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 83. 16 over the preservation of his own life. Meng Sheng argued that if he did not make good on his oath, "From this day forward, Mohists will not be sought as serious teachers,

"7Q worthy friends, and good subjects." As the head of the organization, this was the type of responsibility demanded of the Juzi. As zealous as a Grand Master might have been, his most important task was probably that of authoritative figure over the organization. The Annals of Lti Buwei emphasized this point by stating, "The Mohists believe that those who do not obey the leader do not understand the teachings."80 As a secular institution, the bond that held the Mohists together was their hierarchical structure and their strict observance of Mohist doctrine. Anything that threatened this bond was a threat to the entire movement. It was the responsibility of the Grand Master to preserve Mohist doctrine and to provide consistency in its application. After all, these individuals were entrusted with Q I guaranteeing the "transmission of Mohism to later generations." It is said that Grand Master Fu Tun of Qin was so serious in his conviction to uphold Mohist standards that he declined King Hui's offer of clemency for his son who had committed murder.82 Fu Tun stated, The law of the Mohist order says: 'He who kills another person shall die; he who injures another shall be punished.' The purpose of this is to prevent the injuring and killing of other people. To prevent the injuring and killing of other people is the most important moral principle in the world. Though your majesty out of kindness has ordered that the officials not execute my son, I cannot but implement the law of the Mohist order.

The other component of the Mohist organization was the followers themselves. It is not known exactly how many people the Mohist movement attracted, but there are a few indications in the extant literature. In chapter 50 of the Mozi, Mozi tried to dissuade the King of Chu from attacking the State of Song by stating, "My followers Qin Huali

78 Knoblock, Annals of Lti Buwei, pp. 487-488; Liishi Chunqiu, 19/3/4. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Knoblock, Annals of Lti Buwei, p. 75; Ltishi Chunqiu, 1/5/5. 17 and others, numbering three hundred, are already armed with my weapons of defence, waiting on the city wall of Song for the invading army from Chu."84 Elsewhere, in the Huainanzi, it is stated, "Mozi's followers numbered one hundred and eighty men, all of whom will obey his command to go through fire or tread on sword-blades, and who will die without turning away."85 And in The Annals ofLii Buwei, it is said that one hundred and eighty Mohist disciples died alongside Grand Master Meng Sheng in the defence of an entrusted fief in Chu.86 It is evident from these statements that the Mohist flock must have been considerable in size. Unfortunately, there is no further information on the extent of the organization, but these above statements do offer some insight.

The commitment of three hundred Mohists in the State of Song is a particularly significant event. If this number reflected only the number of Mohists from Song, which was one of the smallest states of the Central Plains, then the school surely thrived in other states as well, and the gamble of 300 defenders would not have threatened the continuation of the Mohist practice elsewhere. If, on the other hand, this number reflected the entire Mohist organization, with the implication that the school was mobilized to protect the State of Song, then Mozi would be said to have been gambling the fate of the entire school. It is indeterminable with certainty which of these two possibilities is closer to the truth, although it seems more likely that the majority of these three hundred Mohists were probably natives of Song or possibly the neighbouring states. As it will be illustrated shortly, there were Mohists in almost every major state. It is therefore unlikely that the entire Mohist School could have been mobilized to the State of Song.

Moreover, it was only fifty-five years later when Mozi's successor Meng Sheng died in the State of Chu under similar circumstances along with one hundred and eighty Mohists. For this massive loss of life not to have decimated the organization was quite a

84 Mozi, Ch. 50, cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 223. 85 Huainanzi, Ch. 19, cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 223. 86 Liishi Chunqiu, 19/3/4. This is a corrected number, as given by John Knoblock in The Annals of Lii Buwei, 487-488. This total is reported variously as 83 by Fung (p. 83), 103 by Hsiao (p. 223), and 183 by Mei (p. 172) and Rowley (Harold H. Rowley, "The Chinese Philosopher Mo Ti." Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 31, (1948): p. 267). 18 feat and suggests that the Mohists were indeed a large group. In fact, if the text is true to the story, the only concern expressed at the time was the survival of the Grand Master. As previously mentioned, Grand Master Meng Sheng dismissed this unease by conferring his full confidence in his successor, stating, "Why need we be concerned that Mohism

on shall be cut off?" This reflects either the availability of other Mohist adherents, or simply the high value and capability of a worthy Mohist leader (who could presumably rebuild the school). Without corroborating evidence, nothing conclusive can be determined by these accounts. However, it can be said that these stories at least suggest that the Mohist organization must have been stable, prominent, and popularly known. All in all, the names of only around forty Mohists have been recovered.88 Citing Sun Yirang's critical edition of the Mozi, Mei Yi-pao noted that of the known Mohists, twenty-four were contemporaries of Mozi, and at least fifteen of those were direct on disciples of the Master. For comparison, Sima Qian famously exaggerated the number of disciples under Confucius as "three thousand" when five other sources of earlier origin all recognized around 70 pupils.90 However, D.C. Lau has argued that "Even this number is probably exaggerated."91 The details of only the first thirty-five were ever recorded, and in The Analects, only twenty-five disciples are present, including "some who appear only once and some who never speak at all."92 In the extant version of the Mozi, it appears as though fifteen of the 40 documented Mohists are mentioned in the text itself, while the remainder can be found in other sources. Needless to say, as many original Mohists have been identified as have original Confucians. Beyond numbers, the Mohist organization covered a vast geographic area. In fact, as prominent as other schools may have been, no discipline was as widespread as the

Knoblock, Annals ofLti Buwei, pp. 487-488; Liishi Chunqiu, 19/3/4. 88 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 223. Song Keng (a.k.a. Song Xing) was not included in this calculation, although he was probably a Mohist. See Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, 56, and Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 101, p. 176. 89 Mei, Neglected Rival, pp. 173-175. 90 D.C. Lau, trans., Confucius, the Analects, (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 196. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 19

go Mohists. "Like Confucianism, Mohism was a northern school of learning. However, Confucianism was limited to the North; Mohism in contrast went southward, and it also went to more distant parts of the north."94 There is evidence that Mozi had students who came from, at least, the States of Qi ^, Song 5^, Zheng M, Lu H, Wei (or Wey) f$j, Qin ^, and Chu ^ [See Appendix A]. From the State of Qi came Gao He and Xian Zishi (two former violent men of Qi), and Suolu Can who studied under Qin Huali ^i#li.95 Few Mohists came from the State of Song, although the second Grand Master Tian Xiang was from there. Song Keng (a.k.a. Song Xing), a Mohist contemporary with Mencius, was also reportedly from Song. The Zhuangzi records a Mohist from the State of Zheng whose surname is unknown, but his personal name was Di.97 None of the identified Mohists can be confirmed as Lu natives, although the Mozi reports on a man from Lu who sent his son to study under Mozi. Mozi probably spent a great deal of his time in Lu, as the triangulation process used to determine his homeland pinpointed this state. At least three passages in the Mozi even indicate that his school had a gate, suggesting that he operated out of an actual establishment.99 If it is assumed that his school was located in his native state, then it would be highly likely that more of his pupils were also natives of Lu. Few Mohists came from the State of Wei, although it is strongly implied that Guan Qin did.100 The State of Qin appeared to have a particularly close relationship to the Mohists. The third Grand Master Fu Tun was from Qin. Moreover, King Huiwen (r. 337-311 BCE) appears to have fostered the care of the Mohist School under his rule, and the Mohist Tang Guguo is noted as one of his subjects.101 Of all the states, the southern

93 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, pp. 56-57. 94 Ibid., p. 56. 95 Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, pp. 122-123; Liishi Chunqiu, 4/3/2. Knoblock and Yates both translate T^SH as Qin Guli. 96 Mencius, VI/B/4, cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 56. 97 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 57. 98 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 470-471. 99 Mozi, Ch. 48, pp. 456-457. 100 Mozi, Ch. 46, pp. 422-423. 101 Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, pp. 397-398; Liishi Chunqiu, 16/7/2. 20

State of Chu perhaps produced the greatest number of Mohists. The first Grand Master, Meng Sheng, was possibly from Chu, as he was a close friend and teacher of the Lord of Yangcheng in Chu.102 Ku Huo, Ji Chi (Jizi), and Deng Lingzi are all noted among the Mohists of the south in the Zhuangzi, indicating that they were all possibly from Chu.103 Qu Jiangzi, a disciple of Hu Feizi, is also believed to be from Chu.104 And the military general Tian Jiu served the King of Chu during the reign of the aforementioned King Huiwen of Qin, with whom he requested an audience. Tian Jiu is noted as discussing Mohism with the King of Chu in the Hanfeizi and with the King of Qin in The Annals of LU Buwei. In addition, Mozi recommended several pupils to government office. He sent these individuals to serve not only as envoys and representatives of the Mohist School, but as ministers for the administrative bodies of the states that they served. He sent Gongshang Guo to the State of Yue; Geng Zhu to Chu; Gao Shizi to Wei; Cao Gongzi to Song; Sheng Zhuo to Qi; and another unnamed pupil to Wei.106 While only these six individuals are recorded in the histories as having served as ministers, it does appear as though Mozi's school, in part, "served as a factory to supply governments with political experts."107 In one instance, Mozi even enticed a prospective follower to study at his school by promising him, "I will make you an official in the future."

As ministers, their overall affect in moderating the decision-making of the Eastern Zhou states remains unknown, but the Mohists were at least active in their duties. Mozi later sent Gao Sunzi to recall his disciple Sheng Zhuo from Qi, where he had participated in several campaigns of aggressive war while serving under chief minister Xiang Ziniu.109 Gao Shizi, who served in Wei, left his ministerial post on his own accord

102 Knoblock, Annals of La Buwei, pp. 487-488; Liishi Chunqiu, 19/3/4. 1 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 56. 104 Ibid.; Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 174. 105 Hanfeizi, Ch. 42; Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, pp. 313-314; Liishi Chunqiu, 14/3/3. 106 Respectively: Ch. 49, pp. 474-475; Ch. 46, pp. 418-419; Ch. 46, pp. 422-425; Ch. 49, pp. 476-477; Ch. 49, pp. 480-481; Ch. 47, pp. 438-439. 107 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 45. 108 Mozi, Ch. 48, pp. 456-457. [Quote from:] Library of Chinese Classics (LCC), pp. 456-457. 109 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 480-481. 21 because his words went unheeded. He left for Qi instead.110 And Gongshang Guo, who was sent to Yue, won considerable favour and even "persuaded the Lord of Yue to accept Mozi's principle."111 The Lord of Yue was so enthused by Mozi's teachings that he sought to enfeoff Mozi and employ him as his personal instructor.112 As a traveling scholar, Mozi himself journeyed between the States of Lu, Song, Wei, Qi, and Chu. Mozi never traveled to Jin or Yue, and there is no evidence he ever

1 1 ^ made it as far west as Qin. When Mozi was still young, he apparently made his first trip to the State of Chu, where he had his first encounter of many with the military craftsman Gongshu Pan.114 He later traveled all the way to the capital city Ying upon hearing that the King of Chu desired to use Gongshu Pan's siege machinery to attack Song.115 On another occasion, Mozi attempted an audience with the King of Chu to persuade him to accept Mohist doctrine.116 He presented the King with a treatise on his ideas to which the King apparently remarked, "It was an excellent work." Mozi also made numerous trips to visit a feudal lord who administered the district of Lu Yang, which was somewhere in the northeast region of Chu.118 On one occasion, Mozi hurried to Lu Yang to convince this lord not to attack the small state of Zheng.119 Mozi also traveled to Wei, where he encouraged Gongliang Huanzi to build military defences. In the State of Qi, which Mozi visited numerous times, he engaged both the chief minister Xiang Ziniu and the Grand Lord of Qi, Tian He, in discussions on 191 his theory rejecting military aggression. Specifically, Mozi urged the Grand Lord of

110 Mozi, Ch. 46, pp. 422-425. 111 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 474-475. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 474-475. 112 Ibid. 113 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 219. 114 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 480-483. First noted by Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 219. 115 Mozi, Ch. 50, pp. 484-489. 116 Mozi, Ch. 47, pp. 430-433. Chien Mu believed this event could have been at the same time as the halting of the attack on Song; as noted in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 219n. 117 Although this account is not recorded verbatim in the Mozi, it is preserved in both the Memoirs of Chu Palace and in a comment in the Shi Ji $.1H. See Mei, Neglected Rival, pp. 43-44. 118 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 464-471. See also, Pi Yuan, "Mo Tzu chu hsu," and Wu Yi, "Pa Mo Tzu," cited in Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 214, and Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 39. 119 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 464-467. 120 Mozi, Ch. 47, pp. 438-439. 121 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 462-465. 22

Qi to be more considerate in the use of military force upon the unfortunate states. And in the State of Lu, Mozi's homeland, there is evidence that on several occasions he was in direct communication with the ruler, including once when the Lord of Lu sought counsel from Mozi regarding an anticipated attack from Qi.122 Sima Qian indicates that Mozi briefly served as a minister in Song, where he was later imprisoned for an unknown period.123 Mozi frequently traveled to and through Song, although in a famous account he was denied shelter at a border pass on his journey home after saving the state from the attack of Chu.124 (It might be that his reputation was not established at this time.) The only historical records that suggest Mozi was formally employed by any particular state remain those noting his service to Song. In the Mozi, it is said that he did serve as an envoy to the State of Wei, but there is no indication on behalf of whom he served this function.125 It is said that he traveled in a "southern direction" as an envoy, but while in Wei, he warned one of the government ministers about the two northern States of Qi and Jin. This suggests that neither of these were his employer. Mei Yi-pao has suggested that Mozi might have been working at the time for the State of Lu. Although Wei and Lu lie at the same general latitude, "certain parts of Wei were south of certain parts of Lu."126 Needless to say, it could not have been State of Song that he was working for, which lies south of Wei.

In general, Mozi was well respected by the rulers of his generation. King Hui of Chu, with whom he had several encounters, might not have ever genuinely embraced Mohist doctrine, but his actions suggest that he held Mozi in high esteem. Hsiao Kung- chuan has reconstructed a textual source that reports how King Hui offered Mozi some form of employment, to which Mozi responded: I have heard that when the worthy man is offered advancement to high office, he will refuse to accept emolument if his Way is not put into practice, and he will not take his place at a court where his standards of righteousness goes unheeded. The

122 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 462-463. 123 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 37. 124 Mozi, Ch. 50, pp. 488-489. 125 Mozi, Ch. 47, pp. 436-439. 126 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 40. 23

letter that I submitted (conveying my governmental principles) is not about to be applied; therefore I request permission to leave.127

Similarly, the King of Yue offered Mozi fifty wagons of tribute, five hundred square li (JH) of territory belonging to the former State of Wu (roughly 250 km2), and official status if he were to travel to Yue and become the King's personal counsel.128 Gongshang Guo claimed that he had persuaded the King of Yue to accept Mohist principles, but Mozi remained skeptical of the King's commitment. He spoke with Gongshang Guo, and said: By your observation, what is the intention of the King of Yue? If the King of Yue will listen to my words and adopt my way, then I will come, asking only for food according to the capacity of my stomach, and clothing according to the stature of my body. I will come and I will just be one of his ministers. What use do I have for a feudal domain!? On the other hand, if the King of Yue will not listen to my words or adopt my way, and I should go nevertheless, then I would be selling my righteousness to him. If I had to sell righteousness, I could do a good job in the Central Plains; why would I go to Yue?1 9

Ultimately, Mozi declined offers from both the kings of Chu and Yue because he figured it unlikely that these rulers genuinely intended to adopt his principles in their governments. Needless to say, the Mohist movement must have had considerable appeal and influence for Mohist ideas to warrant any substantial consideration. Why else would such offers come to Mozi if not for his theories being conceptually well received?

Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 221n. 128 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 474-475. In the chapter that follows, Mozi says, "the land of Chu amounts to five thousand square li, while that of Song is only five hundred square li." (Mozi, Ch. 50) These figures are rough estimates at best, as Mozi is merely making an argument of comparison. But it is curious that "five hundred square li" is the same size of territory offered to Mozi by the King of Yue. On the surface, this suggests that he was offered territory comparable to the entire State of Song. Historical maps indicate that Mozi must have underestimated the size of Song in this statement, which is of no major consequence because he was merely using this figure to make an argument. But these numbers must have had some relevance otherwise they would not have been used. Could it be that the territory offered to Mozi by the King of Yue was of the same size as the State of Song, and the author(s) wished to relay this point by referencing the same size already quoted by Mozi? Probably not, but The Annals of Lti Buwei offers one hint. The King of Yue is said to have offered Mozi territory along the banks of the Yin River comprised of "three hundred registered communities." It also refers to this offer as "a state" {guo H), and says that Mo Di declined this because "he feared that accepting it would compromise his moral principles." Knoblock, Annals ofLii Buwei, pp. 480-481; Ltishi Chunqiu, 19/2/3. 129 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 474-475. [Modified quote from:] Mei, Works, pp. 250-251; LCC, pp. 474-475. 24

1.3 Qualifying Mohism Opinions have varied on whether Mohism was a glorified branch of Confucianism or a separate strain of original philosophy altogether. Frederick W. Mote called Mohism "an offshoot of the Confucian school," whereas Wing-tsit Chan said the two were "bitter enemies" and their doctrines were "diametrically opposed."131 The truth of the matter lies somewhere safely between these two extremes. The philosophy of Mohism shared many common ideas with the philosophy of Confucianism. Most importantly, they shared the same foundation in the lessons of antiquity; Mozi is said to have learned from the same written materials as Confucius. Mozi must have studied the Confucian corpus as well, as he was intimately acquainted with it. That these two philosophical systems share some common root should be of no real surprise. At the same time, the uniqueness of Mohism lies, for the most part, in how it is differentiated from Confucianism. In fact, in some aspects, Mohism could be said to be the antithesis of Confucianism. Two chapters of the Mozi (one of which is now missing) titled "Against Confucianism" (fei ru ^ff§), explicitly denounced Confucian ideals and

traditional practices. As a school, Mohism represented the first structured challenge to the orthodoxy of Confucianism, and in the historical literature the two are often found in contrast to one another. The Confucian School was not a politically endorsed institution at the time, but it was orthodox in so far as it represented the traditions and practices of the previous feudal Zhou era. A.C. Graham has said: There is an important difference between the two; the Mohists are the upholders of ten specific doctrines, while the Ru fff are professional teachers, not primarily of ideas, but of subjects classified by the time of the Han Dynasty as the Six Arts: ceremony, music, archery, charioteering, writing, and mathematics.

The Mohists derived much of their identity from opposition to traditional norms; the Confucians just happened to best exemplify them. The Mohists did not advocate any

130 Mote, Intellectual Foundations, p. 77. 131 Chan Wing-tsit, trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 211. 132 Mozi, Ch. 38 and 39. 133 Graham, Disputers of the Tao, p. 31. 25 form of rebellion or social revolution. Of all things, the disorder caused by such upheavals was considered more of a threat than reliance on traditional practices. "Mozi was not a rebel that wanted to change the system, but a reformer that sought to breathe fresh life into it."134 He was interested in the practical concerns that could be addressed to better the existing state of the world; he was not concerned with theoretical philosophy

IOC or political theory. The Mohists were first and foremost reformers who sought the gradual transformation of social norms and political behaviour.136 Mei Yi-pao has said of Mozi: "His political thought was directed not to formulating a new state but to outlining 1 -3-7 remedies for practical difficulties." One of the greatest misconceptions has been the relationship between Mohist doctrine and religious thought. The Mohists believed in an active Heaven that sanctioned the moral behaviour of human beings. This was unique during the Eastern Zhou era, and the Mohists were the only ones to present this in a structured philosophical package, but it was ultimately derived from occult practices and beliefs from antiquity.138 Modern misinterpretations of Mohism often substitute "God" for "Heaven," which cannot be done without substantial caveats. Likewise, the life of Mozi has been paralleled with the life of Jesus of Nazareth, and the position of Grand Master has been equated to that of the 1 ^0 Catholic Pope. These parallels, which generally disregard historical and ideological contexts, try to illustrate Mohism as something which it was not. That being said, there is perhaps something religious in the Mohist conceptualization of the world. It relates to the Chinese religious ways, which are less concerned about creation and more concerned about categorizing the world. Chinese religion is primarily about deriving human order from Heaven, not human existence or purpose.140 The Mohists were preoccupied with classifications, organization, and order,

134 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 76. 135 Ibid., p. 114. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, p. 14. 139 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 83; Rowley, "Mo Ti," pp. 262-266, pp. 271-272. 140 Mei, Neglected Rival, pp. 28-29. 26 and their entire sociopolitical program was directed towards restructuring society along new guidelines. As Robin D. S. Yates has said, "The interest in classification displayed by the later Mohists, and.. .by all schools of philosophy of the late Warring States period, was an extension of this ultimately religious desire to order the world."141 But the usage of the supernatural in Mohist philosophy, which is often relied upon for comparisons with Western religions, is of a significantly different character. The Mohists, who may or may not have genuinely believed in the occult, needed the spiritual world to support their sociopolitical project. This will be evident in the discussion to follow. A.C. Graham has even argued, in his introductory discussion on Mohist philosophy in Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (1978), that "Even early Mohism is not, on closer inspection, a religious movement; it is as man-centred as Confucianism, and insists on the power and benevolence of spirits only as a buttress for human morality."142 In fact, "the awe and resignation with which Confucius accepts what Heaven decrees for him has much more of the sense of the holy in it than anything in Mozi."143

1.4 Mohist Philosophy There are ten prominent themes in the Mozi that correspond to "core" books of the text. Each of these books is comprised of a triad of shang Jt, zhong *\*, and xia ~Y, which represent the first, second, and third commentaries on each topic. Why the text has been structured into triads is not known, although some commentators, such as A.C. Graham, have suggested that this organization represents three branches of the Mohist School.144 Speculation aside, the content of these sections is not unduly repetitive, so the text reads well as a whole. In the text, the corresponding books appear to demonstrate some methodical consistency between them, as each begins with "Master Mozi

141 Yates, "Mohists on Warfare," p. 560. 142 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, p. 14. 143 Ibid. 144 A.C. Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of Mo-tzu, (Singapore: National University of Singapore, Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985), pp. 1-2 27 pronounced" (ziMozi yanyue -fUrPHH)- Elsewhere, the text has the introduction

"Master Mozi said" (ziMozi yue ^Mi^H) or it is presented in narrative form.145 It is believed, then, that the introductions to each section demarcate what is and is not doctrine

in the text, with the character yan ff representing a stronger statement of doctrine.146

The ten central themes extracted from these chapters are generally understood to be the principal tenets of Mohist thought. These ten sections sufficiently represent the main sociopolitical program of the Mohists, but together they constitute only a fraction of the entire Mozi text. The complementary portions, which actually comprise the majority of the text - a majority of pages and a total of forty-one of the 71 total chapters - are arguably as meaningful to Mohist thought as are the so-called "core" books. This other half contains most of the available history on the Mohist organization and other auxiliary arguments that support Mohist doctrine. All of which have facilitated the reconstruction of Mohist knowledge. However, this is not something well-recognized in modern literature. Accounts of Mohism have generally been oversimplified, and rarely has recognition been given to any of the text beyond what illustrates the ten prominent themes. Many commentaries never get beyond the concept of "universal love" (jian ai H:§§), which is unique and

mysterious. Between the three main English translations presently available, a significant share of the text remains untranslated. Mei Yi-pao's The Ethical and Political Works of Motse was published in 1929, and although it is the most complete translation, only thirty-six of 71 chapters are presented.147 Burton Watson translated a selection of chapters in his 1963 rendition in the Basic Writings of Mo Tzu. However, Watson translated only a miniscule total of 14. A.C. Graham's painstaking reconstruction of the logical chapters was the first attempt at this portion of the text. Unfortunately, his Later

145 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 146 Ibid. 147 Mei Yi-pao, trans., The Ethical and Political Works of Motse, (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1993). 148 Burton Watson, trans., Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hstin Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). 28

Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science (1978), covers just six chapters, or one and a half books of the text.149 All but one modern scholar have neglected the military chapters of the Mozi altogether, with the most common excuse being the troublesome and antiquated nature of the extant portions.150 Robin D.S. Yates dedicated his master's and doctoral dissertations to the first translation of the Mohist defensive chapters into English, which were completed as The City under Siege: Technology and Organization as seen in the Reconstructed Text of the Military Chapters of Mo Tzu (1980). However, his academic translation, which covered the extant eleven of 21 chapters dedicated to military affairs and city defence, remains an unpublished work. Finally, in 2006, the first complete and comprehensive English translation of the

i en entire Mozi was published. In the Library of Chinese Classics edition, the translators indicate that they have incorporated recent advancements in textual research and have corrected occasional omissions, incorrect renderings, and incoherencies in the existing translations.153 While this new translation is far from perfect, it does offer the ability to view the text in English as a whole, as it was intended.154 The earliest record of the Mozi in the Chinese archives is that written in the Han bibliographies, which list the text as it exists today as a work consisting of fifteen books and seventy-one chapters. Therefore, a responsible interpretation of Mohism should take into account not only the chapters that relate to the "core" themes, but the entire text as it is known in its earliest form. It has been suggested that in later times the school divided into separate and

A.C. Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978). 150 Yates, "Mohists on Warfare," pp. 554-556. 151 Robin D.S. Yates, The City under Siege: Technology and Organization as seen in the Reconstructed Text of the Military Chapters of Mo Tzu, Phd. Dissertation (unpublished), Harvard University, 1980. 152 Mo Di, Mozi, Library of Chinese Classics, trans. Wang Rongpei and Wang Hong, (Changsha, Hunan: Hunan People's Publishing House, 2006). 153 Ibid., pp. 56-59. 154 This new translation fails even to reference Robin D.S. Yates or any of his work. The military chapters of this translation suffer greatly because of this. The translation even occasionally omits full sentences or words from the Chinese, even though it is claimed in the preface that, "we never delete any contents of the book, nor do we avoid translating those difficult parts" (p. 59). Some proper names are even translated differently between adjacent sections. Working knowledge of the Chinese language is essential for the proper academic usage of this translation. 155 Library of Chinese Classics, Mozi, pp. 40-42. 29 competitive sects, which might have been responsible for different chapters of the Mozi.i56 However, speculation aside, anything that existed in pre-Han times should be considered relatively central to Mohist thought. More significantly, there exist no radical inconsistencies in the text, if it is viewed as a whole. There are sections which unquestionably vary from one section to the next. But after all, the Mozi is one of the single largest texts of pre-Qin China. Such differences are to be expected, because the text most certainly is not the product of a single author, nor could it have been written in a single sitting. Modern commentators may be correct in assuming that different branches of the Mohist School are responsible for different chapters of the text, but this hardly amounts to a deductive proof that these different groups poorly represented the Mohist tradition. There is nothing in the Mozi for which it is difficult to believe that Mozi himself might have said, written, or taught, other than a few dates and names that postdate his death. In short, the ideological content of the text is positively congruent. As for the military chapters, which have long been neglected by academics, Robin D.S. Yates has argued that "There is nothing in the military chapters of Mozi which is not consistent with a Warring States date. And there is nothing in the military chapters which is inconsistent either textually or philosophically with other parts of the Mohist corpus."157

1.5 Mohist Doctrine: Ten Themes The ten central doctrines of the Mozi represent the essence of the sociopolitical program the Mohists sought to establish. The following synopses are presented as available in the Mozi, with minimal interpretation except where needed. The ten Mohist doctrines are:

Han Feizi, Ch. 50; Watson, Basic Writings of Han Fei Tzu, p. 118; Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, pp. 1-2. 157 Yates, "Mohists on Warfare," p. 580. 30

Promoting Worth (shang xian fnJif)

Conformity with Superiors (shang tong fcrf[SI)

Impartial Caring (jian ai ^M.)

Denouncing Aggressive Warfare (fei gong ^J&)

Moderation in Expenditure (jie yong fftffl)

Simplicity in Funerals (jie zang tftfp)

The Will of Heaven (tian zhi ^^)

Explaining Ghosts (ming gui Bftfy)

Condemnation of Music (fei yue #|j|)

Rejecting Fatalism (fei ming ^np)

1.5.1 Promoting Worth (shang xian fnfM) (literally: "value the able and virtuous")

"All the rulers in the world desire their states to be wealthy, their people to be many, and their government and jurisdiction to be orderly. But they do not know that they should govern their states and people by promoting virtue and ability. They have, indeed, missed the foundation of government."158 The quality and stability of one's government is dependent upon the quality of one's government officials. One should therefore promote worthy and capable individuals to government office regardless of their social origin. This is one of the most fundamental principles of good governance. By conferring honour, rewards of wealth, and the delegation of responsibility, rulers will attract talented men. When worthy men are employed in government, the state will be well-governed, the laws justly administered, wealth not wasted, food stuffs plentiful, the people wealthy and affectionate, the officials loyal, neighbouring states friendly, and the military strong in defence and victorious in attack.159 If government is fair, stability will ensue and the state and its people will prosper. Conversely, the practice of favouritism

158 Mozi, Ch. 10, pp. 66-67. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 48. 159Afoz«,Ch.9,pp.50-51. 31 and the promotion of kinsmen to office, without regard for their abilities, will only lead to social disorder and political chaos.

