• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

144 Reviews Markets & Morality 145 impartial spectator and the common good. The key factor for determining how 2. Jeffrey T. Young, Economics As a Moral Science: The Political Economy of Adam Smith (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1997), 3–4. a society will tend resides in the legislator. A wise and virtuous legislator will 3. Alvey, “A Short History of Economics As a Moral Science,” 56. orient society toward truth and the good. However, since ends are not achieved 4. Young, Economics As a Moral Science, 7. without appropriate means, Young adds that “treatises on political economy 5. Ibid., 201. 6. Ibid., 202. are a political tactic designed to appeal to public-oriented individuals by show- 7. Ibid., 204. ing them the beauty of the system as a whole.”5 The other side, then, is that “public virtue is a necessary condition to establish natural liberty, to protect it from faction … and to guide self-interest into socially beneficial channels.”6 Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets Young’s work has the value of showing Smith’s opus as a systematic and sub- stantially unified whole in which economic and moral ideas are coordinated Robert Kuttner and conjoined. In Young’s words, “Smith’s moral philosophy and economics Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, 410 pp. must be viewed as intertwined, parts of a seamless whole. The system of natural liberty that harnessed self-interest for the social good, required justice and pru- Review by Craig M. Gay dence as its central virtues and a political culture steeped in public spirit.”7 Associate Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies Young’s assessment of Smith reminds me of a brief discussion I once had Regent College with Professor Israel Kirzner of New York University. I am grateful to him for Vancouver, Canada permitting me to quote from a personal letter: You suggest that “moral coordination” is an implicit condition for eco- When one of his students objected that his theoretical system did not actually nomic coordination. Now I have, in other papers, expressed my agree- describe reality very well, G. W. F. Hegel is said to have scoffed: “Well then, so ment with the central idea with which you conclude your letter: much the worse for reality.” So Chicago School economists and other defenders “Economy does not run without a common ethos.” Like you, I do not of free markets are all but forced to reply, Robert Kuttner contends in Everything believe that a market economy (and the economic coordination it is able to achieve) is feasible, as a practical matter, without a shared moral for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets, in the face of a good deal of evidence framework. So that I agree that a condition for the practical achievement that there are significant discrepancies between how markets ought to function of economic coordination is (what you call, if I understand correctly) in theory and how they actually function in practice. Such myopia would be “moral coordination.” humorous, Kuttner feels, were it not for the fact that something like it is shap- It is satisfying to see that Kirzner’s concept of moral coordination resonates in ing a good deal of American economic policy at present. “The ideal of a free, the work of Adam Smith. Readers of this journal will profit from Young’s book self-regulating market is newly triumphant,” Kuttner writes in the book’s Intro- because it shows how one outstanding thinker understood the relationship duction: “Unfettered markets are deemed both the essence of human liberty, between economics and morality. and the most expedient route to prosperity.” But Kuttner, an economic journal- ist and founding co-editor (with Robert Reich and Paul Starr) of The American Prospect, would beg to differ. “The grail of a perfect market, purged of illegiti- Notes mate and inefficient distortions,” he writes, “is a fantasy—and a dangerous one.” Not only are perfect markets, for the most part, unrealizable, Kuttner believes, 1. Kenneth Boulding, “Economics As a Moral Science,” American Economic Review 59, 3 but trying to realize them may well render our society less humane, less demo- (1969). Albert Hirschman published two monographs in French under the title L’économie comme cratic, and ultimately more vulnerable to tyranny. In Everything for Sale, he exa- science morale et politique (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) and (Paris: du Seuil, 1994). Amartya Sen also published a monograph in French with a similar title, L’économie est une science morale (Paris: La mines a number of significantly flawed markets—including the labor market, découverte, 1999). See my Spanish-language work, La economía como ciencia moral (Buenos Aires: the market for health care, and financial markets—with an eye toward defend- Educa, 1997) and the controversy with Peter Boettke over the question, Is economics a moral sci- ence? Journal of Markets and Morality 1, 2 (Fall 1998): 201–25. Cf. James Alvey, “A Short History of ing a mixed economy and persuading his readers that the realization of a truly Economics As a Moral Science,” Journal of Markets and Morality 2, 1 (Spring 1999): 53–73. 146 Reviews Markets & Morality 147 humane and democratic society must inevitably warrant a good deal of govern- tion, education, gross inequality of income, the buying of office or purchase of mental intervention in economic affairs. professions), a recourse purely to ineffectual market discipline would leave both To make his case for a mixed economy, Kuttner underscores the tensions consumer and society worse off than the alternative of a mix of market forces that exist between allocative efficiency and two other economic values asso- and regulatory interventions. ciated with the names of John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter, respec- Beyond defending the importance of regulatory interventions, Kuttner also tively. On the one hand, allocative, or Smithian, efficiency operates on the stresses that attempting to purify imperfect markets by trying to make them basis of price signals by way of supply and demand and ensures that the right more superficially market-like may actually render them even more imper- things will be made in the right places at the right costs. It is the efficiency so fect. Along this line, he refers to a theory, propounded by the economists Rich- often emphasized by defenders of free markets. Keynesian efficiency, on the ard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster in 1956, with the remarkably bland title: “The other hand, addresses the potential output that is lost when the economy is in General Theory of the Second Best.” The theory, Kuttner writes, “holds that, recession and performing below its full-employment potential. Attempting to when a particular market departs significantly from a pure market and yields increase local allocative efficiencies during a recession, Keynes observed, may an outcome that is not ‘optimal’ in market terms, attempts to make it more actually make matters worse by driving more people out of work. Schumpeterian market-like in some, but not all, respects will have indeterminate results for efficiency, furthermore, suggests that technological progress is the real engine economic efficiency—and sometimes perverse ones.” Backing away from regu- of long-term economic growth, and that technological innovation is not often lating an imperfect market in the hopes of rendering it more competitive, in best fostered by the “fierce and mutually ruinous price competition” that other words, will probably not result in greater allocative efficiency and may allocative efficiency enjoins, but instead within relatively stable oligopolies. well make matters worse for consumers and producers alike. The reason Kuttner is concerned to underscore the tensions that exist bet- Kuttner also observes that market institutions have a tendency to drive out ween allocative efficiency and Keynesian and Schumpeterian efficiencies, of extra-market institutions, just as market norms tend to drive out non-market course, is because both of the latter require governmental intervention in the norms. Voluntary associations and the altruism and public-mindedness upon economy. While the need for such intervention has long been taken for which such organizations depend, in other words, are discouraged when mar- granted—he notes that Keynesianism all but dominated the field of economics kets and the maximization of private self-interest are absolutized. “When until the late 1970s—it has been replaced of late with an almost single-minded everything is for sale,” Kuttner writes, “the person who volunteers time, who emphasis upon allocative efficiency and the virtues of free markets. Indeed, helps a stranger, who agrees to work for a modest wage out of a commitment to since the early 1980s, conservatives and liberals alike have backed away from the public good, who desists from littering even when no one is looking, who interventionist economic policies. forgoes an opportunity to free-ride, begins to feel like a sucker.” Yet, Kuttner is concerned that the current preoccupation with allocative Beyond contending with Chicago School economists, Public Choice theo- efficiency is short-sighted and ultimately dangerous. Perfect markets rarely rists, advocates of “Law and Economics,” and other defenders of unbridled actually exist, he suggests, and believing that they must inevitably form in the markets, Kuttner also makes any number of policy prescriptions. With respect absence of governmental intervention simply sets the stage for economic cri- to labor markets, for example, he contends for full employment, stronger unions, ses of various kinds. “The patterns of market failure,” Kuttner writes, “are more fair trade, wage subsidy and social income, education and training, “gain- pervasive than most market enthusiasts acknowledge. Generally, they are the sharing” commitments, and responsible corporations. Insofar as health care is result of the immutable structural characteristics of certain markets and the concerned, Kuttner suggests a universal health-care system similar to Canada’s.

Load more

  6

Copy Link