The Taking of the Outpost Villages
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
CHAPTER VI1 THE TAKING OF THE OUTPOST VILLAGES NOT only the Fifth British Army, but also the right of the Third which was to take part in the great Arras offensive, were still separated from the Hindenburg Line by a chain of villages which had been broken only at one point-Lagnicourt. The date for the British offensive had now been settled- April 8th-and Haig was anxious lest the Third Army should be late in securing the " jumping-off " positions on its right. Gough also was eager to seize the line of villages which prevented him from preparing an assault upon the Hinden- burg Line. He stated that, if the subordinate staffs had shown more energy in getting forward their heavy artillery, the villages would have been taken before March 23rd. The part of the artillery allocated for that purpose was now up, and when, on March 2gth, a third attempt to seize Croisilles and Ecoust, made by the 7th British Division after bom- bardment by heavy howitzers, had failed, the divisional commander was relieved of his position1 and a new attack organised for April 1st. It was decided that the Fifth Army and the right of the Third should attack on the same day the whole string of villages, with the exception of the southernmost, Hermies : on the Third Army's front two divisionsz of the VI1 Corps would advance to beyond Henin; on the Fifth Army's front the 7th Division (V Corps) would seize Croisilles and Ecoust-Longatte, and next to it the left column of the I Anzac Corps would take Noreuil.s The next village in the chain, Lagnicourt, had already been captured, but south of it It is probable that the repulse was not due to lack of energy. but to failure of the higher staff to recognise the difficulty. At Longatte the 2nd Battalion, Gordon Hiehlandrrs (20th Brrgade). had been stopped by strong German machine-gun fire. At Croisilles the attack by the 9rst Brigade had made snme pronress. The I Anzac heavv artillery and the field artillery of the 2nd Australian Division had assisted by firing upnn Noreuil. The relieved commander, Major-General G. de S. Barrow. afterwards served with distinction in Palestine. 'The zist and 30th. 'See Vol XII. plate 307. 207 208 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [27th Mar.-md Apr., 1917 the right Anzac column would seize Louverva14 and Doignies.6 On this flank a further string of villagess would still remain to be taken before the Hindenburg Line was reached, but the task there was somewhat less urgent, since no serious operations against the Hindenburg Line in the neighbourhood were projected. After the capture of Lagnicourt the 2nd Aus- tralian Division was relieved by the 4th, which came in Arrow3 show firajccted attacks. fresh from a month’s rest and training. The two artillery brigades of the and, however, and the 12th (Army) Brigade of Australian Field Artillery, remained in the line, the artillery of the 4th Division not being yet brought up.7 The forces confronting the German rear- guards were now advanced guards only in name, and this term ceased to be applied after April 2nd, on which date the main defensive line of the corps was advanced from near Bapaume to the old German R.111 line, and the front of the advanced brigades now became known as the “advanced line of resistance.” The troops in the left sector (previously known as the “ left column”) were now supported by eight batteries of IS-pounders and two of 4.5-inch howitzers, as well as three siege batteries and two of 60-pounder guns; and these siege batteries, besides shooting on Noreuil and other villages, had by March 29th fired 120 6-inch shells into the salient of the Hindenburg Line around the village of Bullecourt-the only part of that line within range. There was thus sufficient artillery available for the infantry attacking Noreuil to be protected, as at Lagnicourt, by a weak barrage. The attack on Noreuil would be undertaken by the 13th Australian Infantry Brigade, which had relieved the 7th ‘See Val. XII, plate 301. See Vol. XII, plate 302. a Boursies. Demicourt. and Hermies. Photographs of Hermies and Boursies are given in Vol. XII (plates 303, 304). 1 The artillery was still being reorganised under the scheme mentioned on pp 17-15, some of the extra howitzer batteries from England joining the reorganised brigades at this juncture. 2nd Apr., 19171 THE OUTPOST VILLAGES 209 Erigade at Lagnicourt and Vaulx-Vraucourt. Its commander, Brigadier-General Glasgow, decided to turn the capture of Lagnicourt to advantage by attacking Noreuil from the south with the 50th (South Australia) Battalion, while the 51st (Western Australia) drove past it on the north. The inner flanks of the two battalions would rest on two converging roads, and the 50th~on reaching the village, would swing round and advance on the Aank of the 51st to a line 800 to I,m yards east of th village-the Lagnicourt- Bullecourt road afforded a convenient objective. The advance would be a long one since the 51st Battalion had also to go 700 yards, and the 50th 1,000, before reaching Noreuil; but the field artillery would first muffle the German posts around the village, and then advance its barrage so as to keep ahead of the troops. On the barrage reaching the Bullecourt road, forty minutes from the start, it would remain there for twenty minutes while the troops lay in front of the road preparing for the final assault. The barrage would then again advance and the road would be seized. It was recognised that this plan entailed difficulties. The 50th Battalion had an excellent position for concentration on the ridge between Lagnicourt and Noreuil, overlooking Noreuil from the south; but several advanced posts on the sunken roads leading down into the village would have to be taken before the outskirts were reached. A post on the Lagnicourt road on the extreme right was to be seized by the flanking battalion, the ~2nd(Western Australia and Tas- mania). Two others behind barricades in front of the 50th would be bombarded by Stokes mortars, and a third on the left attacked by a platoon of bombers. The right company, which would direct itself east of the village, must, on reaching a field-railway cutting in the valley, wheel to the right and wait for the others to collie up and continue the advance eastward. The centre and left conipanies would cross the 13 210 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Feb.-Apr., 1917 railway and road, enter the village, and then, after fighting through it to the right, emerge from the eastern end and join the waiting company. To strengthen them for the fighting in the village, the centre and left companies were drawn up in two waves, with sixty " moppers-up " following immediately behind to clear the dugouts and houses. The right company was in one wave, spread out over a front nearly equal to that of the other two," but with a platoon of the reserve company supporting it. The formation of the 5Ist Battalion was somewhat similar, its right company, which would brush through the outskirts of the village, being drawn up in two waves, its other two companies in 0ne.O The 5Ist would advance along the spur between Noreuil and Longatte, its left in the shallow depression south-east of Longatte, in touch with the 2nd Gordon Highlanders. The Gordons were to seize Longatte, and the 8th and 9th Devons Ecoust, farther north. The attack on all the villages from Noreuil leftvards would be launched at 5.15 a.m.-the hour when dark began to change towards daylight: but the operation by the right column of I Anzac against Doignies and Louverval could be begun at any hour suitable to the local commanders. The date was eventually postponed until April 2nd. The operations were still in open country, clear of all fortifications except the wire-entanglements and trenches bent around the outskirts of the villages, a few entrenched strong posts between the villages, and a spriiikling of sentry posts dug in advance of the main posts. Most of the posts in the open were on the roads which, as in all this part of France, were largely sunken, often, it is said, through the raising of parts of the neighbouring fields through continnal ploughing-a process which also accounted for the existence of steep banks between many of the fields on the hillsides, giving to the slopes an appearance of having here and there been artificially terraced. The British in their advance and the German rear-guards in withdrawing largely bivouacked in these roads, since the banks, whether three feet or a dozen feet in depth, not only gave protection against fire, excepi in enfilade, but could be quickly scooped into little one-man aThe left and centre companies occupied 250 yards, the right 400. 8 Each wave consisted of two lines. 1st-and Apr., 19171 THE OUTPOST VILLAGES 211 niches in which men lived with slight cover from the weather, but fairly safe against shell-fire. Thus a company or more could quickly settle itself into a series of small nicheslO on a road-bank. At important posts the Germans, when time allowed, tunnelled deep dugouts in the road-banks, and one or more of these were afterwards found by the Australians in most of the sunken roads at this time held by the enemy about Noreuil. The German posts in front of that village had been located by patrols, and for two nights the village had been shelled and its approaches kept under intermittent fire of artillery and machine-guns, to wear down the defenders.