BANNING OBSOLETE WEAPONS OR RESHAPING PERCEPTIONS of MILITARY UTILITY: Discursive Dynamics in Weapons Prohibitions

BANNING OBSOLETE WEAPONS OR RESHAPING PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY UTILITY: Discursive Dynamics in Weapons Prohibitions

Margarita H. Petrova

2010/31

Margarita H. Petrova

Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)

ISSN: 1886-2802 IBEI WORKING PAPERS 2010/31 Banning Obsolete Weapons or Reshaping Perceptions of Military Utility: Discursive Dynamics in Weapons Prohibitions

Edita: CIDOB edicions Elisabets, 12 08001 Barcelona Tel. 93 302 64 95 Fax. 93 302 21 18 E-mail: [email protected] URL: www.cidob.org

Depósito legal: B-21.147-2006 ISSN:1886-2802 Imprime: Edugraf S.L. Barcelona, November 2010 BANNING OBSOLETE WEAPONS OR RESHAPING PERCEPTIONS OF MILITARY UTILITY: DISCURSIVE DYNAMICS IN WEAPONS PROHIBITIONS

Margarita H. Petrova

Abstract:The paper focuses on the argumentative process through which new international norms prohibiting the use of weapons causing severe civilian harm emerge. It examines the debate surrounding the use and usefulness of landmines and cluster munitions and traces the process through which NGOs change conceptions of military utility and effectiveness of certain weapons by highlighting their humanitarian problems and questioning their military value. By challenging military thinking on these issues, NGOs redefine the terms of the debate – from a commonplace practice, the use of such weapons becomes controversial and military decisions need to be justified. The argument-counterargument dynamic shifts the burden of proof of the necessity and safety of the weapons to the users. The process witnesses the ability of NGOs to influence debates on military issues despite their disadvantaged position in hard security issue areas. It also challenges realist assumptions that only weapons that are obsolete or low-cost force equalizers for weak actors can be banned. To the contrary, the paper shows that in the case of landmines and cluster munitions, defining the military (in)effectiveness of the weapons is part and parcel of the struggle for their prohibition.

Key words: Weapons Prohibitions, Humanitarian Norms, Framing, Arguing, Laws of War

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Peter Katzenstein for his helpful comments. Research for this paper has been undertaken with the financial support of a Marie Curie fellowship of the European Commission. An earlier version of it was presented at the 2009 ISA Annual Conference.

-3- 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers again today one could hear that the reason for their prohibition was the fact that they yet And 2008. in banned were they Nevertheless, weapons. military effective highly were munitions cluster that recognition accepted commonly a was there ago years weapon of the past with no or very limited military utility. On the other hand, several Price 1998b). Indeed, nowadays there is a widespread perception that landmines 2002; are (Camerona forces military advanced of powers the against equalizers low-cost possible at least in part by the fact that they were weapons of no strategic importance, cold war the of relics “outdated are They 2007). Coalition Munition (Cluster combat” modern in ity (McGrath 2000:52) powers major the of weapons — opposite the arevirtually forces…Clustermunitions rilla a war lose or win to a country caused never have they force; military any on a advantage confer long-term rarely they states: among capabilities of distribution the on impact little have and personal as mine the sees who soldier, individual protection andaflexibleoffensiveweapon the to and war, of planners the egists, 1. Introduction -4- respective weapons. possible, while in fact it was born out of the discursive processes of deligitimizing the notion the to that the lack of military utility per se rise was one of the factors that made the prohibitiongave NGOs the interests, and capabilities key their upon croach prohibitionsnew groundsmilitary on en didn’t they that military the convincing by the legitimize to trying by Thus prohibitions. the of adoption the behind reasons the supplanted also extent some to utility,but military their of perceptions held monly the strategic and even balance of power level. In turn, this has not only changed com mere from on importance to meet conditions tactical specific under usefulness to and necessity military had weapons the that utility military of bar the raising by and effects sub-optimal delivered had weapons the where instances on focusing by both achieved was latter The effectiveness. military their of downplaying the other, the on and weapons, the of cost humanitarian the of highlighting the hand, one the on – of their military utility resulted from two intertwined processes carried out by NGOs perception the in shift This weapons. “obsolete” being into effective” “highly being from munitions cluster and landmines both reframed has prohibition their for paign cam the of part a been has which process, discursive similar a that argue I ongoing, are utility military their about debates and weapons of types two the between ences differ are there Whereas developments. technological by overtaken weapons were (Cameron 2002:71) The landmine has often been referred to as the weapon of poor countries, of guer of countries, poor of weapon the as to referred been often has landmine The states, of arsenal the in importance strategic of weapon a been never have mines AP The landmine is a weapon of great utility to the military, both to the high-level strat One often encounters arguments that the prohibition of landmines was made was landmines of prohibition the that arguments encounters often One In reality cluster munitions are mainly outdated weapons with limited military util (GeneralLord Ramsbotham inLandmine Action 2008c). (McGrath1994) ------

IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 ------5- ” (Adler the manner Thus, I argue that perceptions of material factors, 1 The point of departure for this paper is the core constructivist argument that I proceed as follows. First, I will situate the paper within the constructivist For overviews of the constructivist approach and its contributions, see for example, Wendt 1987, 1992, 1999; Katzenstein 1996; Checkel 1998; Hopf 1987, 1992, 1999; Katzenstein for example, Wendt and its contributions, see approach For overviews of the constructivist 1998; Ruggie 1998; Adler 2002. 1998; Ruggie 1998; 1. about their military necessity and effectiveness to a view that they are outdated weapons of limited military utility. By demonstrating the through which discursive perceptions dynamics of military utility changed, I challenge ever been banned. ments that only useless weapons or weapons of the weak have realist argu language. Material factors, and in this case, specific design and functional features features functional and design specific case, this in and factors, Material language. regard positions different of range a for allow also they but matter, do weapons of ing military effectiveness and use. Whereas perceptions of militaryindefinitely malleable,utility in theare cases ofnot antipersonnel landmines and cluster muni tions, they have nevertheless undergone a change from widely held assumptions embedded” (Wendt embedded” 1995: (Wendt 73). and specifically, perceptions of technical featuresmilitary utility in combat not are given, objective facts insusceptible to interpreta of weapons systems and their tion.Instead, traceI the processes through which these perceptions aremodified in humani and permissibility the about understandings normative changing of light and discourse reifying argument an not is this However, weapons. of impact tarian meaningful by way of agreement among social actors. It emphasizes “ de and interaction and action human by shaped is and shapes world material the which in pends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world mean acquire only resources “material hence, and original), in emphasis 322, 1997: ingfor human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are 2. Framing and the Social Construction of Meaning of Construction and the Social 2. Framing material factors don’t have a direct and unmediated effect on social actors. Con structivism posits that international relations consist of social facts that become implications of the discursive processes for the development of international hu manitarian law. discursive strategies employed by NGOs that led to a transformation in percep tions of military utility – highlighting the humanitarian costs ofquestioning their Ithemilitary evaluatebenefits. the Finally, explanatoryweapons potential of and an alternative perspective that discourse and the prohibitions were driven by the objective falling military utility of the weapons, and conclude by summing up the approach in International Relations and link it to the social movement literature on on literature movement social the to it link and Relations International in approach humanitarian and uses military the of overview brief a provide I Second, framing. problems of cluster munitions and antipersonnel landmines, followed by an ex amination of the among perceptions state and military officials, munition experts, and NGO members of their military utility at the time when thefor NGO thecampaigns weapons’ prohibition were at their early stages. Then I focus on the two 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers frames targeted at the general public that highlighted the severity and urgency of of urgency and severity the including highlighted that framing” public general the “motivational at targeted to frames related tactics on concentrates paper the of the same category irrespective under of their design and functional differences. Finally,munitions most cluster and landmines antipersonnel problems of types all humanitarian placing and identified the to solution a as ban a advocating by cation simplifi issue of tactics NGO the examine I framing,” “prognostic of stage the At suffering. their and victims the on focusing and weapons the of costs humanitarian “diagnostic of amplification” “frame stage to the attention particular At pay tasks. I framing,” framing these performing in employed be can tactics of A number change). effect to order in act to others “motiva (urging and framing” tional problem), the to solution a of (prescription framing” “prognostic blame), of attribution and change of need problem in a of (identification framing” ing opponents(SnowandBenford 1988:198). mobilizing to view a with aspects their of some on focusing or phenomena complex simplifying by tegically 613-14). 2000: meaningful and hence “organize experience and guide action” (Benford and Snow renderhelp that eventsframes” resultsproductionaction that the“collective in of “framing” as to referred process a – meaning” of maintenance in and engaged production the actively agents “signifying are NGOs and movements social spective, 1992). 1988, Benford and Snow 1986; al. et (Snow effects their and processes framing on focused work the particular, in and movements, social on humanitarian their the regarding and debates prohibition the impact and military effectiveness. Thus the paper also contributes to the literature their frame for strategically to campaigns NGOs the of of ability result the degree large a to was -6- 5. 4. 3. 2. military the and deflation. frame amplification frame humanitarian the of coupling the on degree at attempts these different framing stages are closely intertwined NGO and their success depended to that a large argue I officers. military of support by the drawing credibility NGOs’ the enhancing and weapons the of effectiveness about military claims the their of substantiation evidential the regarding military the of ibility cred the questioning included tactics These munitions. cluster and landmines of arguments the downplaying of opponents and countering – deflation” I “counterframe what call employed will NGOs the so doing In establishment. military the with resonate goalstheir make to attempt an in utility military of issue addressedthe that nents oppo their at aimed tactics NGO the particularly problems,but humanitarian the mework” (Benford 1987:75,quotedinSnowandBenford 2000:626). compelling fashion”andinvolves“highlighting someissues,events,orbeliefsasbeingmore salientthanothers”(SnowandBedford 2000:623). 614). “Counterframing” isdefinedasattempts“to rebut, undermine,orneutralize aperson’sorgroup’s myths,versionsof reality, orinterpretive fra “Frame amplification” represents “theconnectionandalignmentofeventsexperiencesso that theyhangtogetherina relatively unifiedand Framing denotes“anactive,processual phenomenonthatimpliesagency andcontentionatthelevelofreality construction” (Benford andSnow2000: For anoverviewoftherichliterature onsocial movementsandframing,see,Benford andSnow2000. I argue that the shift in the perceptions of military utility of these weapons weapons these of utility military of perceptions the in shift the that argue I nw n Bnod 18) dniy he cr faig ak: “diagnostic tasks: framing core three identify (1988) Benford and Snow 5 3 – in this case, the military arguments about the necessity and utility utility and necessity the about arguments military the case, this in – Thus framing performs an interpretivean performs framing Thus stra so does it but function,

