Finding the Common Good in an Era of Dysfunctional Governance

Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein

Abstract: The framers designed a constitutional system in which the government would play a vigorous role in securing the liberty and well-being of a large and diverse population. They built a political system around a number of key elements, including debate and deliberation, divided powers competing with one Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 another, regular order in the legislative process, and avenues to limit and punish corruption. America in recent years has struggled to adhere to each of these principles, leading to a crisis of governability and legitimacy. The roots of this problem are twofold. The ½rst is a serious mismatch between our political parties, which have become as polarized and vehemently adversarial as parliamentary parties, and a separation-of-powers governing system that makes it extremely dif½cult for majorities to act. The second is the asymmetric character of the polarization. The Republican Party has become a radical insur- gency–ideologically extreme, scornful of facts and compromise, and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition. Securing the common good in the face of these developments will require structural changes but also an informed and strategically focused citizenry.

From Federalist No. 1 on, the framers of the American political system showed a deep concern about the role of government as a trustee of the people, grappling with questions about the power, structural stability, and credibility of government. In that ½rst Federalist paper, Alexander Hamilton defended a vigorous role for government: “[It] will THOMAS E. MANN, a Fellow of the be equally forgotten that the vigor of government American Academy since 1993, is is essential to the security of liberty; that, in the the W. Averell Harriman Chair and contemplation of a sound and well-informed judg- Senior Fellow in Governance Stud- ment, their interests can never be separated; and ies at the Brookings Institution. that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, a Fellow the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the peo- of the American Academy since ple than under the forbidding appearance of zeal 2004, is Resident Scholar at the for the ½rmness and ef½ciency of government.”1 American Enterprise Institute for In Federalist No. 46, James Madison wrote, “The Public Policy Research. federal and state governments are in fact but differ- (*See endnotes for complete contributor ent agents and trustees of the people, constituted biographies.) with different powers and designed for different

15 Finding the purposes.”2 And in Federalist No. 62, tem, were thus essential for the common Common Madison, outlining and defending the good of a society. The framers saw several Good in an Era of special role of the Senate, reflected at challenges peculiar to the new American Dysfunc- length on the need for stable government country. It was, as they wrote, an “extend- tional Governance and the danger of mutable policy: ed republic,” a huge geographic expanse “[G]reat injury results from an unstable and a society containing dramatically government. The want of con½dence in diverse populations, including people liv- the public councils damps every useful ing in rural areas so remote that they lit- undertaking, the success and pro½t of erally might not see other human beings which may depend on a continuance of for months, and others living in urban existing arrangements.”3 areas far more densely packed than today’s Stable government, to Madison, includ- Manhattan. How could the new govern- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 ed an underlying and enduring legitimacy ment build consensus and legitimacy in the legislative process. This meant around policies that would affect all citi- both a disciplined government that did zens, in light of their different interests, not spew out a plethora of unnecessary lifestyles, and backgrounds? The demands and careless laws, and a government that of the American political system differed did not produce contradictory laws or from those in Britain, a much smaller and reversals of laws so frequently that citi- far more homogeneous culture and society. zens questioned the content and legiti- Instead of a parliamentary system, the macy of the standing policies affecting framers carefully constructed a system their lives. Madison wrote in Federalist that would be practicable and desirable No. 62 of mutable policy: “It will be of lit- for their nation, built around the following tle avail to the people, that the laws are elements: made by men of their own choice, if the Debate and deliberation. The legislative laws be so voluminous that they cannot branch was called Congress–not parlia- be read, or so incoherent that they cannot ment. This was not simply a different be understood; if they be repealed or word, but reflective of a different ap- revised before they are promulgated, or proach to governance. The word congress undergo such incessant changes that no comes from the Latin word congredi, man, who knows what the law is today, meaning to come together; parliament can guess what it will be tomorrow.”4 comes from the French word parler, Madison ended Federalist No. 62 with a meaning to talk. In a parliament, the leg- warning that resonates today: “But the islators vote on a program devised by the most deplorable effect of all is that government; the majority members reflex- diminution of attachment and reverence ively vote for it, the minority members which steals into the hearts of the people, reflexively vote against. Citizens accept toward a political system which betrays the legitimacy of the actions, even if they so many marks of in½rmity, and disap- do not like them, because within four or points so many of their flattering hopes. ½ve years, they have the opportunity to No government, any more than an indi- hold the government accountable at the vidual, will long be respected without polls. The minority expresses its power being truly respectable; nor be truly by publicly questioning government respectable without possessing a certain actions and intentions during regular portion of order and stability.”5 periods of “Question Time.” The actions and functions of govern- In contrast, the American framers ment, a vibrant political process and sys- wanted a system in which representa-