1.5.2 Conformity with Superiors (shang tong fnfln]) (literally: "value together")

Disorder is a natural feature of the human community resulting from the lack of a hierarchical structure with which people can be organized and unified. Society should be structured with few above, in authoritative roles, and many below, as subordinates. "What the superior thinks to be right, all shall think to be right; what the superior thinks to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong."160 However, society should function as a collective, with the contributions of all members at their respective levels. "When the superior is at fault there should be good counsel. When the subordinates show virtue there shall be popular recommendation."161 While authoritative figures maintain unity by issuing commands down the hierarchy, the subordinates responsible for adhering to those instructions play an equal role in moderating the actions and decisions of their superiors. The function of the hierarchical organization in society and government is solely to provide stability, order, and unity of purpose. Most importantly, it is only through the hierarchy that a unified concept of morality (yi) jj| is achieved, as punishments and rewards can be administered consistently. "Conformity with Superiors (shang tong fnf|5]) is, indeed, the foundation of government and the essence of orderliness."162

1.5.3 Impartial Caring (jian ai Hit) (literally: "concurrent love")

One of the most controversial notions in the Mozi, the word love (ai ft) is a

value, but perhaps not an emotion at all.163 The logical chapters explain this concept most definitively. First and foremost, in the same manner in which an individual does

160 Mozi, Ch. 11, pp. 76-79. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 56. 161 Ibid. 162 Mozi, Ch. 13, pp. 108-109. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 77. 163 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 149. 32 not think of himself as merely a means to some other end, other human beings should be granted the same courtesy, and should also be considered as ends in themselves.164 While "love of men does not exclude myself; I am myself among those I love,"165 impartial caring (jian ai) is "...that one may learn not to be concerned for oneself alone."166 Moreover, while each human being is deserving of respect, the word love (ai) is chiefly about one's moral conduct and not one's actual being. Our love for someone's moral conduct can bring benefits to the people in the world, while our love for that person cannot necessarily achieve this goal. This is like: the disgust for the robbers' behaviours can bring benefits to the people in the world, while the disgust for the robbers themselves cannot necessarily achieve this goal.167

Therefore, it is said, "Profound love is established on the basis of morality, and not on the basis of intimacy." As a philosophical concept, 'impartial caring' is a reaction to the Confucian emphasis on filial piety. The Confucians said, "Love among relations should depend upon the degree of relationship."169 Therefore, one Confucian argued: "I love the members of my family more than the people of my district, my parents more than the other members of my family, and myself more than my parents. This is because of their nearness to me."170 However, this effectively sanctions families as special interest groups. Mozi said "As he loves only his family and not other families, the thief steals from other families to profit his own. As he loves only his own person and not others, the robber does violence to others to profit himself."172 This logic is equally applicable to

164 Ibid., p. 146. 165 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, p. 256. 166 Ibid. 167 Mozi, Ch. 44, pp. 398-399. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 398-399. 168 Mozi, Ch. 44, pp. 396-397. [Modified quote from:] LCC, pp. 396-397. The term 'righteousness' (yi); is actually used in the translation, but 'morality' conveys the intended message better. 169 Mozi, Ch. 39, pp. 296-297. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 200. 170 Mozi, Ch. 46, pp. 426-427. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 219; LCC, pp. 426-427. 171 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 148. 172' Mozi, Ch. 14, pp. 112-113. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 79. 33 interstate politics. "As he loves only his state and not the others, the feudal lord attacks the other states to profit his own."173 Mozi reasoned: "Whoever cares for others is cared for by others; whoever benefits others is benefited by others; whoever hates others is hated by others; whoever injures others is injured by others."174 Therefore, the solution to conflict and disorder in the world is the social standard of impartial caring. "If everyone in the world will care impartially; states not attacking one another; houses not disturbing one another; thieves and robbers becoming extinct; emperor and ministers, fathers and sons, all being affectionate and filial - if all this comes to pass the world will be orderly."175

1.5.4 Denouncing Aggressive Warfare (fei gong $&Q (literally: "denounce attack")

By its very nature, war negatively impacts both the victims who are attacked and the aggressors who do the attacking. There are no inherent benefits to war; it is always a costly endeavour. If it is in winter it will be too cold; if it is in summer it will be too hot. So it should be neither in winter nor in summer. If it is in spring it will take people away from sowing and planting; if it is in autumn it will take people away from reaping and harvesting. Should they be taken away in either of these seasons, innumerable people would die of hunger and cold.

But despite the realities of war, conquests of military dominance continue. Offensive warfare is typically justified using one of the following rationalizations: the desire for fame and profit; other states have profited from aggressive warfare; there have been no others this strong and capable; the sage kings of antiquity themselves used aggressive warfare to gain benefit; and the desire to establish one's fame as a righteous ruler and win the praise and respect of the other feudal lords. Mozi responded to these

justifications with an equal number of objections. These include (respectively): war is an unprofitable endeavour often not in accordance with the interests of the state; those who

173 Ibid. 174 Mozi, Ch. 15, pp. 118-119. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 83. 175 Mozi, Ch. 14, pp. 112-115. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 80; LCC, pp. 112-115. 176 Mozi, Ch. 18, pp. 144-147. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 101. 34 have ultimately lost everything in such campaigns are considerably more numerous than those who have benefited; even powerful hegemons have been defeated following successful offensive campaigns; the sage kings of antiquity used aggressive warfare in accordance with the Will of Heaven to punish the unrighteous (which is justifiable); and to establish one's fame as a righteous ruler, one need only focus on good government and benevolent rule, rather than aggressive military campaigns. Moreover, offensive conquests of military aggression are analogous to large-scale murder. There is no one who has trouble recognizing the unrighteousness of thievery. If what is stolen is increasingly more valuable, then the degree of unrighteousness of the act is equally greater. Similarly, the murder of one person incurs one death penalty. "Following this logic, the murder of ten persons will be ten times as unrighteous and there should be ten death penalties; the murder of a hundred persons will be a hundred times as unrighteous and there should be a hundred death penalties."177 There is not one individual who does not understand the value of such matters. "But when it comes to the great unrighteousness of attacking states, the gentlemen of the world do not know that they should condemn it."178 The fact that such military endeavours are cherished and recorded for posterity suggests that many individuals are genuinely ignorant of the unrighteousness of aggressive warfare. Therefore, it is important that the feudal lords be educated on the contradictions in their logic.

1.5.5 Moderation in Expenditure (jie yong ff!M) (literally: "restrain use")

The sage kings of antiquity established the model of good governance. They demonstrated the importance of moderation in expenditures by producing only that which is necessary and avoiding that which is unnecessary and excessive. "In issuing an order, taking up an enterprise, or employing the people and expending wealth, the sage never does anything without some useful purpose."179 Clothing, buildings, armour and

177 Mozi, Ch. 17, pp. 142-145. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 99. 178 Mozi, Ch. 17, pp. 142-145. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 99; LCC, pp. 142-145. 179 Mozi, Ch. 20, pp. 168-169. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 117. 35 weapons, boats and vehicles; none of these are produced without first considering their uses. These items have essential functions and should be designed to accomplish those tasks and nothing more. In this manner, "wealth is not wasted and people's resources are not exhausted, and many are the blessings procured."180 The sage kings employed these utilitarian standards because they were concerned foremost with the welfare and basic economic livelihoods of the common people. "What causes extra expense but adds no benefit to the people, the sage kings would not undertake."181 The feudal lords of the Warring States period were quite different. Employed in exhaustive activities, the common people were impoverished by lavish spending, heavy taxes, and aggressive warfare, all of which diminished the people's livelihoods. The sage kings of antiquity, who should be emulated in their conduct, urged that one should "stop when the needs of the people are satisfied."182 Therefore, Mozi said: "To cut out useless expenditures is the way of the sage kings and a great blessing to the world."183

1.5.6 Simplicity in Funerals (jie zang WW) (literally: "economize burial")

To uphold Confucian propriety, it was tradition to stage elaborate funerals and extended periods of mourning for deceased relatives. The typical funeral practice consisted of a deep burial in a massive grave mound, with inner and outer coffins, layers of shrouds, elaborate embroidery, and items buried with the body, including gold, jade, pearls, bundles of silk, wagon carts and horses, sacrificial vessels, drums, tables, pots, spears, swords, feather banners, and animal hides.184 Emperors and feudal lords were accompanied into the grave by several hundred others, while government officials required fewer.185 In addition, those who survived the dead were required to mourn for prolonged periods. They had to mourn without restraint, depriving themselves of essential nutrients and basic comforts. By making their bodies weak and avoiding any

180 Mozi, Ch. 20, pp. 170-171. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 118. 181 Mozi, Ch. 21, pp. 172-173. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 120. 182 Ibid. 183 Mozi, Ch. 20, pp. 172-173. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 119. m Mozi, Ch. 25, pp. 180-183. 185 Ibid. 36 pleasure, they would thereby demonstrate filial devotion to the deceased. According to tradition, this period of mourning was to last three years. If these practices were adopted universally, as the Confucians recommended, there should be three years of mourning for each deceased member of all five relations of the immediate family, one year for extended family, and several months for other relatives.187 According to such standards, an individual could spend his or her entire life mourning deceased relatives. "If, in adopting the doctrine and practicing the principle, elaborate funerals and extended mourning could enrich the poor, increase the few, remove danger, and regulate disorder, it would be magnanimous, righteous, and the duty of a filial son."188 But this has never been the case. Moreover, such practices injure the welfare of the people by stripping them of their wealth, impeding their productivity, and degrading their physical health. If the practices of elaborate funerals and extended mourning are endorsed as principles of government, "the state will become poor, the people few and the jurisdiction disorderly."189 Therefore, Mozi recommended that the rules for funerals and burials should be as follows: The coffin shall be three inches thick, just sufficient to hold the rotting bones. Of shrouds, there shall be three pieces, just to be enough to hold the rotting flesh. The pit shall be dug not so deep as to strike water, and not so shallow as to allow the odour to ascend. The mound shall be just high enough to be identified by the mourners. There may be weeping on the way to and from the burial, but upon returning the mourners shall engage in earning the means of livelihood.

Furthermore, "Sacrifices shall not be neglected, in order to express one's filial piety to one's parents. Thus the rules of Mozi neglect the necessities of neither the dead nor the living."191

186 Ibid. 187 Mozi, Ch. 25, pp. 182-183. 188 Mozi, Ch. 25, pp. 178-181. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 124. mMozi, Ch. 25, pp. 186-189. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 129. 190 Mozi, Ch. 25, pp. 196-197. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 134; LCC, pp. 196-197. 191 Ibid. 37

1.5.7 The Will of Heaven (tian zhi ^j£) (literally: "Heaven's will")

"What is the reason for the disorder in the world? It is because the gentlemen of the world all understand trifles but not things of importance."192 The only thing that matters in the world is righteousness. "For, with righteousness the world lives and without it the world dies; with it the world becomes rich and without it the world becomes poor; with it the world becomes orderly and without it the world becomes

1 QO chaotic." The standard for all human conduct is, therefore, whether it accords or not with what is righteous. But who determines such standards? In a government, "a standard is not to be given by the subordinates to the superior, but by the superior to the subordinates." Therefore it cannot be the common people who decide what is righteous, nor can it be the scholars, ministers, feudal lords, or even the emperor. The emperor makes the standard clear to the feudal lords, the ministers, the scholars, and the common people, but he alone does not decide what is righteous for the world.196 "The gentlemen of the world all understand that the emperor gives the standard to the world, but do not understand that Heaven gives the standard to the emperor." In antiquity, Heaven rewarded those who were righteous and punished those who were not. The successful regimes of the sage kings of antiquity (Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu), who brought benefit to the people through benevolent rule, good government, and respect for Heaven and the spirits, demonstrate how Heaven favours the righteous. Conversely, the shortened reigns of the evil tyrants (Jie, Zhou, Yu, and Li), who oppressed and brought injuring to the people and blasphemed against Heaven and the spirits, demonstrate how Heaven condemns the unrighteous.199 "When the emperor practices virtue, Heaven rewards; when the emperor does evil, Heaven punishes."

192 Mozi, Ch. 28, pp. 220-221. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 151. 193 Mozi, Ch. 26, pp. 200-201. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 136. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid. 196 Mozi, Ch. 26, pp. 200-201. 197 Mozi, Ch. 28, pp. 222-223. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 152. 198 Mozi, Ch. 26, pp. 202-203. 199 Mozi, Ch. 26, pp. 202-203. 200 Mozi, Ch. 27, pp. 208-209. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 141. 38

Heaven desires righteousness in the world because Heaven is responsible for all that exists. Moreover, all that exists was created for the benefit of man. Heaven ordered the sun, the moon, and the stars to enlighten and guide them. Heaven ordained the four seasons, Spring, Autumn, Winter, and Summer, to regulate them. Heaven sent down snow, frost, rain, and dew to grow the five grains, flax, and mulberry, so that the people could use and enjoy them. Heaven established the hills and rivers, ravines and valleys, and arranged many things to minister to man's good, or bring him evil.201

000 Because Heaven cares for all of its creations, it desires order among them.zuz The interaction between mankind and Heaven, therefore, is to ensure that this order ensues. Most importantly, from the perspective of man, Heaven upholds righteousness as the moral standard. Mozi said, "The will of Heaven is to me like the compass to the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter. The wheelwright and the carpenter measure all the square and circular objects with their squares and compasses, and accept those that fit, as correct, and reject those that do not fit, as incorrect."203 As a moral standard, the will of Heaven is "the most competent standard in the world."204

1.5.8 Explaining Ghosts (ming gui RM$L) (literally: "illuminate ghosts")

In every village there are people who have seen or heard spirits. Therefore, ghosts and spirits probably exist. Moreover, there are numerous examples from history where rulers have either believed in spirits or received reward or punishment from them. On more than one occasion, rulers have been injured or even killed by spirits who have

90S sought retribution for an unrighteous act previously perpetrated by the ruler. It is important to believe in ghosts and spirits because they can yield judgments against the human world; they are the stewards for Heaven. "One may not act disrespectfully even

201 Mozi, Ch. 27, pp. 212-215. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 145. 202 Mozi, Ch. 27, pp. 214-215. 203 Mozi, Ch. 26, pp. 206-207. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 140. 204 Ibid. 205 Mozi, Ch. 31, pp. 239-245. 39 in woods, valleys, or solitary caves where there is no man. Spirits and ghosts are watching everywhere."206 Furthermore, the belief itself in these supernatural agents of Heaven is a benefit regardless of whether they really exist or not. Quite simply, people behave better if they think spirits are watching them. "If it could be proclaimed to the whole country and to all the people, it would really be a source of orderliness in the country and a blessing to the people.'""' All cases of public corruption, immorality, thievery, and violence would be subject to the observation of ghosts and spirits.208 Then, out of fear, officials would never withhold reward when the virtuous are found, nor would they withhold punishment when the wicked are discovered. The world would be in order. In practice, respect for the spirits requires the routine sacrifice of cakes and wines. However, "even if there were really no ghosts and spirits, a sacrifice will yet gather together a party and the participants can enjoy themselves and befriend the neighbours."2

The Confucians, who for the sake of propriety readily bankrupt families to honour relatives in elaborate funeral practices and inhibit social duties with prolonged mourning, ironically do not believe that the deceased continue as spirits or ghosts. Of this, Mozi says, "To hold that there are no spirits and emphasize the need to learn sacrificial ceremonials, is comparable to learning the ceremonials of hospitality while there are no guests or to making fishing nets while there are no fish."

1.5.9 Condemnation of Music (fei yue ^0) (literally: "condemn music")

"If the musical instruments also contribute to the benefit of the people, even I shall not dare condemn them."211 Music, which symbolically represents any activity or practice pursued for the value it contains in itself, particularly those that are engaged for the sole benefit of pleasure, such as the creative arts, is to be condemned because it

206 Mozi, Ch. 31, pp. 244-245. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 165. 207 Mozi, Ch. 31, pp. 252-253. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 170. 208 Ibid. 209 Mozi, Ch. 31, pp. 258-259. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 173. 210 Mozi, Ch. 48, pp. 450-451. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 236; LCC, pp. 450-451. 211 Mozi, Ch. 32, pp. 260-261. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 176. 40 contributes no real benefit to the human world. Furthermore, musical instruments are ornate items that require fine craftsmanship, and therefore the production of them necessitates heavy taxes. Not only do musical instruments themselves fail to benefit society, but the taxes levied on the people as a result of their production add no benefit to the world and do not aid in protecting against chaos. Moreover, the love of music negatively inhibits production, because those who indulge in it are more prone to being dilatory in their duties. Most importantly, activities such as music add no benefit to the people "at the present."212 "There are three things that the people worry about, namely, that the hungry cannot be fed, that the cold cannot be clothed, and that the tired cannot get rest. These three are the great worries of the people."213 [Presently,] every large state attacks small states, and every large house molests small houses. The strong plunder the weak, the many oppress the few, the clever deceive the stupid and the honoured disdain the humble. And bandits and thieves rise all together and cannot be suppressed. But can the chaos in the world be put in order by striking the big bell, beating the sounding drum, playing the zithers, and blowing the pipes? Even I do not think it is possible.214

1.5.10 Rejecting Fatalism (fei ming #ffp) (literally: "denounce fate")

Fatalists, and the Confucians who adopt fatalist beliefs, are dangerous influences on society. These individuals argue: "Old age or early death, poverty or wealth, safety or danger, order or chaos, it is all decided by fate and cannot be modified. Failure or success, reward or punishment, luck or adversity, are all fixed; one cannot alter it merely by his wisdom and strength."215 Such ideas encourage indolence and helplessness. If the officials believe in fatalist doctrine, they will neglect their duties. If the common people believe in fatalist doctrine, they will neglect their work. "Lax government will lead to disorder; inefficient agriculture will lead to poverty. And poverty is the root of disorder

Mozi, Ch. 32, pp. 260-261. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 175. Mozi, Ch. 32, pp. 262-263. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 176. Mozi, Ch. 32, pp. 262-263. [Modified quote from:] Mei, pp. 176-177; LCC, pp. 262-263. Mozi, Ch. 39, pp. 300-301. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 202; LCC, pp. 300-301. Mozi, Ch. 39, pp. 300-301. 41

917 and insurrections." "To adopt the fatalists' doctrine is to overthrow righteousness in the world."218 Furthermore, such ideas threaten the very foundation of social control. "Did any of the laws of the early kings ever say: 'Blessings cannot be invoked and disaster cannot be avoided; reverence will not do any good and cruelty will not do any harm'?"219 "The ancient sage kings published laws and issued orders to be standards of reward and punishment, and to encourage the virtuous and to obstruct the evil."220 To advocate fatalism is to contravene the effectiveness of these social measures, measures that are designed for the purpose of maintaining social order. Under fatalism, rewards would be considered the result of pre-determined fate and people would conclude, "It is not 991 because of his virtue that he is rewarded." Punishments would lose their value as people would say, "It is not because of his vice that he is punished."222 Peace and danger, order and disorder, all of these are dependent upon the actions and discretion of those in government. To suggest otherwise is to strip those who are responsible of their moral accountability. "One's destiny does not come from Heaven, but is shaped by one's 994. 99S self." Fatalism is nothing more than the doctrine of irresponsibility. "It is a great calamity to the world."226 1.6 Mohism Reviewed Confucian doctrine had, at its core, only the best intentions for society. Confucius wished that the people would be enriched with all of the benefits of a prosperous and secure state.227 "It was, however, his point of view that such benefits can be achieved

217 Ibid. 218 Mozi, Ch. 35, pp. 274-275. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 184. 219 Mozi, Ch. 35, pp. 272-273. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 183. 220 Mozi, Ch. 35, pp. 276-277. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 185. 221 Mozi, Ch. 35, pp. 276-279. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 186. 222 Ibid. 223 Mozi, Ch. 36, pp. 282-283. 224 Mozi, Ch. 36, pp. 286-287. [Quote from:] Mei, pp. 192-193. 225 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 154. 226 Mozi, Ch. 35, pp. 280-281. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 188. 227 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 145. 42 only in a society in which the vanguard of society has been able to conquer within itself all those individual passions for gain and self-aggrandizement which make the realization of such social goals unattainable." The effectiveness of Confucian doctrine, therefore, rested solely upon the willingness of men to abide by it faithfully. A virtuous man might naturally be drawn to such idyllic behaviour, but how many men would ever achieve this high level of self-perfection? Prior to his death, Confucius himself became pessimistic about the prospects, as he conveyed his personal regret over the failure of his teachings. His declining optimism suggests a loss of confidence in his project and in his subjects. While Confucian doctrine was designed to improve society through the rehabilitation of human behaviour, in reality it ensured that society was static and stale by utilizing only the social elite, which from the Mohist perspective promoted the world's further decay.

Mozi, on the other hand, "set out from the assumption that men in a 'state of nature' are all overwhelmingly bent on benefiting themselves."230 Because man naturally thought first of himself, the embodiment of virtue was not self-perfection, but putting others first. Benjamin Schwartz has summarized these sentiments as follows: "The man of righteousness is the man who clearly understands that his own interests and the interests of all can be served only when 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' is achieved."231 A virtuous man "understands that one's 'object' of benefit must, in the first instance, be the whole human world."232 Mozi himself was primarily concerned with the welfare of people. As a result, activities that forced poverty upon the people without adding substantial benefit were condemned as unrighteous - namely, aggressive military conquests, excessive government spending, elaborate funeral practices, prolonged mourning customs, and indulgence in activities of personal pleasure. Mozi did say that if any of these activities

228 Ibid., pp. 145-146. 229 Mote, Intellectual Foundations, p. 33 (the Analects 7/18); Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 134. 230 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 146. 231 Ibid., p. 146. (italics his) 43 produced more benefit than harm, they would be permissible. In reality, however, not only did these activities fail to generate benefit, but they contributed moreover to the overall decline of social welfare. These activities were even more distasteful since most people were impoverished at the time. As Mozi said, "There are three things that the people worry about, namely, that the hungry cannot be fed, that the cold cannot be clothed, and that the tired cannot get rest. These three are the great worries of the people." Anything above and beyond what serves these basic needs is superfluous. While Mozi's most elementary concern was the welfare of people, this does not mean that he was an egalitarian.235 Humans in general deserved a minimal level of respect, namely, that which one would give oneself, but higher honours and recognition remained reserved for those who earned these accolades through hard work and devotion to righteous principles. Therein people would be motivated to pursue productivity and act morally. Mozi recognized the value of a division of labour, the recognition of talents, and the differentiation between social classes.236 These were important elements in a healthy and productive society. The political structure most suited to uphold Mohist ideals and guarantee benefit to the people and protection from harm was the authoritarian hierarchy. A political structure of this type simultaneously provided the means necessary to control the people through restraint and unify them in cause. Order was best preserved by this type of government, with rewards and punishments encouraging merit, discouraging apathy, and moderating moral behaviour. "What the superior thinks to be right, all shall think to be right; what the superior thinks to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong."237

However, it is here where a serious logical contradiction threatens Mozi's sociopolitical theory. Social order is fundamentally dependent on the people's subordination to their lord. At the same time, social order is also fundamentally

Mozi, Ch 32, pp. 260-261. Mozi, Ch. 32, pp. 262-263. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 176. Schwartz, World of Thought, pp. 151-152. Ibid. Mozi, Ch. 11, pp. 78-79. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 56. 44 dependent on the political leadership receiving and accepting remedial counsel. In one passage alone from the Mozi, there are adjacent statements that contradict one another. In this passage it is said that an individual is deserving of heavy punishment from the superior and condemnation from the people if he "should not think to be right what the superior thinks to be right," and if there is "no good counsel when the superior is at fault."238 As Mei Yi-pao first pointed out, to hold at once that an individual should adherent religiously to his superior's commands and simultaneously provide prudent and timely admonishment is to contradict oneself. Most importantly, from what basis would a subordinate determine whether a superior required reprimand? The people are not all virtuous enough to become rulers, and yet they are endowed with enough 'moral sense' to tell whether their ruler is leading in the right direction. The people are to adopt the standard of their ruler, and yet they should do so only when they judge him to be virtuous.239

To overcome this logical contradiction, Mozi introduced the will of Heaven {tian zhi) a moral standard to supersede all others.240 "That the emperor gives the standard to the high duke, to the feudal lords, to the scholars, and to the common people, the gentlemen in the world clearly understand. But that Heaven gives the standard to the emperor, the people do not know well."241 The emperor cannot make up the standard at will, because he is himself accountable to the will of Heaven. He cannot abuse his powers, nor can he neglect his affairs without Heaven issuing punishment upon him. The fate of the evil tyrants of antiquity proved this to be true. Therefore the will of Heaven was introduced by Mozi as a standard for all human conduct, including the emperor's. Heaven, which was objectively interested only in preserving what was righteous and eliminating that which was unrighteous, was the ultimate moral authority to which all

238 Mozi, Ch. 12, pp. 84-87. [Quote from:] Mei, pp. 60-61. 239 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 115. 240 Mei Yi-pao pointed out that Heaven was also a control provided to prevent Mozi's authoritarian hierarchy from becoming absolutism. See Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 126. 241 Mozi, Ch. 26, pp. 202-203. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 137. 242 Rowley, "Mo Ti," p. 262. 45 human beings were accountable. "Heaven set the pattern for men because all people are self-interested."243 This also provides an explanation for Mozi's interest in ghosts and spirits, which he believed were Heaven's agents on Earth. It is unmistakably clear that Mozi, who remained speculative of the true existence of ghosts, cared more for the affect that the belief in spirits had on people than the actual belief itself. As Mei Yi-pao said, "With such a practical philosopher as Mozi, it is always more important to see what he does with a thing than to know whether he believes it to be existent."244 For Mozi, ghosts and spirits were effective tools of social control.245 As it is claimed in the Mozi, "Spirits and ghosts are watching everywhere."246 In this manner, the supernatural elements of Mohist philosophy (often viewed as religious in nature) were little more than the most effective and far-reaching tools used to enforce proper moral behaviour.247 As A.C. Graham said, "There is nothing to suggest any spiritual dimension deeper than a guilty fear of ghosts."248

In all, Mohist philosophy is reducible to a general interest in establishing standards for society around which it can be reorganized. These standards were designed to overcome contemporary issues of the human community, and as a result were predominantly practical in nature. In Mozi's distinctive pragmatism, he demonstrated that his interest lie not with absolute ends, but in relative successes. Everything was ultimately related to human concerns, even his apparent "religion." Even the concept of 'impartial caring,' or "universal love," was a practical matter for Mozi. A.C. Graham has noted that the Mohists, famous for their notion of universal love, were historically

243 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 145. 244 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 151. 245 Ibid., pp. 151-152. 246 Mozi, Ch. 31, pp. 244-245. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 165. 247 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 158. 248 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, p. 14. 249 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 48. This effectively defeats Scott Lowe's main thesis in Mo Tzu's Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia: the Will and the Way (1992). 250 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 142. 46 known as very impassionate people. Take the example of Grand Master Fu Tun of Qin, who preferred the preservation of law over the preservation of his own son's life. "One has the impression that Mohists were not people with warm sympathies towards everyone, but people whose personal affections were disciplined by a stern sense of justice." As regards warfare, domestic corporal punishments were analogous to punitive expeditions. Graham wrote: "The Mohist has nothing against war as such, and even repudiates the aristocratic code of chivalry which Confucians were trying to keep alive. If your cause is righteous, why give the enemy a second chance?"

251 Graham, Later Mohist Logic, p. 12. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid- . 47

CHAPTER TWO: CHINESE MILITARY THOUGHT

2.1 Introduction It has been established that Mozi and his disciples were actively involved in military affairs. The history alone illustrates this. But is this relationship evident in Mohist thought and how so? Excluding the work of Robin D.S. Yates, previous accounts have failed to recognize the importance of the military chapters of the Mozi and some have denied their relevance altogether. In spite of this neglect, these chapters contain military concepts that are important components of Mohist thought. To appropriately identify and interpret military thought in the Mozi, it is necessary to know how the military realm is distinguished from the sociopolitical realm in ancient Chinese thought. This is especially true in the study of Mohism, which has been popularly stripped of its military character in favour of its social elements. Therefore, this thesis requires a standard against which to measure and categorize the military content of the Mozi- Anything from outside of the Eastern Zhou world is without general relevance to the Mohists, so the standard used must be from the same historical period. I recommend that the most appropriate reference for this study is the Seven Military Classics (Wujing qishu) J^IM-trHr of ancient China.254 Through these texts, which are said to epitomize Chinese military thought, one can hope to derive an understanding of military affairs in ancient China.

The following chapter is an examination of Chinese military thought as represented by the Seven Military Classics.255 These include: Sunzi's Art of War M.~F£&k'j The Methods of Sima (Simafa) WJJUfe Wuzi ^-?; Taigong's Six Secret Teachings ;^£-/\f§; Wei Liaozi WiWr?", Three Strategies of Huang Shigong W^JaQEL^', and Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong

254 Unfortunately, Sun Bin's Military Methods {Sun Bin bingfa MM£<&\ considered by some to be the eighth military classic, has been exempted from this study for convenience of time and space. See Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). 48

Iflfyfc^^ltl^fcKfif- These seven texts have been canonized by the Chinese as the quintessential manuscripts on military strategy and tactics. Although these writings collectively are not comprehensive in all matters of Chinese military thought, together they are the embodiment of the study. As Chen-Ya Tien argued, "No major points on the ancient concepts of war would be missed if one were to examine exclusively the major works available in this field." Each of these texts, with the exception of one (which is in effect a summary of the other six), was written during the middle to late Eastern Zhou era. Therefore, it must be said that these texts exemplify the military thought of that period. An examination of these classics for content and subject matter will reveal a great deal about the concerns of Chinese strategists in ancient times and the structure of Chinese military thought in its most fundamental form.

2.2 Project Considerations Military thought is naturally not one identifiable object. In essence it is one's contemplation and discourse on warfare. Conceptually, it can be broken down into two areas, i.e. strategy and tactics, and it can be explained as the intellectual evaluation of one or both of these matters. In the social sciences, 'strategy' is operational at two levels. It can refer to the political objectives of a state and the plans or methods for obtaining those objectives, or the implementation of military effort to achieve battlefield success. In other words, strategy is functional towards policy objectives and military ones. At the policy level it refers to the grand affairs of a state; the main concern is usually the well- being or survival of the state. At the military level it refers to the "war crafting" of a commanding general; the application of military force against an enemy on the battlefield. The term 'tactics' is sometimes interchangeably used with 'strategy' on the military level, but it is typically understood as the technical details of war fighting.

256 In Hanyu pinyin, these titles are respectively: Sunzl bingfa, Simafa, Wuzi, Taigong liutao, Weiliaozi, Huang Shigong sanlue, and Tang Taizong Li Weigong wendui. See Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). 257 Chen-Ya Tien, Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern, (New York: Mosaic Press, 1992), p. 24. 258 Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy 10, (1991): p. 5. 49

Although strategic thought is present at both the political and military levels, and is generally the connecting factor between policy and military objectives, these two manifestations of strategy are distinct. "There can be no greater error than to assume that because one has identified one's political objective, one's military objective must flow naturally or obviously therefrom." Both forms, however, are embodiments of strategic thought. Looking at the Seven Military Classics of ancient China, one could ask, "Can everything within these works be classified as 'military thought'?" Perhaps not everything written within these texts properly qualifies as such, but that is not a concern for this project. All that matters is that these texts have been identified and labeled by the Chinese as "the military classics." The reasoning behind this designation shall be left (justifiably) to tradition.

