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Undergraduate Review Volume 6 Article 11 2010 The orT ture of Alleged Terrorists Necessary for Public Safety or a Criminal Act? Michaela Clark Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Clark, Michaela (2010). The orT ture of Alleged Terrorists Necessary for Public Safety or a Criminal Act?. Undergraduate Review, 6, 47-54. Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev/vol6/iss1/11 This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts. Copyright © 2010 Michaela Clark The Torture of Alleged Terrorists Necessary for Public Safety or a Criminal Act? MICHAELA CLARK Michaela Clark is a orture is defined in a variety of ways by many different sources. sophomore majoring According to the World Medical Association’s (WMA) Declaration of Tokyo, torture is defined as, “the deliberate, systematic, or wanton in Criminal Justice. infliction of physical or mental suffering by one or more people Under the guidance Tacting alone or on the orders of any authority, to force another person to yield of her mentor, Dr. information, to make a confession, or for any other reason.” The Declaration of Tokyo was passed in 1975 and updated many times, most recently in 2006. This Richard Wright, she participated in is a landmark document that has been used as a model for other medical statutes. the Adrian-Tinsley Undergraduate The Declaration of Tokyo prohibits the involvement of medical personnel in any Research program during the summer activities that would negatively affect the recipient. It denounces torture and the of 2009. Her research focused on use of torture by doctors (Miles & Freedman, 2009). the allegations of torture against the In international law, the authoritative definition of torture is contained in the United States government brought 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman forth by detainees captured in the or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), signed by numerous nations including the United States. This document defines torture as, War on Terror. She presented her research at the American Society any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or of Criminology Conference in mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, Philadelphia, PA in November 2009. punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. This definition does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions. (Miles & Freedman, 2009) Given these definitions, are there any exceptions or situations in which torture is legally permissible? Is torture legal? The United States code prohibits torture with the consequence of severe penalties for its use. In Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113C, it states, BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE 2010 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 47 whoever outside the United States commits or U.S. Government (Office of Legal Counsel) Memos attempts to commit torture shall be fined under • Use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or misperception of suffocation both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by • Stress positions death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life. • Removal of clothing There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited...if • The use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee the alleged offender is a national of the United States; that death or severely painful consequences are imminent or the alleged offender is present in the United States, for him and/or his family. irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged • Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days offender. (US CODE: Title 18, 2340A, 2008) • Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli Torture is also banned by the Geneva Conventions. Along • The use of 20 hour interrogations with over one hundred other nations, the United States agreed • The use of falsified documents or reports with and signed this international treaty in 1949, and ratified it in 1955 (Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment • Using detainees individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) of Prisoners of War, 1950). The Geneva Conventions were to induce stress. written as an international guide as to how to treat prisoners Table 1 (Dratel & Greenberg, 2005) of war, the sick, wounded, civilians, or any other non-violent people that the signatories may encounter while at war. Was torture used on detainees? Furthermore in international law, the 1984 Convention Against Given our domestic laws against torture and international law Torture leaves no room to rationalize torture. prohibiting its use, it is clear that torture is an illegal activity. Given that it is a crime, the process for determining whether or Each State Party shall take effective legislative, not it has occurred is critical. One of the multiple difficulties administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent in assessing torture allegations is the lack of objective evidence. acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction… Because of this, we can only assess the credibility of detainee No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether and interrogator reports. a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any other public emergency, may be A central organization that monitors accusations of torture invoked as a justification of torture… An order from worldwide is the International Committee of the Red Cross a superior officer or a public authority may not be (ICRC). The ICRC is one branch of the International Red invoked as a justification of torture. (OHCHR 1987) Cross and Red Crescent Movement and is a humanitarian organization founded to assist victims of wartime violence Torture is prohibited by U.S. law, international law, and U.S. and other types of conflict. One of their many tasks is to visit military law. Doctors and psychologists are also banned from prisoners and detainees to ensure that international laws against participating in torture, as regulated by the American Medical torture are being respected (ICRC 2007). Association and the American Psychological Association. Torture is an illegal activity under all circumstances. The ICRC’s regional delegation for United States and Canada interviewed fourteen terrorism detainees who were held in What types of interrogation techniques are captivity by U.S. forces. The interviews were conducted in considered torture? private from October 6 - 11 and from December 4 - 14, 2006 The United States government ignored relevant U.S. and inter- (ICRC 2007). national law when they legalized the following “enhanced inter- rogation techniques” to be used on terrorism detainees. Most All fourteen of the detainees were subjected to “enhanced of these methods are considered cruel, inhumane or degrading interrogation techniques” used by the Central Intelligence treatment or torture by various human rights organizations. Agency during their time at Guantanamo. Though twelve The White House Office of Legal Counsel provided the justifi- common methods were inflicted upon most of them and detailed cation for the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques”. The in the ICRC’s report, an extensive variety of cruel procedures following table illustrates the techniques the U.S. government were imposed. Three of the most common “techniques” used approved for use on detainees (Mayer 2009). by interrogators were “beating by use of a collar”, “suffocation by water”, and “prolonged stress standing” (ICRC 2007). 48 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 2010 BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE Several detainees told interviewers that their interrogators These interrogation methods used clearly constitute cruel, used a type of collar that was fastened around their necks and inhumane, and degrading treatment. This demonstrates that used to slam them against walls, causing severe injury. One U.S. personnel violated the Geneva Conventions and the UN detainee, Abu Zubaydah, reported that he was “slammed Charter prohibiting torture. These and other acts of torture directly against a hard concrete wall”, then confined in a box were the subject of this study. for an extensive period of time. After being removed from the box, he said he was again slammed against the wall, this time Methodology with a sheet of plywood in front of it. “From now on it was This study examines the alleged acts of torture committed by the against this wall that I was then smashed with the towel around United States government. Initial research demonstrated that my neck. I think that the plywood was put there to provide torture occurred, and further study supported that hypothesis. some absorption of the impact of my body. The interrogators The approach for this study was qualitative, as it consisted realized that smashing me against the hard wall would probably of analyzing legal documents, international statutes against quickly result in physical injury” (ICRC 2007). torture, declassified military records, detainee statements, three in-depth case studies of detainees alleged to have been tortured, Khaled Shaik Mohammed (KSM), the highest ranking al and reports from reliable human rights organizations. In recent Qaeda operative captured, reported a similar scenario during years quantitative research has been the method of choice for his detention. many social scientists. The nature of this study called for a case study approach. If I was perceived not to be cooperating I would be put against a wall and punched and slapped in the body, The case study approach “is a research strategy which seeks to head and face.
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