16 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences tives of citizens from disparate regions subject.6 A political system with separa- Thomas E. would come together and meet face to tion of powers and separate elections for Mann & Norman J. face, going through extended periods of House, Senate, and president could easily Ornstein debate and deliberation across factional have institutions at loggerheads. The sys- and partisan lines. This model would tem, and the culture supporting it, required enable the representatives to understand safeguards to enable the government to each other’s viewpoints and ultimately act when necessary and desirable, without reach some form of consensus in policy- getting caught in stalemate or gridlock. making. Those who lost out in the delib- Regular order. To make the processes erative process would be satis½ed that work and to foster legitimacy, legislative they had been given ample time to make and executive procedures had to be regu- their case, adding to the likelihood that larized and followed. This would in turn Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 they would accept the legitimacy of the enable real debate by all lawmakers, decisions made, and communicate that opportunity for amendments, openness acceptance back to their constituents. Of and reasonable transparency, and some course, in contrast to a parliament, it was measure of timeliness. Executive actions, a process that made swift action extremely including crafting and implementing dif½cult. But the trade-off was that gov- regulations to carry out policy, would ernment power would be constrained also require elements of transparency, and that Americans would be more likely responsiveness to public concerns, and to accept the decisions and implement articulated purpose. Similarly, judicial them fairly and smoothly. actions would have to allow for fairness, Debate and deliberation could not be access to legal representation, opportuni- limited to governmental actors. For the ties for appeal, and a parallel lack of arbi- system to work and be perceived as legit- trariness. imate, there had to be debate and deliber- Avenues to limit and punish corruption. ation among citizens, via local and national Public con½dence in the actions of gov- “public squares,” and in campaigns, where ernment–a sense that the processes and candidates and their partisans could decisions reflect fairness and enhance the press their cases and voters could weigh common good–demands that the cancer the viewpoints and preferences of their of corruption be avoided or at least con- alternatives for representation. strained. If small groups of special inter- Divided powers competing with one another. ests or wealthy individuals can skew deci- America’s unusual system of the separa- sions in their favor, it will breed cynicism tion of powers did not offer a clean and and destroy governmental legitimacy. pure division between the executive, leg- Thus, it is necessary to ½nd ways to con- islative, and judicial branches, nor between strain the role of money in campaigns, to the House of Representatives and Senate. build transparency around campaign Instead, as constitutional scholar Edward ½nance and lobbying, to discourage “old Corwin put it, it was an “invitation to boy networks” and revolving doors, to struggle” among the branches and cham- investigate and prosecute bribery, and to bers. But that invitation to struggle, which impeach and remove government of½cials anticipated vibrant, assertive, and proud who commit high crimes and misde- branches, also was infused with the spirit of meanors, which include corrupt behavior. compromise, as eloquently analyzed by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in this On all these fronts, there is ample reason volume and in their recent book on the to be concerned about the health and