constituents, gaining bystander support, or demobiliz or support, bystander gaining constituents, 4 – highlighting the the highlighting – 2 From this per this From ------IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 ------7- - The main traditional uses of APLs 8 e people and destroy weaponry at different ranges reaching hundreds of meters. of meters. hundreds ranges reaching weaponry at different e people and destroy The munitions could be air-dropped cluster bombs bombs cluster air-dropped be could munitions The 6

7 An antipersonnel landmine (APL) denotes a mine designed to be exploded by The first problem with cluster munitions is that they pose immediate dan Cluster munitions can generally be defined as munitions designed to dis There are two general types: “blast mines, which are surface or sub-surface laid and explode when trodden on; and fragmentation mines, which are on; and fragmentation mines, which are when trodden surface or sub-surface laid and explode two general types: “blast mines, which are are There For the purposes of a ban, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions defines a CM more restrictively as “a conventional munition that is designed to a ban, the 2008 ConventionFor the purposes of on Cluster Munitions defines a CM more designed to have fragmen Early types of cluster munitions were effects. different that produce models of submunitions a range of different is There The newer types of cluster bombs are combined effects munitions that in addition to fragmentation and incendiary effects have anti-armor effects. This This have anti-armor effects. munitions that in addition to fragmentation and incendiary effects combined effects The newer types of cluster bombs are slug than can penetrate five is achieved by incorporating a copper cone in the bottom of the submunition that upon explosion “turns into a molten 2002: Ch. 2). (HRW vehicles” inches (thirteen centimeters) into tanks and other armored (ICRC 1996). fragments of metal over a wide area” and on bursting project usually activated by tripwires, disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions” (Art. 2) and then exclu disperse or release and unexploded munition effects its coverage munitions meeting a number of cumulative criteria aimed at avoiding the indiscriminate area des from of CMs. problems or thousands of steel pieces and in explosion, the bomblets burst into hundreds – upon tation and incendiary anti-personnel and anti-materiel effects cendiary fragments that fly at very high velocities and can kill or injur 8. 6. 7. the presence, proximity or contact of a person. have been the creation of protective obstacles in defensive operations “designed to delay the enemy advance by breaking up its attack formations and canalizing them par in Mines, 1996). (ICRC weapons” other by attacked be can they where areas into ticular antitank mines in combination with APLs, have also been used in offensive the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, postulating rule of that proportionality, the civilian anddamage should not outweigh under certain conditions the an attack. military advantage expected from and direct the concrete gers to civilians during attacks due to their large inaccuracy, numbers, and wide dispersal patterns. Second, a significant percentage of cluster submunitions faildetonate upon to impact as designed and leave numerous unexploded duds, which function as de facto landmineslaw, humanitarian international in immunity when civilian of rule basic the disturbedviolate could later. Thus cluster munition use wooded territory. Later versions were designed ascase of a Soviet anti-tankland invasion of Europe during the (Hiznay Cold 2006, War Con weapons for use in way 2007, King 2000). numbers and large footprint patterns compensate for the lack of precision or im possibility to positively identify targets under cover. The possibility to numbersdrop great of bomblets in one single pass over the target area makesvery cost-efficient andclusterreduces the riskbombs to pilots exposed to enemy fire. The early versions of cluster bombs were used as antipersonnel weapons in the Korean War. In the Vietnam War, they were employed against antiaircraft weapons and over targets – troops, soft-skinned vehicles and heavy armor, anti-aircraft missileenemy sites,artillery, orairfields. Their ability to strike numerous targets dispersed over largeareasmakes themparticularly useful against moving targets targetsor whose exactlocation cannot be determined. Basically, cluster munitions aregreat area weaponsTheir perimeter. footprint their within comes that anything strike to designed Cluster Munitions and Landmines Munitions Cluster submunitions. release or perse or ground-launched rockets. These weapons have been used against a large set of 3. Military Uses and Humanitarian Problems of 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers tion was that “these weapons could give us a quantum leap on the enemy,” in in enemy,” During the 599). 1974: on (Krepon leap suppression flak quantum of a problem the us solving by give particular, could weapons “these that was tion expecta officer, the in military Vietnam US an to Accordingmunitions. cluster of 20060511). 20060330; 20031210; (interviews prohibition their for process gotiation strictions on their use, re let alone achieving a to ban even obstacle a few an months prior as to perceivedthe launch was of a which ne munitions, cluster of utility sentatives, technical experts, and even NGO members about the significant military Munitions andLandmines Common Views ontheMilitary Utility of Cluster 4. The Presumption of Military Necessity: they continuetokillandmaimcivilianslongaftertheendofconflicts. – effect indiscriminate and long-lasting their is landmines of problem humanitarian main The 1980s. the in crisis humanitarian a created part large in has which lation, conflicts, includingforharassmentofthecivilianpopu and low-intensity in internal Apart from these conventional types of employment, landmines have also been used enemy.the of areas rear the in targets against attacks strategic in use their possible has been facilitated by the introduction of remotely delivered mines, which also made operations to prevent counterattacks or outflanking of the attacking forces – a use that -8- 10. 9. argued: (CCW) Weapons of Conventional talks Certain at on Convention the representatives UK 2005 in example, For munitions. cluster of tiveness column” (quoted inStockton tank entire the dead, stopped decimated, weapons two –“[t]hose 2003 in debut their after praised equally were bombs cluster anti-armor sensor-fuzed, est ploded-ordnance hazard associated with the weapons (US DoD 2000: 90). The unex new the despite CBU-87]” bombs [cluster Munitions Effects Combined of tance impor the demonstrated also Force Allied Operation in “experience that claimed square a out map.” take the of kilometer c[ould] launcher each from rockets the …because winner battle the Gulf War in 1991 ground-launched cluster munitions were seen as “the decisive

visible aftertheIraqiwithdrawal.” “Iraqi prisonerstelloftheterror instilledbywhattheyreferred toas‘steelrain’,andwidespread damagetoinstallationsandequipmentwasclearly http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/m26.ht LTC PeterWilliams, CommanderofBritain’s 39thHeavy Artillery RegimentinSaudi Arabia, quotedin“M26MultipleLaunchRocketSystem,” For details,seeforexample,ICRC1996and Biddle etal.1994. Similarly, state officials have maintained the indispensability and high effec efficiency military the highly evaluated often has military the example, For repremilitary,state the among agreement an been has there recently Until

