ELECTION UPDATE

A Weekly Open House on Election: 2013

Contents:

1. Background

2. Why is this Campaign focused on Punjab?

3. What lies behind Nawaz-Imran rivalry?

4. What should be our role as pollsters?

5. Click to get Gallup Reports on Elections:2013

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Background:

HOW to Make Sense About A Vibrant, Volatile and Unpredictable Electoral Race

We expect an interesting election on May 11. In some ways its outcome remains unpredictable. The May 11 election would be

PAKISTAN’S 10th NATIONAL ELECTION (1970-2013). Last month

(March) we published the findings of Gallup Pakistan Pre Election

Poll. It measured voting intentions at the start of a vigorous election campaign. We shall now wait for the actual polling to happen on May 11. It would be interesting and revealing to see the difference between the estimates at the start of the campaign and the final outcome. Among other things it would provide an insight into whether and how election campaigns affect the final outcome.

In our view pre-election polling has several functions, one of which is ‘fortune-telling’. Unfortunately, the focus on fortune-telling clouds other important contributions of pre-election polls. Pre- election polls can be quite revealing about the dynamics of an election and electoral campaign. They help us understand, at the

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start of electoral campaign, inclinations of various types of voters, geographically, demographically and socio-economic wise. Who among them switches voting loyalties during the campaign can then be understood and gauged by comparing it with results on the election day (Election data) and Exit Polling survey data (Exit poll).

Considering the high level of volatility in voter behavior in this election, we will not focus on fortune telling and will instead concentrate on understanding the dynamics of election campaign.

This issue of the Gallup Election Update looks into the question: First

Question: WHY IS THE CAMPAIGN SO PUNJAB FOCUSED and

Second Question: WHAT LIES BEHIND NAWAZ-IMRAN RIVALRY which appears to be the heart of the campaign, Third Question:

WHAT SHOULD BE OUR ROLE AS POLLSTERS.

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QUESTION # 1

WHY IS THE CAMPAIGN SO PUNJAB FOCUSED

The province of Punjab has 148 or 55% of the total of 272 electoral seats in the national parliament. But, that is not the only reason for this election campaign to be focused on Punjab. The key reason is that it is the only electoral territory where electioneering at this stage of the election CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE. The remaining electoral territories are much less open to change through massive campaigning. They are either unipolar, with one dominant party, MQM in and PPP in the rest of ; or relatively small electoral territories, with local interests split along several national and regional parties. The latter picture is true for the two electoral territories in Balochistan, one representing 2% and the other representing 3% of the National Assembly. There are four electoral territories in (KPK), three of which represent 3% each and the fourth represents 5% of the

National Assembly, their small size does not justify large scale province-wide electioneering. Added to this, of course is the potential for violence and the threat of militant attacks on large

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rallies. Furthermore, all of these territories can be reached by television advertising, a medium which is being used extensively in this election campaign. It is for the first time that television is being used on this scale in any election campaign in the country.

Political Vacuum in Punjab

Important as they are, none of the reasons mentioned above is the PRINCIPAL REASON for Punjab being the focus of electoral campaign. The principal reason is the political vacuum created by the collapse of PPP’s vote bank across the province. Election data show that PPP was already losing ground, in Punjab quite consistently since 1988. Its vote bank in 1990 was 42%, which dropped to 40% (1990); 39% (1993); 22% (1997), 27% (2002) and

29% (2008). This long term decline was not helped by the extremely poor performance during the years of President Zardari

(2008-13). Since Pakistan practices Winner Take All Electoral

System. By the late 1990s, PPP’s vote bank had lost the potential to win parliamentary seats in Punjab. The PPP had received temporary relief during 2002-2008, when PPP’s competitor Muslim

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League was sliced into two factions (PML-N and PML-Q), thus allowing PPP to win a modest number of Punjab seats in two elections. After the last election (2008), voters of Muslim League largely congregated under the dominant faction of Muslim

League led by (PML-N). This left the vote bank of PPP and its local leaders in total despair as well as rudderless in the absence of a dynamic political leader.

The vacuum created by the collapse of PPP vote bank in Punjab provided big opportunity. It was a massive vote bank. Until the

2013 election, it was always the single largest regional component in the PPP’s national vote bank. PPP’s disillusioned vote bank in

Punjab started to look upon Imran Khan as an alternative to lead them, notwithstanding the conventional view that his was a right leaning party while PPP was a liberal-progressive party. Imran

Khan attracted them because they wanted to desert the PPP and to them Nawaz Sharif was not an attractive enough leader.

Moreover their views had been impassioned for a long time in his opposition during which they had voted against him. Imran Khan’s right wing Pakistani nationalism also appealed to many in the

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PML-N vote bank. This was particularly true of a new Muslim

League vote which he had mobilized after shedding his traditional

‘Army’s blue-eyed boy’ image in the 1990s. He had attracted them because compared to his alternatives at that time in Punjab, he personified the prospects for success in business and a prosperous thriving Pakistan led from the heartland of Punjab. He did not necessarily appeal to their passions as a charismatic leader, but offered enough hope which appealed to their pragmatic interests. When Imran Khan emerged on the scene, he started to appeal to them as yet another alternative. His platform on national issues was quite similar to that of Nawaz, but he combined it with personal charisma. The combination of charisma and pragmatic interest based appeal is generally a political winner in the elections of our times. That is the story behind him becoming a key threat to Nawaz Sharif’s vote bank. For more than half of Nawaz Sharif voters, Imran Khan became the second best choice, as shown in the Gallup Pakistan polls as early as 2010.

As Imran Khan’s PTI picked up political steam in 2011, many of those, whose loyalties were split between PML-N and PTI began to switch their voting intentions in Imran’s favor. Thus by early 2012,

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Imran Khan had become a formidable challenge to Nawaz in his bid for primacy in Punjab. Imran Khan’s voting intention Ratings rose from under 10% to around 12% in early 2011 and beyond 20% by the end of that year. According to analyses by Gallup Pakistan at that time his vote bank comprised of three nearly equal streams; New Voter stream (who had not voted before), PPP switchers and PML-N switchers. But as the prospects of next elections became clearer and more certain, some in the PTI’s intending voters vote bank were tempted to return to the fold of their parent party. They were to begin with split-minded. Switching away from a long time partner is a hard decision. It seems that those who had parted ways from the PPP did not return, because

PPP appeared to be a lost case. But in the case of PML-N it was different; they still seemed vibrant and a good prospect. We know from world-wide electoral studies that many split-minded switchers have a tendency to return to their parent parties as elections draw near. This explains PTI’s set-back after mid-2012 and explains its voting Intention rating around 15% in early March 2013.

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The purpose of this narrative is to explain the VOLATILE NATURE OF

VOTE BANK IN PUNJAB. Volatility and a history of switching back and forth creates prospects for a luring and protecting contest. PTI will try to lure them; PML-N will try to protect them. In the sections that follow our readers will find more on the same theme. It explains why this election is focused on Punjab and the reason behind PML(N) – PTI rivalry to be at its centre stage.

QUESTION # 2

WHAT LIES BEHIND NAWAZ-IMRAN RIVALRY

Since Imran Khan’s PTI is a new comer, we have tried to analyze switching behavior in its favor. This is indicated by Arrow Signs in the data Tables (see Gallup Report # 3). You may find them of analytical interest in your research work. Our analysis of the vote in

Punjab, which is by far the largest and the critical electoral territory, shows that Imran Khan’s vote bank is a combination of three streams. The first stream comprises of New Voters (those who did not vote in the last election, 2008, for reasons of apathy or

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because they were under-age); the second stream is Switchers from PPP; and the third stream is Switchers from PML-N/Q.

Among the currently ‘Intending to Vote for Imran Khan’, the distribution is: New Voters (29%); PPP Switchers (42%); PML-N/Q

Switchers (24%); all others (5%). In our analysis the PTI’s potential vote on the polling day could also come from a fourth stream, which comprises of voters who currently regard him as their

Second Choice. This is a large group, nearly twice as large as his currently Intending Voters. The exact figures are provided in the data tables (Report # 3 ahead). If Imran Khan was able to convert

‘Second Choicers’ to ‘First Choicers’, he may succeed in creating the ‘wave of success’ or as he describes it the ‘tsunami’ of his victory. The Second Choicers are mostly in the current vote bank

(intending voters) of PML-N. Consequently it is understandable that the election campaign is focused on PML-N efforts to guard their vote bank and Imran Khan’s efforts to lure away his ‘Second

Choicers’ out of PML-N. This contested bloc of votes constitutes nearly 15% points of the national vote (30% of all voters in Punjab), and the key reason for making 2013 a very interesting election for

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Pakistan. This bloc of votes is the unrealized potential of Imran

Khan. He had not realized it, our poll shows, at the start of the campaign in March 2013. Would he succeed in realizing all or part of it during the final phase of the campaign ending on May 11?

We would have to wait and see. We do not believe that surveys would be able to measure this highly volatile behavior of a shifting vote bank.

It is not for us to favor Imran Khan’s efforts at luring away his

‘Second Choicers’ or for PML-N’s efforts to guard them within their own vote bank. We characterize this bloc of votes as the ‘Soft- belly of PML-N’ or the ‘Luring Ground of PTI’. But we have no favorites between the two, since we have chosen to be a non- partisan research institution. It is not for us to advise PTI on how to lure voters from the PML-N soft belly or to advise PML-N on how to protect them. But researchers who choose to be partisan to a party (which is an equally legitimate public service) may read our data tables and design their advocacy efforts. We have placed our data tables in the public domain and provided them equal

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opportunity. That is our humble and modest contribution to this election campaign.

PML-N’s SOFT-BELLY: 30% of Vote Bank in Punjab

To summarize again, our data tables show that a sizeable voting population in Punjab, as large as 30%, is potentially volatile in choosing its favorite party. While nearly 50% of PML-N voters in

Punjab say they have NO SECOND CHOICE and they are determined to vote for PML-N. However, a sizeable majority 40% say PTI is their Second choice. In other words, they are vulnerable to switching. The reverse is also true. Many among PTI voters say,

PML-N is their second choice. But since PML_N is the front runner, it would understandably be more threatened. This volatility of voters in Punjab may continue through May 11, and the outcome of

Imran-PML-N contest on this turf will settle the outcome of this election.

QUESTION # 3

WHAT SHOULD BE OUR ROLE AS POLLSTERS

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At this point in the election campaign, we have to make a choice between ‘Fortune-telling’ and ‘Analysis of Political and Policy

Dynamics’ of this election. After considerable thought and in- house discussion we have chosen to focus on analyzing the political and policy dynamics of the forthcoming elections, rather than attempting to be fortune-tellers. We would wait for the real poll on May 11 and would welcome whatever fortune of winners and runner ups is unfolded on that day. Our March Report (see

Report Document # 2 and 4) provides the situation analysis at the starting point of this Electoral Race. The difference between that and the final outcome will be attributable to the dynamics of the campaign. We will however conduct a nation-wide EXIT-POLL

SURVEY on the election day. Once again the objective would NOT be to out-guess the actual results by a few hours, but to provide a serious analysis of What happened, Where, Why did it happen the way it did and Who voted for Whom? There are many competing views about voting patterns expected from youth, women, rural and urban dwellers and the motivations behind choosing one type of candidate over another. While the Election Commission of

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Pakistan (ECP-Poll) results will give the total tally, we will combine the ECP Poll Data and Gallup Exit Poll data to answer 3 big questions pertaining to who voted for whom and why:

1- What happened where?

2- Who (geographic, socio-economic and demographic profile)

voted for whom?

3- Why did it happen the way it did?

We believe a serious research analysis based on the twin data sources provided by ECP poll data and Gallup Exit poll data would help us to provide a meaningful basis for discussion on the media and policy deliberation by the next government and the honorable benches of parliamentary opposition.

A Remark about Partisanship and Fairness

Our institution will continue to strive and stay on the path of being

‘non-partisan’ and ‘fair’. It is a path we have chosen. It is not the only one. In our view non-partisanship is a matter of choice (we

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regard those who are partisan to a party as highly honorable). But

‘fairness’ (may be ‘decency’ as well) is not a matter of choice. It is the only path to live a meaningful life. Please remind us if you find us to be otherwise. We shall be grateful for that. Meanwhile we modestly urge all of our honorable interlocutors with whom we engage on this platform to be kindly fair in judging us even when some of our findings do not correspond with their prior expectations.

Score Card on Electoral Race: 2013 AT THE START OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN: MARCH 2013

Front Runner Runner-up

PPP (17%) +3-5% ALL PAKISTAN PML-N (41%) +3-5% PTI (14%) +3-5% URBAN SINDH (Karachi) MQM PPP-PTI INTERIOR SINDH PPP - BALOCHISTAN ? ? SOUTH PUNJAB PML-N PPP NORTH-CENTRAL PUNJAB PML-N PTI WESTERN PUNJAB PML-N PPP-PTI KPK PTI-PML-N JUI-JI Note: For percentage scores consult Reports mentioned in next section.

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Click to get Gallup Reports on Elections:2013

Report 1: Gallup Election Update: April 28, 2013

Report 2: Highlights of Pre-Election Poll: 5 observation on electoral Race: 2013

Report 3: Voting Intentions: at the start of Election campaign (Report released on March 4, 2013) 26 Slides and Maps

Report 4: Why Elections are unpredictable? The erratic relationship between votes and seats: 1970 – 2008, Paper highlights the complication of translating votes into seats in the parliament. It traces the history of Pakistani elections since 1970 and shows that scored votes at the polls (or polling ratings) do not necessarily translate into victory on election date.

Report 5: Gallup – Pildat Political Weather Forecast Report (Elections: 2013) Released on March 4, 2013

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Contact details:

Islamabad:

H.45, St. 52, F-7/4, Pakistan Phone: +92-51-2655630 Fax: +92-51-2655632 Email: [email protected] www.gallup.com.pk www.gallup-international.com www.galluppakistan.blogspot.com

Disclaimer: Gallup Pakistan is not related to Gallup Inc. headquartered in Washington D.C. USA. We require that our surveys be credited fully as Gallup Pakistan (not Gallup or Gallup Poll). We disclaim any responsibility for surveys pertaining to Pakistani public opinion except those carried out by Gallup Pakistan, the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International Association. For details on Gallup International Association see website: www.gallup-international.com

Gallup Pakistan has conducted this poll according to the ESOMAR Code of Ethics and internationally recognized principles of scientific polling. The results in this Report do not represent views held by the authors or Gallup Pakistan. The results only represent public opinion, computed on the basis of views expressed by anonymous respondents selected through the procedure outlined in the Methodology section of this Report.

Gallup Pakistan has provided this data in the public interest and gratis. It cannot be held liable, contractually or otherwise, to the users of this data.

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