142 (2) Spring 2013 17 Finding the function of America’s current political dency, can give a majority party the Common institutions. Of course, no political sys- opportunity to behave like a parliamentary Good in an Era of tem operates exactly as intended. Politics majority. But that phenomenon, which Dysfunc- and policy-making are inherently messy, occurred for Democrats in the ½rst two tional Governance occurring at the intersection of power, years of the Obama administration, money, and ambition, and leading to resulted in major policy enactments but temptations and imperfections. We have not a smoothly functioning political sys- been immersed in these processes in tem. It featured neither a widespread sense Washington for more than forty-three of legitimacy nor deep public satisfaction. years, and we have observed frequent Why? The processes of debate and governmental failures, deep tensions, deliberation were disrupted ½rst by the and challenges to the political system– Republicans’ unprecedented use of the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 from profound societal divisions over ½libuster and the threat of ½libuster as wars like Vietnam to the impeachment purely obstructionist tools. This deluge proceedings against two presidents. But was designed to use precious floor time those challenges were modest compared without any serious discussion of the rea- to what we see today: a level of political sons behind the ½libusters, or any real dysfunction clearly greater than at any debate on differences in philosophy or point in our lifetimes. policy. Second, when Democrats were Fundamentally, the problem stems able to pass legislation, it was against the from a mismatch between America’s united and acrimonious opposition of the political parties and its constitutional minority. America’s political culture does system. For a variety of reasons, all re- not easily accept the legitimacy of policies counted in our book It’s Even Worse Than It enacted by one party over the opposition Looks: How the American Constitutional Sys- of the other–much less the continued, tem Collided With the New Politics of Extrem- bitter unwillingness of the minority ism, the two major political parties in party to accept the need to implement the recent decades have become increasingly policies after lawful enactment. But this homogeneous and have moved toward dynamic, which accompanied the eco- ideological poles.7 Combined with the nomic stimulus package in 2009, the phenomenon of the permanent campaign, health care reform law of 2010, and the whereby political actors focus relentlessly ½nancial regulation bill in 2010, among on election concerns and not on problem- others, resulted in greater divisions and solving, the parties now behave more like public cynicism, not less. parliamentary parties than traditional, The approach of the minority party for big-tent, and pragmatic American parties. the ½rst two years of the Obama adminis- Parliamentary parties are oppositional tration was antithetical to the ethos of and vehemently adversarial, a formula that compromise to solve pressing national cannot easily work in the American polit- problems. The American Recovery and ical system. The parliamentary mindset Reinvestment Act of 2009, a plan which has been particularly striking in recent included $288 billion in tax relief, gar- years with the Republican Party, which nered not one vote from Republicans in has become, in its legislative incarnation the House. The Affordable Care Act, especially, a radical insurgent, dismissive essentially a carbon copy of the Republi- of the legitimacy of its political opposition. can alternative to the Clinton adminis- Of course, substantial majorities in the tration’s health reform plan in 1994, was House and Senate, along with the presi- uniformly opposed by Republican parti-

18 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences sans in both houses. A bipartisan plan hence control. Despite the election, the Thomas E. to create a meaningful, congressionally dysfunction in the policy process contin- Mann & Norman J. mandated commission to deal with the ued in the succeeding lame duck session Ornstein nation’s debt problem, the Gregg/Conrad of Congress, as efforts to resolve America’s plan, was killed on a ½libuster in the Sen- ½scal problems before a January 1, 2013, ate; once President Obama endorsed the deadline were thwarted until after the plan, seven original Republican co-spon- deadline had passed. House Speaker John sors, along with Senate Republican Leader Boehner was himself undermined by Mitch McConnell, joined the ½libuster to members of his own party when he tried kill it. McConnell’s widely reported com- to devise an alternative to the president’s ment that his primary goal was to make plan. In this case, a substantial share of safe Barack Obama a one-term president–a House Republican seats were immune to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 classic case of the permanent campaign broader public opinion and to their own trumping problem-solving–typi½ed the Speaker, but were more sensitive to threats political dynamic. from well-½nanced challenges in their The succeeding midterm election next primaries–from the Club for Growth brought a backlash against the status and other ideological organizations–and quo–which meant divided government to incendiary comments from radio talk once Republicans captured a majority in show hosts and cable television com- the House of Representatives. As a result, mentators popular among Republican the 112th Congress had the least produc- voters in their districts. tive set of sessions in our lifetimes, enact- Tribal politics and vehement adversari- ing fewer than 250 laws, more than 40 of alism has also led to deterioration of the which were concerned with naming post regular order. In recent years, there have of½ces or other commemoratives.8 The been more and more closed rules in the major “accomplishment” of the 112th House, denying opportunities for amend- Congress was the debt limit debacle, which ments from the minority, and more uses marked the ½rst time the debt limit had of a majority tactic in the Senate called been used as a hostage to make other “½lling the amendment tree,” in which political demands. The result was not just the majority leader precludes amend- the ½rst ever downgrade in America’s ments, usually as a way to forestall or credit, but another blow to the public’s limit the impact of ½libusters. There have assessment of its government’s capacity been more omnibus bills, pooling action to act on behalf of the common good. across areas because of the increased The 2012 elections were in most respects dif½culty in getting legislation enacted; a clear expression of public will. President and fewer real conference committees to Obama earned reelection with a majority iron out differences between bills passed of popular votes, as did Democrats in by each house of Congress. There have elections for the House and in the thirty- been fewer budget resolutions adopted three contests for the Senate. But in the and appropriations bills passed; fewer House, a concentration of Democratic authorizations of programs and agencies; voters in high-density urban areas, con- and less oversight of executive action. tributing to a more ef½cient allocation of Fewer treaties have gained the two-thirds Republican voters across congressional vote needed for rati½cation in the Senate, districts, and a successful partisan gerry- leading to more executive actions. There mander in the redistricting process left have been more holds and delays in the Republicans with a majority of seats, and Senate in executive nominations. All of

