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UNIDIR/2009/8 Unacceptable Harm A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won John Borrie UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Geneva, Switzerland New York and Geneva, 2009 About the cover F.1 France, from ANTIPERSONNEL © 2004 Raphaël Dallaporta. Image courtesy of Raphaël Dallaporta. F.1 “Ogre” submunition, France. l: 40mm h: 90mm W: 244g An “Ogre” F.1 155mm shell contains 63 dual-purpose improved conventional submunitions with self-destruct, each weighing 244g. Each shell leaves a footprint of 10,000–18,000m2, depending on range. The F.1 used to be manufactured by Versailles-based Giat Industries (now Nexter). In connection with the signing of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, France withdrew the F.1 from operational service and said it would destroy its stockpile of the weapon. NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. * * * The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author. They do not necessarily refl ect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors. The moral right of the author has been asserted UNIDIR/2009/8 Copyright © United Nations, 2009 All rights reserved UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS Sales No. GV.E.09.0.8 ISBN 978-92-9045-196-9 The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and confl icts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government offi cials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations. The Institute’s web site can be found at: www.unidir.org CONTENTS Acknowledgements ........................................................................ ix About the author ........................................................................... xiii Foreword by Eric Prokosch ............................................................ xv Preface ......................................................................................... xvii Introduction “What is happening in my yard could happen in yours” ................ 1 Chapter 1 The technology of killing ............................................................... 5 Cluster weapons ..................................................................... 7 The ICRC conferences ........................................................... 11 Indochina .............................................................................. 16 “Improved” cluster munitions ................................................ 21 The Ottawa process and the Mine Ban Treaty ........................ 26 Eloquent but grim testimony .................................................. 34 Chapter 2 From little things big things will grow ............................................. 37 First steps ................................................................................ 40 Explosive remnants of war ..................................................... 44 Afghanistan, Iraq and the birth of the Cluster Munition Coalition ................................................. 49 The Cluster Munition Coalition .............................................. 54 Voices in the wilderness ......................................................... 56 Out of balance ...................................................................... 61 Belgium’s ban on cluster munitions ........................................ 64 The future is now .................................................................. 70 Chapter 3 Norway and cluster munitions ....................................................... 71 Good versus bad .................................................................... 74 The “Norwegian Model” ........................................................ 79 The right political conditions .................................................. 82 Testing cargo ammunition ...................................................... 87 A new hope ........................................................................... 92 v vi Chapter 4 Lebanon ....................................................................................... 95 The 2006 confl ict ................................................................... 97 Ceasefi re ............................................................................... 103 Aftermath .............................................................................. 108 Longer-term clearance and impacts of unexploded submunitions ................................................. 112 Lessons to be learned from Southern Lebanon ....................... 115 Chapter 5 The commencement of the Oslo Process ...................................... 121 What to do about cluster munitions ........................................ 124 Lebanon and the CCW .......................................................... 129 The CCW Review Conference ............................................... 134 The road to the Oslo conference ........................................... 140 The Oslo conference ............................................................. 148 Chapter 6 After Oslo—Shifting the burden of proof ....................................... 159 Oslo’s aftermath ..................................................................... 162 The ICRC’s meeting of experts ............................................... 168 The German proposal, and the emergence of the “Like-minded” ......................................................... 171 The Lima conference ............................................................. 173 “Ping-pong” in the CCW ....................................................... 175 Fatal footprints ....................................................................... 177 Belgrade and the voices of the cluster munition-affected ........ 179 The CCW: old arguments, a new mandate ............................. 182 A defi ning period ................................................................... 183 The Vienna conference .......................................................... 186 Final thoughts ........................................................................ 190 Chapter 7 Crunch point ................................................................................ 193 The US and cluster munitions, and interoperability ................. 196 Gathering forces .................................................................... 200 The Wellington conference .................................................... 204 Civil society at the Wellington conference .............................. 218 vii Chapter 8 The evolution of cluster munition policy in the ICRC and UN ....... 227 ICRC policy development on cluster munitions ....................... 227 Cluster munitions and the origins of United Nations policy .... 235 The Oslo process and the UN ................................................ 242 Chapter 9 Dublin: defi ne and conquer .......................................................... 249 State of play ........................................................................... 253 Dublin at the halfway mark .................................................... 276 Chapter 10 Dublin: endgame .......................................................................... 281 Interoperability ....................................................................... 284 The endgame ........................................................................ 291 Final endgame ....................................................................... 298 The agreement of the Convention on Cluster Munitions ......... 304 Chapter 11 The end of the beginning .............................................................. 309 Factors in the achievement of the cluster munition ban treaty ................................................. 312 Challenges to the Convention on Cluster Munitions ............... 322 Final thoughts on the meaning of “unacceptable harm” .......... 333 Notes ............................................................................................ 339 Annex A The Oslo Declaration .................................................... 415 Annex B The Wellington Declaration ........................................... 417 Annex C The Convention on Cluster Munitions ........................... 419 Annex D Timeline of cluster munitions use .................................. 443 Annex E Types of cluster munitions in global stockpiles ................ 447 Glossary ........................................................................................ 449 Index ............................................................................................ 469 Acronyms ..................................................................................... 487 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The 2008
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