2003: 6). And yet,allofthoseweaponswere bannedin2008. 10 Battle damage assessments of the 1999 Kosovo campaign campaign Kosovo 1999 the of assessments damage Battle m ). Similarly, King(2000: 17) reports regarding theuseofsubmunitionsthat

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------12 -9- (UK e highly effective strikes against a very e highly effective

13 Early on, challenging the military utility of the weapons was not part of the An independent expert advising both NGOs and governments on the use Throughout the period, US state and military officials have insisted that clus that insisted have officials military and state US period, the Throughout Cluster munitions are still the most appropriate air-delivered weapons in many Whereas the assessment of cluster munition effectiveness in different conflicts varied, King asserted that in the 1991Gulf War their military utility asserted that in the 1991Gulf conflicts varied, King in different of cluster munition effectiveness the assessment Whereas Bombs - The military advantage,” May 2003, quoted in Pax Christi Netherlands (2005: 20). Ltd, “The Case for Cluster Resolution Threat wide range of targets” (Russia 2007). wide range of targets” Iraqi stock of fighting equipment, denied access to supplies and the reduced was “clear evidence that submunitions effectively was “clear” and there morale” (King 2000: 17). substantially lowered en général et de la France en particulier.”Similarly, representatives of the Polish Ministry of Defense argued in 2005 that “[f]rom a military perspective 2005 that “[f]rom in of the Polish Ministry of Defense argued representatives en général et de la France en particulier.”Similarly, and attack multiple targets,” area in their ability to dispense carried submunitions/ bomblets over a broad unmatched cost-effectiveness they offer quoted in Pax Christi Netherlands (2005: 22). Russian officials have maintained that cluster munitions “ensur My translation; original reads: “Décider de s’en passer impliquerait d’accepter une réduction importante des capacités de défense terrestre des Etats des Etats terrestre importante des capacités de défense passer impliquerait d’accepter une réduction “Décider de s’en My translation; original reads:

12. 13. forces, forces, especially those attacking or on the move” and “cluster weapons are cer 11. works, it works. If it were possible to manufacture a variant with no propensity for for propensity no with variant a manufacture to possible were it If works. it works, failure and causing long-term danger, the military effectiveness of cluster muni tionswould notquestion”inbe (McGrath 2000: Similarly,52).another NGOreport posing questions about the battle effects of the weapons admitted that,no “[t]heredoubt is about the military utility of cluster weapons against large mechanized NGOstrategy. Rather, NGOs perceived this issue as a roadblock on the way to any future use restrictions. While there were a couple of NGO reports questioning the military effectiveness of cluster munitions, even those were circumscribed in their conclusions.For example, aLandmine Action report argued that cluster munitions had not been a “critical positive of combatexamined factorconflicts, for butthe still user acknowledged force” thatin “[w]hena thenumber cluster munition dispense a payload over a broad area and attack multiple targets” (King 2000: 37). 2000: (King targets” multiple attack and area broad a over payload a dispense In 2003, another expert even claimed that cluster weapons were a “battle winningmunition.” and technical aspects of munitions, concluded in a 2000 study of the use and af tereffects of cluster munitions since WWIIuse that,of submunitions“[t]he seemstrend unlikelytowards toincreasing changemilitary in point the of foreseeable view, they offerfuture. unmatchedFrom a cost-effectiveness in their ability to neutralization of ground targets (such as battlefieldvehicles, supply points)artillery (France 2002)batteries, and to decide temporary“to do withoutmean accepttothemimportant an wouldreduction thenationalof defense capabilities states,of 2005). and of France, in particular” (Scellos ter munitions “serve indispensable military purposes” and “provide distinct ad vantages against a range of targets and can result in less collateral damage than unitary bombs” (USA 2001; US DoD 2005: 11; Gates 2008). Similarly, French ficials of have argued that cluster munitions are “peerless in their efficiency” for the situations because of their ability to destroyarea effectenemy capability assetsof air-dropped dispersed cluster munitionsover is notan matched area…by currentweapons, Theprecision or by large unguided unitary bombs… Artillery-launched cluster munitions will maintain a crucial capacity in for the of targets a suppression area long time to come 2005) 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers Sweden and Finland also insisted that landmines were an essential element of their of their element an essential were landmines that insisted also Finland and Sweden as such countries Scandinavian of ministries defense The views. such military US holding was the only not However, 1995). (Shalikashvili future” defense foreseeable safe the for in forces US by required be “will and warfare maneuver of “indispensable” an element were weapons the that War,insisting Gulf 1991 the in victory 1995: 4). The US military, for example, extolled the contribution of mines to the US (CCW considerations military by dominated still were Conference Review CCW the at landmines restricting on discussions state 1995, In 1994). (McGrath weapon” offensive flexible a and protection personal as mine the sees who soldier, dividual utility great of to the military,weapon a both to the high-level strategists, the is planners of war, and to the landmine in “[t]he that, underlined representative NGO aSimilarly, 1994, 257-63). February 2000: in Maslen and Maresca 19; 2004: Maslen ued use and the military did not regard alternative systems to be viable (ICRC 1994; feeling was that the military utility of antipersonnel mines warranted their contin predominant the that concluded that landmines antipersonnel on meeting expert (ICBL), mines 1994, Land January Ban to in Campaign International the example, of establishment For the after year itself. a about prohibition their for campaign the of result the measure large a in are today landmines of utility military low the common about argue, views I As nowadays. is it than higher much was weapons militarythe of perceived utility the launched was campaign landmine the when time the At 62). 2006: (Cave recognized” widely and readily more is weapons utility these of military the mines, and anti-personnel NGOs “unlike of that, organizations representatives by independent accepted was it internationally, force gathering was munitions cluster ban to campaign the when 2006 in Even 25). 22, 2005: lands Nether Christi Western(Pax forces”advanced in even fashion’ of ‘out not tainly -10- 14. weapons the by caused (ICRC 1996). crisis a humanitarian the toward over progress concern hindered despite which prohibition cost,” human their outweighs value military their that and value military high of weapon essential an are mines] [antipersonnel that assumption “the was there that admitted still ICRC the 1996, In defenses. land

landmines washeldinLondon. and theVietnam Veterans of America FoundationappointedJody Williams asacampaigncoordinator. InMay1993,thefirstNGOconference on Medico International,Mines Advisory Group, PhysiciansforHumanRights,andVietnam Veterans of America Foundation)joinedtocreate theICBL HRW and PhysiciansforHumanRights,“LandminesinCambodia:TheCoward’s War.” InOctober 1992,sixNGOs(HandicapInternational,HRW, Individual NGOshadstartedworkingonthe landmineproblem in1990-91 withthefirst report focusingontheissuepublishedinSeptember1991by However, this statement reads the past from the point of view of the present. 14 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) convened an an convened (ICRC) Cross Red the of Committee International the - - - - IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 ------11- eof, which

The narrative that emerged from these 15 16 the NGOs argument was that whatever the 18

19 Similarly, Similarly, in the case of cluster munitions NGOs gathered data on the hu Given that the permissibility of the use of military force under international The first step in this direction was awareness-raising by gathering evidence Thus, I argue that at their inception both the landmine and the cluster mu In addition, NGOs argued that landmines were indiscriminate weapons because they could not distinguish between civilians and soldiers, which vio indiscriminate weapons because they could not that landmines were In addition, NGOs argued On securitization and desecuritization, see Buzan et al. 1998. On securitization and desecuritization, see Buzan in September 1991, in October War After publishing together with PHR The Coward’s that contributed most to this effort. was the organization HRW 28, 1994). February Record, Quoted by Senator Leahy in a speech to the Senate (Congressional deciding to launch any from that the military should “refrain I to the Geneva Conventions reads Protocol Additional Article 57(2a,iii) of For example, would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” and direct to the concrete would be excessive in relation everything possible to verify lated the principle of distinction and civilian immunity establishing that those who plan or decide upon attack shall “do and “the civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not neither civilians nor civilian objects” that the objectives to be attacked are Article 57(2a,i) and 51(2)). I to the Geneva Conventions, be the object of attack” (Additional Protocol 1992 Rae McGrath of Mines Advisory Group wrote for it another report on the landmine situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, Hidden Death, followed by on the landmine situation in Iraqi Kurdistan, for it another report wrote Advisory Group 1992 Rae McGrath of Mines Angola in 1993 and Mozambique in 1994, as well as by another publication together with PHR on the global landmine crisis in 1993, on reports Deeds Live On (1993), and African Rights, Violent issued by PHR, Hidden Enemies (1992), MAG and were reports Other Deadly Legacy. A Landmines: After the Guns Fall Silent (1995). VVAF, or a combination ther attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects,

19. 15. 16. 17. 18. manitarian cost of the weapons, documented as the wellnumbers asof civilianthe casualties,socio-economic problems resulting from their use in all conflicts humanitarianlawdepends balanceaon between military advantages andnegative side effects on innocent bystanders, military utility of landmines, it was far outweighed on civilians. effects by their grave humanitarian portrayals of landmines as “weapons of mass destruction alsointoLarrinaga slowand Sjolander motion”1998: 374-6). (seeThe image was apowerful one and even wide and toxic most the be may “landmines that, agreed Department State US the facing mankind”. pollution spread onthe magnitude of the problems these weapons caused to civilians. In the dif case in of contamination landmine of scale the documenting started NGOs landmines, ferent part of the world and its impact on civilians and their way resulted ofin a living,series of influentialwhichreports. accounts was one of a “humanitarian crisis,” “global epidemic of landmines,” and cabulary that also approximates an attempt to desecurtize thefrom the fieldissue of stateby securitymoving where the itmilitary has the upper hand into the field of human security, humanitarian aid and development players. discussed and NGOs become key where it can be publicly widely recognized, the main NGO strategy to overcome this opposition has been to create a counter discourse highlighting weaponsthecause years enormousafter the end of conflicts civilian (e.g.Williams and sufferingGoose 1998; Price those 1998a;Larrinaga andSjolander 1998; Rutherford 2000; Hubert 2000; Cameron 2002) – the so-called humanitarian “frame amplification” in the social movements vo Reframing the Debate on Weapons Use on Weapons Debate the Reframing nition campaigners were facing a formidable opposition grounded in entrenched perceptions about the military utility and necessity of the weapons. As has been 5. From Military Utility to Humanitarian Impact: Impact: Humanitarian to Utility Military From 5. 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers fication – calling for a total ban on landmines and subsuming all types of cluster of types all subsuming and landmines on ban total a for calling – fication simpli issue with together This, issues. the of framing initial of purpose vital the served and talks CCW the in involved negotiators state at also but public, the and sense of crisis and urgency, and the suffering of victims were targeted at the media ating themdirectly with the suffering andmutilationtheyhadcaused. tional power to the NGOs arguments and helped single out the weapons by associ state remind to treaties delegates of the human lives behind the statistics. new the of negotiations the at present be would weapons landmines by inflicted societies munitions. cluster war-torn and in efforts reconstruction to im pediments and children) and women often (most victims innocent of of stories suffering horrific portrayed publications The 2000). (Rutherford bodies and lives their on weapons the of impact immediate the visible make and victims the the of present face to human sought also NGOs and the world, weapons, the the around of casualties of rates numbers failure the the ground, the on lying submunitions ploded were takentodealwithit(e.g.HRW 2006;alsoLandmine Action 2006b). measurestimely unless disaster” “looming a and waiting” the in crisis manitarian NGOs landmines, with managed to convey its severity, that as well as a sense of urgency by alluding to a “hu than of limited scale more was the problem Although munition landmines. cluster the facto de into weapons the turned post-conflict remaining submunitions of percentage large the and misleading were on rates data failure manufacturer that arguments their supported information This use. tle bat actual in failure submunition of rate the about information gathering at forts 1999. in Kosovo NATOin the intervention after -12- 22. 21. 20. certain that proof of burden the shifted NGOs the terms, humanitarian in debate the framing By harm.” “unacceptable causing effectively were were weapons NGOs such the that 2006, showing in Lebanon in war the as such conflict, recent in reliability rate of 1-2%, had failed to function properly and led to civilian casualties vilians”. By providing the evidence that even advanced submunitions that touted a states ci on harm “unacceptable cause that that munitions cluster those ban gatheredto had understanding the on based was process negotiation whole the ample, have been affected in the process. However, in the case of cluster munitions, for ex humanitarian and costs, even if we could assume that perceptions of military utility interests per se might not military between balance postulated the changed ons ternational humanitarian law, zooming in on the humanitarian impact of the weap mobilization behind the campaigns. From the point of view of negotiations and in public and NGO to – contributed banned be to category same the within munitions

engaged theminlobbyingactivitiesduringthe negotiationsoftheConventiononClusterMunitions(www emphasis onthemandoccasionallyclaimed thattheymade90%ofthevictims(LarrinagaandSjolander1998:376-7). Moyes 2007;HandicapInternationalNorwegian People’s Aid 2007a. See, forexample,HandicapInternational’sproject “Ban Advocates” thataimedatproviding avoiceforthevictimsofclustermunitionsandactively Even thoughtheestimateswere thatwomenandchildren comprisedabout30,maximum40% of thelandminevictims,NGOsalwaysplaced See, forexample,HRW 1999,2000,2002,2003,2008;MennoniteCentralCommittee2000;McGrath 2000;ICRCLandmine Action 2006a; These tactics of amplifying the humanitarian problems of the weapons, the the weapons, the of problems humanitarian the amplifying of tactics These unex or landmines of numbers the about statistics up piling to addition In 21 And they also made sure that the people affected by the by affected people the that sure made also they And 20 They also concentrated their ef their concentrated also They 22 This brought an effective emo .banadvocates.org). ------IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 ------13- 23

Incidentally, the NGO campaign was helped in this respect by a report on Early on in the landmine campaign, NGOs realized that they had better However, not only have NGOs managed to reframe the debate from security Steven Goose of Human Rights Watch, quoted in ICBL 1995b. quoted in ICBL Steven Goose of Human Rights Watch,