142 (2) Spring 2013 19 Finding the these pathologies lead to more acrimony division and polarization, not to mention Common inside Congress and between Congress politicians beholden to those whose Good in an Era of and the executive, and a diminished money put them in power. Dysfunc- sense of con½dence by Americans in Organizations such as the American tional alec Governance their political and policy institutions. Legislative Exchange Council ( ) At the same time, the administration of have used large and often anonymous elections has been politicized. Partisan contributions from corporations and legislatures have passed stringent voter individuals to write laws, including the ID laws to narrow the vote; several of voter ID laws and laws favoring the cor- these laws have been thrown out by porate sector, that many state legislatures courts for targeting or unfairly affecting have simply enacted as written, obviating minorities. In other cases, shortened vot- their independent role. And inside Con- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 ing hours and restrictions on early vot- gress, many lawmakers have told us about ing, in states such as Florida and Ohio, the intimidating effect that occurs when were also aimed at constraining minority a lobbyist tells them that if they do not voters. Fortunately, the 2012 election was support a bill or amendment, they might not close; had it been more like the 2000 face a multimillion dollar independent election, it is very likely that it would attack days or weeks before the election, have further reduced public trust in the which they will be unable to counter due fundamentals of democratic elections. to a lack of time or fundraising limita- The world of money and politics has tions. Such threats can result in the pas- also taken an alarming turn toward at sage of bills or amendments without any least the appearance of corruption, of money even being spent. By any reason- democracy driven by big money and able standard, this is corruption. large interests. A combination of factors –the Supreme Court’s Citizens United All of this exhibits a level of dysfunc- decision, an appeals court decision called tion in American political institutions SpeechNow, a Federal Election Commis- and processes that is dangerous to the sion that is unable or unwilling to enforce fundamental legitimacy of decisions made campaign ½nance laws, and an Internal by policy-makers, not to mention the Revenue Service that allows the opera- ability of those policy-makers to act at tion of faux social-welfare organizations all. Tribal politics at the national level has set up to influence elections but not metastasized to many states and locali- required to disclose donors–has given ties, and has affected the broader public wealthy individuals, corporations, and as well. The glue that binds Americans other entities an overweening influence together is in danger of eroding. What on elections and on the policy process. If can be done about these problems? super pacs did not determine the out- There is no easy answer, no panacea. come of the presidential election, their The problems are as much cultural as impact did expand as one moved down structural. But if structural change inside through Senate and House elections and and outside Washington cannot solve the on to state, local, and judicial elections. problems, it can ameliorate them, and In states like Kansas, North Carolina, and perhaps also begin to change the culture. Arkansas, large donations from a handful One strategy for structural change is to of individuals and groups targeted mod- accept the emergence of parliamentary- erate Republicans and replaced them with style polarized parties and try to adapt reactionary conservatives, creating more our political institutions to operate more

20 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences effectively in that context. This is easier or pressure on politicians to come together Thomas E. said than done. Eliminating or constrain- to make a deal (Fix the Debt); the mobi- Mann & Norman J. ing the Senate ½libuster would give lization of centrists in the citizenry to cre- Ornstein uni½ed party governments a better shot ate political space for more collegial and at putting their campaign promises into collaborative policy-making (No Labels); law.9 But separate elections for the presi- the use of outside bipartisan groups to dency and Congress, as well as the mid- map policy solutions that split the differ- term congressional elections, often con- ences between the polarized parties spire to produce divided party govern- (Committee for a Responsible Federal ment, which has become more a basis of Budget); and the support of independent parliamentary opposition and obstruction presidential candidates or third parties to than consensus-building and compro- lay claim to the allegedly abandoned polit- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 mise. Shifting more power to the presi- ical “center” (Americans Elect). These ef- dency, which is already under way, may forts by and large seek to create a spirit of produce more timely and coherent policies compromise, an atmosphere of civility and but at a considerable cost to deliberation, mutual respect, and a focus on problem- representation, and democratic account- solving–outcomes which are indeed ability. A president is, of course, elected commendable. by the entire nation. Especially on national But we believe that these well-inten- security issues, Americans are willing to tioned efforts are limited by the strength tolerate and even embrace many unilat- and reach of party polarization, which is eral presidential actions; think Grenada buttressed not only by genuine ideologi- and Abbottabad. But America’s political cal differences among elected of½cials, culture has ingrained in the public a sense but also by like-minded citizens clustered that legitimate policies more often call in safe districts, committed activists, a for some form of broad leadership con- partisan media, a tribal culture, interest sensus and institutional buy-in. A series groups increasingly segregated by party, a of unilateral actions by the president party-based campaign funding system that would not necessarily result in public now encompasses allegedly independent acceptance of the decisions as being made groups, and a degree of parity in party for the common good. The same can be strength that turns legislating into strategic said for other forms of delegation, from political campaigning. Most of these Congress to fed-like independent agencies, efforts also suffer from an unwillingness or boards that encourage more expert and to acknowledge the striking asymmetry evidence-based decision-making that is at between today’s political parties, which least somewhat removed from the clash in the process gives a pass to obstructionist of polarized parties. Each of these ideas and dysfunctional behavior. has some limited promise, but none can A more promising strategy of reform is be the basis of constructively reconciling to bring the Republican Party back into a fundamental mismatch between parlia- the mainstream of American politics and mentary-like political parties and the policy as the conservative, not radical, American constitutional system. force. Ultimately, this is the responsibility Another approach emphasizes trying of the citizenry. Nothing is as persuasive to bring the warring parties together: by to a wayward party as a clear message reaching for consensus through increased from the voters. The 2012 election results social interaction (the House experiment and the widespread speculation of the with civility retreats); encouragement of diminishing prospects of the Republican

