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Npr 6.1: Nearing a Fork in the Road: Proliferation Or Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., and Douglas B. Shaw he world community is nearing an unavoidable goal of the NPT, a world ultimately free of nuclear weap- fork in the road. We will soon have to decide ons. Twhether or not to continue with existing policies regarding nuclear weapons, policies that have potentially Significant Progress far-reaching proliferation consequences. Are we resigned The last decade has been characterized by arms control to living in a world where progress more rapid than nuclear weapon proliferation anyone would have pre- may occur on a wide scale and VIEWPOINT: dicted even a few years ago. we merely attempt to manage Goals long believed beyond this process, or are we ready NEARING A FORK IN reach have been achieved: to move decisively toward the the Comprehensive Test ultimate elimination of THE ROAD: Ban Treaty (CTBT) has nuclear weapons? Should the been signed, and an initial world’s future security be PROLIFERATION OR reversal of the superpower based on nuclear weapons, or arms race has been negoti- on an international treaty re- NUCLEAR REVERSAL? ated through the Strategic gime aimed at strict control Arms Reduction Treaty by Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., and and eventual abolition of these (START) process. The NPT weapons? Can we really man- Douglas B. Shaw has been strengthened and age to go on indefinitely as we made permanent, while have in the past? India’s nuclear tests and Pakistan’s re- South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Algeria, Ar- sponse have made it clear that continuing with existing gentina, and Brazil have all forsworn nuclear weapons by policies risks leading the world in the direction of wide- becoming parties to the NPT. Although they do not consti- spread proliferation. With the end of the Cold War and the tute disarmament in themselves, these achievements dem- rapid diffusion of technology, we can no longer have our onstrate that the control and renunciation of nuclear cake and eat it too; a small group of states can no longer weapons and programs to develop them are possible, if we possess large numbers of the ultimate weapon and deny it choose to make them happen. to everyone else. The Spirit of New York: Nonproliferation is ASTRIDE THE NUCLEAR FENCE Disarmament The world has remained astride the nuclear fence with Diverse contributions from many states, all acting to regard to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament longer support the common understanding that more nuclear than prudence permits. Despite significant arms control progress and the indefinite extension of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the per- Thomas Graham, Jr., is the President of the Lawyers ceived political value of nuclear weapons remains far too Alliance for World Security (LAWS). Ambassador Graham high. The price of global indecision regarding the future of served as the Special Representative of the President for nuclear weapons is rising. The inconsistent behavior of the Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Disarmament from nuclear weapon states (NWS), which claim to support dis- 1994-1997, and led U.S. government efforts at the 1995 armament while clinging to nuclear arsenals, has now NPT Review and Extension Conference. Ambassador spread to include India and Pakistan, creating a new nuclear Graham has also served as Acting Director and Acting equation that endangers both South Asia and the global Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament nuclear nonproliferation regime. If security is to be pos- Agency. Douglas B. Shaw is the Director of sible in the future, the path toward the ultimate elimination Communications for LAWS and the Committee for National of nuclear weapons must be chosen and vigorously pur- Security. Prior to joining the organization, Mr. Shaw served sued. If the NPT regime is to remain viable, the nuclear as a foreign affairs specialist with the U.S. Department of weapon states cannot ignore their disarmament obligations Energy’s Russia and Newly Independent States Nuclear and all the nations of the world must work toward the Material Task Force. 70 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., and Douglas B. Shaw weapon states would be detrimental to international se- for nuclear disarmament, as some had wished, the NPT curity, contributed to the indefinite extension of the NPT is unmistakably a treaty that mandates the ultimate abo- in May 1995. President Clinton committed the United lition of nuclear weapons. States to “lead the charge” for a permanent nonprolif- eration regime, and countries such as Australia, Canada, High Political Value of Nuclear Weapons and Japan contributed significantly to that effort. A Continues worldwide diplomatic campaign sought to bring every Despite this clear commitment to work toward nuclear country in the world, on the basis of its own security disarmament, the United States and the other NWS par- interests, into the NPT. This campaign also aimed to ties to the NPT have for too long contributed to the in- convince every NPT state party to join a coalition sup- appropriately high political value attached to nuclear porting indefinite extension without conditions. weapons. The United States retains plans for the use of During the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Confer- nuclear weapons, continues to deploy nuclear weapons ence at the United Nations in New York, a number of beyond its shores, and debate persists in Washington countries assumed significant international leadership about whether nuclear weapons should be used for new roles. South Africa, supported by President Mandela’s roles, such as the explicit deterrence of chemical or bio- unique global stature, its natural role as a bridge between logical attack. The possibility of nuclear weapons as- the developed and the developing worlds, and the fact suming new roles is often considered without reference that it was the first country to dismantle a nuclear arse- to the adverse effect such actions would have on U.S. nal, led many nations in Africa and elsewhere into the nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The more the United coalition supporting indefinite extension. This extension States relies on nuclear weapons to solve security prob- of the NPT was part of a package that included a State- lems, the harder it will be to convince other states that ment of Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation they do not need nuclear weapons for the same reasons. and Disarmament and an enhanced review process for The United States itself may have made a particularly the treaty. Subsequently, Indonesia further bolstered the powerful contribution to India’s perception of the value already strong majority for indefinite extension by link- of nuclear weapons during the early 1970s. Because of ing the Principles and Objectives Document to the en- the importance it assigned in U.S. grand strategy to the hanced review process, establishing that the enhanced famous opening to China, the Nixon administration al- review process would, among other things, monitor com- lowed global politics to dictate its policy toward India. pliance with the commitments made in the Principles During the 1971 war between India and Pakistan that and Objectives document. resulted in the independence of Bangladesh, the United The indefinite extension of the NPT, without condi- States sent a nuclear-capable naval task group into the tions and without a vote, was a victory for all of the Bay of Bengal and used the direct communications link states parties to the NPT. In deciding to extend the treaty to the Soviet Government—the so-called “hotline” cre- indefinitely, these states reaffirmed their commitment ated after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis—for the first to the basic bargain of the NPT, in which both nuclear time.2 These signals may have been interpreted in India weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and elsewhere as suggesting that nuclear weapons were work together toward the ultimate objective of a world determining factors—and nuclear weapon states the only free of nuclear weapons. At the New York Conference, real players—in international crises. the states parties to the NPT explicitly linked permanent Nuclear weapons do not make the United States, or nuclear nonproliferation to nuclear disarmament. As any other nation, strong. It is the power of the U.S. United Nations Undersecretary General Jayantha economy and the United States’ vast superiority in us- Dhanapala, who presided over the conference, observed: able conventional forces, including advanced technolo- “[a]ll wanted concrete steps taken toward nuclear disar- gies, that make it a world leader. Tens of thousands of mament and were emphatic that the indefinite extension nuclear weapons did not save the former Soviet regime of the Treaty was not a carte blanche for the nuclear from dissolution. Nuclear weapons do not hold the At- weapon states to retain their monopoly over the posses- lantic Alliance together; common culture and institutions sion of these weapons forever.”1 Although the NPT Re- do. Nuclear arms are not effective tools for dealing with view and Extension Conference did not set a timetable the most immediate threats to international security to- The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 71 Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., and Douglas B. Shaw day, such as terrorism or ethnic conflict. Nuclear weap- to seek a nuclear-weapon-free world while retaining ons remain necessary to deter their use by others, but nuclear arsenals. this role justifies the retention of only a very small num- The addition of the world’s sixth and seventh declared ber of weapons. The nonproliferation price we pay for nuclear arsenals has exacerbated pressure for prolifera- not reducing existing nuclear arsenals to the lowest num- tion. This is not only because more states now openly bers necessary is high and must be recognized. contend that nuclear weapons are vital to them, but also At the fork in the road that the world is approaching, because these additions threaten the integrity of the NPT continued excessive reliance on nuclear weapons will regime, which is designed, however imperfectly, to ac- undercut nonproliferation efforts.
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