23. halted without first countering the arguments about its military usefulness.” halted without first countering the arguments the military utility of landmines and its implications for arms control that was is for the weapons in offensive operations due to new technological developments and the introduction was mines” ofof utility military scatterableday present the of mines.study analytical and There“serious more was consensus, however, that a and distin needed and that they had to “challenge the claim of military necessity, 83). 1994: (ICBL utility” military limited more and necessity military between guish The tactic itself was based on the notion that “no weapons program has ever been cessity of antipersonnel landmines.Although this remained a secondaryef serious a approachmake “should they that argued representatives NGO campaign, the in forttoquestion themilitary usefulness oflandmines” (ICBL1994: Atthat82). point opinions still diverged: while some suggested that landmines were of “decreasing utility in the post-Cold situation,”War others perceived an increasing importance 6.1 Antipersonnel Landmines Antipersonnel 6.1 chances of success if they didn’t limit themselvesne and effectiveness the about debate a in military the to engaged also but weapons, the humanitarian cost of the 6. From Military Utility to Disutility and and Disutility to Utility Military 6. From Obsolescence military utility of weapons that I now turn. military utility of weapons that ons in a process I call “counterframe deflation” – challenging and downplaying military arguments. NGO members have noticed that therespond “armed to the forces emotional will issue” not of humanitarian suffering (ICBL thus 1994: have 82) deemed and it necessary to address issues of military in usecases where they perencountered stiff military opposition se,to the especiallyprohibitions. It is to these processes of challenging and redefining the existing perceptions of the were claiming so (e.g. Price 1998a; Rappert 2005; Rappert and Moyes 2009). 2009). Rappert and Moyes Rappert 2005; (e.g. Price 1998a; claiming so were into humanitarian terms as weap mostthe of utility military the authorsabout arguments undermine to sought consciously have noticed. Also, I argue, they have weapons systems work properly and provide a high military utility to those who 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers with senior military experts to discuss its findings. Themeeting unanimousa conclusion was convened later and WWII with starting conflicts 26 in landmines sonnel antiper of effectiveness and use military the of study a commissioned ICRC 1996 in the end, Tothat considerations. humanitarian and military between balance a international establish to of sought and arguments military to guardian attention law, a paid humanitarian it as role its with line In weapons. the of utility military prohibited. be could utility military promised com of weapons only that idea the again once poison (Vaninvoking gas” 1995), or Gerwen bullets dum-dum like warfare, regular from disappear to set weapon[s] went on arguing that mines were “just another form of old-fashioned ill-conceived activists some there From 56). 1995b: (ICBL “indispensable” nor “essential” neither utility,military some argumentshave might mines werewhile they that point the on focused NGO matter. the on opinion military of differences 1995: out CCW point and 6; had 6) 1995: they News (CCW practice believed in than effect and smaller much exaggerated a highly delivered been had landmines of utility tary mained unclear, 68). 1994: al. et (Biddle control” arms landmine of consideration preclude not need conflict intensity high obtain. to had conditions stringent very effect, an have to landmines antipersonnel for order in US the future, the whereas in campaigns offensive in engaged be to likely most was operations, defensive in higher was landmines of utility military the that first, by concluding, landmines for need military high the about arguments on doubt cast report The 1994. June in Analysis Defense for Institute the by sued -14- 27. 26. 25. 24. of utility the on establishment military the within opinions divergent the lighting tried to enhance their credibility as experts in military matters. 19 from capacity. commanders personal their military in countries senior 55 by endorsed was subsequently that tion posi a – 1996) (ICRC conflicts” actual in use their of consequences humanitarian appallingthe of by utility outweighed military far limited APis “[t]he mines that,

former membersofthemilitaryestablishment (Benford andSnow2000: 621). time whenthedebateonlandminesstarted in earnest. Timothy Connolly–theabilityof SOLICtoinfluencetheDoDpolicyonmatterwaslimitedandbothbanproponents lefttheirpostsin1996, the Secretary ofDefenseforHumanitarianandRefugee Affairs, PatriciaIrvinandPrincipalDeputy Assistant Secretary ofDefenseforSpecial Operations, chief civilianofficialswere twopoliticalappointeesoftheClinton Administrationwhowere infavorofatotallandmineban–Deputy Assistant maneuvers thisdismountedinfantryanditsaccompanyingarmored vehiclesindependently”(Biddleetal,1994:70). infantrydismounts andconductstheassaultonfoot;(3)thatattacker positions where USdoctrineplacesmost AP mines;(2)thattheattacker’s contrast toprevious assertionsinthearmscontrol debatethatgivingupmineswilldoubleUSlosses(Biddleetal.1994:44). on desertterrainthatincludesacounterattackanduseofscatterableantitankminesbythe US,there wouldbea 20%increase inUSvehicle losses,in one underpure defenseconditions;Forexample,ifmineswere altogetherremoved from ascenariofeaturingUSmechanizedbrigadeindefense is rare, eveninadefensivescenario,theneteffect ofremoving landminesonUSmaterielandcombatantlosseswouldbelesssignificantthanthe noticed thatcombatoftheoffensive typewagedinthe1991GulfWar wouldbemore probable. Inaddition,sincepure defensewithoutcounterattack The nucleardisarmamentmovementhasalso employedasimilartacticsofenhancingtheircredibility asframearticulatorsbyenlistingthesupportof The report wascommissioned totheInstitutebyOfficeofSpecialOperationsandLowIntensityConflict(SOLIC). EventhoughamongSOLIC’s “For AP minestohaveadecisiveeffect, anumberofimportantpreconditions mustbemet,amongthesebeing:(1)thattheattackerreach theclose-in envisagedaKoreanThe militarygenerally typescenario,orevenrelied onoldColdWar plans offightingadefensivewarinEurope, whilethe report Thus, by garnering the support of military officers for their cause, NGOs NGOs cause, their for officers military of support the garnering by Thus, the seriously examining in role important an played particular in ICRC, The re Pentagon the and thinking military on impact actual report’s the While 25 The overall conclusion of the report was that “military utility in utility “military that was report the of conclusion overall The 26 it provided substantive grounds for NGOs to claim that the mili 27 Importantly, high 24 and second, second, and ------IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 - - - - -15- An additional representation of landmines in the US 28 Whereas enlisting military support for the NGO cause and highlighting the The tactic of questioning the military use of weapons became salient in par The NGO approach included questioning the usefulness of landmines in See for example, two reports challenging military claims that landmines were needed for the protection of Korea – Demilitarization for Democracy of Korea needed for the protection challenging military claims that landmines were See for example, two reports (1997) and HRW (1997). (1997) and HRW

28. and peace operations (e.g. New TimesYork 1997a,b; Washington Post 1996, 1997). split in military opinion about the utility of the weapons was an effective strategy, intheUSmade proving thelack ofmilitary effectiveness oflandmines thepinnacle ofits efforts in abid to provide President Clinton with the military credentials that he lacked, but also to convince the US military itself that the ban would not affect negatively its capabilities. media portrayed them as cheap weapons for poor countries war thatin weapons these didto victim notfell times yieldoften that anyforces US to advantage relative generals to sign an open letter to Clinton President assuring him that banning an tipersonnel landmines was “not only humane, but also militarily responsible” and would not “undermine the military wouldeffectivenessleave “unimpaired the use of… orundeniably militarily safetyuseful weapons.” ofThe [US] forces”Vietnam Veterans ofAmerica as Foundation it(VVAF) leading the landmine campaign ticular in the US campaign to oppositionban landminesand wherein NGOsan facedattempt sternto showing militaryovercomethat a ban it would focusednot undermine a the US lot military 1998: 224; inter a particularly successful campaign considered strategy (Wareham ofcapabilities. their In what energiesis on view 20060514), the US campaign managed to convince 15 high-ranking retired 1998) and even scholars who do not buy into the military disutility argument refer to landmines as weapons of “dubious military utility”114). As I argue,(Rutherford this particular2000: representation76, 111, of landmines was not efforts. of conscious NGO the result necessarilygiven fact, but largely a a category of weapons technology carries the burden of extramoral political,baggage, legal,the andordinary criteria of mere utility 633). will Nevertheless,just notit do”has (Pricebecome commonly1998: accepted thatthesuccess theofoneprohibition wasof“the fact that the theuseabolitionor minesofreasons would for have little impact on the global military balance” (Cameron 2002: 83; also Gard particular instances of armed conflict or out future from the warnarrow combat utility scenarios,of the weapons to buttheir importance alsofor over zooming all military doctrine and strategy, and eventually for the global balanceArguably, atof power. such a high level of abstraction be provenonly of utmosta importance.few However,weapons as has been systemsargued, “to thecould extent that to the military. Whereas prior to the NGO campaign the military weapons was accepted as a matter necessityof fact, as the issue became the offocus of public the debate the military was forced to justify the need of using landmines (Price 1998a: 632-33). landminesopened a window of opportunity for NGOs to shift the burden of proof 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers military utility may not have been achieved yet, the attempts to show that land that show to attempts the yet, achieved been have not may utility military nate weaponfrom theU.S. arsenal”(quotedinFCNL undated). landmine indiscrimi outmoded, the this of elimination the for “redirect need the reflect to reviewto policy him urging Bush to the sent of was members 124 Representatives from of letter House a 2001, December in and well as mobilized lators urged and alarm landmines. the of utility realmilitary the was what consider to policy-makers sounded also (HRW) Watch Rights Human available, came be review policy landmine Administration’s the for recommendations Pentagon utility military minimal 2003). the (USCBL weapons” outweigh these of far Treaty] Ban Mine the [to speedy accession of US advantages humanitarian and diplomatic, military, the that believe We troops… own our to liability a be to proved again, and time have, that weapons outmoded “are landmines antipersonnel that arguing letter a him sent admirals for studies several purpose. the commissioned tirelessly it and utility landmines military that limited a demonstrating had remained adoption its after treaty the sign US the of VVAFthe to make focus main the campaign grounds, on military in 1997 vention rather thantheopinionofretired generalssupportingtheNGOcause. chargein military uniformed the wars of advice fighting the and heed planning to of natural only was it arguments, military on based made be to had decision a if tions, considera divorcedfromhumanitarian utility military on focused setting discursive Policy. Security for Center conservative the around organized officials military active and retired from backlash a provoked tactic The effects. productive counter its also had grounds military on predominantly debate the back shifting -16- 33. 32. 31. 30. 29. was thereWhereas landmines. to comparedarguments NGO the in nuance a was 6.2 Cluster Munitions ceptions ofmilitaryutility, ratherthantheotherwayaround. prohibition itself and the efforts to sell it to the military that redefinedthe general per was it of sense, that process In weapons. the obsolete to as portrayal and contributed delegitimation their have operations military in uses limited had mines

military utilityalwaysinrelation totheweapons’humanitarianeffects. “protecting” antitankmines?,”thatwere thensubdividedintonumerous detailedtechnicalandoperationalquestions (HRW 2001). Mines haveaRoleontheModernBattlefield? HowMuch Time Do AntipersonnelMines Buy?Whatisthebenefitthatantipersonnelmines provide in mines (Dupuy2001). on all“dumb”mines(antipersonnelandanti-tank), includingthoseinKorea, wasasensibleoption,butdefendedtheusefulnessof“smart”antitank Whereas intheUSdebateshiftedprimarilyonmilitarygrounds, themainapproach followedbyNGOs,andtheICRC inparticular, wastorefer to The focuswasalmost entirely arguments onthemilitary aboutlandmineuse.HRW brought totheattentionofpolicy-makersquestionssuchas,“Do In March 2001,VVAF commissionedyetanother studyoftheconsequencesbanning,thistime, antitankmines.Thestudyconcludedthatatotalban 2000a,b,c. See DupuyInstitute See forexample,CenterSecurityPolicy1997a,b,c,d. A similar process took place in the case of cluster munitions although there there although munitions cluster of case the in place took process similar A Even if the concrete objective of the campaign in the US to win the debate on Nevertheless, even after its failure to convince the US to join the Ottawa Con 30 After president Bush took office in 2001, another eight generals and and generals eight another 2001, in office took Bush president After 31 In November 2001, as information about the the about information as 2001, November In 33 29 Within this Within 32 Legis ------IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 ------17-

35 More directly, they questioned the penetration 34 Once the Oslo Process to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions was Challenging the military utility of the weapons became a campaign strategy For example, HRW (2003: 114) emphasized that due to their high failure rate DPICM submunitions used by US artillery in the 2003 Iraq War, were were artillery in the 2003 Iraq War, rate DPICM submunitions used by US emphasized that due to their high failure (2003: 114) For example, HRW 27) also noted that, “no detailed military study of the military utility of these for Humanitarian Demining (2007: The Geneva International Centre called “losers” and “a Cold war relic” in a lessons learned presentation of the 3rd Infantry division. 3rd of the in a lessons learned presentation called “losers” and “a Cold war relic” weapons – if one has been conducted – has ever been made public”.

34. 35. arguedthat cluster munitions had nomilitary utility inthe post-Cold conflicts War where protecting the civilian population and winning its supportimportance were (e.g. ofUK House utmostof Lords 2007a,b). However, the arguments in this case focused not so much on challenging the military utility of the weapons in itself, campaign efforts on cluster munitions in the US were for the most part weak, chal weak, part most the for were US the in munitions cluster on efforts campaign lenging the military utility of these weapons came to the fore in the UK, the major military force reluctantly participating in the negotiation process. Landmine Ac tionwasparticularly active theonissue andworked withparliamentarians raiseto the visibility of the problem and put pressure internationalon the ban governmentprocess. In debatesto in thesupport UK House theof Lords it was persistently ons prohibitions. launched in early 2007, it was deemed necessarycluster to showmunitions that wouldthe prohibitionnot criticallyof undermine military capabilities. Whereas account military requirements and not just pacifists onmilitaries a crusadeand toabolish disarm all their weapons. Again, this in campaigncountries wheretactic militarywas oppositionmost wasvisible an obstacle to achievingunderlines athe argument ban, that whichthe absence of military utility was not an established weap for efforts behind force moving a it was less even and circles military in fact tionalorganizations perceptions about the political costs and admissibility ofthese weapons changed. At this stage when momentum behind a prohibition has gath ered force, studies of the weapons’ military utilityto weremaking undertakena ban,with justifieda view on humanitarianwell. Asgrounds,in the US campaign palatableto ban landmines (Price to1998a: 632), thethis step was militaryalso as made in order to portray the ban proponents as responsible statesmen taking into advantages versus humanitarian costs impossible (Rappert 2005). advantages versus humanitarian to delegitimize them. But it came only the humanitarian aftercost of thethe weapons. Under NGOsthe scrutiny hadof NGOs and showninterna convincingly mines, they also highlighted the heavy toll unexploded cluster submunitions took on friendly forces (HRW 2007). effects of some cluster submunition types against contemporary tank armor (Mc Grath2000; Rappert 2005; Conway 2007) pointedandfinally, out the lack of studies of the military utility of cluster munitions, which made the balancing of military was linked to the argument that their use undermined the larger political goals population. local the of minds” and hearts the “win to campaigns military today’s of Hence, the high political cost of cluster munitions made them weapons military of utility limitedas well. NGOs repeatedly argued that cluster munitions were rel ics of the past designed for the As in the case ofconflicts land that often times take place in urban environments. battlefields of the ColdWar rather than today’s a direct challenge to the military effectiveness of the weapons, in many cases this 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers rector Mines Action Canada quoted in Burtinshaw 2007) and accused some states some accused and 2007) Burtinshaw in quoted Canada Mines Action rector Di Hannon, (Paul weapons” good have should soldiers “good and outdated” are Similarly,2007). (CMC arguedmembers NGO weapons these know … soldiers “the that, weapons conventional other by fulfilled be well could munitions cluster by targetticular arguedas sets military.the by performedtasks the time, same the At par against advantages specific delivering a for than rather targets”against of range wide convenience of weapon “a as used been had they conflicts recent argued in CMC that effectiveness. their about claims military on doubt place and nitions “obsolete”. mu cluster and of utility military “unique” the challenge “outdated” to was approach the as Again, them to referring started and weapons the of ness mine Action 2008a,c; (Land gain” military real “no War”of Cold the of relics “outdated cluster as munitions portraying continued allies parliamentarian their and Action Landmine ( munitions precision-guided as such indiscriminate weapons, the UK government should these better equip them with use the “right” weapons, soldiers letting of Instead world.” modern the in force of their prohibition would “establish a new benchmark for the responsible projection and losers,” “battlefield were soldiers, and population civilian the among both ties Work and Must be Banned”. In it they argued that cluster munitions caused casual in letter open an The Times published leaders military British senior nine 2008, May in tions Muni Cluster on Convention the of negotiations final the of eve the on US, the in costs. political and humanitarian their against it weighing after utility their refuting on rather but -18- 36. assertions andcredibility ontheissue. military on doubt casting again once aspect, this of study further information for need reliable the of and lack the indicate the did on it but position weapons, the concrete of a utility issue military not did munitions cluster on landmines, meeting on expert meeting the ICRC 1996 the to contrast In 2007). (Borrie utility military or cost humanitarian their either assess to possible not was it submunitions, of rate failure the on data reliable no had militaries if that charge their continued atives and legal aspects of cluster munitions (ICRC 2007). At the meeting, technical, military, NGO represent humanitarian, the discuss to meeting expert an organized ICRC 2007). Netherlands Christi Pax in quoted co- Conway, Simon (CMC chair civilians” protecting than munitions cluster obsolete their protecting in interested “more being of Process Oslo the full-heartedly support to reluctant

Cold War-era munitions” (quotedinHandicapInternationalUSA 2007). litary doesn’tneedoutdatedclustermunitions, thedumbestofdumbweapons...[t]oomanyinnocentlivesare beinglostbecauseoftheseoutmoded, To sametrend theextentthat surfacedin theUS,itcouldbedetectedinarguments byCongressman JimMoranwhohasargued that“TheUSmi In a further attempt to clarify the issue of military utility, in April 2007 the the 2007 April in utility, military of issue the clarify to attempt further a In The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) also questioned the military effective ban landmine the of support in published letter generals’ the of reprise a In to the Secretary of State for Defense under the title “Cluster Bombs Don’t Don’t Bombs “Cluster title the under Defense for State of Secretary the to Guardian 28May2008;Oxfam2008). Times , 19 May 2008). And campaigners from from campaigners And 2008). May 19 , 36

------IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 ------19- If that were a 38 But the conclusions report’s strength 39 oyed tanks only at 14, while NATO’s final assessment at 93. See for example, oyed tanks only at 14, while NATO’s (Dullum 2008: 3). The study undermined exaggerated or unsubstantiated claims about 37 Thus,the conclusion was that although cluster munitions had better military Cluster weapons do not constitute an irreplaceable capability on the battlefield. Al Cluster weapons do have a satisfactory or adequate effect against most targets. Un Finally, in Finally, an attempt both to provide the missing military analysis of clus From a different perspective, Price (1997: 5) has argued that “the lack of decisive utility” initially has never precluded the entry of new weapons in the that “the lack of decisive utility” initially has never precluded perspective, Price (1997: 5) has argued a different From A couple of months earlier, a leading munition expert, consulted in the project claimed that, “there is clearly a military role for cluster munitions and for cluster munitions is clearly a military role claimed that, “there a leading munition expert, consulted in the project couple of months earlier, A during the Kosovo tanks and other mobile targets to destroy forces wide-ranging debates about the success of NATO were For example, there has been given as evidence of the ineffectiveness of UK cluster bombs RBL 755 (e.g. McGrath 2000), in the NATO campaign tanks were also targeted also targeted campaign tanks were 755 (e.g. McGrath 2000), in the NATO of UK cluster bombs RBL has been given as evidence of the ineffectiveness tactics, such as high altitude with PGMs, and hence the lack of success could be attributed to this type of weapon as well and to the overall military in of PGMs against tanks and other tactical targets bemoaned the use Allied Force commander in bombing. For example, Gen. Short, the air force 1999). in Serbia (Tirpak targets instead attacks against strategic Kosovo as “tank plinking,” preferring of chemical weapons could not be explained by their low military effectiveness. the prohibition military arsenals, and similarly, one could not ask the military to carry out missions with one hand tied behind its back” (Colin King quoted in ICRC 2007: 19). one could not ask the military to carry out missions with one hand tied behind its back” (Colin King quoted in ICRC bombing campaign with some estimates putting the number of destr tanks in Kosovo and Zandee 2001: 77-83. Even though the low rate of strike success against 2001: 155-62; Leurdijk Newsweek 15 May 1999; Cordesman

39. 37. 38. Thus once again we witness the same strategy of challenging unsubstantiated mili unsubstantiated challenging of strategy same the witness we again once Thus tary assertions and raising the standards of military utility toclustermeet – from being munitionsuseful under certain had circumstances to being “unique” in their capabilities. enedthe position of states advocating aban by showing it to be backed by military analysis and enjoying the support of demonstratedthe that militarycluster munitionsestablishment. were neitherImportantly, “indispensable”it thus nor opening“unique,” the door for arguments that they were dispensable and outdated. criterion for “obsolescence,” and hence prohibition, the military with very few weapons wouldleft at its disposal. find itself delivered higher military utility despite their much higher economic cost (Dullum (Dullum cost economic higher much their despite utility military higher delivered 2008: 143). the “unrivaled” military effectiveness of cluster munitions against certain types of targets. However, it should be remembered that “unique”. veryand “indispensable” being of test the pass fewcould arsenals weapons in military (Dullum 2008: 143). effectiveness than unguided unitary bombs,bombs and a advanced combination types of cluster of munitions precision-guided such as sensor-fuzed weapons indispensable ternatives exist, although in some cases they may be less effective thanThus cluster a prohibition weapons… of cluster weapons will not mean that a set of unique capabilities is lost utility at all. Instead, it argued that: it argued utility at all. Instead, der certain conditions the effect is claimquite that good.such weaponsHowever, areno far evidencebetter thanhas theirbeen alternativesfound to to the extent that they are ter munitions and show that banning them would not be an irresponsibleNorwegian act, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tasked Establishment to theundertake a concrete study Norwegianof the weapons’ The military utility. Defense Research simu computer predominantly, and studies, case on based was report subsequent lations. Whereas its conclusions debunked assertions about thecluster high munitions,efficiency it of was not a sweeping statement that cluster munitions had no 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers to use in the Iraq war (HRW 2009: 179). Fast forward, in November 2006 the UK the 2006 November in forward, Fast 179). 2009: (HRW war Iraq submunitions the in M85 use to self-destruct advanced, on stocked just had UK and the 2005) 2003-04 Rappert in in quoted Hoon Secretary (Defense effective” makes “extraordinarily adopted, were as seen were strategy munitions cluster in 2003, In questionable. explanation changes alternative the major no and operations military ing ongo in involved was country the which during time, of period relativelyshort a over position UK the in changes the at look a quick banning, their at the aimed from process isolation in assessed be cannot weapons of utility military the that argue reality. I that While reflected change discursive the thus and replacement for due the weapons were banned simply because they were indeed becoming that obsolete – and take realist alternative, the of potential explanatory the evaluate could one 20090526). view (inter military” the to ban] [the sell unreliable to able us make to something “justification, a and “obsolete use to liked one weapons,” while admitting that evaluating the military utility of the no weapons was that insisted Cluster delegates on Convention Munitions, the of adoption the after 20071206), (interview operations in needed and deployed were submunitions cluster argued M85 having that 2007 Despite December in frame. weapons” “obsolete the into bought requirements against a comprehensive prohibition on cluster munitions because of UK’s military Utility of Weapons Reflection of the“Real” Diminishing Military 7. AnAlternative Explanation–Discourse asa -20- banned. were ons could hardly drive the discursive changes and even less so explain why the weap positions) UK the in changes year a separating than months of a couple less just even of (or a half and period a in munitions cluster of utility military “objective” the in A change munitions. cluster of stock entire its banned that Munitions Cluster on Convention the adopted it Yet,2008 May in 20090525). (interview treaty the joining for line” “read a submunitions M73 its of retention the declaring prohibition, from munitions remaining its to exclude UK fought the negotiations, international of the end the till And 2007). ofCommons House (UK value” military significant with ons (Norton-Taylor 2007). Still, it insisted troops that its two remaining submunitions were British “legitimate weap to risk” acceptable but small very “a at only diately March 2007 the in UK later, agreed under months strong few domestic a pressure to Just ban its old 2006b). munitions imme 2006a, Commons of House (UK gap” ity available be would arguing that to do otherwise would systems “risk leaving our armed forces with a capabil replacement when 2015 by out them phase to sioned problems humanitarian the envi only although ministers acknowledged, alreadywere submunitions RBL755 old its of and weapons” legal are munitions cluster Minister of State for the Armed Forces argued that, “United Kingdom believes that Examining further the evolution of the British position on cluster munitions munitions cluster on position British the of evolution the further Examining Process Oslo the during long fought that delegates UK even Eventually, ------IBEI Working Papers • 2010/31 ------21-

But under the cir 40 I have argued that through their framing tactics, NGOs have managed to I have argued that the success of the NGO campaigns to ban landmines and The success of the discursive shift in the presentation of cluster munitions from from munitions cluster of presentation the in shift discursive the of success The 41 ry Utility and Role of Cluster Munitions,” Presentation to the CCW, Geneva, 19 June 2007, quoted in to the CCW, Colonel Gary S. Kinne, “The Ongoing Military Utility and Role of Cluster Munitions,” Presentation The only exception is Price (1998a: 632-33). Goose (2008).

40. 41. 1998a; Hubert 2000; Rutherford 2000), the latter has not received particular atten tion. their and weapons the of effects humanitarian the about perceptions influence both landmines of utility limited the of perceptions current Thus effectiveness. military and about evolving the perceptions usefulness of cluster munitions have originat tween military benefits and humanitarian costs that is at the heart of internationalhumanitarian Theylaw. have done so by bothutil military highlightingtheir about claims themilitary negativeundermining and civilians impacton ofweapons the especially in those ity, cases where NGOs faced strong military opposition. While the first aspect of the NGO campaigning has been largely emphasized (e.g. Price and Humanitarian Considerations Guiding the War of Laws cluster munitions was premised on the ability of NGOs to change the balance be 8. Conclusion: Turning the Scales of Military Military of the Scales Turning 8. Conclusion: to amalgamate them back into the category of commonly accepted and unremarkable unremarkable and accepted commonly of category the into back them amalgamate to weapons. Not only were cluster munitions established as indiscriminate and weapons worst offenders of humanitarian principles, but they were also on their way to them. landmines have before becoming “obsolete weapons” as of humanitarian harm caused by unexploded cluster submunitions relative problems to of the other unexploded ordnance and mines (US Department of State when late too came it issue, right the addressed 2008, approach the While 2008). 2007, USA cluster munitions had already been singled out for regulation due to their unaccept able humanitarian impact. The time when the political contest over the definition of cluster munitions as a humanitarian problem has already passed and it was difficult the drive towards a prohibition. The US, which opposed a comprehensive ban, real ized that but too late after the agenda-setting stage of “diagnostic framing” at which out stood that weapons the of effects humanitarian severe, the established had NGOs in comparisons with any other weapons system. In 2007 and 2008, US officials tried degree the about assertions their questioning turf own their on NGOs the reengage to “highly effective” to “obsolete” is also witnessed by the fact that cials at US the military CCW meetings offi deemed it necessary to argue against “common miscon ceptions” that cluster munitions are “outdated weapons” and claim once again that “cluster munitions will continue to be the most efficient weapons to address numer ous targets and target combinations when employed correctly.” stem to enough not was weapons the of utility military the emphasizing cumstances, 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers ever been banned, it is equally true that no weapon has been banned just because because have just banned value been has military weapon no that high true of equally is it weapons banned, no been ever that been has NGOs among even dom wis accepted the While impact. humanitarian their of context the in always and established well are weapons the of problems the humanitarian the of after sense case makes the as present, ever only utility military of is question the up Opening showed. utility campaign landmine US military of discussions prohibitions in weapons on engaging debate by the “re-securitizing” of danger the and remains cal process drivenbyhumanitarianconcerns (Kongstad 2008). questionedseriously is utility military the areunacceptable, that effects humanitarian the to addition In expected. as perform not do munitions cluster view, of point military a from ancing actisreflected instatementsbyoneoftheengineersOsloProcess: the military that are bound to benefit from new technology replacement. legations that the bans are simply playing to the interests of the arms industry and al deflect time same the reasonsat humanitarian and for prohibitionpursued a is that claims sustain to difficult it made weapons of utility military the downplaying something given,butpartandparcel ofthestruggle fortheirprohibition. perceptions of the military effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the weapons were not ed in the conscious NGO efforts to achieve a prohibition on those weapons. Hence, -22- 43. 42. their of perceptions way. the along changing utility military by history” of dustbin the to them “consigned and strategies involved in the process of prohibiting the weapons literally “made them obsolete”discursive The weapons. “obsolete” as redefined gradually – soletized” of realm the into “ob also security were they but of 374), 1998: Sjolander and filed (Larrinaga action humanitarian the of out brought – “humanitarianized” they cases thetrend hasbeentoward increasing civilianprotection inwar. examined the in least at utility,but military its of a irrespective use put of to out weapon enough be would alone considerations humanitarian extent be what to to remains seen still It away. fade to began utility military of considerations vilians, ci on impact humanitarian their about evidence the of face the in case, munition cluster the and landmine the both in Indeed, battle. in sub-optimally performed it

obsolete asweaponsofwar”(Nqakula2008). Also, Landmine Action (2008c). weapons have…becomeobsoleteas ofmodernwarfare,” and atthesametimeassertthat,“wewillsucceedinrendering clustermunitions process ofdefiningtheweaponsas“obsolete”andmakingthemobsolete byvirtueoftheirprohibition: “wehavecometothebeliefthatthese For example,thestatementofSouth African MinisterofDefenseuponsigningtheConvention onClusterMunitionsisrevealing ofthedialectical For acritiqueofthelandminebanalongthes e lines,seeforexample,BeierandCrosby (1998). The need to always balance the humanitarian versus the military aspects aspects military the versus humanitarian the balance always to need The In the process of banning landmines and cluster munitions not only were were only not munitions cluster and landmines banning of process the In This process is not about military utility of an outdated weapon system, but a politi that, fact the of recognition growing been has there years of couple last the [o]ver and costs humanitarian the highlighting of strategy double the However, 43 Indeed, invoking military uselessness as a reason reason a as uselessness military invoking Indeed, (Kongstad2007). 42 This bal ------for the prohibition of the weapons nowadays is a sign of successful norm mak- ing – the norm is acknowledged even if the rationale behind it is misrepresented or forgotten.44 Paradoxically, the very success of NGOs to redefine the weapons as being of limited military utility could backfire and diminish the degree of their achievement by contributing to beliefs that only militarily useless weapons ever get banned.

44. See Price (1997) for a genealogical study of norm creation regarding chemical weapons that also points that discounting the military necessity for the weapons has been a strategy to legitimize the chemical weapons taboo (p. 174). 2010/31 • IBEI Working Papers Center for Security Policy. 1997c. Former Military Leaders Urge President To Hold Center for Security Policy. 1997b. Many Of Nation’s Most Respected Military Lead Pentagon’sPolicy.SecurityNavigation:CelestialforCenter Extraordinary 1997a. CCW News. 1995. What are we doing here. 11 October 1995, p. 6 in ICBL. Report on 6 the ofRecord Summary CCW.1995. Cave, Rosy. 2006. Disarmament as Humanitarian Action? Comparing negotiations Ottawathe Societyand Cameron,2002.Civil Process:MaxwellGlobal A. Lessons Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Burtinshaw,2007.Julie. 2007.March22Bombs.StopCluster Available at Borrie, John. 2007. The Road from Oslo: Emerging International Efforts on Cluster Biddle, Stephen D., Julia L. Klare, and Jaeson Rosenfeld. 1994. Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Move Beier, J. Marshall and Ann Denholm Crosby. 1998. Harnessing Change for Continu Adler,2002.Emanuel. Constructivism Internationaland Relations. WalterIn Carl Politics. World in Constructivism Ground: Middle the 1997. Seizing Adler, Emanuel. References -24- Activities: Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, Weapons, Conventional on Convention the of Conference Review Activities: Effects, CCW /CONF.I/SR.6, 5October 1995. Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Weapons Injurious or to ConventionalHave Indiscriminate Certain of Use the on Restrictions or Prohibitions on Convention the to Parties States the of Conference Review 1995. tember Practice to tive 1997. That (Red) Line On The Emerging, Defective Landmine Ban. 97-D 132, 11 Sept 101, 21July1997. ers Join Forces To Oppose Bans On Use Of Self-Destructing Landmines. 97-P Landmines. All Ban to 97-D 97, Agree 14July1997. Cannot U.S. The Why Shows Letter ‘64-Star’ Vienna, Austria, 25 September -13October 1995. V. Martin Randin (eds). explosiveand anti-personnelremnantswar.minesof on andBorrie John In United NationsUniversity Press. (eds). al. et F. Andrew Cooper In Mines. Anti-Personnel Ban to Movement the from Analysis. disarmament.suite101.com/article.cfm/stop_cluster_bomb Control Arms for Munitions. Implications Landmines: of 639. European Journal of International Relations International of Journal European ments: An Overview and Assessment. and Overview An ments: Landmines Ban to Maxwell A. Cameron et al. (eds). ity: The Play of Political andEconomic Forces behindtheOttawa process. In lications. snaes et al. (eds). Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy? New a Towards Governance: Global Enhancing Colorado: Lynne Rienner. Disarmament Diplomacy Disarmament , pp. 51-78. UNDIR. Handbook of International Relations International of Handbook , pp. 269-291. Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspec From Action: Humanitarian as Disarmament

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