142 (2) Spring 2013 21 Finding the coalition in presidential elections may be dates, but can cast unmarked ballots) and Common the start of that process. But it can be do not have a written excuse are subject Good in an Era of boosted and accelerated by the groups to modest ½nes, the equivalent of a park- Dysfunc- discussed above speaking clearly and ing ticket. This system moved Australian tional Governance forthrightly about the damage caused to turnout from around 55 percent, similar constructive public policy by tax pledges, to the United States, to over 90 percent.10 debt limit hostage-taking, the abuse of Most important, it changed Australian the ½libuster, climate change denial, the campaign discourse. Politicians of all demonization of government, and ideo- stripes have told us that when they know logical zealotry. The mainstream press that their own base will turn out en could also do its part by shedding its con- masse, and will be balanced by the other vention of balancing the conflicting party’s base, they shift their efforts to Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 arguments between the two parties at the persuading voters in the middle. That cost of obscuring the reality. Voters can- means talking less about wedge issues, not do their job holding parties and rep- like abortion or guns, and more about resentatives accountable if they do not larger issues like education and jobs; and have the necessary information. Some in it means using less of the ½ery or divisive the media think it is biased or unprofes- rhetoric that excites base voters but turns sional to discuss the many manifestations off those in the middle. of our asymmetric polarization. We think Another option is to expand the use of it is simply a matter of collecting the evi- open primaries and combine them with dence and telling the truth. preference voting. Several states, includ- More signi½cant, for both parties, would ing California, now use open primaries, be to enlarge the electorate to dilute the in which all candidates from all sides run overweening influence of narrow, ideo- together; the top two ½nishers go on the logically driven partisan bases that domi- ballot for the general election. Add in nate party primaries. As a result, these preference voting, whereby voters rank bases have an outsized role in choosing their choices in order of preference candidates, who often do not reflect the (something also done in Australia), and it views of their broader constituencies; reduces the chances of an extreme candi- and as a means of heading off primary date winning a top-two ½nish because challenges, the bases can intimidate law- multiple non-extreme candidates divide makers searching for compromise or a the votes of the more populous, moder- common good into moving away from ate electorate. Another advantage of an solutions. Meanwhile, the enlarged influ- open primary is that lawmakers who cast ence of party bases pushes campaign contentious votes would be less intimi- operatives and candidates away from dated by threats of a primary challenge broader appeals and toward strategies to funded by ideological organizations if turn out one’s own base (often by scaring they knew the primary electorate would them to death), and to suppress the other be expanded beyond a small fringe base. side’s base. The politics of division trump If we could combine these changes with the politics of unity. redistricting reform, using impartial citi- To counter this set of problems, we zen commissions to draw district lines as propose adoption of the Australian system we have seen operate in states like Iowa of mandatory attendance at the polls, and California, we might get somewhere. where voters who do not show up (they Of course, the enhanced leverage that do not have to vote for speci½c candi- smaller groups possess over the sentiments