For this analysis, only English translations of the Seven Military Classics have been used, as personal translations would have been above and beyond the scope of this project. That being said, at all times I had access to the original Chinese editions of the texts. Therefore, I accept full responsibility for the quality of the translations used in this study and their concurrence with the Chinese language. In my analysis of the Mozi, which is detailed in later chapters, it is evident that I regularly referenced the original Chinese. I used my own translations or modifications of existing translations to ensure that the original Chinese was adequately represented in a reading of the text that I agreed with. For the Seven Military Classics, I rarely found the need to take such measures. Ralph Sawyer's authoritative edition of the Seven Military Classics is a carefully executed translation.260 While linguistics suggests that language is a determining factor in thought, the potential negative repercussions of this on my analyses are tempered by my knowledge and usage of the original Chinese texts.

While several of the Seven Military Classics have individually been translated by other Sinologists, Sawyer remains the only one who has translated the entire

259 Ibid. 260 Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). 50 compendium of writings in a single volume. This amounts to a welcomed consistency across the seven translations. In this thesis, the English terminology available within each translation, as provided by Sawyer, has been adopted as often as possible to articulate the content found within. Not only would developing a special lexicon for this paper prove pointless and a distraction from the texts themselves, but adoption of the translated terminology has preserved consistency across the project. The Chinese language is noted for its heavy reliance on context, so accuracy and consistency are desirable attributes. Ralph Sawyer's translations offer this basis.

Examining these writings in a language other than the original does not permit authoritative commentary on any features of style. Content is really the only thing that one has access to in a translation. This is not a textual analysis. Analysis of writing style, the reconciliation of terminology, and the finer details of syntax are all matters that need to be dealt with in the Chinese language directly.261 Similarly, historical issues such as the proper historical placement of these texts, the inconsistencies between extant remnants and details recorded in the ancient bibliographies, and whether or not the historical figures attributed to these military writings existed or even wrote these texts are of no major concern to this paper.262 All of these issues will be left to scholarship which has dealt with them in finer detail and much better than could be done in this thesis. This project is solely interested in the ideological content of these ancient writings.

2.3 Methodology All content analyses are based on some universal assumptions and judged by common criteria. The most fundamental assumption for all such analytical endeavours is

261 Benjamin E. Wallacker provides some interesting insight into the concepts of qi ijf (unorthodox) and zheng IE (orthodox). See Wallacker, "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought." Language 42, no.2 (1966): pp. 295-299. Similarly, D.C. Lau's commentary on the translation of Sunzi is similarly important. See Lau, "Some Notes on the 'Sun tzu'." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 28, no.2 (1965): pp. 319-335. 262 Robin D.S. Yates addresses these issues in, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Text: Notes on their nature and evolution, and die development of military specialization in Warring States China." T'oung Pao 74, (1988): pp. 211-248. 51 that the study of manifest content is meaningful. In other words, there exists a common universe of discourse such that "manifest content can be taken as a valid unit of study." Without this assumption, the technique of content analysis would be baseless. There are also several requirements that must be addressed when employing such methodology. Content analysis must be objective, systematic, and all inclusive.265 Moreover, what distinguishes content analysis from ordinary reading is the use of quantification, expressed numerically or otherwise.266 With this comes the assumption that frequency is meaningful in the communication process.267 These are the general characteristics of content analysis in the social sciences.

As a research method, there are as many different definitions of "content analysis" as there are techniques. But what all content analyses have in common is that each of them is aimed at answering some research question.268 In other words, there is always some theoretical purpose in mind. While some analyses are designed to test specific hypotheses, in its simplest form the content analysis is designed "to provide a more or less precise description of the content in terms meaningful for the problem at hand."269 That is, the description of the content is itself the primary objective of the analysis. In analyzing the Seven Military Classics it has been my purpose to do exactly this.

My objective is to produce a meaningful representation of the content of these military classics. That includes illustrating the relative distribution of this content across the texts. I perceive this as a necessary precursor to the study of contemporary military thought contained within the Mozi, for without it, I have no standard against which to judge and measure what I find in my analysis of the military chapters. Missing in the

263 Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971), p.19. 264 Ibid. 265 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 266 Ibid., p. 17. 267 Ibid., p. 20. 268 Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley, 1969), pp. 4-5. 269 Berelson, Content Analysis, p. 188. 52 current field of Chinese military studies is a comprehensive content analysis of the Seven Military Classics directed at describing and categorizing the content itself. There has been only one other attempt, of which I am aware, to analyze these texts using a similar approach, but the actual analysis is not provided. Alastair Iain Johnston, who indicates that he conducted an analysis of cause-effect relationships in the Seven Military Classics, uses content analysis as a means to do further analytical work on decision-making and strategic choices. It does not appear as though his initial analysis would be properly described in the manner I have outlined, but it is certain that he must have examined these texts in some basic fashion to produce the foundation for all of the other things he extrapolates from them. Needless to say, his interest lay not with the menial task of describing the content of Chinese military thought.

In this thesis, I have used a quantitative approach in analyzing the content of the Seven Military Classics. The objective is simply the identification of categories in Chinese military thought. The relative importance of these categories is, of course, displayed in my results for each analysis. However, from these I have not derived value- statements regarding the content, but merely the frequency with which these categories appear. The relative frequencies of content categories are important in the task of identifying Chinese military thought because they offer the opportunity to apprehend what relevance the various topics had to the Chinese military strategist in ancient times. Therefore, I have decided to present the results of my analyses in the simplest form possible, the numerical tally. I have not translated these results into proportions, ratios, or percentages, but have decided to leave them in their most raw form. I consider the identification of the categories, or "themes," to be the most important feature of my analysis.271 The frequency of these is without question informative, but identifying these categories is, I think, the most fundamental step in understanding these texts.

His analysis procedures are outlined in Appendix A. Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 267. 271 Berelson, Content Analysis, pp. 138-140. 53

The reason why I have decided to present the results of my analytical work in such a simple and unimaginative form is because these analyses have not been designed with the aim of producing a single right answer. Arguably, there is no such answer to this investigation. The results themselves are the answer to my question of 'What is Chinese military thought?' Similarly, I did not begin this chapter with a hypothesis in mind. The objective was to produce a descriptive representation of the content, regardless of what that content is. Obviously, I assumed that the content of the Seven Military Classics of ancient China would relate to some conceptualization of war, but this assumption is self-evident.

To address the issue of consistency and objectivity, several measures were taken. First of all, the analysis of each text was conducted independently. Therefore, the categories, or "themes," found in the results are specific to each text. While some of them may appear virtually identical across multiple texts, no category was recognized unless it was uniquely identifiable in that text. That is, no categories were superimposed prior to an analysis of any given text; each category had to be derived from the text itself. Also, the "physical unit" used in these analyses, i.e. the portion or amount of text

979 attributed with a value, corresponds to the format of each text independently. In some texts, the physical unit was the paragraph. Therefore, each paragraph represented at minimum one central idea or concept. In all other texts, the physical unit was the separated passage. The ancient military texts of China were originally transmitted on inscribed bamboo slats that were tied together in bundles. These bundles are represented in our modern renditions of these texts as separate passages. More often than not, one passage of text can generally be said to contain one dominant theme. The passage is therefore considered the equivalent of the paragraph. Having combed through these texts paragraph by paragraph, or passage by passage (however they have been presented), I identified key notions and concepts within each text. Secondary scholarship was consulted to aid in the conceptualization and

Ibid., p. 140. 54 categorization of the ideas that were found within each text, and a resulting list of themes was created for each. Determining where an idea began and ended might appear problematic; fortunately, not only were the Chinese writers dealing with relatively basic subject matter, but much of the difficult conceptual work has already been organized in the edited translations. A content analysis was conducted on each of the Seven Military Classics separately. Generally speaking, each passage, or the material under each subtitle, more often than not represented one central idea or concept. This was simply the nature in which the material was organized. Although several ideas might have been mentioned within any given passage, there was in every instance a main point or theme of the material. Where the theme of each passage was not as easily identified, I made reference to the passages in the immediate vicinity, and the nature of the content relative to the rest of the work. In this manner, the attempt was made to reflect as accurately as possible the main topics of each text.

Where appropriate, I retained concepts under their designated subtitles as indicated in the translated editions. Although each passage was assumed to represent at least one concept, the sizes of texts in each passage need not be equal. The fragile and somewhat corrupted nature of the extant texts has left much to be desired. Thus, some passages are likely incomplete, and some are known to be missing altogether. This unfortunate reality means that the modern understanding of these classical writings will at best be partial, at least unless or until more complete texts are recovered. Therefore, as mentioned, in the analysis each passage has been treated as if it represents at minimum one concept, and it is assumed that the ideas represented in a partial fragment are illustrative of a full passage on the same topic. The accuracy of such a method may be subject to question, but conversely, it does not seem appropriate to disregard partial fragments when they are present. Fortunately, this was an infrequent occurrence and the majority of passages throughout the Seven Military Classics exhibit relative consistency in size per text. 55

Conceptually, however, each passage has not been limited to one concept alone. Where passages are slightly longer or ideologically diverse, I recognized multiple themes. Fortunately, once again, such passages are in the minority by far. Attributing multiple themes to a single passage was done with much reservation, although it was done with the interest of being ideologically accountable. The qualifications for such an occurrence remained the clear differentiation between themes; the subject material needed to be different, unique, and strongly associated with a separate conceptual theme to be individually recognized. The purpose in all circumstances has been the preservation and identification of conceptual boundaries within each text.

After a text was analyzed, the secondary literature consulted, and the concepts reorganized into the principal themes of that text, I reapplied these categories to their corresponding passages as uncovered in the content analysis. This produced, for each text individually, the following: a set of approximately ten themes, a schematic of the themes across the text, and a quantifiable result that is illustrative of the distribution of content. A 'rank of themes' for each text has been produced and will be provided, along with an explanation of each theme. It needs to be noted that these rankings provide only a rough measure of the relative importance of each theme per text, and nothing more.

These ideological boundaries have been designed for the purpose of conceptualizing these writings. Where the boundaries lie between one theme and the next is specific to this analysis alone. The numerical results provided only highlight the frequency that concepts were identified, as defined for each work. There are no real lines which demarcate where one idea ends and the next one begins; this does not reach beyond an attempt at conceptualization. The intention has been to find the "best fit" for each section of text. Effort has been made to apply the analytical method as consistently as possible to curb any misappropriations. That being said, it would be argued that these analyses have been done with due diligence and that their portrayal of the textual content is accurate and true. To bolster the validity of these analyses, I will be as explicit as possible in my categorical definitions. 56

2.4 The Seven Military Classics In accordance with the technique outlined above, a content analysis was conducted on each of these texts individually. In the following, the thematic results from the content analysis of each text will be provided, along with a general description of each text and an explanation of the themes. In the interest of expediency and preserving the flow of the text, the explanation of the themes will be given only for the first appearance of each theme. However, it should be noted that there may be minute differences between how each theme is represented in each text. To suggest otherwise would be irresponsible and unmindful of the multiple origins of these written classics. There are a few minor themes which will receive no elaboration, but their titles are self- explanatory. After each text has been represented in this section, an exposition on Chinese military thought will conclude this chapter. In this section, the military classics will be presented in the chronological order offered by Ralph Sawyer in his translation.273 As Sawyer himself admits, this order is tenuous at best because of uncertainties that remain about the authenticity and historical origins of the texts. Regardless, this is one possible arrangement which may represent the appropriate historical sequence.

2.4.1 The Methods ofSima (Simafa) The Simafa dates from around the fourth century BCE, although this was likely only its compilation date. The original materials are believed to date back far into antiquity, possibly to pre-Western Zhou times.274 "Apart from the two books by Sunzi and Sun Bin, [the Simafa] has traditionally been accorded far more authenticity than any of the other military writings."275 However, the extant text is reportedly only five chapters of an original 155 from Han times; although this total might include duplicate

Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 17. Ibid.,p. Ill, p. 411. Ibid.,p. 111. 57 copies or variations of the text. There was an historical figured named Prince Fan •^-JX. who may be associated with the Simafa. He was the Director of Horses (Minister of War) for the State of Chu, and he died after the Battle of Yanling in 575 BCE.277 It is believed he was the son of a nobleman named Gongzi Ce.278 He may have genuine ties to the Simafa text, although this is mere speculation. It is probable that no single author wrote the Simafa and that it is the product of numerous contributors who may have simply used the name for historical legitimacy.

Rank of themes (frequency - theme) Freg. - Themes 16 - Civil-military affairs

14 - Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi 0,)

10 - Controlling the disposition of force (xing jf^)

8 - Preparation for war

6 - Strategic configuration of power (shi f§)

5 - Just cause (justification for war)

= 59

'Civil-military affairs' is understood to include all commentary focused on the dynamics of civil-military relations and civil governance. This includes issues of harmony between the ruler and the people, the importance of benevolence, necessity of laws, maintenance of rank, imposing order, establishing social parameters, 'awesomeness' (i.e. decisiveness of command) in civil and military authority, the use of "soft" and "hard" techniques of governing, and the difference between the civil and military realms (e.g. inside-outside analogy).

Ibid., p. 115. Knoblock, Annals ofLU Buwei, pp. 343-344; Ltishi Chunqiu, 15/2/2. Knoblock, Annals ofLU Buwei, p. 792. 58

'Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi ^,)' is a frequent theme throughout the military classics. It spans everything from stimulating strength and courage in battle to encouraging men (and families) to support the army by honouring the fallen. It includes the importance of spirit to military victory; implementation of rewards and punishments; importance of prohibitions and regulations; fear as a motivator (i.e. fear one's general more than the enemy); the effectiveness (or lack of) of extreme rewards and punishment; the moderation of military discipline for maximum results; the care and nurturing of troop spirit; shame as a motivator; and the use of oaths, formation density, drums, gongs, discipline, encouragement, and supervision for motivation.

'Controlling the disposition of force (xing J&y designates all references to the crafting of measured force deployment so as to create advantages and exploit natural terrain. This theme does not concern just the recognition of disposition, but the active manipulation of forces to effect advantages on the battlefield. Such measures include measuring army size versus terrain, the use of regular (zheng IE) and irregular (qi i?f) troops and formations, the stimulation of the enemy for assessment, planning/maintaining escape routes, and maintaining vigilance in battle.

'Preparation for war' includes all discussion related to preparation of society and the military for war. This theme includes the organization of society, exploitation of societal strengths and use of the skillful, enforcement of roles, readiness of equipment, adequacy of resources, and training and military preparedness. 'Strategic configuration of power (shi f§)' is a concept very similar and

sometimes overlapping with disposition of force (xing ]&). In general, strategic

configuration of power (shi) indicates the cultivation and application of strength, force, and influence.280 Generally it is used to refer to the exploitation of one's superior balance of power (quan |H) or configuration of force (xing). In the military classics, it is through

279 For a brief explanation of regular (zheng IE) and irregular (qi i?f), see Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, pp. 427-429. Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, pp. 429-433; Roger T. Ames, The Art ofRulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), pp. 65-72. 59 the use of the strategic configuration of power (shi) that armies win victories. The theme includes maximizing troop effort by fostering troop courage and unity, control of strategy / preservation of the subtle, targeting weakness, attacking when and where advantageous, the advantages of speed, deception, and control, flexibility of response, divide and conquer tactics, and the employment of the unorthodox (qi ijf) and orthodox (zheng IE) to wrest victory from the enemy. An army that uses its strategic configuration of power (shi) is like a river rushing down a mountain; it cannot be stopped.281 'Just cause (justification for war)' is a theme that encompasses both the necessity and proper purpose of war. The Simafa states, "If one must stop war with war, although it is war, it is permissible." This theme denotes reference to war as a social tool to rectify evil. It includes discussion on the nature of war (past and present), the proper focus of war (i.e. on enemy governments), the employment of restraint in war, and the use of war as a tool to protect life and preserve the state.

2.4.2 Sunzi's Art of War Easily the most well-known of the military classics throughout history, Sunzi's Art of War has been considered the single most important Chinese military treatise. Unfortunately, however, traditionalists still ignore the "development and existence of more than two thousand years of warfare and tactics prior to 500 BCE and [consequently]

989 attribute the virtual creation of military strategy to Sunzi alone." Although indeterminable, the core of the Art of War could have possibly been written by the actual

individual the book is attributed to, namely Sunzi Mrf (or Master Sun), who is believed

to have been a genuine historical figure named Sun Wu MM, who lived from 544-496

BCE.

Freq. - Themes

Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 156. Ibid., p. 150. 60

30 - Disposition of force (xing 0)

24 - Assessment and evaluation of the enemy

18 - Morale and motivation of spirit (qi H,)

17 - Generalship

13 - Strategic configuration of power (shi ^)

12 - Centrality of warfare

10 - Deception

10 - Military Method: measurement, estimation, calculation, weighing, and victory

2 - Balance of power (quart HI)

=136

'Disposition of force (xing -f&y is a theme of great importance to Chinese military strategy. It relates to an army's situation and form or configuration. This concept deals with matters of terrain, weather/climate, morale, time and distance, troop formations, control and command, and any other element where strengths or weaknesses may advance or impede a military force. Essentially, an army's disposition is always either good or bad and can be forced to either extreme. Maintaining a favourable disposition relative to the enemy is the most important thing to military success, as one will then present no weaknesses for the enemy to exploit. Victory in war is then about self-knowledge and self-control. The pinnacle of victory is having a disposition of force (xing) that is advantageous relative to the enemy, so much so that the enemy dare not fight. Because military power is what states use to survive, this theme specifically focuses on the disposition of force (xing) on the battlefield. Central to one's disposition are the vacuous (xu iJ|) and the substantial (shi j|f). In general, vacuous indicates

weaknesses; substantial indicates strengths.

Ibid., p. 156. 61

'Assessment and evaluation of the enemy' is a theme recurrent throughout the military classics. This theme includes military intelligence, knowledge of enemy, assessment of enemy activity, evaluation of the enemy general, observance of battlefield signals, assessment and evaluation of enemy disposition on terrain, employment of local peoples, use of spies, evaluation of enemy weakness and deficiencies, stimulating the enemy to action, probing the enemy with offensive feints, and knowledge of regional characteristics. 'Generalship' is another theme which is very common among the military classics. A general must exhibit certain qualities such as wisdom, courage, strength, certainty, and self-control. Conversely, a general must not be weak, irrational, driven by emotions, or indecisive. A general's competency level is extremely important, because war is central to a state's survival. The general is typically depicted as the "fate of the state," so the evaluation of them is of utmost importance. The general must also be the single primary knower of all military affairs. The texts differ as to whether a commanding general must be capable of both military and civil administration, but they all contend that a general's military authority must be unimpeded by the political ruler. Although each of them also stress the necessity for a general's authority or "awesomeness" to be full and complete, some of the texts show a preference for a general who also assumes no greater luxury than his soldiers.

'Centrality of warfare' is a theme that illustrates the role of warfare in society. In emphasizing the importance of warfare to state survival, this theme represents the most basic generalizations about war. The theme covers the aspects of the civil-military dimension, civil-government affairs, political objectives of warfare over military strategy, and the preference for the subjugation and preservation of the enemy over their destruction. Related themes from the other texts differ with respect to the specific discussion of war (whether they categorize warfare or discuss the nature of it), but this theme is the core basis for each of those other themes, as the emphasis here is merely on the centrality of war to state functioning. 62

'Deception' is an independent theme unique to the Art of War, but the concept itself is not as isolated. The other military classics all incorporate the principle of deception into their themes, but it is only in the Art of War that the notion of retaining formlessness, or being unfathomable to the enemy, is pursued directly. The concept of deception is fundamental to the notion of the general being the sole primary-knower of all military affairs and is important for withholding one's own military weaknesses from the enemy's peering eyes on the battlefield. If deception is maintained, the enemy cannot determine one's disposition of force (xing) and will either hesitate to attack or not attack at all. If the enemy does attack, he will attack in the wrong place and will consequently be overwhelmed. 'Military Method: measurement, estimation, calculation, weighing, and victory' is also unique to the Art of War, although the basic principles are found elsewhere in the classics. The "Military Method" is a term that the Art of War designates to the actual process of calculating the strengths and weakness of oneself and one's enemy to determine whether battle is advisable. Passages in the Art of War that have been identified with this theme could also be placed within the 'Assessment and evaluation of the enemy' category, but because of the uniqueness and prevalence of this concept in the Art of War, it was decided that it was better preserved. This theme should be conceptualized as the actual weighing of power. 'Balance of power (quan H)' is a very complex concept which takes on several forms.284 The core idea is that of power and strength, but it also indicates authority and rights. In the Art of War, quan is regularly used to identify the zero-sum numerical balance of forces. This incorporates the ideas of troop totals, alliances, and also resources. Elsewhere, Sawyer has translated quan as the tactical imbalance of force, indicating the deviation between one army and another in such numerical advantages. The term is also frequently used in the application of authority, such as in the Three Strategies of Huang Shi Gong. Here the concept denotes the power of authority within a

284 Ibid., p. 433. 63 state, such that a ruler sits at the top of the power hierarchy where authority is the greatest, and therefore the balance of authoritative power is in his favour. In this analysis, this theme has only been recognized independently in passages that specify nothing other than matter-of-fact statements about the military or political balance of power. In passages where the usage or exploitation of quart is the emphasis, either the 'disposition of force (xing ]&y or 'strategic configuration of power (shi §§)' has been attributed to it, depending on the rest of the passage.

2.4.3 Wuzi The Wuzi is considered, alongside Sunzi's Art of War, as one of the two core pillars of Chinese military thought. The Wuzi gained its fame for its serious contemplation of all aspects of war. Attributed to the historical Wu Qi ^^B (440-381

BCE), the text was probably composed by Wu Qi himself and then expanded and revised by disciples. History records that Wu Qi was a complicated individual who often contradicted his own Confucian ideals. As an army general, he is famed as having never suffered a single military defeat, and thus "his views and methods, to the extent that they may be preserved in the Wuzi, are not merely theoretical but were founded and thoroughly tested in reality."287 The text is notorious for its proposition that the military arts belong to the category of "contrary Virtue." This belief holds that, although military capability is necessary, "the longer one's involvement and the more extensive one's experience, the more likely it becomes that disaster will befall that individual."

Frea. - Themes 9 - Assessment and evaluation of disposition - 6 - a) Of enemy - 3 - b) Of terrain/climate

286 Ibid., p. 192. 287 Ibid. 288 Ibid., p. 200. 64

6 - Strategic configuration of power (shi §§)

5 - Centrality and characteristics of war 5 - Military organization, order, and control 3 - Managing military campaigns 3 - Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi H,)

2 - Just cause (justification for war) 2 - Generalship 2 - Selection and employment of men = 37

'Assessment and evaluation of disposition' is a theme that has been distinguished in this text for its unique treatment of the material. In the associated passages, the Wuzi incorporates both the assessment of the enemy and that of one's own disposition into the same evaluation. Hence, these are passages assessing disposition in general, and not just of the enemy. This theme is, however, of the same nature as similar themes. Part a) 'Of enemy' includes assessment of the tactical imbalance of power (quan H); the evaluation of enemy integrity, tactics, and the enemy commander; the use of spies; the use of offensive feints to probe the enemy; and assessment of national and regional characteristics of war fighting. Part b) 'Of terrain/climate' includes analysis of terrain, the configuration of form (xing 0), and analysis of climate/weather/environment.

'Centrality and characteristics of war' is a theme that focuses on the importance of war and its all-encompassing nature, with discussion touching on the various reasons troops are raised. This theme has been distinguished from 'Centrality of war' because this text uniquely categorizes warfare. This theme also encompasses issues pertaining to civil affairs, such as the importance of public support and the use of Confucian policies to implement adequate material welfare and the maintenance of basic virtues. The main idea is that the people's willingness depends on favourable government, which in turn determines the strength of a state. 65

'Military organization, order, and control' is a theme naturally common to the military classics. It encompasses all matters related to the organization and structuring of the army and the measures of control needed to direct it. This includes harmony and organization; order, distinction, and the maintenance of rank; compositions of units, formations, and solidarity; instruction and training; maintaining unity; formalized military units such as squads, platoons, companies; field signals such as gongs, drums, bells, and flags; formation segmentation and control; centralized hierarchical command under the general; and methods of control. The Wuzi states that a disciplined, effective fighting force needs proper organization, extensive training, and thorough motivation.

'Managing military campaigns' is a theme unique to the Wuzi. This theme specifies the management of armies on campaign, not just general war preparation. The analogy used in the text is that men are like horses, which need to be properly nourished at the appropriate times. First of all, mobility is dependent on horses, so horses themselves need to be maintained. But by extension, these vital principles apply to the troops as well. The theme encompasses the following: logistics and war preparation; the proper nourishment and appropriate eating times; adequate rest periods; erection of temporary shelters; implementation of extensive continuous training; and the general upkeep of equipment.

'Selection and employment of men' is a fairly straightforward theme. It emphasizes the need to select men only after insightful evaluation of their character, talents, and merit. After selection is made, individuals should be the properly employed according to their natural talents. Men with talents, wisdom, and those who have proven themselves are considered worthy individuals and should be appointed to important positions. The strong, brave, and highly motivated should similarly be employed in elite military units. In both the military and civil administrations, men should be assigned based on individual expertise. One of the Wuzfs underlying principles is that self- reliance leads to disaster, while accepting wise counsels leads to victory. 66

2.4.4 Wei Liaozi As with the other military writings, the Wei Liaozi is presumably based on a historical figure for which the book was named. Exactly which Wei Liao this text should be attributed to is uncertain, but the style and historical content of the text indicate that it was likely Wei Liao It£g who assisted King Hui (r.370-319 BCE) of the Wei state.289

The composition of the book clearly indicates that it was written around the end of the fourth century BCE, although some material may have been added by later disciples.290 The matter is complicated by the bibliographic accounts which have two separate entries of the same title (i.e. Wei Liaozi) and by the dramatic differences between the first and second halves of the book, suggesting that two distinct sources were cobbled together. As Wei Liao was not noted as a man with any military experience, "he appears to have been strictly a theoretician." In this largely philosophical text, success and failure in war is considered the result of human effort alone, and not fortune or fate.

Freq. - Themes 13 - Centrality of war / nature of war 11 - Military organization, order, and control 9 - Strategic configuration of power (shi §§)

5 - Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi H,)

2 - Authority 2 - Generalship 1 - Balance of power {quan HI)

1 - Tactics for attack of a fortified city 1 - Tactics for defence of a fortified city 1 - Controlling the disposition of force (xing J&)

= 46

Ibid., pp. 230-232. Ibid., p. 232. Ibid., p. 229. 67

'Centrality of war / nature of war' is distinguished from other similar themes due to the Wei Liaozi's lengthy philosophical exposition on war. Fundamentally the same as the 'Centrality of war' theme, it accounts for the importance of people, concepts of government, and the importance of welfare to maintain the peoples' allegiance. However, this theme is unique for several philosophical beliefs espoused in the Wei Liaozi. Listed, they are as follows: war is only ever a matter of human effort; necessity of markets for resources, equipment, and information; unreliability of feudal allies; excellence as a technique of mind; moderation of the peoples' indulgences; conflict as contrary virtue; weapons as evil implements; and the post of general as an office of death. 'Authority' is better dealt with under Huang Shi Gong.

2.4.5 Taigong's Six Secret Teachings Purported to record the Taigong's "political advice and tactical instructions to Kings Wen and Wu of the Zhou dynasty in the eleventh century BCE," the Six Secret Teachings claims the longest lineage of all the military classics.292 Although debate has surrounded the historical existence of the sagacious strategist and army commander the "Grand Duke" or Taigong ;fc£\ (whose personal name was either Lii Shang Sfnf or Lu

Wang Sil, and is variously referred to as Jiang Shang Hfpjfr, or by his courtesy name, Jiang Ziya H^3f), historians have more or less concluded that he not only existed but played a vital role in Zhou ascendancy.293 That being said, the Six Secret Teachings is itself of a much later date. Believed for a long time by modern scholars to be a forgery of Sui dynasty (581-619 CE) origin, the writing style, content, and additional archaeological finds in 1970 suggest that the text was composed by a military expert of the third century

Ibid., p. 23. 68

BCE. Espousing essentially the same general principles as the other military classics, the text has been shunned by Confucians for its apparent advocacy of total war.

Free/. - Themes 13 - Controlling the disposition of force (xing J&)

11 - Civil affairs 8 - Field maneuvers and tactics 6 - Selection and employment of men 5 - Strategic configuration of power (shi §§)

4 - Centrality of war 4 - Military organization 4 - Assessment and evaluation of the enemy 3 - Civil-military relations 3 - Generalship 2 - Weaponry and equipment

1 - Balance of power {quan Iff)

= 64

'Civil affairs' is a theme that is virtually identical to 'Centrality of war' and 'Civil-military affairs.' The exception from these is the lack of content regarding the military. This theme is unique to this text, as the Six Secret Teachings dedicates a significant portion to civil-government matters. This theme includes benevolence of the ruler, welfare of the people, agriculture as a basis, prosperity and good government, tolerance of allies and local customs, universal moral and social standards, virtuous qualities of a ruler, human nature, leadership by example, moderation of expenditures, attracting the disaffected, and saving the world from tyranny and suffering.

294 Ibid., p. 37. 69

'Field maneuvers and tactics' is a very straightforward theme, and one special to this text. It designates all passages explicating specific tactics for various scenarios. Without elaborating details on the suggested strategies and tactics of every situation, such commentary has been categorized together under this theme. Examples include assault methods against fortifications, night attacks, counterattacks, escape from entrapment, forest warfare, water conflict, mountain fighting, valley defence, survival under fire attack, and traps and ambushes. 'Weaponry and equipment' is another theme unique to the Six Secret Teachings. This text is the only one to comment in depth on details regarding weaponry. It includes discussion on categories of military equipment and weapons, preparation of weapons, creation of new weapons, and specialized weapons systems.

2.4.6 Three Strategies of Huang Shigong As the last of the truly ancient military writings, there are five basic views concerning the origin of this text. Among the five is one that attributes the book to the Taigong. However, "in its present form the language, subject matter, and presentation suggest it dates from near the end of the first century BCE." This approximation accords nicely with the book's storied association with Zhang Liang ^HjsL a chief

strategist in the rise of the Han Dynasty.296 The text was probably composed late in the Former Han dynasty by "integrating highly disparate Warring States material within a new, heavily Daoist perspective known as Huang-lao."297 This scenario also concurs with the contemporary political environment, with "reference to powerful families usurping power...and the narrow focus on government affairs in an age of peace." This would place the composition date of the text somewhere around 0 CE.299

295 Ibid., p. 281. 296 Ralph Sawyer, "Military Writings," in A Military History of China, (eds.) David A. Graff, and Robin Higham, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), p. 106. 297 Ibid. 298 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 283. 299 Ibid., p. 284. 70

Freq. - Themes 22 - Authority and control - 14 - a) Administrative control - 8 - b) Authority 18 - Civil-military affairs 16 - Recruitment and employment of the Worthy 13 - Generalship 9 - Strategic configuration of power (shi i|§) 2 - Importance of Three Strategies 2 - Assessment and evaluation of enemy 1 - Just cause (justification for war) 1 - Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi H,) = 84

'Authority and control' is a predominant theme in this text. It encompasses two main elements, which have been separated for distinction: a) Administrative control and b) Authority. The theme of 'a) Administrative control' is original to the Huang Shigong and focuses precisely on control over the government. It is similar in kind to 'b) Authority,' but it differs in that it homes in on the ruler's administration of government business. The government is best if the ruler advances worthy individuals to positions of power, filling his administration with virtuous administrators. The government is in poor condition if the ruler loses effective control of the government, evil men have gained control of bureaucratic offices, and parties and cliques are allowed to develop and dispense government largess. Essentially, the employment of men within government must be strictly controlled and observed. The theme of 'Authority' appears in two other texts, the Wei Liaozi and Questions and Replies. These references are identical to 'b) Authority' in this text. 'Authority' is a 71 theme focused on the political authority of a state's ruler. By extension it also characterizes the authority of government ministers. Authority (quan H) is the political power a ruler exerts over his government and state. The ruler must be the primary knower of all civil affairs and must be the sole authority of the state. A ruler exerts his authority (quart) through his awesomeness (wei JgSc) in command. He must be stern, decisive, remote, and command the respect and allegiance of men (through fear). Because the image of authority is the only basis for power and control of men, the awesomeness (wei) - i.e. the aura of the authoritarian figure - must be cultivated. The state's awesomeness (shi f^) depends on the ruler's character. Consequently, once threats are eliminated, it is vital that the corresponding ministers must have their awesomeness (wei) and authority (quan) taken away, and that they should be enfeoffed in court. 'Recruitment and employment of the Worthy' is a theme closely related to 'a) Administrative control' and the 'Selection and employment of men' found in other texts. The Huang Shigong, however, does not focus broadly on the selection and employment of men, but specifically on the recruitment of worthy individuals. A Worthy is someone who is virtuous and enlightened, a man of good character. Such men are only attracted by enlightened rulers who epitomize Virtue; they do not seek fame for themselves. This theme covers all references specifically focused on methods of recruiting and employing such characters. This includes the importance of Worthies (who are referred to as the "trunk" of the state), the recruitment of the Worthy and Sages (the Worthy are attracted to Virtue; Sages are attracted to the Tao), proper methods of honouring and embracing such men (with rank and material goods), and their common traits. 'Importance of Three Strategies' is a minor theme accounting for passages which emphasize the lessons of the book and the importance of the knowledge contained within. 72

2.4.7 Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong This text purports to be a dialogue between Tang dynasty's second emperor Tang Taizong BX% (599-649 CE) and his top general Li Jing ^$f (571-649 CE).300 Probably a forgery of late Tang or early Northern Song (960-1126 CE) times, the book "is at least based on an actual proto-work or recorded notes." Furthermore, "If the Questions and Replies actually preserves [Li Jing's] conversations with Tang Taizong, or even a large part of them, the strategies they discuss were not only theoretical concepts but had been personally tested and employed by them in critical battles." The text is principally an overview of the other military classics and their theories. Noticeable in the discussion is the absence of chariots, which were no longer useful, and the emphasis on pure flexibility, which advanced military specialization must have inspired.

Freq. - Themes 22 - Military organization, order, and control - 13 - a) Military organization, order, and control (general) - 9 - b) Formation types, design, and number 12 - Unorthodox-orthodox 12 - Disposition of force {xing f&)

1 - About the topic of military strategy 5 - Authority 4 - Centrality of war 3 - Strategic configuration of power (shi ^)

3 - Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi H,)

2 - Generalship 2 - Selection and employment of men = 72

300 Ibid., pp. 312-313. 301 Ibid., p. 313. 73

'Military organization, order, and control' is the same as noted previously under the Wuzi, with the exception of part b) Formation types, design, and number. This subsection belongs underneath the parent title of 'Military organization, order, and control.' However, it highlights the unique and unequivocal discussion on formation types, which are largely unaddressed in the other writings. This text dedicates a substantial portion to the explanation and discussion of structured formation patterns, including both historical examples and contemporary arrangements within which troops are grouped, organized, and deployed. Resembling a tic-tac-toe board, these basic formations are discussed at length. This theme is attributed to all passages specifically discussing such formations. 'Unorthodox-orthodox' is a theme that represents one of the core features of Chinese military thought. Surprisingly, this theme is only discussed in any detail in the last of the military classics. However, the concepts of the unorthodox (qi lrf) and orthodox (zheng IE) can be found implicitly throughout the other military manuals. Next to Questions and Replies, this theme is most explicit in the Art of War. These two concepts constitute a core feature of the disposition of force (xing) and the employment of the strategic configuration of power (shi). Unorthodox (qi) and orthodox (zheng) are the two polarities of military application. Every single military attack can be considered either one or the other. The term qi (unorthodox) should be conceived as the unconventional or irregular application of force, while the term zheng (orthodox) is the exact opposite. However, the distinctions between the two are not very clear and their relationship is complexly intertwined. In this analysis, this theme represents the substantial portion of the Questions and Replies dedicated to the discussion of these concepts. Generally speaking, an army attacks with its normal vanguard (zheng), but wins victory through less conventional tactics and deployments such as ambushes or cavalry encirclements (qi). However, unorthodox methods (qi) can become orthodox 74

(zheng) if they are deployed regularly or are expected by the enemy. The opposite is also true. 'About the topic of military strategy' is a theme that simply covers general discussion on military strategy as a study in itself, including historical references and comparisons between strategists. Passages under this theme do not comment on strategy per se, but rather the study of it.

2.5 Chinese Military Thought Canonized by tradition, the Seven Military Classics of ancient China are together considered the philosophical embodiment of the Chinese way of warfare. Although these texts only account for around 15.5% of all recorded military titles written between the Eastern Zhou and Qing Dynasty periods, the strategies in them are held in the absolute highest regard. This chapter has been fashioned towards characterizing Chinese military thought through the analysis of these ancient classics. Having already explored the raw thematic content of these works, a general critique of Chinese military thought is in order. First of all, the most notable attribute is the comprehensiveness of the Chinese concept of war. In each of these military writings a portion of the text, some considerably greater than others, is dedicated to issues that arguably lie outside the military realm. Such topics have relevance at the political level of strategy and are illustrative of the importance of the civilian world in military affairs. Here, the Seven Military Classics reveal both political-level and military-level strategic concerns; for the Chinese, strategic thought includes both battlefield tactics and political objectives. As Edmund E. Balmforth has commented, "The ancient concept of 'war,' in the sense of bing [Ji] as the Art of War used it in its famous opening statement [i.e. warfare is the greatest affair of the state], meant the whole range of politics and actions implied in the modern term 'national strategy' and not simply 'theater strategy' or 'battlefield

Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 44. 75 tactics.'" The incorporation of non-military affairs into military discourse demonstrates a greater social conceptualization of war and is the first indication that the Seven Military Classics are not merely studies of the execution of warfare, but studies of war as a social phenomenon. The early strategists shared an appreciation for the all-encompassing nature of warfare. They also understood that conflict was a deeply embedded feature of human society. Christopher Rand has written, "Repeatedly we find in pre-Qin writings the notion that war is a natural, evolving attribute of the human community, which has allowed, paradoxically, for the advancement of civilized life."305 Like a hereditary disorder, war was understood, then, as an inherent and almost inevitable condition that needed to be treated. Evidence of this attitude can be found throughout the military classics. For example, the Simafa famously warned, "Even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered!"306 And, as previously referenced, the Art of War famously opened with the statement: "Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Dao to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed." Several of the texts do offer guidance on how to eliminate the root causes of war, but this generally amounts to nothing more than idealistic recommendations of perfect governance and absolute accordance with the Dao. In these texts, a distinction is commonly drawn between the semi-mythical kingdoms of the past, where such idyllic conditions were achieved, and the corrupted and chaotic present, where warfare is rampant and rulers greedy. This distinction seems to imply that such perfection is ideal at best, as there is never any suggestion that contemporary circumstances can be reversed. However, the implication is always that these ideals are worth emulating. Given man's

304 Edmund E. Balmforth, "A Chinese Military Strategy of the Warring States: Sun Pin." PhD diss., Rutgers University, (1979): p. 19. 305 Christopher C. Rand, "The Role of Military Thought in Early Chinese Intellectual History." Unpublished PhD diss., (Harvard University, 1977), p. 7. 306 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 126. 307 Ibid., p. 157. 308 Tien, Chinese Military Theory, pp. 33-34. 76 natural warring state and the degradation of the contemporary state of affairs, the conclusions in most of these military texts seems to be advocacy for the second-best option next to perfect governance, which is to resort to military arms. It is here where a fine distinction needs to be made between the purpose of war and one's participation in it, as discussed in the Seven Military Classics. It is only logical to expect that the authors of the Chinese military classics were advocates of excellence in military affairs. These are intellectual discussions about the subject of war and one's participation in it. Warfare is the topic, and warfare is recommended. However, this needs to be qualified properly to be understood correctly. Attempts to identify this Chinese attitude toward war have met with varied success, and there has been much controversy surrounding the subject. The easiest way to address this issue is to revert to the Seven Military Classics themselves. It will be evident shortly that although warfare itself was about competing for advantage, "the majority of ancient Chinese strategists saw war as a means to achieve righteousness and stop unrighteousness."309 In fact, as Alastair Iain Johnston has written, "In the military texts, the only conditions under which force can be legitimately employed is to fight a 'righteous war' against those who have created the conditions for war." This concept of the 'moral war' is one that is predominant throughout the Seven Military Classics.

The Six Secret Teachings of Taigong calls weapons "evil implements" but writes, "When [the Sage Kings] had no alternative, they employed them."311 The conditions necessary to justify initiating war included the greatest extremes of social misfortune. "If there are no ill omens in the Dao of Heaven, you cannot initiate the movement to revolt. If there are no misfortunes in the Dao of Man, your planning cannot precede them. You

Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 68. 311 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 51. 77 must first see Heavenly signs and moreover witness human misfortune, and only then can you make plans."312 Similarly, the Simafa stated:

Should the rule of benevolence fail to achieve its goals, it should be replaced by force. Indeed, it is justifiable to kill those who have threatened the peace and safety of other people; it is thus also permissible to attack a state in order to save and liberate its people from a cruel tyrant. To stop a war with war is acceptable.313

And in quoting the 'Nine Prohibitions' of the Zhou Rites, the Simafa noted the first three as follows: "Those who take advantage of weak states or encroach on sparsely populated ones will have their borders reduced on all sides. Those who murder the Worthy and harm the people will be attacked and deposed. Those who are brutal within their state and encroach on others outside it will be purged."314 This theme is echoed again in the Three Strategies of Huang Shigong: The Sage King does not take any pleasure in using the army. He mobilizes it to execute the violently perverse and punish the rebellious. Now using the righteous to execute the unrighteous is like releasing the Yangzi and Yellow rivers to douse a torch, or pushing a person tottering at the edge of an abyss. Their success is inevitable!315

In another reference to military weapons, Huang Shigong calls them "inauspicious instruments" and states, "the Dao of Heaven abhors them." 316 "However, when their employment is unavoidable it accords with the Dao of Heaven. Now men in the Dao are like fish in water. If they have water they will live; if not they will die. Thus the ruler must constantly be afraid and dare not lose the Dao." The most philosophical text of the military classics is the Wei Liaozi. As can be expected, the concept of the 'moral war' plays a central role in this highly intellectual analysis of warfare. In staying with the common theme, Wei Liaozi once again states

312 Ibid., p. 53. 313 Tien, Chinese Military Theory, p. 32. 314 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 128. 315 Ibid., p. 305. 316 Ibid., p. 306. 317 Ibid., p. 306. 78 that "Weapons are inauspicious implements." 318 He adds: "Conflict is contrary Virtue. All affairs must have their foundation. Therefore, when a true king attacks the brutal and chaotic, he takes benevolence and righteousness as the foundation for it."319 Once a military is engaged in conflict, Wei Liaozi offers recommendations on how to remain righteous in battle. In general, when employing the military do not attack cities that have not committed transgressions or slay men who have not committed offenses. Whoever kills people's fathers and elder brothers; whoever profits himself with the riches and goods of other men; whoever makes slaves of the sons and daughters of other men is in all cases a brigand. For this reason the military provides the means to execute the brutal and chaotic and to stop the unrighteous.320

The Wei Liaozi is unique among the classics for its negative tone towards the use of the military. Because, on its own, the role of commanding general lacks anything that would oblige those who fill this position to respect higher morals or observe standards of behaviour (especially during the professionalized Warring States period in which Wei Liaozi lived), Wei Liaozi is particularly wary of this military office. This translates into a general concern for the military as a whole, as he considered above all the general to be "the mind of the army."321 He stated: Presently the commanding general is not governed by Heaven above, controlled by Earth below, nor governed by men in the middle. Thus weapons are evil implements. Conflict is contrary virtue. The post of general is an office of death. Thus only when it cannot be avoided does one employ them.

Wuzi was the only one among these strategists to categorize the different types of war and the associated causes. The text lists five reasons why troops are raised: fame, profit, hatreds, internal disorder, and famine. Five types of war are fought in correspondence with these stimulants: righteous war (to suppress the violently perverse), aggressive war (when the strength of the masses is employed), enraged war (when

Ibid., p. 254. Ibid., p. 273. Ibid., p. 254. Ibid., p. 250. [Modified from] Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 256. Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 208. 79 mobilizing out of anger), wanton war (when greedily seeking profit), and rebellious war (when one's country is in turmoil, the people exhausted, and countrymen rise in insurrection). Chen-Ya Tien has said of these categories that "Wars to suppress violence and quell disorder are righteous. All others, therefore, are unrighteous."325 Beyond this classification, the Wuzi champions a remarkably more positive posture toward the role and usage of the military. As opposed to Wei Liaozi, Wuzi conceived of righteousness as the coordination of both proper civil governance and military effort. After having cited one historical king who neglected military affairs and thereby lost his state, and another who relied too heavily on them but shared the same fate, Wuzi advised, "The enlightened ruler, observing this, will certainly nourish culture and Virtue within the domestic sphere while, in response to external situations, putting his military preparations in order." "Thus when opposing an enemy force if you do not advance, you have not attained righteousness. When the dead lie stiff and you grieve for them, you have not attained benevolence." Evidently, Wuzi was more aggressive in his application of military force, and he was certainly more of a military realist than was Wei Liaozi. Nevertheless, he only ever entertained the notion of a righteous war, where the objective was to "suppress the violently perverse and rescue the people from chaos."328

The only texts that do not mention a justification for war are the Art of War and Questions and Replies, which themselves are reviews of previous military tactics and theories. Questions and Replies between Tang Taizong and Li Weigong reference Sunzi's Art of War twenty-eight times, Taigong Six Secret Teachings ten times, the Simafa, 10; Wuzi, 6; Wei Liaozi, 2; and Huang Shigong, once. As an annotation of later composition, Questions and Replies is really a reiteration of previous ideas, and because

324 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 208, and Tien, Chinese Military Theory, p. 31. 325 Tien, Chinese Military Theory, p. 31. 326 Ibid., p. 32. 327 Ibid. 328 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 208. 80 it does not relate to the subject material from the same perspective, the authors are not concerned with matters of justification or cause. As for the Art of War, even Sunzi himself, the foremost advocate of offensive military strategies, famously stated, "Unless endangered do not engage in warfare." Although this does not amount to a moral statement like those from the other military classics, the sentence is open to interpretation. Perhaps it could be said that one would only be endangered because of the unrighteous acts of another. At the very least, unprovoked war is not authorized. When taken in conjunction with Sunzi's proclamation that "Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence," it appears that Sunzi shared the same attitude towards war found in the other texts. However, because of ambiguities in the Art of War, this subject has been the object of great controversy and debate. And because of Sunzi's individual importance to Chinese military thought, the resolution of this controversy is central to the identification of the greater Chinese attitude toward war.

2.6 A Modern Perspective In his groundbreaking monograph, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (1995), Alastair Iain Johnston attempts to resolve this exact issue. He argues that traditionally held beliefs about Chinese military preferences are not substantiated by Chinese history or even the Chinese military classics themselves. In his book, Johnston appropriately challenges secondary scholarship for its careless depiction of a generally non-violent Chinese culture. "Concepts, phrases, and passages such as [Sunzi's above statements] have sustained a view in much of the secondary scholarship that Chinese strategic culture downplays the efficacy of violence, that it exhibits a marked 'disesteem of violence.'"331 As Johnston argues, this portrayal is

9 Ibid., p. 184. 0 Ibid., p. 161. 1 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 99. 81

"often juxtaposed explicitly with an alleged Western or Clausewitzian tradition where war is seen as 'an act of violence pushed to the utmost bounds.'"332 Having correctly identified a monumental error in traditional Chinese historical studies, Johnston's project is to rectify this inadequacy in the scholarship by redefining the military classics through a comprehensive analysis of content and logical associations. His objective is more than just the identification of this problem in traditional studies; his goal is to identify and define the overarching grand strategic preferences propagated by Chinese strategists. In other words, Johnston defines the Chinese attitude toward warfare as available in the Seven Military Classics. In his analysis, Johnston discovers that not only does scholarship underrate the Chinese strategist's reliance on violence, but Chinese strategies on the whole express a remarkably aggressive quality, contrary to traditional beliefs.

There are essentially two parts to his argument. One is that the Chinese have endorsed violence as a legitimate tool historically and conceptually. The other is that there exists a cultural preference for aggressive and violent strategies. The objective of his analysis is primarily to illustrate the predominance of this second point regarding cultural preferences. For Johnston, it is not the military level of strategic thought that is significant, but the grand policy level. His thesis claims that this preference for violence is so culturally embedded in grand strategic decision-making that it has permeated cultural norms and guided Chinese military strategy throughout history.

The first part of Johnston's argument is a welcome addition to this field of study. The second part, or rather Johnston's main thesis, contradicts the consistent 'moral war' theme previously identified in the classics. As it turns out, this discrepancy is generated by an error on Johnston's part. While he does identify aggressive strategic tendencies, they remain at the military level and have little to do with political objectives. Clarifying Johnston's error will assist in resolving this issue for this thesis.

332 Ibid. 82

The essence of Alastair Johnston's argument rests on what he perceives as unaccounted-for logic in the military classics. He argues: At a more mundane level, the notion that 'not fighting and subduing the enemy' is the core of [the Art of War] loses sight of what the rest of the text tells a strategist to do: the last eight of the thirteen chapters explore the principles of mobile warfare - attacking, defending, and invading other states under maximal geographic, logistic, and tactical conditions.333

"It is really only in the first and third chapters that one finds strategic axioms that might be construed in the standard way as stressing 'not fighting and subduing the enemy.' But, as the cognitive map [drawn by Johnston] indicates, these are not necessarily central to the text or to traditional Chinese strategic thought in general."334 He continued, "One could argue, then, that the essence of strategic choice in the military texts is not 'not fighting and subduing the enemy' but 'respond flexibly to the enemy and thus create conditions for victory'."335

As correct as Johnston is for recognizing how the subject matter in the Art of War is distributed across the text, so that the majority of the book consists of principles on conducting mobile warfare, his conclusions suggest that he is neglectful of the logical associations he sets out to explain. He does not adequately explain why the strategic axiom of 'not fighting and subduing the enemy' is not central to the text, except for reference to his cognitive maps. The message of such an axiom is itself logically more significant than any statement on mobile warfare that can be found anywhere in the remainder of the text. (For example: "When it rains upstream, foam appears. If you want to cross over, wait until it settles."336) How can Johnston fail to recognize the difference between such content?

His conclusion should read: "One could argue, then, that the essence of military strategic choice in the military texts is not 'not fighting and subduing the enemy' but 'respond flexibly to the enemy and thus create conditions for victory.'" The grand

333 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 334 Ibid., p. 102. 335 Ibid. 336 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 173. 83 strategic preference remains 'not fighting and subduing the enemy,' regardless of what the rest of the text tells a strategist to do. The rest of the text offers military strategies conditional on the political strategy failing. The political objective is the ideal and the military objectives are next to the ideal. Elsewhere, he identifies six strategies employed in the Seven Military Classics, including accommodation, static defence, invasion, military destruction, political destruction, and annexation.337 After determining which texts endorse which strategies, Johnston classifies their grand strategic preferences as either 'accommodationist,' 'defensive,' or 'offensive.'338 With reference to these tabulated results, he writes, All the texts consider the invasion of an enemy state to be a legitimate step in the pursuit of state security, and six of the seven texts explicitly accept the destruction of the enemy's military capability as an important part of the process. This conclusion is corroborated by the language used in the texts to describe legitimate actions against an enemy and legitimate outcomes of these actions.

He also lists a selection of seventy total verbal expressions used that describe "offensive, invasive, and destructive actions" such as 'attack,' 'invade,' 'punish,' and 'destroy.' ° From this basis, Johnston concludes that "In all there is a high degree of agreement on the role of offensive, invasive uses of force."341 However, Johnston fails to realize that he is analyzing military strategies and not political ones. There are actually two layers of logic in the military classics, but he sees only one. In the Seven Military Classics, aggressive military action is discussed and endorsed only on the political premise of righteous war against the unrighteous. His analysis returns such aggressive and offensive strategies because he studies the pure military sections of the text, and no legitimate military strategist would have written a military text that recommended pacific, static, and completely non-aggressive military strategies. (At least, no strategist that would have been remembered through time!) This would hardly constitute military strategy.

337 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 144. 338 Ibid., pp. 144-148. 339 Ibid., p. 144. (italics mine) 340 Ibid. 341 Ibid., p. 145. 84

It seems as though Johnston genuinely missed this distinction between political and military levels of strategy. As previously mentioned, these two manifestations are distinct. "There can be no greater error than to assume that because one has identified one's political objective, one's military objective must flow naturally or obviously therefrom.'"^ The inverse of this is true as well. One of Johnston's problems appears to be his own word choice. For example, 'legitimate' is not the proper word to use in describing the adoption of offensive strategies and aggressive terminology in the classics, yet Johnston uses the word frequently to establish his arguments. A better word would be 'effective.' The sentence would then read: "All the texts consider the invasion of an enemy state to be an effective step in the pursuit of state security." While the meaning may be approximately the same in English, there is a subtle but important difference. By using the term 'legitimate' instead of 'effective,' Johnston invoked a sense of value, suggesting perhaps a moral legitimacy to such actions. Whether purposefully done or not, this helps sell his argument that offensive actions are politically preferred, because invasion is considered "legitimate" in every text. From a military standpoint, invasion may be considered legitimate as a tactic, but because it is effective, not because it is necessarily desired. Yet, Johnston decided, "We can safely conclude that violent grand strategies are preferred to nonviolent or accommodationist ones."

While his account remains one of the most complete analyses of the Chinese military classics, Johnston confusingly infuses grand strategic preferences together with military preferences. Strangely enough, he already answers his question early in his book when he writes, "In the military texts, the only [italics his] conditions under which force can be legitimately employed is to fight a 'righteous war' against those who have created the conditions for war."344 Fortunately, his analysis did produce at least two very important revelations. First of all, the Seven Military Classics readily endorse violence as

342 Klein, "Strategic Culture," p. 5. 343 Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 143. 344 Ibid., p. 68. 85 a means to strategic ends. Secondly, the military strategy of the Seven Military Classics is predominantly aggressive and offensive-minded. There is a unique interplay of "soft and hard" techniques in these texts, but the pinnacle of Chinese military strategy is the overwhelming of one's enemy through military means or superior disposition. What Johnston has actually illuminated in his analysis is Chinese military preferences for effectiveness in war fighting. What the Seven Military Classics advocate is nothing more than excellence in warfare, if warfare is needed or resorted to. The common premise on which these discussions of excellence are based is that of combating the unrighteous. There should be no confusion about this. As demonstrated here, the military classics are clear on their conditions for employing the military. However, let there be no mistake about it, if war is deemed necessary because of unrighteousness, these texts are also unanimous in the determination that one must fight a ruthless, violent, and decisive war until the eradication of unrighteousness is achieved.

2.7 Excellence in Warfare Excellence in warfare was the main idea behind the Chinese military classics. This is evident not only in the numerous references to effective military techniques and orderly military affairs, but in the various passages that recommended victory without battle. As Sunzi himself said, "Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence."345 This statement is clearly about the epitome of excellence in warfare and has nothing to do with moral justification. It is echoed in the other classics as well. The Six Secret Teachings, for example, says: "If you can attain complete victory without fighting, without the great army suffering any losses, you will have penetrated even the realm of ghosts and spirits. How marvelous! How subtle!"346 The Wei Liaozi similarly exemplifies military excellence through reference to the Sage Kings of antiquity, stating: "King Wu did not exhaust the warriors or people, the soldiers did not

345 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 161. 346 Ibid., p. 53. 86 blood their blades, but they conquered the Shang dynasty and executed King Zhou. There was nothing auspicious nor abnormal; it was merely a case of perfecting oneself or not perfecting oneself in human affairs."3 7 The Wuzi also expresses praise for non­ violent victories over exceedingly violent ones, saying, "Those who have conquered the world through numerous victories are extremely rare, while those who thereby perished are many."348 To this end, Sunzi and Wuzi both suggested that the preservation of the enemy's infrastructure and the protection of his people are important military objectives in the pursuit of excellence. Sunzi says: In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the enemy's state capital is best, destroying their state capital is second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army is second-best. Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions is second-best. Preserving their squads is best, destroying their squads is second-best. For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence.349

Elsewhere he says:

Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people's states without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of 'preservation.'350

And Wuzi says:

After his cities and towns have already been shattered, enter each of the palaces, take control of their bureaucrats, and collect their implements of administration. However, wherever your army goes do not cut down the trees, destroy the houses, take the grain, slaughter the animals, or burn their supplies. Thus you will show the populace that you do not harbour vicious intentions. Accept those who seek to surrender and settle them.351

All of these passages arrive from purely strategic consideration, but none of them negate the premise of a moral war. In fact, in the Wuzi example, it is clearly evident that the

34/ Ibid., p. 256. 348 Ibid., p. 208. 349 Ibid., p. 161. 350 Ibid. 351 Ibid., p. 223. 87 object of attack is not the people of the enemy state, but the unrighteous ruler and the infrastructure that would support such unrighteousness. The emphasis on excellence and the perfection of military craft illustrates the importance of executing military affairs effectively and decisively in a very hostile environment. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, there was no margin for error in military affairs, nor was there pity for the soft or pacific. The hard military policies advocated in these texts correspond to the harshness of the political and military environment of the times. Modern commentators who have appealed to Sunzi's aggressive nature need only observe the historical environment he was writing about: an extremely hostile, multi-state system dominated by an over-sensitive balance of power in which state survival was the foremost concern. The military theory in the Sunzi may be oriented overwhelmingly towards the aggressive side of warfare, but the explicit interlude at the beginning of the text was intended to contextualize the discussion by premising it within the respective historical framework. As the most anti-military among the Seven Military Classics, the Wei Liaozi even stated: "At the present time the warring states establish their awesomeness, resist their enemies, and plot against each other. Thus they cannot abandon their armies." Most importantly, it must be recognized that the Chinese military classics, in general, do not glorify war but treat it as a regrettable and necessary aspect of human society. Instead of reading different interpretations into what is written in these texts, why has attention not been drawn to what is not said? Almost every text mentions the necessity to maintain war preparations and military readiness, but none of them openly advocate for the unjustified or unrighteous annexation of other territorial lands.

2.8 Civil and Military (wen-wu) SiMi

Finally, one must note something in general about Chinese thought. Contrary to what may be popular belief, the Chinese do not like dualisms. In fact, they much prefer

Ibid., p. 273. 88 monisms and polarities. As Peter Boodberg stated, "Chinese thinking has as its fundamental principle, polarity, and not dualisms. Yin [H] and yang [|i§] are not irreducible or contrasting, they blend imperceptibly into each other."353 Similarly, For most of the political philosophers of China, the civil and military functions are closely bound together. The wen ~$C (civil) and the wu 3£ (martial) are the two poles of political activity. It is as hard to draw the line between them, as it is to differentiate the two members of any Chinese binom.354

Indeed, the integrated manner in which the civil and military realms functioned during Eastern Zhou times is embodied within the core of the military classics. The analysis results have shown the high occurrence of civil affairs of one sort or another in each of the Seven Military Classics. Far from being strictly concerned with military strategy, Chinese strategic thought focuses on overall grand strategy. War is considered an essential function of government. In Christopher Rand's "The Role of Military Thought in Early Chinese Intellectual History" (1977), he carefully outlines this exact feature of the military texts, accounting for the treatment of and distinctions between wen j$C (civil) and wu j£

(martial) in the ancient traditions.355 Although he focuses on the differences between the military classics with regards to the predominance of either the civil or martial realms, or the synchronicity between them, his dissertation notes the close relationship between these two aspects of early Chinese society. He states, "The origins of war are said to coincide with the drive to survive and with the demands of the natural environment... [..]... This indulgence in wu (the martial) was not viewed as a disruption of order, but a means of preserving it."356 Furthermore, Far from being an aberration or a disturbing event in early Chinese culture, war was a normal part of the yearly growth cycle... [..]...But with an ever greater

Peter A. Boodberg, "The Art of War in Ancient China: A study based on upon the Dialogues of Li, Duke of Wei." PhD diss., (University of California, 1930), p. 11. 354 Ibid., p. 15. 355 Christopher C. Rand, "The Role of Military Thought in Early Chinese Intellectual History." Unpublished PhD diss., (Harvard University, 1977). 356 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 89

differentiation of people and territory, it was necessary for leaders to devise means for utilizing conflict in such a way that growth was still sustained.357

Indeed, if one looks to the historical and environmental influences on the military classics, it is evident why certain topics received the emphasis accorded to them. "There was a clear realization that war, though still useful for expansion and cultural enrichment had to be balanced carefully with the pacific arts of government, with internal ordering, and with social stabilization."358

Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 12. 90

CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY CHAPTERS OF MOZI

3.1 Introduction The Seven Military Classics are primarily theoretical in their approaches to the subject of warfare. The Mozi, on the other hand, is quite different. Most of the military discussion in the Mozi is limited to tactics, preparations, and organization. Explicit theoretical discussions are, for the most part, restricted to the chapters on 'Denouncing Aggressive Warfare.' It should be remembered that as a philosopher Mozi was interested mainly in the practical application of knowledge.359 Thus, his military thought is considerably more reactive and prosaic than it is abstract like the military classics. It has been suggested that the Mohist military chapters themselves are possibly technical manuals designed by the Mohists for their own usage.360 They lack "redundant wording," "rhetorical flourishes," and they are obviously "not intended to persuade anyone." As Robin D.S. Yates has argued, among the military texts of ancient China, "the Mohist works are the most introverted and directed at specialists within their own school."362

Regardless of this, military thought of any origin has as a requisite some antecedent conceptualization of warfare. Therefore, despite the relative lack of explicit theoretical analysis, the Mohists necessarily embraced a more comprehensive understanding of strategic warfare; it was just never recorded explicitly in the historical texts. The Mohist organization did not assume responsibility for the perfection of military strategy or the obligation of passing such skills onward. The Mohists were interested foremost not in fighting wars, but in eliminating the need for them altogether. Their adoption of military means was only out of necessity. Nevertheless, let this not be

359 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 113. 360 See Robin D.S. Yates, "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Text: Notes on their nature and evolution, and the development of military specialization in Warring States China," T'oung Pao 74, (1988): pp. 211-248. 361 Yates, "New Light," pp. 242-243. 362 Ibid., pp. 248. 91 mistaken for suggesting that this negates the importance of excellence in warfare for the Mohists. The execution of warfare was just as important to the Mohists as it was to any other group and perhaps even more so. War fighting was an essential of survival for the Mohist School; it was just not the legacy they wished to be known for. In the end, the only real difference between the Mohists and the militarists was their respective vantage points. Yates has written: "It is through the writings of the Mohist School that we can see into the inner workings of the tactics involved in contemporary siege warfare, for the other military manuals pay little attention to such matters, being written, for the most part, from the point of view of the besiegers, not the besieged."363

3.2 Methodology The extant Mozi appears to be a compilation of three or four original versions, and is probably the result of an early but poorly executed compilation.364 It is suspected that a Han Chinese compiler juxtaposed different versions of the same passages without properly distinguishing between them and then re-incorporated those passages into different places within the text. As a result, the thematic content is not entirely consistent with the chapter titles. Until recently, the only English translation of the military books of the Mozi remained the previous academic work of Robin D.S. Yates. In Yates's academic translation, he ignored the divisions and chapter titles altogether and divided the text into separate fragments that accorded to the content as opposed to the titles. Yates wrote, "The divisions into different fragments have, therefore, been made as

Robin D.S. Yates, Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 5, Chemistry and Chemical Technology; Part 6, Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 254. 364 Yates, City under Siege, p. 47. 365 Ibid. 366 The Library of Chinese Classics edition of the Mozi (2006), published by Hunan People's Publishing House, was not used in this content analysis because it remained unavailable at the time the analysis was performed. Furthermore, this translation is lacking the necessary amendments to the military chapters applied by Yates in his translation. Yates is not even referenced in this English translation of the Mozi. See Robin D.S. Yates, The City under Siege: Technology and Organization as seen in the Reconstructed Text of the Military Chapters of Mo Tzu, PhD. Dissertation (unpublished), Harvard University, 1980. 92 much because of semantic content as for convenience for the reader." Nevertheless, Yates clarifies which fragments he believes ideologically relate to others. The translated text results in a total of 148 fragments as presented by Yates. Because of the corrupted nature of the original text, these fragments vary in size from as short as two sentences to a full page. Several of them remain quite corrupt through the translation with sentences trailing off unfinished, and one fragment, number 80 is so insignificant as to render interpretation impossible. As a result of the inconsistencies among the fragments, a content analysis could not conform strictly to the structured presentation of the text, so that each fragment could be attributed to one theme equally. The analysis has instead necessarily followed from the ideological discourse. However, I have assumed that each fragment, regardless of size, represents at least one of the themes. Again, while this might produce skewed analysis results, arguably the omission of material would be more inappropriate. Nevertheless, discretion was used throughout the course of the analysis. Of course, in turning to the ideological discourse, the issue again becomes one of determining what constitutes a concept: where does it begin? Where does it end? Fortunately, the subject material in the Mozi, as transmitted by Yates, is relatively simple in nature. It is still not ideologically fluid or linear, but it is easily categorized.

3.3 The Text This analysis has been limited to the two military books at the end of the Mozi. As a whole, the Mozi is an unusually large corpus of writings for a pre-Qin era text, especially as compared with the military classics. Therefore, to perform a content analysis on the entire Mozi would be beyond the scope of this paper and too cumbersome a project. Nonetheless, as has been earlier argued, the text is relatively coherent as a whole. Discrepancies between chapters may suggest different authors or editions, but it has never been suggested, nor should it be, that any section of the text is inconsistent with

Yates, City under Siege, p. 55. 93

Mozi's original ideology. As far as is known, all portions of the Mozi may well have been inspired by the Master himself. The two military sections of the Mozi are books fourteen and fifteen. Together they comprise chapters 52 to 71 of the Mozi, roughly one third of the entire text. Time and history has taken its toll on the Mozi, as eighteen of the total 71 chapters remain missing today. Unfortunately, of the total twenty chapters of the military books, nine of those are among the missing, including titles. This leaves only eleven chapters in the military books, and thus only a partial insight into Mohist military thought. This unfortunate fact and the corrupted nature of the recovered text have made study of the document difficult. However, as previously mentioned, the reconstruction work of Robin D.S. Yates has rendered a highly readable and informative text of that which remains. In the extant text of the Mozi, the titles of the chapters are given as follows:

Book 14 Chapter 52: Fortification of the City Gate (bei chengmen f/iMf"!)

Chapter 53: Defense against Attack from an Elevation {bei gaolin flfrSjKsi)

Chapter 54: (title lost) Chapter 55: (title lost) Chapter 56: Defence against Attack with Ladders (bei ti fjf^)

Chapter 57: (title lost) Chapter 58: Preparation against Flooding (bei shui HzK)

Chapter 59: (title lost) Chapter 60: (title lost) Chapter 61: Preparation against Sudden Attack (bei tu fjff;fe)

Chapter 62: Defence against Tunneling (bei xue fj§7^)

Chapter 63: Defence against a Mass Infantry Assault (bei efu \MWiM) 94

Book 15 Chapter 64: (title lost) Chapter 65: (title lost) Chapter 66: (title lost) Chapter 67: (title lost)

Chapter 68: The Sacrifice upon the Arrival of the Enemy (ying di ci *MWM\)

Chapter 69: Flags and Pennants (qi zhi JUffD

Chapter 70: Orders and Commands (hao ling 5^^)

Chapter 71: Miscellaneous Measures in Defence (za shou |$rvF)

Robin D.S. Yates has also identified several titles that may be among those chapters lost. Without further means to reconcile these names, it will remain unknown whether these are the missing titles from the extant text or variations of existing titles drawn from different versions.36 Among them, however, are a few which might suggest a more comprehensive analysis of military strategy. Those that stand out include: "Defence to the Death" (shou si xf^E); "Preparations for Defence" (shou bei Tffjfi);

"Orders for Defence" (shou ling ^f^)\ "Rules for Defence" (shou fa ^f££); "Mental

Techniques" (xin shu >{/M)\ "Human Affairs" (ren shi J\M)\ "Sending out Scouts" (fa hou Hflfc); "Preparation against Fire" (bei huo Omik.)', "Rules for Armouries" (ku fa j|rffi); "Soldiers/Warfare of a True King" (wang bing zEJ^); "Rules for Markets" (shi fa

rff/£); "Rules for Judicial Officers" (Ufa $y£); "Rules of a True King" (wang fa 3LT£);

and "Orders for Soldiers" (bing ling Js^p).369 Whether these titles reflect any greater

conceptualization of war would be mere speculation. However, even without these

chapters, there is a considerable amount of military theory that can be extracted from the

implicit strategy contained within the existing portions of the text.

368 Yates, "New Light," pp. 239-241. 95

3.4 Analysis Results Again, I have identified ten themes in the analysis. Two of the themes are divided into subsections to provide further illustration of thematic content. A 'theme' is not necessarily constituted by technical particulars, such as 'defence against tunneling' versus 'defence against a mass infantry assault,' but rather is comprised of commentary of the same nature and/or purpose, such that both 'defence against tunneling' and 'defence against a mass infantry assault' might be categorized under 'defensive preparations' or possibly 'defensive tactics' depending on particulars. Effort has been made to limit all or any personal embellishment and restrict terminology to that found in the translation. However, the Mohists were not traditionally known for their high culture or refinement, and as result the concepts are not particularly linear. Therefore, it is fitting that some degree of creative interpretation is needed to extract ideas and reconcile them throughout the sections.

In reapplying the ten themes that were identified through the analysis as present within the Mozi, I have produced an approximate scheme of ideological importance. With a total of 148 fragments, 211 thematic references were identified. The following ranking scheme illustrates these findings:

Frequency - Themes 83 - Civil-military affairs - 37 - a) Civil organization, distinction, and control - 22 - b) Military organization, distinction, and control - 11 - c) Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi H,)

- 10 - d) Management of social mobility - 3 - e) Divination/ritual 61 - Defensive preparations (10) - 25 - a) Fortifications 96

- 14 - b) Weapons/equipment - 12 - c) Provisions/materials/logistics 19 - Selection and employment of men 18 - Defensive tactics 13 - Assessment and evaluation of enemy 6 - Centrality of war 4 - Generalship 4 - Strategic configuration of power (shi |§)

2 - Disposition of force (xing ^)

1 - Balance of power (quan H?)

= 211

These thematic references were identified and collated using parameters explained in the paragraphs below: 'Civil-military affairs' is the theme of greatest prominence in this analysis. For refinement, this theme was subdivided into 5 categories: 'a) Civil organization, distinction, and control,' 'b) Military organization, distinction, and control,' 'c) Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi Hi,),' 'd) Management of social mobility,' and

'e) Divination/ritual.' These subdivisions were chosen because the textual content displayed minute but relevant distinctions in the topic matter. Where there were issues of civilian order and organization, proper civilian conduct, identification, gender roles, private property, laws and prohibitions, rewards and punishments for civil acts, and civilian contribution to the military effort, subdivision a) was designated. Subdivision b) is identical, but is specific to military personnel, such as soldiers and officers. Where the text was discussing techniques for, or the importance of, arousing the morale and spirit of the people or soldiers, subdivision c) was attributed to it. Content that was applicable to 'd) Management of social mobility' refers to the physical restraint and control of the populace, as opposed to the sociological notion of mobility in a social hierarchy. This 97 theme could just as easily be substituted into themes a) or b) under the notion of control; however, it has been distinguished to preserve the unique emphasis on people management in the military chapters. Understandably, this topic is especially important to the defence of a city under siege. Finally, the last subdivision, 'e) Divination/ritual,' is merely meant to preserve the Mohist belief in divination and the few references to it in the military chapters. This is important because the Chinese military classics differ on the relevance of auspicious and inauspicious signs.

'Defensive preparation' is a theme designated to cover all significant commentary on prewar preparations. This includes everything from prewar planning, to the construction of fortifications and weaponry, to technical design and blueprints for city construction, to logistics. For specificity, this theme has been subdivided into 3 parts: 'a) Fortifications,' 'b) Weapons/equipment,' and 'c) Provisions/materials/logistics.' Single passages that express concepts from two or more of these subdivisions, but in an undifferentiated manner, were identified under the umbrella title of 'Defensive preparation.' In such cases, specificity was deemed indeterminable, and to attempt so would only skew the results unnecessarily. 'Selection and employment of men' is a theme generally embedded within other themes. In this analysis, identification occurs wherever the talents, skills, and/or strength of individuals are deemed of great importance. The reason for recognizing this theme independently in this analysis lies with its relative importance in the Seven Military Classics. In the classics, this theme receives considerable attention because the employment of men can be a deciding factor in military combat. In addition to that, throughout the rest of the Mozi, there is a premium placed on utilizing both capable and worthy individuals. 'Defensive tactics' covers all discussion of specific techniques in battle, including defensive maneuvers, counterattack methods, and the employment of deception to rout the enemy attacker. 98

'Assessment and evaluation of enemy' denotes all content stressing the methods, techniques and importance of assessing the enemy and their commander. The main point is that knowledge acquired from various forms of field intelligence such as through the employment of scouts and from simple observation is fundamental in determining the enemy's location, character, resolve, and any possible weaknesses. 'Centrality of war' is understood to include commentary emphasizing the importance of war, i.e. its central role in human affairs, its all-encompassing nature, generalizations about what war is, what it means, and what it requires, and just cause or justification for war. The military chapters of the Mozi are not dense with material of this nature, but there are sections which require this identification because they are essentially generalizations about war. 'Generalship' is also not discussed with much frequency in these chapters. This theme covers all commentary directed at identifying qualities and characteristics of military generals, their duties, capability, authority, and roles that each must possess, command, or fulfill. Lastly, the three remaining themes: 'Balance of power {quan H?)', 'Disposition of force (xing ]&)', and 'Strategic configuration of power (shi §§)' are concepts distinguished in the military classics. Therefore, it is important to observe for them in the Mozi. These concepts encapsulate the essence of force application in Chinese military strategy, as the balance of power (quan) is about relative strengths, disposition of force (xing) is about situation, circumstance, or form, and strategic configuration of power (shi) is about the cultivation of advantages to overwhelm the enemy. These simple definitions do not do these terms proper justice; however, this is sufficient for this analysis. The single reference in my analysis to the balance of power (quan) was in fragment 51, where the number of defensive troops sufficient to confront an offensive force is outlined. The two references that directly specify disposition of force (xing) are fragments 74 and 148. The first one discusses the sufficiency of resources, materiel, and

Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 156. 99 defensive implements in the frontier regions, as well as the formation of defensible terrain. The latter is the very last fragment of the entire Mozi, and it details five unfavourable situations where it is suggested that one should decide not to posture a defensive effort. And the four references to strategic configuration of power (shi) in the analysis deal with less tangible conceptualizations of power; namely advantages conferred by the cultivation of knowledge, quickness (or speed), and spirit. At a glance, this analytical assessment pinpoints what military issues the Mohists valued foremost. The main thrust of these two books is the relationship between the civilian and military sectors of society during the cooperative defence of a city. Given that the Mohists busied themselves first and foremost with military defence, especially of fortified cities, there is no wonder why this issue commissioned such great importance. From the content analysis that has been performed, many specific details about Mohist strategy and tactics are available for further explication. These details shall now be reconstructed with reference to Yates's fragments to demonstrate the finer specifications of Mohist military ideology.

3.4.1 Civil-military affairs a) Civil organization, distinction, and control i.) Organization and Distinction In terms of social organization, the military chapters of the Mozi place a premium on structure and order. Accordingly, all civilians should be provided duties and a rank. "When you receive wise lords and those with plans and skills or craftsmen, rank them in order. As for all butchers and wine-sellers, set up kitchens and give them duties, ranking them in order."371 The purpose of assigning duties is to keep the people active and satisfied; the purpose of assigning them rank is to give them social responsibility. Conceivably, an active and responsible populace is a reliable one, for they do not have time for indulgence nor do they embrace treacherous thoughts. Part of the organization

1 Yates, City under Siege, frag 55, p. 364. 100 process is also identification. Hence, numerous fragments stress the proper and clear identification of names and duties. "People are to write their names in person in large characters on boards and display them in their offices."372 The military chapters also emphasize the distinction between genders. "The officers, soldiers, and people, male and female, are to be distinguished by different

'in'i clothing, marks and badges so that men and women can be recognized." Furthermore, "When men and women move up to the main army, of those who are traveling, order that the men travel on the left and the women travel on the right; they are not to go together. All are to go to their defensive positions." Such distinctions were especially important for the Mohists who, with their focus on city defence, looked to employ the entire populace in any defensive effort. The Mozi states that both men and women were to be equipped with weapons for defence; the men with crossbows and swords, and the women with spears. Even children were to assume a support role in the cause. "Order them to perform duties in the government buildings or barracks."376 The Mozi also recommends the creation of divisions and wards within the city to foster the effective and accountable management of the populace. It states, "Therefore, make eight divisions out of the two wards within the city walls, with one officer per division. Each officer is to have four attendants with whom he travels along the roads and within the wards...to examine and question those who travel back and forth at improper times. Those who travel and behave in other strange ways are doing it to gain their treacherous ends."377 Furthermore, these city divisions are structurally divided, as inner city roads and divisional boundaries are to be walled with earthen mounds. These walls serve multiple functions including: the reinforcement of administrative boundaries, the reinforcement of civilian groupings, and the protection of the city from enemy forces in

Ibid., frag 114, pp. 544-548. Ibid., frag 70, p. 407. Ibid., frag 82, pp. 440-442. Ibid., frag 82, pp. 440-442. Ibid., frag 145, pp. 605-606. Ibid., frag 81, pp. 437-439. 101 the event the city is besieged. In the Mozi, structure and organization serves as the fundamental basis for all other matters that fall under the heading of civil-military affairs in the Mozi.

ii.) Control The Mozi frequently cites the need for strict social controls. For instance, "Should the shamans, the diviners and the ether watchers go in and out creating rumours to startle and terrify the officers and people, carefully investigate them and execute them. The crime is not remittable."379 Similarly, elsewhere the text states, The shamans, prayer-makers, recorders, and ether-watchers must announce good news to the people, but must report the true facts to the Defender. The Defender alone is to know the facts. Shamans and ether-watchers who recklessly startle and frighten the people by announcing bad news are to be executed without pardon.380

Hence, there is a primacy placed on keeping the people ignorant of affairs, as only those in positions of high authority need to know the true nature of events. It is important to note that the Mozi does indeed accept divinations and omens as reliable sources of information; however it is understood that such things can create undue panic in people who have limited perspective. To this end, there is an element of propaganda involved in social control. Maintaining an ignorant populace is not a major premise in the Mozi, because the mutual reliance of the people, the military, and the government requires that everyone has some knowledge of defensive affairs. However, individuals are only required to know what is pertinent to their duties, and nothing more. A degree of ignorance is necessary for maintaining order within the city walls. When food is scarce, for example, the state should require all individuals to compile and submit, under time restrictions, their own grain provisions for government

Ibid., frag 118, pp. 554-556. Ibid., frag 54, pp. 360-362. Ibid., frag 105, pp. 509-512. 102 inspection and reporting. An official record of total provisions is taken, from which a fair market value for materials can be determined by the state. The government must then collect all "unhusked and husked grain, cloth, silk, cash and metal, oxen and horses and (other) domestic animals" in the support of defensive preparations. Each individual is given a contract with the government chief in charge, from whom afterwards they can receive a fair payment in return for their portion submitted. The Mozi recommends a return of "double the price" of initial investment.383 The submittal of provisions is mandatory for all citizens, under pain of arrest or execution. However each citizen benefits from the system, as does the state from its collection. This process of redistribution operates like a rudimentary tax system and has the positive economic outcome of market correction. However, the text warns "Take care not to let the people know the amount of unhusked and husked grain in the possession of the defence."384 The overall stability of the state remains the clear priority, and all measures must ensure that this remains the case. This system of provision collection is designed for the greater good of the people and the city in the case of emergency.

Control is also exerted on the city through the delegation of authority among the

lot wards and households. The Mozi discusses routine night patrols by the ward chiefs, the assignment of fire extinguishing duties, 86 the designation of authority to division leaders, household heads, and outer city prefecture magnates. Beyond these positions of authority, the fullest realization of control in the military chapters comes in the form of surveillance over the city. One of the single most recurrent notions throughout these chapters is the recommendation that an active overseer be employed to manage all affairs during the defence. The storied tradition of the traveling Mohist defender is here alluded to. The following passage illustrates this tradition: 381 Ibid., frag 106, pp. 513-518. 382 Ibid., frag 106, pp. 513-518. 383 Ibid., frag 106, pp. 513-518. 384 Ibid., frag 106, pp. 513-518. 385 Ibid., frag 83, pp. 443-445. 386 Ibid., frag 84, pp. 446-448. 387 Ibid., frag 96, pp. 484-487. 388 Ibid., frag 95, pp. 482-483. 103

When the Defender enters to oversee the city, he must carefully question the fu- lao, the officers and the ta-fu lords about all those who have grievances and hatreds that have not been resolved between each other. He is to summon these people and clearly resolve the disputes for them. The Defender must in person separate these people, register them, and keep them apart. Those who through personal grievances harm the affairs of the city or the officers are, in every case, to have their fathers and mothers, wives and children executed. Those who plan to make the city over to the enemy outside are to have their three sets or relatives exterminated. Enfeoff those who are able to capture, arrest, or denounce them with a city the size of which they are defending. The Defender confers a seal on them and honours, favours and esteems them, so that the officers and ta-fu and the soldiers and the people all may clearly know it.389

This concept of a supreme commander and supreme control stretches even further, as it is recommended in the text that a central observation tower be built, akin to a panopticon, to overlook the entire city. "Below the Defender's hall, construct a large tower tall enough to overlook the city."390 "The tower must be thickly plastered so that those below cannot see those above, but those above can see those below. Those below are not to know whether or not there are people above."391 From this tower, the central authority can observe the comings and goings of all individuals. "When the look-outs on watch see carriages, cavalry or foot-soldiers coming along the road outside and any unusual

"3Q9 activities inside the city, they immediately tell it to the Defender." On a related note to the Defender's tower, one of the methods of controlling individuals in the military chapters is through what is called the "Hostage Palace."393 The Hostage Palace is to be constructed in the centre of the city, next to the general's barracks and underneath the Defender's tower. Inside the Hostage Palace and associated hostage barracks are kept the "closest relatives, fathers and mothers, wives and children" of the chiefs of the townships and districts, the magnates from outside the city walls,394 the state's most talented soldiers,395 all officers of the state,396 and any individual of

389 Ibid., frag 103, pp. 504-507. 390 Ibid., frag 93, pp. 476-479. 391 Ibid., frag 104, p. 508. 392 Ibid., frag 116, pp. 551-552. 393 Ibid., frag 33, pp. 238-245; frag 103, pp. 504-507; frag 105; pp. 509-512; frag 130, pp. 581-583. 394 Ibid., frag 103, pp. 504-507. 3951 •Ibid. , frag 33, pp. 238-245. 104 authority, including the diviners. The purpose of these hostage buildings is the motivation and manipulation of the men whose relatives are taken hostage. The individuals who are held in the hostage buildings are not to be retained in obvious hostility, as they are to be entertained and nourished with the best foods and drink and showered with honour and respect.398 These arrangements are not employed with ill- intent, but reflect the critical importance of loyalty, unity, and motivation in defensive city warfare. Given the significant importance of hostage buildings, observation over them is imperative. "Garrison soldiers who are thoroughly honest must be chosen to be guards for the Hostage Buildings. Take care to choose officers to supervise the guards who are loyal and reliable and most capable to perform their duties."399 Interestingly, there is even an indication of what appears to be a proper method in which one may earn the freedom of his loved ones. The text states: "Let those who have been conferred with rewards visit the Hostage Building and give them their relatives (?). All those who wish to assist the higher authorities again are to have their ranks and rewards doubled."400 It is not certain that "give them their relatives" is a permanent reprieve or merely temporary, but it is interesting.

iii.) Law and punishment The military chapters of the Mozi are written specifically about the defence of a city under siege. Under such circumstances, the unity and harmony of the people is of critical nature. Not only must the city function in an orderly fashion, without disturbances, but its citizens must be encouraged to cooperate and stand firm in the face of the enemy's aggression. Presumably many individuals would be inclined to flee or desert at the oncoming attack of an aggressive army. Therefore proactive measures must

396 Ibid., frag 130, pp. 581-583. 397 Ibid., frag 105, pp. 509-512. 398 Ibid., frag 103, pp. 504-507. 399 Ibid., frag 105, pp. 509-512. 400 Ibid., frag 106, pp. 513-518. 105 be instituted to curb such selfish tendencies. Accordingly, the laws and punishments should be strict and overwhelming. For Mohists, virtually every criminal offence is potentially punishable by execution, often without court being held. Quite plainly stated, the rule of law is: "Those who do not follow the order are to be executed."401 Furthermore, the Mozi is creative in the manner in which execution can be used to motivate individuals. For example, "All those who are guilty of crimes warranting death on up, are to have their fathers and mothers, wives and children and siblings arrested." 402 And for some serious crimes, the punishment is not just imprisonment of one's relatives, but the execution of all family members. For those who abandon their posts, they are to have "their chopped off heads exposed for three days."403 The text states, "This is the way in which you prepare against treachery."404 Other punishable crimes include donning enemy marks or standards, issuing orders without proper authority, fashioning the appearance of aiding the enemy in any measure, shouting out recklessly to cause panic, arriving late to one's office once the drums have sounded, invading other's offices and private property, carrying private communications pertaining to defence (without proper authority), robbing other soldiers or people of any private property, perversely traveling without a proper tally, flattering the enemy in public conversation, picking up and/or responding to an enemy letter shot in by arrow, and numerous other offences related to improper and inappropriate conduct.405 The last prohibition is particularly interesting because it characterizes the tense nature of maintaining control. As the Mozi states, "Letters shot by arrows should not be picked up, nor should letters be shot at the enemy. Those who disobey the order are to have their fathers and mothers, wives and children executed and their own bodies exposed above the city walls."

Ibid., frag 83, pp. 443-445. Ibid., frag 81, pp. 437-439. Ibid., frag 82, pp. 440-442. Ibid., frag 82, pp. 440-442. Ibid., frags 102, pp. 499-503; frag 114, pp. 544-548. Ibid. [Modified quote from:] frag 102, pp. 499-503. 106

The forms of punishment for the treacherous, careless, and rebellious include "breaking on the chariot," execution, and "having one's ears slit with an arrow."407 The only context in which 'arrest' is ever mentioned is with regard to punishing one's family members in some situations. All personal acts of crime appear to warrant severe physical punishment. As harsh as these prohibitions and punishments appear, there is more to the conceptualization of law in the Mozi than merely this. One of the strangest oddities is the following statement: "All women who commit a crime worthy of the death penalty to the extent of being liable for letting fire loose, are not to be punished according to what they have let loose, but (according to the law) arrest those who use fire to create a rebellion."4 This seems to indicate that there is some reprieve in the law under special circumstances. Why it specifies special treatment for females is unknown. However there is also evidence of a notion of redemption in the Mozi. In a passage explaining the multiple ways in which a reward earned for military contribution can be redeemed, the text states: "If acquaintances, elder and younger brothers of the townspeople are guilty of a crime, even if it is not within the same prefecture (yet the soldier wishes to make a redemption), if he uses husked or unhusked grain, cash or metal, cloth or silk, or other personal property to release them, order that it be allowed."409 This concept appears elsewhere as well. "Permit those who wish to become officers, and those who do not but wish to be bestowed with rewards, ranks and salaries, or to redeem close relatives or acquaintances who have committed crimes, permit them by an order." This is an interesting anomaly in the text. There is even a reference to punishment by hard labour or "community service." "All those who have committed a crime or a fault, and their case cannot be decided, are to be ordered to clean out the latrines and purify them."

7 Ibid., frag 114, pp. 544-548. 8 Ibid., frag 84, pp. 446-448. 9 Ibid., frag 94, pp. 480-481. 0 Ibid. [Modified quote from:] frag 106, pp. 513-518. 'ibid., frag 119, p. 557. 107

Finally, it is important to note that the Mozi does not only advocate the execution of law and punishment, but also the establishment of it in society. "Make regulations for the preparations of defence and set them up stating, X Regulations. Place them in the offices, roads, streets, crossroads, staircases and gates. Order all those who are traveling back and forth to look at and follow them" Thus, the Mozi is not ignorant of the necessity to inform the populace of such serious restrictions and prohibitions.

iv.) Mutual responsibility A concept that is unique to the Mozi, and one that penetrates both the civilian and the military realms, is the notion of mutual responsibility. Accordingly, each individual is responsible for those next to him. However, this is not a theory of mutual support, but rather mutual accountability. The closest the text gets to advocating a notion of mutual support is its commentary on fire safety. "The officers, soldiers, and people in the government buildings and beneath the city walls all guarantee those on the left and right, and front and rear, with respect to fire."413 However, even in this context it can be read as community surveillance. The manner in which mutual responsibility is most commonly cited pertains to the responsibility of both citizens and soldiers to report those next to him or her who commit crimes and violate the prohibitions. If they fail to do so, they share in the crime. On the city walls, each of the soldiers and officers is to guarantee those on his left and right. If there is anyone who desires to plan that the city be made over to the enemy outside, his father and mother, wife, children and siblings are all to be executed. Those on left and right who are cognizant but do not arrest or denounce him share the crime. The households of the commoners in the wards beneath the city walls are all to guarantee each other, just as on the city walls. Enfeoff those who are able to arrest and denounce traitors, with a town of a thousand households. If they arrest or denounce a traitor who is not on their left and right but in another five-man group, enfeoff them with a town of two thousand families.414

Ibid., frag 90, pp. 467-468. Ibid., frag 95, pp. 482-483. Ibid., frag 101, pp. 497-498. 108

Hence, mutual responsibility pervades all levels of society. It functions as a social control, with the effect of insuring social order and authority of command. It prevents society from becoming perverse and individuals from risking the stability of the city. "If someone has concealed an item and others do not report what that person has hidden although it is listed in the prohibitions, they are to be executed."415 If each man is accountable for the actions of every man around him, then people will observe proper forms of conduct and the defensive effort will be secured. In its military application, mutual responsibility produces unity and group cohesion. It also functions at different levels of authority. All the soldiers and people positioned on the city walls in each case guarantee those on their left and right. If those on left and right are guilty of a crime and they do not know about it, the five-man squad next to it is guilty of a crime. If they are personally able to arrest the criminals or denounce them to the officers, they are all to be rewarded. If they are not members of the five-man group, but have prior knowledge of another five-man groups' guilt, in every case double the reward bestowed.41

Society is segmented so that individuals are responsible for the individuals beside them, squads are responsible for squads beside them, and so on. Similarly, responsibility is delineated in a hierarchical fashion as well. Therefore, the individual who has authority over a group of men is not only responsible for maintaining the order between them, but he is responsible for the group itself. "Each of the officers is to guard his own cash or metal, cloth and silk and other personal property. But the Defender is to take care that they do not rob each other."417 If a five-man squad member jumps over the city walls and goes to the enemy and the other five-man squad members do not apprehend him, they are executed. If they jump over the walls with the centurion and go to the enemy, the officer of the line is to be executed. If they jump over the walls with the officer of the line, the At Q general of the line is to be executed.

Ibid., frag 99, pp. 492-494. Ibid., frag 92, pp. 472-475. Ibid., frag 105, pp. 509-512. Ibid., frag 85, pp. 449-450. 109

And accordingly, "If the prefect, assistants or colonels lose more than a full ten men on up, reduce each of the prefects, assistants and colonels two degrees in rank; if they lose more than a hundred men, the prefects, assistants and colonels are designated garrison troops and relieved of their posts."419 It is in this manner that mutual responsibility creates accountability and keeps figures of authority responsible, honest, and acutely aware. It should be noted that mutual responsibility is not an automatic death warrant for any individual caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, for individuals earn reprieve if they report the offence. "If the five-man squad members do not apprehend the criminal, they are executed. If they apprehend them, they are pardoned."420 This might have the effect of producing an environment of much suspicion and hostility, as every individual carefully observes and watches the next. However, it does force people to be accountable for their actions and it creates a level of awareness and alertness necessary for a unified effort in a besieged city. In the military realm, the Mozi advocates a similar notion of reprieve for authority figures. "With regard to matching [i.e. replacing] captured soldiers with those that have been lost: they must capture the enemy and make them prisoner, before the case can be heard.""1 So even if a squad leader loses a few men to desertion, the soldiers can be "replaced" with captured enemy troops.

Mutual responsibility explains why the prohibitions warrant that punishment extend to family members and relatives: relatives share in the disloyalty of their kin. "Each of the family members in the wards beneath the city wall guarantees those on left and right, front and rear, just as on the city wall."422 Mutual responsibility also manifests itself in stranger ways yet. For example, "When taking care of criminals, those who take charge of them on their own responsibility when it is not their function, or try them on their own responsibility when they should not, are to be executed."423 This essentially

419 Ibid. [Modified quote from:] frag 92, pp. 472-475. 420 Ibid., frag 84, pp. 446-448. 421 Ibid., frag 92, pp. 472-475. 422 Ibid., frag 93, pp. 476-479. 423 Ibid., frag 91, pp. 469-471. 110 means that individuals are required to report all crime to the proper authorities, but they should never assume the role of authority themselves; this would counteract social order. (One should wonder how individuals are expected to act decisively to reprimand those who desert, while taking care not to assume too much responsibility over such actions.) In terms of incentives, the Mozi oddly states that "For every person who is able to arrest one planning to rebel, sell the city, or jump over the walls and go over to the enemy, according to the ordinance, commute the death penalty for two men or ch'eng-tan hard labour terms for four men on his behalf."424 This is a strange "incentive" indeed, and one that presumably would only serve to heighten social tensions. It is complicated to envisage how a society with all of these strict guidelines would function at all. However, it was the cohesive effort that the Mohists emphasized most in the defence of a city.

3.4.2 b) Military organization, distinction, and control Short of explaining all of the appropriate positions and roles of military personnel recommended in the military chapters, this section will be restricted to features that stand out as unique. Essentially everything that has been explained in the civilian section on organization and control is equally applicable in the military realm, if not already indicated. Therefore, for the sake of space and time, only a few notes will be provided specific to the military. As should be expected, the Mozi is very exact in its recommendation for troop organization and deployment. The text throughout states how many men should be deployed and where they should be stationed on city walls, within the city, in sally-ports, outside the city walls, the use of scouts, guards, and so on. There is only one reference to training, which states, "Train the troops inside, teaching them to understand the movements of forward and back, left and right."425 However, arguably, defensive warfare does not demand the elaborate drills and practice that is required of offensive warfare. Offensive fighting necessitates the employment of various field manoeuvres and

424 Ibid., frag 91, pp. 469-471. 425 Ibid., frag 77, pp. 430-431. Ill troop formations; defensive warfare is certainly not as technical in that regard. The Mozi adopts the traditional Chinese military group designations, with much discussion about the mutual responsibilities of the five-man squad and ten-man platoons.426 Military rank and seniority is also featured in the text.427 Guards also figure prominently in the military chapters. There is commentary on the proper conduct of guards, the duties and responsibilities demanded of these roles, and the routine inspection and monitoring of the men who assume this function.428

Most significant to the military realm (as distinct from the civil), however, is commentary on drums, flags, pennants, and standards for the organization of, and communication between, military personnel. Flags are used to prepare for battle and they are used by scouts in their communications home;429 within the city, sail-signals are used to communicate the level of alarm and hostility observed outside the city walls;430 standards designate the rank of military personnel;431 pennants indicate the degree of enemy advance; and drums, which have numerous functions, are primarily used to coordinate personnel within the city. It is also suggested that in the darkness of nighttime, operations require the use of fire signals instead of flags and pennants. For maintaining order and coordination, military personnel must garner appropriate badges on their uniforms, and they must be situated in the correct location on the body, in accordance with their position and rank.434 In the same manner that torches can be used to communicate in darkness, the Mozi recommends that at night, personnel "Put on white clothing and use shouts to link up with each other."435

Fundamental to all discussion of military affairs is the key component, once again, of organization. Organization is fundamental to all joint operations between

1 Ibid., frag 85, pp. 449-450. 427 Ibid., frag 87, pp. 454-458. 428 Ibid., frag 87, pp. 454-458; frag 130, pp. 581-583. 429 Ibid., frag 112, pp. 538-541. 430 Ibid., frag 110, pp. 531-536. 431 Ibid., frag 65, pp. 398-399. 432 Ibid., frag 64, pp. 396-397. 433 Ibid., frag 49, pp. 333-338; frag 64, pp. 396-397; frag 89, pp. 461-466. 434 Ibid., frag 66, pp. 400-401. 435 •Ibid. , frag 49, pp. 333-338. 112 civilians, the military, and the administrative leadership. Hence, it is emphasized in every section of the military chapters. The following passage highlights this in detail: Make grey-green flags for wood; make red flags for fire; make yellow flags for firewood and fuel; make white flags for stones; make black flags for water; make bamboo flags for food; make grey goshawk flags for soldiers that fight to the death; make tiger flags for mighty warriors; make double rabbit flags for brave soldiers; make youth flags for fourteen year old boys; make grasping arrow flags for women; make dog flags for crossbows; make forest flags for chj halberds; make feather flags for swords and shields; make dragon flags for carts; make bird flags for cavalry. In general, when the name of the flag that you are looking for is not in the book, in all cases use its form and name to make the design on the flag. On the city walls, raise the flags. When the officials in charge of preparing the equipment have brought a sufficiency of materiel, then lower them.43

3.4.3 c) Motivation and manipulation of spirit (qi fj&)

Possibly the single most important aspect of warfare is the concept of morale. As the Seven Military Classics all emphasize, high morale equals strength in war. How each of these texts stimulate morale may differ, but the Mozi advocates some unique notions altogether. Like the military writings, the Mozi notes the importance of a proper system of punishments and rewards, the necessity for "awesomeness" in command, and the fostering of certainty / elimination of doubt.439 It even recommends in numerous fragments that the fierce, keen, and zealous soldiers should assume the front ranks of one's formation to "strengthen those who look back in fear."440 Where the Mozi is unique is in the personal connection between the general and the citizenry. In addition to numerous references regarding the holding of hostages, as previously noted, men are stimulated to fight when they see the general's personal gratitude to the people. Hence, "As for those soldiers who have held off the enemy and are to receive a bestowal of rewards, the Defender must go in person to the residences of

436 Ibid., frag 61, pp. 387-390. 437 Ibid., frag 71, pp. 408-409. 438 Ibid., frag 90, pp. 467-468. 439 Ibid., frag 24, pp. 198-202. 440 Ibid., frag 24, pp. 198-202. 113 their relations so as to show them his favour." This public display of gratitude and appreciation is even more important when a soldier has been killed in battle. "When the siege is over, the Defender is to send officers to go in person to the families of those who have died of their wounds and lament the corpse, and grieve and mourn him."442 Another passage reads: When the enemy has withdrawn, and the disturbance is over ...[...]... He must go in person to the families of those who have died of their wounds in order to condole and mourn them, and personally visit the corpse after the disturbance is over.. .the Chief is to quickly send out messengers to offer and present ranks and salaries to those with merit, and those who have died of their wounds. The Defender is in person to honour and favour them making his esteem of them clear so that their resentment will be directed towards the enemy.443

Although the concept of close relations between the general and soldiers is not unique to the Mozi alone, this particular manifestation of this relationship is. While such measures are merely required as a means of stimulating morale in the city, it is reflective of the goodwill nature of relations between the civilians and military in the defence of a city. There are a few other unique methods for manipulating the spirit of the people that should be highlighted. One is the proper treatment of the wounded. Those who have been wounded in combat should be ordered home to rest and recover. "Feed them well, provide a physician and supply drugs. Present them with two sheng of wine and two chin of meat per day. Order an officer to go repeatedly to question them. When he observes that the sick are healed, he is immediately to announce the fact to higher authorities."444 However, there are fierce penalties for those who attempt to avoid military duties because of injuries: "Those who falsely and wantonly wounded themselves to avoid duty are to have their three sets of relatives exterminated."445 Rewards for outstanding achievements in the defeat of the enemy are also important for the simulation of morale. Reward two grades of rank per person to those males who took part in the defence, and reward the females with five thousand cash per person. Reward

441 Ibid., frag 120, pp. 558-559. 442 Ibid., frag 99, pp. 492-494. 443 Ibid., frag 100, pp. 495-496. 444 Ibid., frag 99, pp. 492-494. 445 Ibid., frag 99, pp. 492-494. 114

males and females, old and young who did not participate in the defence with a thousand cash per person, remit their taxes for three years: they are not required to pay anything and they are not required to pay the tsu and shui land and produce taxes. This is the way by which one encourages the officers and people to defend stoutly and defeat a siege.446

And finally, one of the simplest but most fundamental methods of heightening morale is to encourage the people to shout when appropriate. Given that a besieged city is behind high walls, and thus the enemy cannot observe the numbers or character of the men and women inside, shouting can also have special strategic benefits in battle. "On quiet nights when everyone hears the sounds of the enemy's drums, they are to shout out loud: this is the way to neutralize the enemy's qi and to strengthen the people's will. When they shout out on appropriate occasions, they will not suffer."447

3.4.4 d) Management of social mobility Although the idea of managing social mobility is just as applicable to the category of control for either the civil or the military, it takes on a special role in the Mozi that should be noted. Not to be mistaken for the sociological concept of social mobility between different social groups or classes, this usage of the term is strictly in the literal sense. Because the Mohists were primarily concerned with the defence of a besieged city, it was especially important that personnel and the common public be appropriately managed and accounted for. "Gates must be constructed in the alleys (in the wards), the roads in the city, and on the encircling road. Two men are to guard the gates. Whoever lacks a reliable tally may not travel. Those who do not follow the order are to be executed."448 "Those in charge of surveying all the gates and those supervising the prohibitions of defence are in no case at all to allow those without proper business to be able to linger, delay or stop by the sides of the gates. Those who do not follow the orders are to be executed."449 Accordingly, as indicated in the text, every individual who

446 Ibid. [Modified quote from:] frag 86, pp. 451-453. 447 Ibid., frag 59, pp. 370-372. 448 Ibid., frag 69, p. 406. 449 Ibid., frag 76, pp. 427-429. 115 wished to travel within or through the city was required to produce a tally or "passport" that indicated who he was and why he was traveling. Even generals were subject to this examination as illustrated in the following: When the Defender of a city leaves, he must have made clear badges and flags, and let all the officers and people know them fully. If the Defender leaves with more than one hundred followers, or if he leaves not carrying the flags and badges, or his followers are not his original men or the original flags and badges, the generals of a thousand men on up are to stop him and are not to let him pass. If he passes and the officers and soldiers permit him, they are to be executed and the whole matter is to be reported to the superiors. These are the heavy prohibitions for defending cities. It is the origin of great treachery. It absolutely must be fully investigated.450

Thus a complex system of tallies, badges, passwords, and markers were used to distinguish legitimate travelers from illegitimate ones.451 "Travelers are to give the officers at the stairs and gates their tallies. If the tallies match, the officers are to admit them and entertain them. If they do not match, they are to arrest them and report to the Defender." For all those whose tally passports were doubtful, they were asked to "report to the court of the prefecture [outside of the city] to tell the facts and be asked the reason for it."453 More to the point, this monitoring system not only restricted those who traveled to and from the city, but it was a detailed tracking system established for all posterity, with details such as the names, purposes, and times of each individual recorded at the gate of exit.454 "Make badges and distinguishing marks so as to be able to keep track of and know those who are going back and forth, and their numbers, and the places where they might hide and conceal themselves."455 The daily closing of the gates was coordinated with massive drum rolls that would sound across the city to indicate that travel was no longer permissible. The same was done in mornings. "When dawn appears the holder of the great drum allows travelers to proceed by beating the drum, and all the officers of the

"Ibid., frag51,pp. 345-350. 'ibid., frag 81, pp. 437-439. 2 Ibid., frag 89, pp. 461-466. 13 Ibid., frag 96, pp. 484-487. i4 Ibid., frag 134, pp. 588-589. i5 Ibid., frag 123, pp. 568-569. 116 city gates enter to request the keys to open the gates. When they have done this, they are to return the keys immediately."456 The only individuals not bound by such ordinance are those carrying special tallies, messengers, and the Grand Defender.457 Naturally, in times of emergency, the monitoring of social mobility became even more scrupulous. The Mozi states, "When there is an emergency alert, the center army beats the drums rapidly three times. There should be no travel in any case allowed on the city walls, on the roads and pathways in the wards, or in the alleys and streets. Those who travel are to be executed."458 And as an enemy approaches the city, the general "summons all the members of the five offices and centurions, and the kindred of the rich men and the important houses, and lodges them in the government headquarters, taking care to order reliable men guard and protect them."459 "The reason for this procedure is to guard against secret plots."460 As it can be imagined, besieged cities were especially vulnerable to treason. The tenuous nature of sustaining a solid defensive war against an attacking army meant that trust and faith in men alone were simply not enough. Managing the social mobility of all citizens, personnel, and travelers was a means of controlling variability and threats to the defensive effort from within.

3.4.5 Defensive preparation c) Provisions/materials/logistics In any warfare situation, provisions such as food and water are especially important. For a besieged city, this is even truer. As the military chapters emphasize, "If there is no food in the city, then we call the situation 'the great killing.'"461 The standard procedure for defending a city is thus annotated with the need for ".. .piles of stones, piles of fuel and firewood, piles of rushes and grass, piles of Leonurus and reeds, piles of wood, piles of ash, piles of sand, piles of pine and cypress timbers, piles of p'eng (?) and

456 Ibid., frag 89, pp. 461-466. 457 Ibid., frag 102, pp. 499-503; frag 103, pp. 504-507; frag 105, pp. 509-512. 458 Ibid., frag 82, pp. 440-442. 459 Ibid., frag 79, pp.433-435. 460' iIbid. , frag 79, pp.433-435. 461 Ibid., frag 22, pp. 191-192. 117 artemisia, piles of hemp and fat, piles of metal and cash, piles of unhusked and husked grain..."462 All of these essential resources need to be calculated, collected, and stored. If a city is to withstand a siege of ninety days, then the ration expenditures must be a specific amount per year.463 Additionally, families should be ordered to prepare their own "three years' supply of vegetables and grain foods in order to provide against excessive rain or drought when the harvest does not mature." 464 Such reserve stock would naturally benefit war preparations as well. As regards collection, "All unhusked and husked grain, domestic animals and property from the dwellings outside the walls that can be used to assist the city should be sent into the city. When there is an emergency, then have it piled inside the gates."465 The civilian population is expected to assist in the preparations of the city by submitting all items from their residences that can be used to increase the city's supplies.466 "Those who do not follow the order are to be executed."467 Each officer is also expected to "present to his superiors the property in his area of jurisdiction that can be used to assist the preparations for defence."468 Defensive war is a shared burden that demands cooperation and the pooling of resources. Even the population from outlying prefectures is expected to contribute, especially in the collection of poisonous plants and herbs that can be used to poison the ditches and wells prior to an invasion. 6 Finally, the destruction of resources is deemed significant in creating circumstances unfavourable to an invading army. The Mozi adopts a "scorched earth" policy in this regard. "When the invaders press close, cut down the trees: although there may be requests and petitions to spare them, do not listen to them... [..]..Timber and wood that cannot be completely brought in to the city should be burnt so as not to let the

462 Ibid., frag 62, pp. 391-393. 463 Ibid., frag 127, pp. 574-576. 464 Ibid., frag 136, pp. 591-593. 465 Ibid., frag 124, pp. 570-571. 466 Ibid., frag 129, p. 580. 467 Ibid., frag 129, p. 580. 468 Ibid., frag 142, p. 601. 469 Ibid., frag 136, pp. 591-593. 118 invaders be able to use it."470 Similarly, "When the invaders arrive, kill first of all the oxen, sheep, chickens, dogs, ducks, geese and swine and flay them all. Gather in their skins, hides, sinews, horns, fat, skulls and feathers."471 If the land can be stripped of the natural resources and the foodstuffs necessary to sustain an invading military, then some strategic advantage can be gained by the defender.

3.4.6 Selection and employment of men There are slanderers and useful men, there are bad men and good men, there are leaders, tacticians, brave soldiers, craftsmen, messengers, men who work on the inside and those who work on the outside, there are men expert at guarding gates. The Defender must examine what each man would be right for, match the names with the appropriate duties, and then bring them into service.472

The selection and employment of men is an important topic in the Chinese military classics, and it is prevalent throughout the military chapters of the Mozi as well. Often it is only present in the text as a note in passing, found in passages discussing tactics and preparations. In these fragments, this concept appears in what would be considered largely common sense. However, collectively these references are reflective of astuteness in strategic thought. The following are all examples of these: "Order those with good eye-sight to watch the enemy";473 "Make those with acute hearing hold the jars and listen to them: they will learn exactly the positions of the enemy tunnels";474 "You must order those with long-term practice in the use of bellows not to leave the furnaces";475 ".. .quickly make miners and picked soldiers tunnel and meet them."476 And there are also passages that place the emphasis on features of human character more than ability. For example: "...choose and select servants with merit and

Ann long service and followers who will serve to the death"; "...choose officers to

470 Ibid., frag 128, pp. 577-579. 471 Ibid., frag 137, pp. 594-595. 472 Ibid., frag 143, pp. 602-603. 473 Ibid., frag 28, pp. 214-222. 474 Ibid., frag 38, pp. 256-267. 475 Ibid., frag 38, pp. 256-267. 476 Ibid., frag 40, pp. 270-271. 477 Ibid., frag 79, pp.433-435. 119 supervise the guards who are loyal and reliable"; 78 "...recommend officers who are upright and pure, loyal and reliable and the most capable to perform the duties."479 And emphasis is also placed on employing brave and zealous individuals at the forefront of the battle to maximize military power; a notion that is shared by most of the military classics. Practical considerations are also suggested such as the division of workload between men and women and the employment of the old and young who are not of service age as guards on the city walls, but in roles where they are never to face an attack.481 The selection and management of scouts is emphasized in the Mozi. Scouts must receive special treatment because their role in information acquisition is particularly vital. These men are to be housed and fed at government expense, but in special quarters that separate them from all other personnel.482 Because there is always a risk that one's scouts might be captured by the enemy, scouts should never have access to any information about "the preparations for the protection and defence of the city."483 All other military personnel conditions apply to scouts, such as the mandatory hostage requirement, but scouts operate on a unique incentive system. "When the scouts return, the general is to compare them with one another (i.e. their reports). If they are fully reliable, he is to award them liberally."484 Furthermore, the more times a scout returns with reliable information and the further into enemy territory he penetrates (to return home again in one piece), the greater is his reward. As a result of exceptional performance in this vital role, scouts reserve the right to choose between rewards, salaries, and rank. The families of scouts also receive considerable wealth and comfort, at state expense.

478 Ibid., frag 105, pp. 509-512. 479 Ibid., frag 105, pp. 509-512. 480 Ibid., frag 46, pp. 315-323; frag 49, pp. 333-338; frag 87, pp. 454-458. 481 Ibid., frag 42, pp. 274-287; frag 51, pp. 345-350. 482,Ibid. , frag 108, pp. 522-524. Ibid., frag 107, pp. 519-521. Ibid., frag 108, pp. 522-524. 120

The basic principle of selecting and employing men in the Mozi is captured in the following: "When the general makes each person take charge over that which he is strong at, the affairs of the world will be as they should. If he equalizes their shares and duties, the affairs of the world will be taken care of. If he moderates what they enjoy, the affairs of the world will be put in readiness. If the strong and weak have their lots, the affairs of the world will be prepared."485

3.4.7 Assessment and evaluation of enemy Information plays a crucial role in warfare. It can be the difference between victory and total defeat. To defend against any enemy force it is essential to have some basic understanding of who, where, with what, and how the enemy will attack. The military chapters of the Mozi address these issues. The Mozi says: "The Defender should frequently order cavalrymen and officers to travel around to observe for enemy activity." Each of these soldiers should carry with them one drum with which to signify the people in the city should the enemy be spotted. "Order empty roads and strategic points where people might come and go to be examined for tracks, with the trackers no fewer than three men per ward.""0' Scouts should be dispatched day and night and should examine for enemy tracks in and around

AQQ "all large hills, mountains and forests." "At daybreak, whether there are tracks or no tracks, they are in each case to set up the appropriate flags to indicate enemy movements, and those on the city wall should react correspondingly after receiving the signals."489 Lookout posts, which are 30 feet high, should be used to watch for the enemy and should link the border regions to the commander's city.490 In emergencies, smoke and sail- signals are to be transmitted across this network of outposts, indicating the enemy position and activity. "Light the fire when the enemy launches the attack.. .After the sails

485 Ibid., frag 126, p. 573. 486 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 112, pp. 538-541; LCC, pp. 604-605. 487 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 109, pp. 525-530. 488 Ibid., frag 109, pp. 525-530; frag 112, pp. 538-541. 489 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 112, pp. 538-541; LCC, pp. 604-605. 490 Ibid., frag 110, pp. 531-536. 121 have been raised and the fire is lit beat the drums five times immediately and light another fire to indicate the direction of the enemy's attack and their number. Do not delay or be slow."491 The siege of a fortified city is something that would properly take months to plan and execute. Unless an invading force has the complete element of surprise or an absolutely dominating technological advantage, it is likely any siege would take place within view of the defenders. Therefore, during a siege it is important that the defenders remain diligent in their surveillance of the enemy and report any and all changes in their activities. Accordingly, the Mozi states that tall observation towers should be constructed in all four corners of the city and should be used to peer down onto the enemy.492 The enemy's behaviour, appearance, and positions must be closely studied as they advance, retreat, move left and move right.493 "Should the enemy make unusual changes in the construction of walls and heaps of earth, or the water at the sides grows muddy in an unusual fashion, this indicates that the enemy is tunnelling earth."494 "If the enemy makes a mine for tunnelling into the city or a mine for battering the city wall, one must fully know the width of the attacking tunnel and order the defenders to bore down at an angle their own tunnel."495 To identify where the enemy is tunnelling, jars should be taken inside one's own tunnels and held against the walls to listen for the enemy.496 By utilizing jars in this manner one can "know exactly the position of the enemy tunnels, and can dig tunnels to meet them."497 Additionally, jars can be utilized for the same effect on the surface. Along the foundation of the city wall, jars should be buried every 5 feet. "Place boards above them, cover the jars and listen."498 By employ these methods the defenders will always be able to intercept enemy attacks through tunnelling.

491 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 110, pp. 531-536; LCC, pp. 602-603. 492 Ibid., frag 9, pp. 127-136. 493 Ibid., frag 9, pp. 127-136. 494 Ibid, frag 38, pp. 256-267. 495 Ibid, frag 41, pp. 272-273. 496 Ibid., frag 42, pp. 274-287. 497 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 42, pp. 274-287. 498 Ibid., frag 43, pp. 288-307. 122

The tactics of the enemy commander, once engaged in a siege, can also reveal the nature of his character and weaknesses of his military strategy. Mozi's disciple Qin Huali posed the following hypothetical: The enemy are numerous and brave, reckless and arrogant, and appear awesome [wei JgS£] in order to intimidate the defenders. The enemy troops pile up the earth into a high platform and carry wood and stone onto it to build a mound called yangqian, joining the ramp to the city walls so that they can attack us from above, and under the protection of their shields they advance together up the ramp, using both arrows and broadswords as they approach. Facing this situation, what can be done?499

Mozi replied: "A general who uses a yangqian mound is a stupid man. It is sufficient to exhaust the troops, but insufficient to damage the city walls."500 Arrows, stones, and large crossbow bolts should be fired upon the attackers who use such tactics, and if the yangqian mound threatens the city walls, the defending troops need only raise the height of the corresponding section of wall.501 In a later chapter, Qin Huali posed another hypothetical question. He asked Mozi the following: When the enemy climbs up in strength and makes a mass infantry assault upon the city walls, ordering that the last up is the first to be executed, and the enemy soldiers tear down the city walls to build earthen mounds below, and dig underground to build tunnels, and if the enemy soldiers in front scale the walls incessantly while those at the rear fire arrows rapidly and repeatedly, what can be done?502

Mozi replied: "A general who launches a mass infantry assault is an angry man."503 These types of attack are launched without due thought and consideration. A general

499 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 24, pp. 198-202; LCC, pp. 596-599; frag 23, pp. 195-197; LCC, pp. 516- 517. 500 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 23, pp. 195-197; LCC, pp. 516-517. In his commentary (p. 196), Yates suggests that the character for general (jiang M), which he translates as "advance" in his translation of this sentence (yangqianzhe, jiang zhi zhuozhe ye ^-Wf^i ' Jft^firl^iriil), might be an error for the character gong X$t ("attack") which is found in the near-identical fragment 24. Yet later in fragment 44, in a virtually identical sentence (i.e. efuzhe, jiang zhi fenzhe ye WiM^i ' M£.f£iiiQ), Yates translates jiang ffi as "general." Therefore, I have modified his translation of fragment 23 to this effect. I also think this relays the intended message better. 501 Ibid., frag 23; LCC 516-517; frag 24, pp. 198-202. 502 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 44, pp. 309-311; LCC, pp. 542-543. 503 Ibid., frag 44, pp. 309-311. 123 who uses such tactics demonstrates that his urgency and impatience dominate his military skill. His objective is the quick destruction of the enemy, without care for his own soldiers or the sustainability of his attack. Even Sunzi's Art of War says: "If the general cannot overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops, and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results from attacking fortified cities."504 Hence, Mozi considered the defence against such attacks to be a relatively simple matter. The defenders do not require any clever strategies, but should embrace the natural advantages offered by the fortification. What the defending troops need to do is to strengthen the raised parts of the city wall and shoot at the enemy from above. They should remove the enemy's instruments for climbing the city wall, employ trebuchets, and throw torches, boiling water, stones and sand at the enemy. Then, the attack of the mass infantry assault will certainly be defeated.505

The formations used by the enemy in their attack on a city are also of analytical value to the defenders. From the enemy's military formation, the direction and style of attack can be anticipated. In the defence of a small city, the invaders should not be confronted at the outer walls, but the scouts should use these fortifications as an opportunity to "inspect the formation and number of the enemy."506 After this has been done, the appropriate strategy can be decided upon before responding to the enemy. If the enemy attacks in line formation with a host of one hundred thousand men, and the attack is in not more than three waves, the first wave being five hundred bu *fr wide [i.e. roughly 690m], the second wave three hundred bu wide [414m] and the third wave one hundred and fifty bu wide [207m], and in all not wider than five hundred bu, the defenders will gain the advantage and the enemy will be worsted.

These "wave" formations of attack can be easily defended by a small number of individuals acting from behind a properly maintained and supplied fortification. Above

Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 161. 505 Yates, City under Siege, [Modified from:] frag 44-45, pp. 309-312; LCC, pp. 542-543. 506 Ibid., frag 77, pp. 430-431. 507 Ibid., frag 51, pp. 345-350. Calculations based on Robin D.S. Yates, Towards a Reconstruction of the Tactical Chapters of Mo Tzu (ch. 14), (Inaug. diss. (M.A.); University of California, Berkeley, 1975), xxvii. 124 all, "If the defenders have prior knowledge of [the attack], the defenders will gain the advantage and the enemy will be worsted."508

3.4.8 Generalship Generalship is a key notion in the Seven Military Classics, and it is no less significant in the military chapters of the Mozi. While references to this theme are few in number, they are of such high quality that further explanation is warranted. For example, the Mozi says: Although the Defender [shou zhe Tf^lf] is an expert, if the ruler does not employ him, then the city cannot be defended. If the ruler does employ him, the Defender must also be capable, because if the Defender is not and the ruler employs him, then the city cannot be defended. Therefore, the Defender must be an expert and the ruler must employ him and follow his instructions. Only then can the city be defended.509

In other words, the "Defender," who presumably is a trained Mohist specialist recruited to command the defensive effort, must not only be a capable individual, but he must have the ruler's full support and backing.510 In fact, as the supreme commander of the city during the siege, the Defender must be empowered with unimpeded access to and authority over the city, its citizens, and its military forces. If the Defender has reason to be displeased with the Internuncios, the Shield Bearers, and Purifiers, and the women who serve the front, and the Defender says that they are to be executed, beaten or bound, all those who do not follow the order or bind them are later to be executed. He must frequently and at regular times warn them.511

It is his unobstructed authority alone that provides direction to the defensive forces during the siege. Interference with or challenges to his command cannot be permitted. The Defender must therefore be the primary knower of all things. As it has already been noted, the Mozi recommends that a tower be built in the centre of the city

508 Yates, City under Siege, frag 51, pp. 345-350. 509 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag lb, pp. 70-71. 510 That the Defender {shou zhe vf:#) was necessarily a Mohist is uncertain. However the military chapters of the Mozi appear to be designed for internal use within the Mohist School. It would seem likely then that in most cases the Defender would have been a Mohist military expert. See Yates, City Under Siege, 61. 511 Yates, City Under Siege, frag 87, pp. 454-458. 125

designated the "Defender's tower." From here, the Defender is able to observe all that happens within the city and some of what happens outside. Moreover, "The tower must be thickly plastered so that those below cannot see those above, but those above can see those below. Those below are not to know whether or not there are people above." n The Defender thus retains an authentic psychological advantage over all citizens and soldiers below. To further enforce this advantage, the shamans, doctors and diviners, whose leaders are kept under the close supervision of the Defender, must report directly to him. These soothsayers must report all true facts to the Defender, but must announce only good news to the people. "Only the Defender is to know the true facts reported by the shamans, the diviners and the ether watchers."513 Regardless of his unrestricted power and authority, as the leader of the defence the Defender must show concern for his soldiers and the people of the city. The soothsayers, whom he must carefully monitor, must still be treated respectfully as if they are "spirits."514 He must demonstrate his personal appreciation for those who have participated in the defence and earned merit, and his personal grief over those who have lost their lives. When the enemy has withdrawn and the disturbance is over.. .the Defender, by an order, issues benefits to the local magnates in the towns who have fought bravely and all those with merit. He must also go in person to the families of those who have died of their wounds in order to condole and mourn them, and personally visit the corpse after the disturbance is over.515

While during the siege the Defender must take care to prevent the relatives of officers, soldiers, and civilians who have died in battle from mourning for extended periods, after the siege he must send officials to those families to express his person sorrow for their losses.516 As a principle of leadership, this is how the Defender demonstrates his unity

Ibid., frag 104, p. 508. Ibid., frag 54, pp. 360-362. Ibid. Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 100, pp. 495-496. Ibid., frag 99, pp. 492-494; LCC, pp. 580-581. 126 with the people. It is especially important in the defence of a city, because the military effort is supported by both soldiers and civilians alike. When the siege of the city has ended, the ruler is to quickly send out messengers to offer and present ranks and salaries to those with merit and those who have died of their wounds. The Defender is in person to honour and favour them, making his esteem of them clear so that their resentment will be directed towards the enemy.517

517 Ibid., [Modified from:] frag 100, pp. 495-496. I have modified this sentence only by placing "ruler" where Yates had "Chief in the translation of the character zhu ^. While accurate, the word 'Chief is an ambiguous term. I suggest that the word 'host' might be clearer. The usage of zhu 3i in other fragments of the military chapters also coincides well with the term 'host.' I have then assumed that the host would be the ruler (or at least the ruler of the city), who has turned authority over to the Defender during the siege. The juxtaposition of "the Chief and "the Defender" in this passage suggests that they are two separate individuals and both of high rank. Given that the passage starts with "When the siege of the city has ended...," it would be logical to assume that the ruler participates in the celebratory and commemorative activities after the conflict is over. 127

CHAPTER FOUR: MOfflST MILITARY THOUGHT

4.1 Contemporary Perspectives on War The intellectuals of the Eastern Zhou era were united in their moral disapproval of unrighteous warfare. Moreover, "Regarding offensive wars the age was unanimous in denunciation."518 Perhaps the only exceptions were the scholars of the 'laws' (fa ?£) and 'methods' (shu |$j), otherwise known as the Legalists (Fajia QctiO (i.e. "School of

Law"), who endorsed a type of military realism.519 Otherwise, all of the intellectuals opposed offensive wars of aggression. As previously demonstrated, even the most celebrated core military thinkers expressed some form of antipathy towards the act of war. These sentiments were amplified only further by the social philosophers of the era. The Confucian scholar Mencius embraced the most antagonistic view of warfare. He was impartial to both offensive and defensive institutions; even so-called "punitive expeditions" were rejected by Mencius. His shrill evaluation is best highlighted by his statement that "Those skilled in war should suffer the most severe punishments; those who secure alliances with other feudal lords come next." To emphasize this point, he added, "Death is too light a punishment for such men." While it might be said that his extreme hostility toward the military institutions was later infused into Confucian bureaucratic elitism, his attitude is most importantly indicative of the chaotic and degenerate times in which he lived. Mencius lived during the middle of the Warring States period, and he would have witnessed firsthand some of the most perverse diplomatic conduct and military aggression of the entire Eastern Zhou era.

By his time, the practice of war had lost all connection to the protection and promotion of righteousness; the premise on which wars were fought had become exceedingly weak. Mencius said, "In antiquity, a border station was set up as precaution

Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 99. Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 312. D.C. Lau, trans., Mencius, (London: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 124; Mencius, IV/A/14. 128 against violence. Today it is set up to perpetrate violence." Therefore, anyone who willingly supported the infrastructure necessary for committing acts of war was, according to Mencius, himself performing a criminal offence against the establishment of

coo benevolence. While his absolute opposition to the military was unique among prominent thinkers, his critique of warfare was even more severe. Unlike other philosophers of the era, Mencius questioned the legitimacy of the punitive wars of antiquity. Mencius said, "In the Spring and Autumn Annals there were no just wars. There were only cases of one war not being quite as bad as another. A punitive expedition is a war waged by one in authority against his subordinates. It is not for peers to punish one another by war."524 This is followed shortly by: "To wage a punitive war is to rectify. There is no one who does not wish himself rectified. What need is there for war?" It is clear from this that Mencius perceived human society in very idealistic extremes. Far from being anything of a pragmatist, Mencius rejected the legitimacy of all military measures, including those of self-defence. Instead he suggested (or perhaps hoped) that men would be drawn away from war by benevolence. His attitude might be less about hope than it is about helplessness. A world of endless turmoil would be an effective stimulus to this end; idealism thrives in extreme environments. Contrary to popular belief, his intellectual predecessor, the Grand Master Confucius, was not himself necessarily opposed to the use of the military. Confucius did not approve of wars of aggression, but he accepted the military as a necessary tool. "While Confucius's highest aspiration may indeed be a government based on ren [fH] and li [fH], there is evidence that he does not envisage a situation in which recourse to force was completely dispensable."527 Like the military strategists and unlike Mencius,

522 Ibid., p. 195; Mencius, VII/B/8. 523 Ibid., p. 194; Mencius, VII/B/4. 524' iIbid. , p. 194; Mencius, VII/B/2. 525 Ibid., p. 195; Mencius, VII/B/4. 526 Ibid. 527 Schwartz, World ofThought, p. 104. 129

Confucius had an appreciation for the 'punitive expedition.' He knew well that King Wu used the military when he expelled the corrupt Shang and founded the righteous Zhou

coo Dynasty. He also, on one occasion, requested that the Duke of Lu carry out a punitive expedition against a high official in the neighbouring State of Qi who committed regicide against his benevolent ruler. This stands in contrast to the judgment made by Mencius, who was born a full century after the Grand Master's death. Mencius condemned such punitive actions, while Confucius evidently supported them. The difference for Confucius was that he saw legitimacy in such limited military usage. Ideologically, Mencius did not permit legitimacy even under such specific circumstances. He did not even allow for the possibility of finding conditions that might necessitate the employment of the military. All in all, it is evident that Mencius saw the world in absolutes, while Confucius appears to have been more moderate and practical. This is important because it shows that Confucius was not himself opposed to the military, but rather only opposed to unjustified offensive wars. For Confucius, the military was considered a necessity, and were preparations and CO f training for war. However, it was the least important element of government; an ideal society could be sustained without the military. As Benjamin Schwartz has said, "The Master seems to take for granted the need for a military establishment as one of three requirements of any government - food, weapons, and the faith of the people - although he gives it lowest priority."532 When juxtaposed with the Confucian social principles of benevolence {reri) and proper conduct (//), his characteristic disesteem of the military has been emphasized in a manner unbecoming of his true sentiments. Confucius did not embrace weaponry, but he did value its function in limited and highly circumstantial roles. 528 ibid. 529 Ibid. 530 Notice: "There is no one who does not wish himself rectified. What need is there for war?" Lau, Mencius, p. 195; Mencius, VII/B/4. 531 Lau, the Analects, p. 123; the Analects, 13/29; 13/30. 532 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 104. 130

As for warfare itself, Confucius was cognizant of its destructive and disorderly

COO nature. He adamantly opposed wars of military aggression and expansion. A state's warring capacity should only be used sparingly and by those with the proper authority. The only legitimate military expeditions were those that "proceeded from the Son of Heaven."534 All punitive ventures that "proceeded from the nobles" were signs of political degeneration and social disorder. Unfortunately, these latter types were by far more common. As a result, his opposition to offensive wars circumstantially translates to opposition to all wars. Under his strict moral guidelines, it was almost impossible to legitimize any conflict. His opposition to military aggression and his general disesteem of the military establishment earned Confucius and all of his followers the reputation for being military pacifists.

4.2 Mozi on War: Attitude and Involvement Of all the philosophers of the ancient period, there were none more famous for opposition to war than Mozi. The three chapters of the Mozi on 'Denouncing Aggressive Warfare' have been especially instrumental in casting the Mohist patriarch in this light. As a result, he is generally understood as a peace-loving idealist who abhorred war because it was unrighteous, unprofitable, and socially inhibiting.536 Yet this depiction of the Mohist founder is something of a misrepresentation. It is true that in general, Mozi opposed the concept of war. He believed that military conflict was detrimental to all those involved, and he explicitly idealized a conflict-free world. However, it could be said that even the authors of the Seven Military Classics were philosophically opposed to war, hence the emphasis on righteousness and the high value of victory without fighting. These individuals merely made it their business to elaborate on the function and execution of warfare, which each of them recognized as important to state survival and

533 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 266. 534 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 59; the Analects, 16/2. 535 Ibid. 536 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, pp. 266-270. 131 the promotion of righteousness. Mozi was really no different than these individuals in his deliberation; he only differed in his exact approach. It is evident that there are distinct differences between how Mozi viewed war and how it is treated in the Seven Military Classics. Most obviously, the classics discussed warfare from the offensive perspective, whereas Mozi described only the defensive army. The classics were also primarily concerned with the execution of effective warfare, while warfare took second place to Mozi's concern for creating a better society. However, the more significant question is how Mozi differed from the social philosophers in whose company he is usually included. As previously illustrated, Mencius was fervently opposed to all methods of war, while Confucius was only generally opposed to aggressive actions. Both of them de-emphasized the military, but Confucius at least noted its vital role. Mozi was yet unique among the Eastern Zhou intellects. Like the Confucians, he was opposed to aggressive warfare, but unlike them, he emphasized the role of the military, especially its defensive potential.

Mozi shared with Confucius a general dislike of war. But war assumed a more integral role in Mozi's analysis of society. Conflict, and by extension war, was recognized by Mozi as a natural feature of human society, flourishing from the disagreement among men. Mozi said: "In the early days of human society, there were no rulers and administrators and different people had different views.... [..]...As everyone approved their own ideas and disapproved those of others, it unavoidably resulted in dispute." The resolution of this, and therefore the betterment of society, would be the establishment of new standards through which men could find common purpose. Mozi's sociopolitical program was aimed at the creation of this new normative culture, but he was still faced with overcoming existing societal conditions and natural warlike behaviours. This is where Mozi's interest in war originated from. By Mozi's own assessment, the reformation of society would contravene human nature. Ironically, this meant that even though the objective was the elimination of

Mozi, Ch. 13, pp. 98-99. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 71; LCC, pp. 98-99. 132 conflict, actual combat and participation in warfare would likely be required. Accordingly, Mozi stressed the importance of maintaining a military force under all circumstances. He said, "Supply is the treasure of a country, weaponry its claws, and the city walls are the stronghold of its self-defence. And these three items are the essentials to the existence of a state."538 This measure of pragmatism shown by Mozi illustrates both his understanding of his world and his dedication to his sociopolitical project. Warfare was an important subject of study, not for want but out of necessity. Mozi said, "There are still many feudal lords in the world who are keen on attacking and annexing their neighbouring countries...They are like blind men, who can name black and white [i.e. right and wrong] in the same way as ordinary men but cannot distinguish between them." While it appeared as though, in some cases, genuine ignorance was at the root of the problem, these wars of military aggression were in all ways "not in keeping with the interests of the people."540 Yet they dominated the political landscape as much during Mozi's life as during any other period of the Eastern Zhou. Mozi said, "The whole world has for a long time been plagued by warfare and is as weary as a child who has spent the day playing horse [i.e. self-exhausted for no tangible benefit]."5

In such a world, one had no choice but to take preventive measures to ensure one's own survival. The military thus found purpose in its capacity for self-defence. After all, it was the righteous sage kings who created weaponry for this very reason in the first place. Mozi said, "Because the ferocious and cunning animals were destroying men and injuring the people, the ancient sage kings taught the people the use of weapons."543 They instructed the people by stating, "Carry a two-edged sword which penetrates when it pierces and severs when it cuts. When struck with the flat side it does not break, this is the utility of a sword. To be light and strong and afford convenience of

538 Mozi, Ch. 5, pp. 26-27. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 20. 539 Mozi, Ch. 19, pp. 154-155. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 154-155. 540 Mozi, Ch. 19, pp. 154-157. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 154-157. 541 Mozi, Ch. 19, pp. 164-165. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 115; LCC, pp. 164-165; Watson, Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, p. 59. 542 Mozi, Ch. 20, pp. 168-171. 543 Mozi, Ch. 21, pp. 174-175. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 121. 133 action, such is the utility of armour."544 If the sage kings declared legitimacy in the defensive applications of military force, Mozi felt justified in doing so as well. Corresponding to his defensive perspective on warfare, Mozi stressed 'preparation' more than any other concept. He said, "One cannot defend himself unless the inner and outer city walls are in repair and one cannot meet emergencies unless his ideas are well thought out."545 As history recorded, the tyrant rulers of the Xia and Shang dynasties, Jie and Zhou respectively, failed to retain their empires not because of any major threats, but because both indulged in wealth and failed to commission appropriate preparations. These examples, among others from history, convinced Mozi of the importance of preparatory measures. "Therefore, preparation is what a country should emphasize."547

The Mozi also listed "Seven Potential Dangers" to a state. Of those, each pertains to some failure in making provisions, including neglect of defensive fortifications, failure of alliances, exhaustion of resources, and ministerial indifference.549 To further highlight the value of preparation, one of the dangers listed is a warning against administrative complacency. It states: "When the lord is over-confident of his own wisdom and holds no consultation, when he feels he is secure and makes no preparations against attack; and when he does not know that he must be watchful while neighbours are planning against him."550 It is concluded that "When these seven dangers reside in the administration of state affairs, the state will certainly perish, and, if they are present during the defence of a city, the city will be reduced to ruin by the approaching enemy. Wherever these seven dangers subsist, the state will face calamity." All of this corresponds with Mozi's identification of human society as inherently belligerent and

544 Ibid. 545 Mozi, Ch. 5, pp. 24-27. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 20. 546Moz/,Ch.5,pp. 26-27. 547 Ibid. 548 Mozi, Ch. 5, pp. 20-23. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 20-23. 549Mozr,Ch.5,pp.20-23. 550 Mozi, Ch. 5, pp. 20-23. [Modified quote from:] Mei, pp. 17-18; LCC, pp. 20-23. 551 Ibid. 134 human nature as intrinsically greedy. Preparations and self-defence are essential because of these factors. Although the military assumed primarily a defensive capacity for Mozi, he conceived of its function beyond state borders, with its ability to punish the unrighteous. Mozi said, "Justice cannot be maintained against the unjust unless there are ready weapons in the armoury."552 Self-defence was applicable in the protection of a state; punitive expeditions were applicable in the protection of humankind. Mozi said, "What the sage kings did was not 'to attack' (gong X$Q, but 'to punish' (zhu I^)."553 In ancient times, Heaven gave King Yu orders to punish Youmiao, King Tang orders to punish King Jie of the Xia Dynasty, and King Wu orders to punish Zhou of the Shang Dynasty.554 Only after receiving the orders from Heaven did tiiese ancient rulers decide on displacing the tyrants responsible for disorder and unrighteousness. The orders from Heaven were, in every instance, inauspicious symptoms of chaos and dysfunction, including natural disasters (such as droughts, floods, earthquakes, disturbances of the cyclical seasons), changes in animal behaviours, and human suffering.555 To be legitimate, any punitive expedition must first have been premised by one of these ill-omens. Thus Mozi said, "When the wise men in ancient times planned for the welfare of the world, they would first consider whether such a plan was righteous or not before pursuing it."556 Like the Seven Military Classics, Mozi supported this punitive application of the military arm. His representation is a fairly typical interpretation of these sage kings of antiquity and their so-called "punitive expeditions." According to tradition, these virtuous rulers had perfected themselves in all realms of governance, and they epitomized philanthropy. Mozi concluded, "Therefore, the benevolent rulers in ancient times would object to offensive wars launched by large states against small ones and would bring the

Mozi, Ch. 5, pp. 24-27. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 20. Mozi, Ch. 19, pp. 160-161. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 160-161. Mozi, Ch. 19, pp. 158-163. Ibid. Mozi, Ch. 19, pp. 154-155. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 154-155. 135 world into harmony." However, Mozi also displayed an uncharacteristically aggressive inclination, not found in any other social discourse and only present in the military classics. It appears to stem from Mozi's unfavourable evaluation of human nature and society. "In antiquity," Mozi said, "armour and weapons were not left in disuse and the soldiers and the people were not tired, but were ready to punish the noncompliant. Thus the ruler could become a hegemon over the empire."558 Therefore, recourse to warfare was a common occurrence in ancient times, but justifiably so. This aggressive inclination is also present elsewhere in the Mozi. In his criticism of the Confucians, Mozi again highlighted the aggressive application of military righteousness. He said, Suppose that a sage, in order to rid the world of harm, raises his troops and sets out to punish a violent and tyrannical state. But, having gained victory, he employs the methods of the Confucians and orders his soldiers, saying: 'Do not pursue the fleeing enemy! Do not shoot when the enemy is at bay. And if your opponents turn and run, help them push their heavy carts.' Then the violent and disorderly men will get away alive, and the world will not be rid of them. This is to inflict cruelty upon the parents of the world and do the age a great injury. Nothing could be more unrighteous!559

Here, Mozi is effectively suggesting that no clemency be given to unrighteous actors. The world is simply better without them. This is a remarkable prejudice not often seen in Mozi and Mohist philosophy, yet it is not incompatible with the rest of his teachings. Above all else, his foremost concern is always the preservation or attainment of righteousness.

When considered alongside his political and military activism, and several statements in the city defence chapters that stress the importance of counterattacks in a defensively fought war, Mozi's aggressive attitude is not inconsistent. Most importantly, Mozi opposed only aggressive unjustified warfare. He said nothing about limiting one's attacks when fighting from the defensive position, which was legitimate and justified. If anything, Mozi encouraged cleverness of strategy, sharpness of weapons, and strength of

557 Ibid. 558 Mozi, Ch. 6, pp. 30-31. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 24; LCC, pp. 30-31. 559 Mozi, Ch. 39, pp. 302-303. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 204; LCC, pp. 302-303; Watson, p. 129. 136 force. His aggressive righteousness was merely an extension of his desire to eliminate evil and wrongdoing, but on the interstate scale. As should be noted, there is an interesting congruency between this and Mozi's strict and unforgiving domestic law. Mozi may have been China's greatest philanthropist of the pre-Qin era, but he was not an egalitarian, nor was he very merciful.

4.3 Activism It has already been recognized that the Confucians were military pacifists. Conversely, the Mohists were the period's most vigorous practitioners of activism. Mozi and his school of followers exemplified the so-called "knights-errant" (xia $£) of ancient China, who, without regard for their own persons, "traveled about China offering their services to feudal lords." The Mohists engaged in interstate diplomacy, military strategy, tactics, wartime preparations, siege weapon manufacturing, and all measures necessary for the effective defence of fortified cities. The Mohist School actively participated in both the defence of Song and the defence of Yangcheng.563 Interestingly, in the defence of Song, a mere three hundred Mohists, Qin Huali, and Mozi's dialectic charm, were enough to dissuade the King of Chu from attacking the small state. Either the King of Chu was impressed by Mozi's arguments, which would illustrate the Master's diplomatic ability, or he came to realize that the Mohists would have staged too much of a military challenge to overcome. A mere three hundred men should not have paralyzed the conquest of an entire state, unless of course the Mohists represented that much of a threat, strategically or tactically.

The Mohist School was itself organized in a strict hierarchical military fashion, and the Mohists followed their own code of law, akin to military regulations. It has been speculated by some that Mozi himself might have come from a military background or

560 Schwartz, World ofThought, pp. 151-152. 561 Fung, Chinese Philosophy, pp. 83-84. 562 All of which are accounted for within the historical records and the Mozi military chapters. 563 As discussed in "Chapter 1: Mohism and its Influence." See respectively: Knoblock, Annals of Lti Buwei, pp. 560-561, pp. 487-488; Liishi Chunqiu, 21/5/2, 19/3/4. 137 family.564 "Mozi's mind displays a kind of military rigidity and simplifying tendency, a rather literal quality in its quest for intellectual order; and the society of his followers became a rigorously organized order apparently modeled on military prototypes."565 While it is not known whether Mozi was part of the warrior stratum, Benjamin Schwartz has argued, "The creation of an organized power, particularly of an organization with a military cast, can have as an aim only the express use of coercive power."566 It has even been suggested that the School operated as a factory that produced ready-made state officials to be deployed across the Central Plains.567 To this end, a minimum of six Mohists were recommended as officials to major states, most of whom appear to have served in positions of direct counsel to the state leadership. It is known with certainty that the States of Song, Qi, Wei, Yue, and Chu accepted Mohists in their administrations. There is also further evidence in the Mozi that directly suggests a military function or purpose behind the Mohist School. In chapter 48 there is a story which records how some pupils wished to learn archery from Mozi. He told them, "No, you cannot. The wise man must measure how far his capacity can reach before he is engaged in his work. Even the best soldier cannot fight and aid somebody at the same time. Presently you are not soldiers, so how would you be able to accomplish both your study and learn archery?" In the chapter that follows, there is another story of a man from the State of Lu who sent his son to study with Mozi but became upset when his son died in battle. The father held Mozi responsible for the death of his son, and Mozi replied, "You wanted your son to be my pupil. Now he has finished his study and died in battle, and you blame me. This is like trying to sell grain, but once having sold it, regretting the decision. Is this not ridiculous?"569 And there is yet another story where a pupil who had abandoned the Mohist cause returned to Mozi and said: "I am not to blame because I am

564 Mote, Intellectual Foundations, p. 78. 565 Ibid. 566 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 137, p. 162. 567 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 45. 568 Mozi, Ch. 48, pp. 458-459. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 241; LCC, pp. 458-459. 569 Mozi, Ch. 49, pp. 470-471. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 248; LCC, pp. 470-471. 138 not the first one to leave you." With a military analogy, Mozi replied: "This sounds like a defeated soldier asking for reward because he is not the first one to withdraw."570 It is definitively clear that the Mohists were well-versed in military affairs. They countered military aggression at the highest level, in the courts, and at the most rudimentary level, on the battlefields. In the social realm their dedication was no less evident. Their provocative maxim, which they adopted in response to Confucian pacifism, was "create good," rather than "transmit good." This was because the Mohists believed that humans lacked inherent goodness and the social institutions in use only exacerbated social tensions. Family ties rooted in ancestor worship had failed to prevent war thus far, and Confucian virtue had yet to be embodied.572 The Mohists could not but conclude that 'the good was nothing given, the good was something achieved.'573

This ideological disposition was derived directly from Mozi's personal character. He was a valiant and altruistic individual, and his active philosophy of putting others first was a genuine reflection of his own being. As Mei Yi-pao has written, "Mozi was certainly one of those rigorous individuals who always felt a sense of personal responsibility in general situations." 74 In the Mozi, his altruism is explained to a friend. His friend said, "Presently no one is practicing righteousness in the world. You are the only one who takes great pains to practice righteousness. You had better give it up." Mozi replied: "Suppose a man has ten sons. Only one attends to the farm while the other nine dwell at home. In such a case, the farmer must work all the more vigorously. Why? Because many eat while few work. Now that no one is practicing righteousness in the world, you should encourage me all the more. Why do you ask me to stop?"

Such an attitude is characteristic of the proactive nature of the Mohist organization. This trait permeated the core of all Mohist activities. It is evident in everything from Mohist ideals for personal conduct to righteous applications of the

570 Mozi, Ch. 46, pp. 424-425. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 424-425. 571 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 219. 572 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 142. 573 Ibid. 574 Mei, Neglected Rival, p. 44. 575 Mozi, Ch. 47, pp. 430-431. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 222; LCC, pp. 430-431. 139 military. In all cases, the emphasis was placed first and foremost on the active pursuit of what was righteous and what was most beneficial. This activism is best exemplified in Mozi's discussion with the Confucian Gong Mengzi. Gong Mengzi said, "A gentleman should fold his hands and wait. He will speak when consulted; he will not speak when not consulted. He is like a bell. When struck it sounds and when not struck it does not sound." Mozi replied that such a man, one who does not moderate his ruler's decisions whether asked or not, is in fact a disloyal subject.577 This is especially true when the ruler is militarily aggressive, because warfare is "beneficial neither to the victor nor to the vanquished."578 Mozi said, If the ruler should launch out on some unrighteous, extraordinary enterprise; and if in possession of clever military schemes, he should attack innocent states with a view to extending his territory, collecting taxes and gathering wealth...in such a case the gentleman must respond with counsel though he is not asked. 7

The Mohists believed that "the man of worth cares nothing for the appearance of dignity, or for the feelings with which such 'mindsets' are associated."580 Social formalities were void of substance if not associated with producing righteousness. The Confucians were fixated on the notion of proper conduct (//); it was the motive behind deeds that mattered. The Mohists, on the other hand, valued only the effectiveness of an act. In the text, Mozi concluded his conversation with Gong Mengzi by criticizing the logic he employed, saying, "Moreover.. .presently, no one had asked you and yet you spoke. Is this what you call sounding without being struck? Is this what you call ungentlemanly?"582 For Mozi, the worthy gentleman was one who acted as a "bell which rings even when not struck." "In the present world of chaos...those who seek goodness are few. Without intelligent persuasion, people will not understand."

576 Mozi, Ch. 48, 442-443. [Modified quote from:] Mei, p. 230; LCC, pp. 442-443. 577 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 159. 578 Mozi, Ch. 48,442-445. [Modified quote from:] Mei, pp. 230-231; LCC, pp. 442-445. 579 Ibid. 580 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 159. 581 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 40. 582 Mozi, Ch. 48,442-445. [Quote from:] Mei, pp. 230-231. 583 Schwartz, World of Thought, p. 159. 584 Mozi, Ch. 48, 442-445. [Quote from:] Mei, pp. 230-231. 140

As previously suggested, this proactive attitude translated readily into Mohist military ideology. Hsiao Kung-chuan has suggested that Mozi advocated a type of roc "armed peace." This assessment is substantiated by the Mohist preoccupation with military preparations and self-defence. As Mozi saw it, "aggressive campaigns mostly were undertaken because the aggressor regarded war as profitable."586 To remove the profit would, then, be to remove the motivation. An ideal world would not have any belligerent states or unrighteous rulers, but Mozi knew well that his world was far from the ideal. Instead of confronting the world by retreating into seclusion, the Mohists approached it with a willingness to participate and a readiness to defend those who were defenceless. As Mei Yi-pao has said, Mozi knew well that "one way to prevent war from being waged is to remove the confidence in its successful issue."587 The most definitive declaration of 'armed peace' in the Mozi can be found (of all places) in the extant chapter on "Simplicity in Funerals." It reads: Now that the sage kings have passed away and the world has forgotten the principle of righteousness, the feudal lords rely upon force of arms to attack each other. In the south are the kings of Chu and Yue, and in the north are the lords of Qi and Jin, all of whom drill and discipline their soldiers, attack and annex their neighbours, and seek to rule the world. Some small states, however, they do not attack, and this is because these small states are well stored with supplies, their inner and outer city walls are in good repair, and the superiors and their subordinates are harmonious. Therefore, the large state would not want to attack them.588

By logical deduction, Mozi concludes that the converse is similarly true. Those states that lack supplies, functional defensive fortifications, and harmony between superiors and subordinates, "the large states would want to attack." Therefore, to avoid war, military preparations are necessary. In essence, military readiness amounts to self-preservation. On the interstate scale, this may be referred to as armed peace.

Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, pp. 270-272. Ibid., p. 267. Mei, Neglected Rival, pp. 96-97. Mozi, Ch. 25, pp. 186-187. [Modified quote from:] Mei, pp. 128-129; LCC, pp. 186-187; Watson, p. 71. Mozi, Ch. 25, pp. 186-187. [Quote from:] Mei, pp. 128-129. 141

Throughout the military chapters of the Mozi there is a premium placed on being militarily strong.590 The logic amounts to a recognition that the defensive position is among the strongest in warfare. If preparations can be maintained, a state will never be attacked. And if an aggressor is ever foolish enough to attack such a well-prepared state, the damage to the defender would be minimal. This is logically similar to Sunzi's suggestion that "one who excels in warfare is able to make himself unconquerable."591 It also accords nicely with Sunzi's warning against attacking defensive fortifications, such as cities, because of the natural advantages that the defender controls.592 Hence, Sunzi concludes that the lowest realization of warfare is to attack fortified cities.593 By Mozi's own assessment, if done correctly, the siege of one hundred thousand men could be defended against by only four thousand individuals.594 This was the power of defensive war fighting. But it had to be understood to be effectively utilized. The most important element of military defence was quite simply the capacity to defend oneself. Therein, the first of the "Seven Potential Dangers" listed in the Mozi is the inability to do so. 9 While unjustified military aggression was never condoned, Mozi advised rulers to provide themselves with the ability to exert military force, if needed. In one instance, he urged the minister Gongliang Huanzi of Wei to maintain a ready force of knights because Wei was a small state situated between the large and powerful states of Qi and Jin.596 He said, "If the money spent on the decorations of the vehicles, the food of the horses, and the embroidered clothes worn by women, is used to sustain soldiers, it can support at least one thousand. In case of emergency, several hundred of them can be stationed in the front while several hundred more can be stationed in the rear." To emphasize the importance of maintaining such a military capacity, Mozi sarcastically remarked, "To compare this with having several hundred women [in embroidered

590 Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, p. 271. 591 Sawyer, Seven Military Classics, p. 163. 592 Ibid., p. 161. 593 Ibid. 594 Yates, City under Siege, frag 51, pp. 345-350. 595 Mozi, Ch. 5, pp. 20-21. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 20-21. 596 Mozi, Ch. 47, pp. 438-439. 597 Mozi, Ch. 47, pp. 438-439. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 438-439. 142 clothes] in the front and in the rear, which is safer? I should think to keep women is not so secure as to maintain soldiers."598 Beyond the basic ability to exert military power, one's method of defence depended on what was being protected. During an enemy siege, the benefits of one's defensive fortifications needed to be maximized to achieve the best possible results. The size of the city therefore dictated the nature of the defending strategy to be used. In general, if the city was a thousand chang (2.31 km) in circumference, "one must meet them at the outer walls, for then the defenders will have the advantage."599 "In a city less than a thousand chang in circumference, do not meet them, but inspect the formation and number of the enemy before responding to them."600 The difference between these two strategies probably correlates to the task of defending fortifications of different territorial sizes and populations of different amounts. Conceivably, a larger city would be more difficult to defend because there would be more territory and people to manage and because the enemy has more locations on which to launch an attack. However, the city would also have more defenders with which the outer walls could be manned. The advantage to the defenders in this situation would be greater if the enemy was met at the outer walls and use of these additional fortifications was made so that the maximum defensive effort could be put forward. At any rate, Mozi said that deciding on which strategy to employ was "the greatest essential in defending cities."601

4.4 Excellence in Warfare: Manipulation of Disposition Excellence in warfare was not just about assuming a strong defensive position. For the Mohists, it was about the creative manipulation of factors that would influence relative military strengths. The objective was to create favourable conditions for the defensive army behind the fortifications, while dictating those available to the invading army. A defensive army would naturally benefit from the foreknowledge of terrain and

598 Ibid.. 599 Yates, City under Siege, frag 77, pp. 430-431. 600 Ibid., frag 77, pp. 430-431. 601 Ibid., frag 77, pp. 430-431. 143 local environment, but the true value of these would depend on how well the defensive army could prepare the battlefield. The Mohists recognized the vital role that logistics played in sustaining military campaigns, especially in prolonged conflicts. Hence, it was said, "If there is no food in the city, then we call the situation 'the great killing.'"602 Therefore, the Mohists recommended more than three months' worth of stored provisions to sustain a besieged city.603 A calculation was even provided for determining how to appropriately ration for such extended lengths of time.604 Under mandatory restrictions, all food stocks necessarily became property of the city administration during a siege so that supplies could be centrally managed and distributed.605 Other important items seized by the government included metal vessels, bronze, iron, timbers, wood, tiles, stones from people's houses, domestic animals, and any "property from the dwellings outside the walls that could be used to assist in the defence of the city."606 Those who did not comply with the orders to relinquish all such items were to be promptly and publicly executed.607 But while adequate provisions were important to the survival of the defenders, they were equally important to the invading enemy forces. The Mohists understood this and thus advocated a "scorched earth" policy. The Mozi states: "Outside the city walls, to the distance that arrows can reach, destroy the walls so that they cannot be used by the enemy as cover. Within thirty miles (//), take inside the city all of the firewood, twigs, and large wood."608 A later passage is more specific on these details. It reads, "For one hundred bu (138m) beyond the outer wall, cut down and remove absolutely all walls, both high and low, and plants and trees, both large and small."609 As the enemy advances closer, all trees within the stated perimeter must be cut down, and "although there may be requests and petitions to spare

602 Ibid., frag 22, pp. 191-192. 603 Ibid., frag 20, pp. 186-188. 604 Ibid., frag 127, pp. 574-576. 605 Ibid., frag 106, pp. 513-518. 606 Ibid., frag 124, pp. 570-571; frag 128, pp. 577-579; frag 129, p. 580. 607 Ibid., frag 129, p. 580. 608' Ibid.• , frag 59, pp. 370-372. 609 Ibid., frag 113, pp. 542-543. 144 them, do not listen to them." "Fill in all the empty wells outside the walls so that water cannot be drawn from them.. .Take into the city everything that could be used to attack the city with...all timber facing the roads, that cannot be brought into the city, is to be completely burnt, so as not to let the enemy be able to use it."611 If there are any water wells or ditches outside of the city walls that cannot be filled in and blocked, they are to be contaminated with poisonous plants. To this end, "Regularly order the border prefectures to plant and gather in advance, the leaves of Daphne genkwa, Illicium religiosum, Aconitum Fischeri, and Xanthoxylum piperitum [i.e. various poisonous plants]." As for local livestock, these should be slaughtered when the invaders arrive, making sure to "gather in their skins, hides, sinews, horns, fat, skulls, and feathers."614 The land is to be essentially stripped of its plant and animal life, and its fresh water supply. The immediate vicinity around the city walls is to be bare and void of obstacles that could serve either as defensive shelters for the enemy or as raw materials to be used in the attack against the city. The invaders should be left with nothing with which to sustain themselves or their attack.

The Mohists understood that defensive warfare was particularly difficult to sustain the longer the conflict continued. In a protracted war, the defensive army could potentially outlast an invading enemy force if the fortifications were sturdy and the provisions plentiful. However, a defensive army might also be severely handicapped by physical confinement to the fortifications. Therefore, the Mohists recognized the essential need for allied support and the ability to strike the invaders with counterattacks. Of all the means through which a state is held, "the help of the feudal lords who are my four neighbours" is listed prominently among them.615

y Ibid., frag 128, pp. 577-579. 'ibid., frag 113, pp. 542-543. 2 Ibid., frag 136, pp. 591-593. 3 Ibid., frag 136, pp. 591-593. 4 Ibid., frag 137, pp. 594-595. 5 Ibid., frag la, pp. 62-69. 145

An ancient proverb says, "When the lips are gone, the teeth will be exposed to the cold."616 To the Mohists, this was analogous to the nature of military alliances. One's neighbouring states were one's buffer (i.e. lips) against outside aggression (i.e. the cold). Neighbouring states were mutually dependent when under the threat of military aggression, as the loss of one's neighbours made probable one's own extinction the following day. In the defence of a city, the Mohists looked to the outlying areas and the districts beyond for assistance. While the area outside of the city walls was technically the responsibility of the prefects, the prefects, their assistants, and colonels all remained accountable to the authorities inside the city. "Each prefecture outside the city reports to the higher authority the loyalty of its local magnates and strategists and resident lords, and the amount of its population." Close relatives of the town and district chiefs, and those of the elders and local magnates, were to be honoured and favoured in the city to generate ties of loyalty across the region.619 Any local magnates who had relations to the feudal lords outside of the district were instructed to "let the higher authorities know them thoroughly and entertain them well in the officers' quarters."620 "The higher authorities are to feast [these local magnates] with food repeatedly so that they cannot, on their own responsibility, enter or depart. Link them by taking hostages from them."621

City defence was a project that required the mutual interest of neighbours because their mutual dependency guaranteed each other's independent survival. A fortified city, which would have stood as one of the principal bulwarks against enemy invasion, would have been especially vital in the protection of regional territory. To maintain the outlying districts, the Mozi suggests that the ruler regularly send envoys to the border cities and the frontier barriers and passes, to bestow rewards on those who guard these areas and those who "prepare against the troublesomeness of the Man and Yi barbarians." These

616 Mozi, Ch. 18, pp. 152-153. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 152-153. 617 Yates, City under Siege, frag 92, pp. 472-475. 618 Ibid., frag 95, pp. 482-483. 619 Ibid., frag 103, pp. 504-507. 620 Ibid., frag 103, pp. 504-507. 621 Ibid., frag 103, pp. 504-507. 622 Ibid., frag 74, pp. 424-425. 146 border guards are expected to "recommend whether the materiel of the defenders and commanders is excessive or insufficient, whether the formation of terrain indicates that the border should be guarded, and whether the implements and preparations are regularly in large quantities." These are the measures through which a state is defended.

4.5 Counterattack Capability The Mozi says, "In general, those who defend cities make their priority the speedy injury of the enemy. Lengthy waiting for the arrival of help is not the wisest policy for defenders. If they are able to accomplish this injury to the enemy, then they will be able to defend cities." The Mohist conceptualization of warfare included such intelligent readings of military strategy. While the organization was primarily concerned with its defensive-orientation, the Mohists saw offensive tactics as part of the function of defensive war fighting. For example, sally ports played an important role in Mohist city defence. Sally ports, or doorways through which the defence could launch sorties against the attacker without compromising the defensive fortifications, were to be built every thirty bu (41.4 m) along the city walls, and were to be roughly 2 metres long, 2 metres wide, and just under 2 metres in height.625 They were to be used in situations that required quick and efficient counterattacks against the enemy forces. One such usage is during the repulsion of an enemy mass infantry assault. It might be expected that during such an attack, which presumably would favour the defending forces, the last thing to be suggested would be sending one's own soldiers into the battlefield, but the Mozi suggests exactly that.

The primary means with which a mass infantry assault is defended is through dropping objects such as sand, boiling water, stones, and fire onto the attacking enemy soldiers.626 However, because "the general who launches a mass infantry assault is an angry man," this type of offensive manoeuvre was susceptible to an organized

623 Ibid., frag 74, pp. 424-425. 624 Ibid., frag 78, p. 432. 625 Ibid., frag 18, pp.165-176. 626 Ibid., frags 45-50, pp. 312-343. 147 counterattack. The suggestion offered in the Mozi was for the construction of a rough perimeter fence some eight feet from the outside of the city wall that would obstruct the attacking soldiers from retreating, once suspended structures were set ablaze and dropped

/TOO on top of them. The gates of the rough perimeter fence were also to be set on fire to cause panic and disorientation among the enemy soldiers. The enemy will suffer badly. [The general] will therefore lead the troops away. If they should do this, then order our side's elite warriors to leave the sally ports in all directions and to strike at the departing soldiers...Usually, when troops are to be sent out, create a diversion.. .The enemy will necessarily be deluded, and under these circumstances, you will necessarily destroy the army and kill the generals.629

It is through such aggressive means that the attack by mass infantry assault is defeated. That the Mohists endorsed such offensive military acts, and to such extremes, should be no surprise. Above all, the aim of a defensively fought war remained victory over the enemy. The Mohists took their cues from historical records, which most importantly instructed them to defend while still able. "As an ancient poem goes: 'If the fish does not run away while it is still in the water, it will have no chance once being caught and placed on land.'"630

4.6 Strength through Fierceness Mozi was concerned as much as any other military strategist with the performance of soldiers on the battlefield. The objective of warfare, after all, was the defeat of the enemy. For the Mohists, defensive warfare did not negate this objective in any way. In fact, because military aggressors attacked unrighteously, it was even more appropriate that the defenders defeat them fully and rid the world of their inhumanity. Mozi therefore advocated military strength through the promotion of fierceness. Bravery, courage, and confidence were all qualities embraced in the Chinese military classics. The Mohists

Ibid., frag 44, pp. 309-311. Ibid., frags 49-50, pp. 332-343. Ibid., frag 49, pp. 333-338. Mozi, Ch. 18, pp. 152-153. [Quote from:] LCC, pp. 152-153. 148 embraced these concepts just the same; the defensive effort was to be led by men who best exemplified these qualities. "The brave and daring are to be the front rank."631 Like in the military classics, the Mohists also recommended that generals should focus on the elimination of doubt as a principle of military leadership. In the Mozi it is stated, "Fully investigate rewards and carry out punishments, the reason being to make the soldiers firm of purpose. Follow up their actions quickly so as not to let them have second thoughts."632 Elsewhere in the text, it is said, "Though there should be tactics in war, courage is fundamental."633

However, beyond the standard qualities of excellence expected of soldiers, the Mohists were atypical in their adoption of a necessarily ferocious attitude toward warfare. The fierceness of one's soldiers, i.e. the haste and violence of their actions in defensive combat, were to be absolute in order to eliminate the enemy. Hence it was said, "Defeat the enemy through fierce battles and make sure that they cannot launch another attack after being defeated." This fierceness is a derived necessity of the zero-sum nature of counter-siege warfare and city defence. One's own survival was dependent not only on one's bravery and courage, or even cleverness, but on one's willingness to "defend to the death."635 This extreme level of dedication could be cultivated in one's soldiers through various means, all of which presumably were to be concurrently employed.

It was especially important for the leadership of a city under threat of attack to nourish hatreds of the enemy. Therefore, the Mozi says, "Carefully provide for garrison troops whose own towns may have fallen to the enemy." Punishments were to be exceedingly harsh to encourage soldiers to fight with intensity and vigor. The soldiers were to know that the consequences of retreating from enemy were more severe than what might happen at the hands of the enemy. "As for those who go to the enemy, their fathers, mothers, wives, children, and siblings are all broken on the chariot.. ..Those who,

631 Yates, City under Siege, frag 87, pp. 454-458. 632 Ibid., frag 28, pp. 214-222. 633 Mozi, Ch. 2, pp. 6-7. [Quote from:] Mei, p. 6. 634 Mozi, Ch. 70, pp. 570-571. [ Quote from:] LCC, pp. 570-571. 635 Yates, City under Siege, frag 60, pp. 377-382. (frag 79, pp.433-435, also says "serve to the death") 636 Ibid., frag 89, pp. 461-466. 149 when facing the enemy lines abandon their positions because of fear of the enemy, are to be executed."637 And rewards were to be regularly distributed for excellence in performance and contribution to the defensive effort. "This is the way by which one encourages the officers and people to defend stoutly and defeat a siege."638 Rewards were to be of increasing value dependent on one's contributions to the defence, and those who participated in driving the enemy away three times or more were to be bestowed rich rewards "in front of the other defenders."639 Rewards were also used to stimulate friendly competition among soldiers, by selecting two men from each unit of those who have fought desperately and rewarding them with handsome emoluments.640 "Nurture their bravery and heighten their enthusiasm, when the people's zeal is increased a hundred-fold, many will grasp for the few rewards and the soldiers will not be dilatory."641 Mutual responsibility also played a role in motivating soldiers to fight, creating both unity and accountability in and between the five-man squads.642 "The five- man squads are to be mutually liable. Order each to be cognizant of those on the left and right, and front and rear."643

Most importantly, the Mohists recognized the impact that appearance could have in warfare. "If the defenders do not take warfare seriously, the attackers will [see this and therefore] consider retreat an option in their attack."644 In other words, the strength of the defenders, or at least the appearance of strength, can act as a deterrent on the battlefield. If the enemy soldiers believe that retreat is an option, they will be encouraged to attack.

637 Ibid., frag 85, pp. 449-450. 638 Ibid., frag 86, pp. 451-453. 639 Ibid., frag 71, pp. 408-409. 640 Ibid., frag 86, pp. 451-453. 641 Ibid., frag 121, pp. 562-564. 642 Ibid., frag 85, pp. 449-450; frag 91, pp. 469-471; frag 92, pp. 472-475. 643 [Modified from:] Ibid., frag 87, pp. 644 Mozi, Ch. 71, p. 598. This translation is my own. The original Chinese reads: shouzhe zhong xia, gongzhe qing yun qu ^f#llT, J^#iM(5)£- Yates's translation is less clear: "...for if the defenders consider surrender a grave matter, the attackers will make light of departing." (frag 24, pp. 198-202) The Library of Chinese Classics edition of the Mozi does not translate this sentence into English, and in the modern Chinese translation, the content of the original Chinese sentence is changed substantially. The modern Chinese translation reads: shouzhe hen hen huanji, gongzhe ziran tao kui ^^"3S©S^. Jfc#S^SSIN®- In English, this is: "If the defenders ruthlessly and relentlessly fight back, the attackers are destined to flee in a disorderly retreat." 150

Conversely, if the defenders show the attackers that retreat is not an option, the psychological advantage belongs to the defenders. The defenders should be fierce in action and absolute in determination. This intensity must be demonstrated on the battlefield, because alternatively, a lack of confidence and ferocity will show weakness and motivate the attackers. In all of these ways, the Mohists encouraged excellence in warfare. 151

CONCLUSION

This thesis project was stimulated by the discrepancies that exist in the study of Mohism. The objective was to examine the neglected military chapters of the Mozi to establish their ideological relevance to Mohism and Chinese military thought. Conceived as a contribution to the work started by Robin D.S. Yates, this project has included original content analyses of the Seven Military Classics of ancient China and the military chapters of the Mozi. The Seven Military Classics have assumed a large role in this thesis because of the need to identify first with the ancient Chinese concept of war. The problem this thesis has attempted to resolve is that Mozi is not recognized for his military expertise. In fact, because of his unique philosophical perspectives, this lack of recognition is not the only issue. As a social philosopher, Mozi is perceived as a military pacifist. This is a problem because, as this thesis has shown, Mozi's attitude towards war and his ideas on how it should be conducted are radically different from this perception of him. The major obstacle for this thesis, then, was to identify and isolate Mozi's military thought apart from his sociopolitical ideas of which he is well-known for. Distinguishing his military ideology in the military chapters, and throughout the Mozi, required first knowing what to look for and how to value it appropriately. The content analysis of the Seven Military Classics provided the necessary foundation for this.

The exploration of Chinese military thought in the classic texts has tremendous value on its own. However, in this thesis it was a prerequisite to the analysis of military thought in a seemingly unrelated sociopolitical treatise. The importance of this comparison is only emphasized by the fact that I truly believed during the writing of this thesis that Mohist military thought was something altogether different from the mainstream military ideology of the Seven Military Classics. I initially believed that it was perhaps related to a pacifistic strain of military thought that favoured accommodation over conflict. 152

There appears as though there might have been a trend of anti-militarism in the State of Song, represented partly by a sequence of state officials who sought to abolish war.645 The Guanzi, an encyclopedic text with contributions spanning the Eastern Zhou era, even describes such a movement as a threat to state security, stating, "If talk of abolishing the use of arms prevails, the strategic passes will not be defended."646 Given Mozi's condemnation of aggressive warfare, and previous scholarship that de- emphasized his interest in the military, I could not help but think that the material I was examining was perhaps one of the first known theoretical manifestations of this pacifist movement. Little did I anticipate how wrong that early expectation was and how much Mohist military thought actually shared with mainstream military ideology. The similarities are profound. And what this tells us is that Mozi was not an outsider in the military community. His ideas on warfare are comprehensive and of high intellectual value. This insight would not have been available without conducting a study of both the military chapters of the Mozi and the Seven Military Classics. That the Mohist organization was involved in military affairs during the Warring States period has never been explicitly denied. There are corroborating historical records that confirm the involvement of Mohists in the military realm. Yet, this has been de- emphasized in modern studies. More critically, the military component of Mohist thought has been overlooked and completely undervalued. Through the content analysis of the military chapters of the Mozi, this study has not only revealed the character of Mohist military thought, but it has demonstrated the central importance of military affairs in Mohist philosophy.

645 Specifically, Duke Xiang of Song (r. 650-637 BCE), Minister Xiang Shu (ca. 575-532 BCE), and Hua Yuan (ca. 575-532 BCE). Fung Yu-lan says, "The Zuo Zhuan tells us that after the death of Duke Xiang, his efforts towards peace were continued by other men of Song, some of whom [Xiang Shu and Hua Yuan in 546 BCE] proposed a disarmament for all states." (p. 78) This movement, if it existed, might have also been ideologically connected to the legendary ruler Shennong, the Lord of Guzhu and his sons Bo Yi and Shu Qi, and the later quasi-Mohist Song Keng. Each of these individuals has been recognized for their aversion to conflict and killing. See Fung, Chinese Philosophy, p. 78, Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, pp. 217-218, and Knoblock, Annals of Lit Buwei, pp. 266-268; Ltishi Chunqiu, 12/4/2. W. Allyn Rickett, trans.,Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China, Vol. 1, Rev. ed. (Boston: Cheng & Tsui Company, 2001), p. 110. 153

War has a fundamental role in Mozi's discourse on society, one that extends beyond his condemnation of aggressive warfare and his promotion of impartial caring. Mozi did not delight in the military arts, but he did not shy away from them either. In fact, in specific political and social contexts Mozi considered warfare justifiable and absolutely necessary. Although war is itself generally undesirable, less-than-ideal circumstances make it fundamentally unavoidable. As a result, Mozi's unique defensive perspective on warfare should not be mistaken for pacifism. In all actuality, his ideas on warfare reflect his deep understanding of how it must be skillfully used to achieve society's greater goals. It is evident that in those limited circumstances where warfare is necessary, Mozi believed that it is imperative to wage it in a manner that would ensure a victory with lasting results.

This is not unlike the principal military writings. The authors of the Seven Military Classics are unanimous in their approach to war as an institution; war is a regrettable necessity. Therefore, the pinnacle of excellence in warfare is to achieve one's political objectives without employing the military in combat. This agrees with all moral obligations, but this also satisfies all military objectives, as the preservation of one's own forces is the highest standard of military success. In situations where warfare is needed, these texts are again unanimous in stressing the importance of optimizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the military. Violent military strategies are sometimes required, not for want of violence, but for the desire to create military and, ultimately, political success.

Where the Mozi and the Seven Military Classics differ is in the intentions of their respective authors. The latter texts were written for the expressed purpose of explicating methods of excellence in warfare; the former only discussed it as a means to a greater social good. Nevertheless, Mozi's analysis of war and his strategies and tactics for conducting warfare are no less intelligent than those of his military contemporaries. Furthermore, his ideas on warfare are ideologically compatible with the social elements of his philosophy. Even his more progressive military ideas are not inconsistent with 154 core Mohist doctrine. His philosophy in general reflects the contemplation of a practical reformer confronted with a hostile and violent world. When the military chapters are incorporated into the examination of the Mozi, thus enabling the text to be studied as a single document, it becomes clear that Mozi explained warfare by contrasting how it negatively affects society with how it can be properly and effectively employed. For situations that required military confrontation, Mozi advocated the use of political strategies, alliances, adequate preparations, defensive weaponry, and defensive military techniques. Whether or not Mozi himself partook in actual combat, he advocated nothing less than excellence in it. Warfare was not his personal passion, but the realities of his environment dictated that he must understand it on both the political and military levels of strategy. With the military chapters included, the Mozi demonstrates that he thoroughly did. While he was at once a philosopher, a teacher, and a social reformer, Mozi was also a military genius whose ideas on warfare were directed toward the establishment of a just and harmonious society. 155

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ames, Roger T. The Art of Rulership: A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1983.

Balmforth, Edmund E. "A Chinese Military Strategy of the Warring States: Sun Pin." PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1979.

Berelson, Bernard. Content Analysis in Communication Research. (Facsimile of 1952 edition) New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971.

Boodberg, Peter A. "The Art of War in Ancient China: A study based on upon the Dialogues of Li, Duke of Wei." PhD diss., University of California, 1930.

Bryman, Alan. Social Research Methods. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Carney, T.F. Content Analysis: A Technique for Systematic Inference from Communication. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1972.

Chan Wing-tsit, trans. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Cleary, Thomas, trans. The Essential Confucius: The Heart of Confucius' Teachings in Authentic I Ching Order. New Jersey: CASTLE BOOKS, 1998.

Cua, Anthony S., ed. Routledge Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2002. de Bary, W.M. Theodore, and Irene Bloom, eds. Sources of Chinese Tradition. Vol. 1, From Earliest Times to 1600. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Eberhard, Wolfram. Conquerors and Rulers: Social Forces in Medieval China. 2n edition. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1965.

Fung Yu-lan. A History of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 1, The Period of the Philosophers: from the beginnings to circa 100 B.C. Translated by Derk Bodde. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

—. A History of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 2, The Period Classical Learning: from the Second Century B.C. to the Twentieth Century A.D. Translated by Derk Bodde. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Geaney, Jane. "A Critique of A.C. Graham's Reconstruction of the 'Neo-Mohist Canons'." Journal of American Oriental Society 119, no.l (1999):1-11. 156

Gerbner, George et al., eds. The Analysis of Communication Content: Developments in Scientific Theories and Computer Techniques. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969.

Graff, David A., and Robin Higham, (eds.) A Military History of China. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002.

Graham, A.C. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989.

—. Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of Mo-tzu. Singapore: National University of Singapore, Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985.

Graham, A.C, trans. Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978.

Herrmann, Albert. An Historical Atlas of China. Edited by Norton Ginsberg. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966.

Holsti, Ole R. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

Hsiao Kung-chuan. A History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume I: From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century A.D. Translated by F. W. Mote. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Hsu, Cho-yun. Ancient China in Transition: An Analysis of Social Mobility, 722-222 BCE. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965.

Johnston, Alastair I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Kao, George, (ed.) The Translation of Things Past: Chinese History and Historiography. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982.

Kierman, F.A., and J.K. Fairbank., eds. Chinese Ways in Warfare. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Klein, Yitzhak. "A Theory of Strategic Culture." Comparative Strategy 10, (1991): 3-23.

Knoblock, John and Jeffrey Riegel, trans. The Annals ofLii Buwei. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Lau, D.C. "Some Notes on the 'Sun tzu.'" Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 28, no.2 (1965): 319-335. 157

Lau, D.C., trans. Confucius, the Analects. London: Penguin Books, 1979.

—. Mencius. London: Penguin Books, 1970.

Lau, D.C., and Roger T. Ames. Sun Pin: The Art of Warfare. New York: Ballantine Books, 1996.

Lewis, Mark E. Sanctioned Violence in Early China. New York: State University of New York Press, 1990.

Liau, Timothy Yeong-shyang. The Just War Theory in the Teaching of Mo Tzu. PhD diss., University of Notre Dame, 1991.

Loewe, Michael, and Edward L. Shaughnessy, eds. The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Lowe, Scott. Mo Tzu's Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia: The Will and the Way. Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.

Maeder, Erik W. "Some Observations on the Composition of the 'Core Chapters' of the Mozi." Early China 17, (1992): 27-82.

Mei Yi-pao. Motse, The Neglected Rival of Confucius. Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1973.

Mei Yi-pao, trans. The Ethical and Political Works of Motse. 1929. Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1993.

Mo Di. Mozi- Library of Chinese Classics. Translated into English by Wang Rongpei and Wang Hong. Changsha, Hunan: Hunan People's Publishing House, 2006.

Morgan, Evan S., trans. Tao, the Great Luminant: Essays from the Huai Nan Tzu. Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1934. http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/tgl/index.htm

Mote, Frederick W. Intellectual Foundations of China. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989.

Needham, Joseph, and Robin D.S. Yates. Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 5, Chemistry and Chemical Technology; Part 6, Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Needham, Joseph, and Wang Ling. Science and Civilization in China. Vol. 2, History of Scientific Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1956. 158

Rand, Christopher C. "The Role of Military Thought in Early Chinese Intellectual History." Unpublished PhD diss., Harvard University, 1977.

Rickett, W. Allyn, trans. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China. Vol. 1, Rev. ed. Boston: Cheng & Tsui Company, 2001.

Rowley, Harold H. "The Chinese Philosopher Mo Ti." Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 31, (1948): 241-276.

Rubin, Vitaly A. Individual and State in Ancient China: Essays on Four Chinese Philosophers. Translated by Steven I. Levine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Sawyer, Ralph D., trans. One Hundred Unorthodox Strategies: Battle and Tactics of Chinese Warfare. Oxford: Westview Press, 1996.

—. Sun Pin's Military Methods. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

—. Sun Tzu, Art of War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

—. The Art of the Warrior: Leadership and Strategy from the Chinese Military Classics. Boston: Shambala Publications, Inc., 1996.

—. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. Oxford: Westview Press, 1993.

Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985.

Scobell, Andrew. China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Tien, Chen-ya. Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern. New York: Mosaic Press, 1992.

Waley, Arthur. Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China. London: Allen & Unwin, 1953.

Wallacker, Benjamin E. "Two Concepts in Early Chinese Military Thought." Language 42, no.2 (1966): 295-299.

Walt, Stephen M. "The Search for a Science of Strategy: A Review Essay." Review of Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (ed.) Peter Paret. International Security 12, no.l (1987): 140-165.

Watson, Burton, trans. Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hstin Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 159

—. Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty I. Rev. Ed. Hong Kong: Renditions- Columbia University Press, 1993.

—. Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty II. Rev. Ed. Hong Kong: Renditions- Columbia University Press, 1993.

—. Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty. Hong Kong: Renditions-Columbia University Press, 1993.

Yates, Robin D.S. "Early China," In War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds: Asia, The Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica. (eds.) Kurt Raaflaub, and Nathan Rosenstein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, 7- 45.

—. "New Light on Ancient Chinese Military Text: Notes on their nature and evolution, and the development of military specialization in Warring States China." T'oung Pao 74, (1988): 211-248.

—. "Siege Engines and Late Zhou Military Technology," in Explorations in the History of Science and Technology in China, ed. Li Guohao. Shanghai: Shanghai Chinese Classics Publishing House, 1982. pp. 409-451.

—. "The Mohists on Warfare: Technology, Technique, and Justification." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 47 (no. 35, Thematic Issue), (1979): 549-603.

Yates, Robin D.S., trans. The City under Siege: Technology and Organization as seen in the Reconstructed Text of the Military Chapters of Mo Tzu. PhD diss, (unpublished), Harvard University, 1980.

—. Towards a Reconstruction of the Tactical Chapters of Mo Tzu (ch. 14). Inaug. diss. (M.A.); University of California, Berkeley, 1975. 160

APPENDIX A:

;too° 115° \125"

/ STATES OF THE EASTERN ZHOU ERA

•-.i...

QIN IZHOU/ZHENG

Scale 1:10,000,000 25" MILKS I I « II I'I 1 I 0 20 50 100 150 200 KILOMETRES ti I I • In i » 0 50 100 200 300 400

(Based on A. Hermann) fH^|^Hi»A