22 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences of the larger populace has other roots, in- including vigorous debate based on com- Thomas E. cluding especially the post–Citizens United mon understanding of the facts, should be Mann & Norman J. campaign ½nance world. When groups like a priority here. One way to do so would Ornstein the Club for Growth, wealthy individuals, be to apply a rental fee to broadcasters or “social welfare” organizations funded and others for their use of the public air- by anonymous sources threaten lawmak- waves, in return for erasure of the public- ers with massive negative campaigns interest requirements that now have little sprung in the ½nal weeks of the election impact.11 season, or threaten to ½nance primary Most of these changes will be hard to opponents against them, it gives immense implement in the short run. The best we leverage to the well-heeled few against can hope for is a more tempered Republi- the viewpoints of the many. Absent a new can Party willing to do business (that is, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Supreme Court, a multiple public match deliberate, negotiate, and compromise for contributions from small donors would without hostage-taking or brinksmanship) give additional leverage to the broader with their Democratic counterparts. Over population. the long haul, both political parties in the The pull toward tribal politics and away United States need to depolarize to some from a focus on the common good has degree. The parties may maintain clear also been shaped by the emergence of differences in philosophy and policy, to be tribal media, via cable television and talk sure, but they must also cultivate enough radio. The tribal media have established agreement on major issues to permit the lucrative business models built on apoca- government to work as designed. The lyptic rhetoric and divisive messages that parties must also serve an electorate that guarantee regular audiences within select shares a common vision and common demographics. These business models facts, even with sharp differences in phi- have emerged in large part because of the losophy, lifestyles, and backgrounds. dramatic technological changes that have Despite the obstacles, we must think big created hundreds or thousands of alter- about changing the structures and the native information outlets, which are culture of our partisan government and ampli½ed by the emergence of social populace; the stakes are high. media. All of this has devastated the con- cept of a public square, where most Americans could get their information, share a common set of facts, and debate vigorously what to do about common problems. Having real debate and deliberation at the public level, much less the governmental level, depends on sharing a common set of facts and assumptions. Re-creating a public square is a Her- culean task given the contemporary media and technology landscape. But it must be attempted. Public media would be the best venue; ½nding a way to fund a public/ private foundation that would focus on innovative ways to use public media for straightforward analysis and discourse,

142 (2) Spring 2013 23 Finding the endnotes Common THOMAS E MANN Good in * Contributor Biographies: . , a Fellow of the American Academy since 1993, an Era of is the W. Averell Harriman Chair and Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Dysfunc- Institution. He previously served as the Director of Governmental Studies at Brookings and tional as the Executive Director of the American Political Science Association. His publications Governance include It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism (with Norman J. Ornstein, 2012), The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track (with Norman J. Ornstein, 2006), and Party Lines: Competition, Partisanship and Congressional Redistricting (2005). NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, a Fellow of the American Academy since 2004, is Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. He also writes the weekly column “Congress Inside Out” for Roll Call. His publications include It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism (with Thomas E. Mann, 2012), The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get It Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/142/2/15/1830178/daed_a_00200.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Back on Track (with Thomas E. Mann, 2006), and The Permanent Campaign and Its Future (edited with Thomas E. Mann, 2000). He is chair of the Academy’s Stewarding America project. 1 Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No. 1,” The Federalist Papers, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ histdox/fed_01.html. 2 James Madison, “Federalist No. 46,” The Federalist Papers, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ histdox/fed_46.html. 3 James Madison, “Federalist No. 62,” The Federalist Papers, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ histdox/fed_62.html. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012). 7 See Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism (New York: Basic Books, 2012). 8 Amanda Terkel, “112th Congress Set To Become Most Unproductive Since 1940s,” The Huf½ngton Post, December 28, 2012, http://www.huf½ngtonpost.com/2012/12/28/congress -unproductive_n_2371387.html. 9 For more on this topic, see Norman J. Ornstein, “A Filibuster Fix,” The New York Times, August 27, 2010, http://www.aei.org/article/politics-and-public-opinion/legislative/a -½libuster-½x/. 10 Australian Electoral Commission, “Who Voted in Previous Referendums and Elections,” October 26, 2012, http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Australian_Electoral_History/Voter _Turnout.htm. Compulsory voting was implemented in Australia in 1924. 11 For in-depth discussion of the re-creation of a public square, see Norman J. Ornstein with John C. Fortier and Jennifer Marsico, “Creating a Public Square in a Challenging Media Age: A White Paper on the Knight Commission Report on Informing Communities: Sustaining Democracy in the Digital Age,” American Enterprise Institute White Paper, June 23, 2011, http://www.knightcomm.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/CreatingaPublicSquare.pdf.

24 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences